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Abstract	  	  This	  thesis	  explores	  the	  idiosyncratic	  internal	  hierarchy	  of	  the	  Max	  Planck	  Society	  in	  Germany,	  through	  which	  its	  natural	  scientific	  work	  is	  produced.	  Using	  the	  emic	  notion	  of	  a	  ‘principle’	  (Prinzip),	  it	  articulates	  the	  presence	  of	  three	  hierarchical	  principles	  within	  the	  Society	  –	  the	  hero	  principle,	  the	  longevity	  principle,	  and	  the	  precarity	  principle	  –	  which	  have	  a	  range	  of	  subjective	  and	  intersubjective	  reality	  effects.	  Based	  on	  fifteen	  months	  of	  partially	  itinerant	  fieldwork	  at	  various	  Max	  Planck	  locations	  across	  Germany,	  it	  mobilizes	  testimonies,	  observations,	  virtual	  texts,	  statistics	  and	  archival	  data	  in	  the	  service	  of	  this	  contribution	  to	  organisational	  anthropology.	  In	  so	  doing	  it	  also	  performs	  a	  syncretic	  act	  which	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  made	  in	  this	  field,	  that	  is,	  to	  bring	  traditional	  anthropological	  studies	  of	  hierarchy	  –	  most	  significantly	  the	  work	  of	  Louis	  Dumont	  –	  to	  bear	  on	  a	  complex	  and	  technologized	  Western	  organisation.	  It	  argues	  that	  the	  cause	  of	  this	  neglect	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  historical	  product:	  the	  last	  forty	  years	  or	  so	  being	  characterized	  by	  a	  generalized	  repression	  in	  the	  human	  sciences	  of	  full	  consciousness	  of	  societies’	  hierarchical	  aspect,	  expressed	  most	  visibly	  in	  the	  ubiquitous	  use	  of	  tropes	  like	  	  ‘agency’	  and	  ‘action’.	  In	  offering	  a	  Dumontian	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Max	  Planck	  Society,	  this	  thesis	  thus	  brings	  the	  presence	  of	  social	  hierarchies	  and	  their	  respective	  value-­‐ideas	  once	  more	  to	  the	  fore.	  ‘We,	  the	  Max	  Planck	  Society’	  –	  a	  reference	  to	  Raymond	  Firth's	  Pacific	  islanders	  and	  betokening	  collective	  solidarity	  and	  identity	  –	  is	  the	  historical	  product	  of	  an	  alternate	  Teutonic	  vision	  of	  togetherness,	  which	  since	  the	  eighteenth-­‐century	  has	  contradicted	  and	  opposed	  Western	  Enlightenment	  individualism.	  Germany	  therefore	  provides	  a	  good	  regional	  vantage	  point	  from	  which	  to	  expose	  obscured	  ethnocentrisms,	  and	  offer	  an	  alternative	  version	  of	  how	  organisations	  can	  work.	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 1. Introduction 	  
 
 
'There are clear divisions between the different levels in the 
hierarchies. It is always advisable to be aware of the status of the 
people you are working with and not to by-pass the individual levels 
in working relationships'.1 
 
Living and working in Germany: a guide for international scientists at 
Max Planck Institutes 
 
 
 
 
 i) The thesis  
 
 Much like the Max Planck Society (hereafter the Society or the MPG), this 
thesis works through several different ‘levels’, each of which performs its own 
scholarly function in the text as a whole. First and foremost, it is an ethnographic 
account of some of those materially and intellectually involved in the production 
of natural scientific knowledge inside Germany’s ‘most successful research 
organisation’.2 It is an account of its technical staff – those who make exquisite 
items of scientific equipment or do the housekeeping to ensure its laboratories 
whirr – of the meaning and focus they attach to their work, and the enduring 
quality of their bond with the Institutes.3 It is an account of its scientists – those 
who perform the bulk of the organisation’s intellectual labour on computers and in 
laboratories – whether they are bubbling with excitement or glancing nervously 
towards the future and what it holds. It is lastly (but naturally by no means least) 
an account of its directors – those modern ‘monarchs of science’ tasked with 
leading their Institutes to glory both inside the organisation and out – of the 
creativity they inject into such a task, and the anxiety such a weight of authority 
brings with it. But mostly it is an account of how the whole thing hangs together, 
of how the organisation makes sense to itself, of its logic. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  www.mpg.de/4311252/Living_working_Germany.pdf	  2	  http://www.mpg.de/183251/portrait	  3	  I	  have	  capitalized	  ‘Institutes’	  throughout,	  as	  they	  are	  all	  abbreviations	  of	  proper	  nouns:	  each	  Institute	  bearing	  its	  own	  unique	  title.	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 This thesis is secondly an analytical statement: that the Max Planck 
Society is a profoundly hierarchical organisation. Ascribing it the status of 
hierarchy as theorized by Louis Dumont (1980), rather than the alternatives of 
stratification or a system of purely political inequality, is to reposition the locus of 
value. In a hierarchical society, value rains down on all subjects from the skies of 
the whole, rather than sprouting upwards from spontaneous exchange 
relationships. For Dumont, hierarchy and value are basically synonymous; one is 
the pre-condition for the other. As he says in his most famous work, Homo 
Hierarchicus, ‘To adopt a value is to introduce hierarchy’ (1980: 20).4 My focus 
is consequently not on the intra-mural life of this organisation as an immanent 
process, in which selves are continually coming into being in the tradition of 
modern liberal self-fashioning, but on the inheritance of a particular architecture 
of value which produces persons at the scale of the whole.5  
 
 Thirdly, it is a critical project. In repositioning value in this way, I buck a 
long trend in the anthropology and sociology of organisations which could be 
traced back to Max Weber and his emphasis on ‘social action’ (Runciman 1993: 
7).	  6 This trend, which will be traced in the literature below, asserts that the 
members of organisations come to exist and to operate inside them by virtue of 
their own ‘agency’ or ‘action’, within a social environment of inexhaustible 
emergence. However, despite his genius I by no means hold Weber singularly 
responsible for the expansive entrenchment of his viewpoint. The rupture between 
‘thought’ and ‘act’, as Dumont says elsewhere, is a key tenet of ‘modern 
ideology’ (1986: 233): one which makes possible the action-oriented event of 
commodity exchange, and, perhaps more importantly, gets a shot in the arm 
therefrom. As Marx says quoting Goethe’s Faust, ‘Im Anfang war die That’ (in 
the beginning was the deed) (1995: 52). Thus I link the tendency within the study 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  As	  André	  Iteanu	  notes,	  in	  later	  writings	  Dumont	  attempts	  to	  abandon	  the	  unpopular	  idiom	  of	  hierarchy	  for	  the	  less	  contentious	  one	  of	  value	  (2013).	  Although	  Dumont’s	  change	  of	  language	  invites	  confusion,	  for	  Iteanu,	  the	  two	  remain	  ‘inseparable’	  (2013:	  156).	  5	  Marcel	  Mauss	  is	  credited	  as	  the	  first	  to	  develop	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  ‘person’	  (1985),	  distinct	  from	  the	  individual	  as	  such,	  in	  being	  the	  conceptual	  product	  of	  a	  society.	  Dumont	  was	  greatly	  influenced	  by	  Mauss	  and	  accepts	  and	  develops	  this	  Maussian	  premise	  in	  his	  own	  work.	  6	  Paradoxically	  I	  will	  be	  harnessing	  Weber	  to	  the	  service	  of	  my	  alternative	  strategy,	  being	  the	  first	  to	  elucidate	  certain	  elementary	  principles	  of	  ‘charismatic	  authority’	  (1978).	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of organisations to focus upon action at the expense of thought, to the 
epistemological sublimation of a particular moment of late capitalism, which 
attacks all forms of value obstructing the practice of ‘equivalence’ (ibid). I trace 
this within the social sciences, as (somewhat ironically) beginning with the ’68 
social critique, one which has been dispersed and reproduced through the wide 
application of  post-’68 social theory.  
 
 The closest scholarly allegiance to the task I am undertaking here, is to be 
found in a small and little-known but extremely powerful book, edited by Bruce 
Kapferer and entitled The Retreat of the Social: The rise and rise of reductionism 
(2005), with contributions from Jonathan Friedman, André Iteanu, Roger Just and 
others.7 It deals as a whole with the prevailing tendency within anthropology to 
deny supra-personal concepts such as society and culture, while aggrandizing the 
significance of a strong subjectivity in their stead (also cf. Holbraad 2010). Yet 
such reorientations suffer from a misplaced concreteness, as they often fail to 
recognize that this subjectivity is just as abstract as its alternatives. Kapferer cites 
Eric Wolf to bring this point home. ‘The abstract individual is merely another 
monad, a timeless reified essence like the conceptual entity it is supposed to 
criticize and oppose’ (2001: 333). Shifting the emphasis from society/culture to 
individuals thus does not really help us much, or at least only if it is 
acknowledged that both lie on the same conceptual continuum.  
 
 However increasingly such acknowledgement appears to be lacking. This 
‘abstract individual’ then, is similarly the object of my critique. It is Dumont’s 
relentless comparativism that enables him to trace some of the shadow puppets of 
‘modern ideology’ (cf. 1977, 1986, 1994), and it could be argued that the decline 
of comparison within the anthropological project, and its substitution for 
philosophism as the work of abstraction, has imprisoned anthropologists and other 
social scientists within an ideological cell the walls of which they cannot see.8 As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  It	  is	  probably	  not	  incidental	  that	  many	  of	  these	  scholars	  –most	  notably	  Kapferer	  (cf.	  1998)	  –	  have	  themselves	  been	  clearly	  influenced	  by	  Dumontian	  scholarship.	  8	  As	  Dumont	  himself	  notes,	  ‘Comparative	  social	  science	  can	  throw	  light	  on	  those	  questions	  philosophers	  neglect’	  (1977:	  11).	  I	  am	  thinking	  here	  of	  studies	  with	  a	  genuinely	  comparative	  ambition,	  not	  simply	  a	  collection	  of	  case	  studies	  with	  a	  unifying	  theoretical	  premise.	  A	  good	  example	  of	  this	  is	  Bloch	  and	  Parry’s	  exploration	  of	  money	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Rio and Smedal note with some unease, ‘It is becoming harder and harder for 
anthropology to conceive of sociality beyond interaction and individuality’ (2009: 
34). The study of organisations has been a particular locus for this, possibly 
because it has always been an interdisciplinary endeavour. All of the debates in 
this field surrounding the ‘agency’ and ‘action’ of individuals, as I will go on to 
argue, merely cloak the spawn of a particular modern ideology in the garb of an 
apparently innocent materialism. I never found such an individual inside the Max 
Planck Society, but instead others which were different: close siblings, but 
different.  
  
 Fourthly, the thesis is a contribution to the anthropology of Germany. In 
this era of intellectual surplus, any account of ‘the literature’ cannot pretend to be 
anything other than partial; nevertheless there are certain noticeable themes that 
spring forward. In the early years of the discipline, Germany – in comparison to 
other regions – was always ‘a rather neglected area of study’ (Norman 1991: 2). 
Nazism had put ‘its dismal mark on everything German’ (ibid: 3) and the 1950s 
gave rise to a handful of national character studies (Lowie 1954, Rodnick 1948) 
which could not escape such a legacy. Thereafter the ambitions became more 
modest: a spate of village studies confronted the sub-cultural themes of religion, 
education, and identity (Golde 1975, Spindler 1973, Warren 1967), a tradition 
continued by Norman (1991) and Berdahl (1999). Presumably the result of both 
changing scholarly priorities, and the processes of urbanization which made 
villages larger or eradicated them altogether, is that village studies have since 
been largely usurped by studies of towns and cities (Borneman 1992, Ringel 2012, 
Weszkalnys 2010). Of course the latter are also steeped in that historical epoch 
when Germany suddenly became much more interesting to anthropologists: 
Postsocialism (Baer 1998, Berdahl 2010, Boyer 2005). Today there are also other 
recognizable strands of scholarly interest which have surfaced, namely: the 
experiences of first or second-generation migrants in Germany (Goldak 1997, 
Mandel 2008, Ostermann 2010, Weißköppel 2009) and its lively culture of 
environmental activism (Berglund 1998, Krauss 2009). To my knowledge there 
has never been a study of an organisation in Germany, making this thesis an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (1989). It	  should	  be	  said	  that	  my	  argument	  applies	  particularly	  to	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  sphere.	  French	  anthropology	  still	  in	  part	  maintains	  the	  comparative	  ambition	  Dumont	  promoted.	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original intervention of a sort. However, the organisation is just another way of 
drawing the ethnographic whole (Otto and Bubandt 2010: 3-5), and as such finds 
its precedents in those village studies: a local site, which concentrates and 
reproduces big ideas about what it means to be a person in the cultural context of 
Germany.  
 
 This thesis is also an effort to reconnect with an older kind of 
anthropology. The title ‘We, The Max Planck Society’ is a deliberately 
provocative reference to Raymond Firth’s We, the Tikopia (1957): one of the 
discipline’s early classics. My critique of the post-’68 paradigm which fed and 
bled into postmodernism is thus expressed not simply in the form of a cursory 
literature review, but in the whole attitude I adopt, which looks to earlier decades 
for inspiration. Rather than a story of endless complexity, I aim instead for a 
certain kind of modernist simplicity in formulating a triumvirate of principles. 
Rather than turning the inherently partial nature of ethnography into an analytic 
conceit, I attempt to present a more complete picture of the internal logics 
governing a community. Rather than beginning with the diverse lives of 
individuals and ending with some kind of abstracted argument therefrom, 
individual testimonies only erupt from within the confines of a larger argument. 
And rather than ending the story with some statement about cultural particularism, 
I use the Max Planck Society’s particularisms to think comparatively (and vice 
versa). However it is in this final approach that I ultimately part company with 
Firth and his path-breaking contemporaries. By repatriating debates about non-
Western forms of hierarchy and leadership back into Europe, I take a decidedly 
twenty-first century turn: transgressing the boundary between the West and the 
‘Rest’ that they – and Dumont in their wake – were so invested in. 
 
 Yet a re-imagining of We, the Tikopia suits my purposes in other ways. 
Firth’s decision to appropriate this indigenous turn of phrase into his title was the 
result of its ability to capture something of the essence of Tikopian thought: what 
he calls ‘that community of interest, that self-consciousness, that strongly marked 
individuality…which they prize so highly’ (1957: xxi). The Max Planck Society 
exhibits similar traits: a self-awareness, an exceptionalism, but most importantly, 
an analogous emphasis on the ‘we’. It is this dominating ‘we-principle’ – if you 
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like – which sets the Society apart from other organisations of its kind. It is not 
the energetically manufactured collective identity of a for-profit corporation, but 
one particular brushstroke of a philosophical tint which still colours German 
society at large: the importance of being a member of a collective. A German 
technology company recently launched a competitor to Apple’s iPad called the 
‘WePad’. 
 
 Finally, any outline of what a thesis is, must be forthcoming about what it 
is not. This is emphatically not a study of those Max Planck Institutes oriented 
towards the humanities and social sciences. Although members of the Institutes in 
those disciplines may see some of my arguments as transferable beyond their 
original empirical referent, there is no question that the relations of knowledge 
production in the human sciences are qualitatively different from their 
counterparts in the natural sciences. By and large, the latter require far greater 
social collaboration and – particularly in experimental science – divisions of 
labour. I likewise do not examine the administrative side of the Max Planck 
Society: whether librarians, the director’s personal assistants, or those situated in 
the administrative offices. However my general impression is that being for the 
most part permanent, German, and gender-segregated, as persons they are 
commensurable to the technical staff. Furthermore, despite exploring the relations 
of natural scientific knowledge production, this is not a thesis about scientific 
epistemology. The subject already has screeds of scholarship devoted to it (the 
highlights being Daston and Galison (2007), Latour and Woolgar (1979), and 
Traweek (1988)) and it is not my intention to expand it further. Finally, it is 
important to be clear that I am not staking any kind of moral claim on how the 
organisation functions: whether it ‘works’ or ‘does not work’, whether its 
hierarchy is a positive or negative thing. I do however, endeavour to give voice to 
a broad spectrum of human experience within it. If my readers from the Max 
Planck Society wish to draw moral conclusions from this experience, that is their 
right. 
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 ii) The negation of hierarchy 
 
 Much like Physicist Niels Bohr’s philosophical revelation about a 
scientist’s relationship to nature, it must be said from the outset that 
anthropologists are part of the culture ‘they seek to understand’ (Barad 2007: 26). 
By this I mean that anthropologists and social scientists more generally have been 
exposed to certain social and political currents over the last fifty years, and that 
this has had certain ramifications on the direction of their epistemological 
concerns. One significant current, which has been running for many years now, is 
the negation of hierarchy in the West as a socially-acceptable moral order. This 
negation has had a range of consequences for the study of organisations, and is 
one this study itself seeks to negate: a double negative to make way for the 
positive reinstatement of hierarchy as an analytic concept in this field. 
 
 The perceived oppressiveness of formal hierarchies was one of the major 
social critiques that drove the 1968 student/worker revolts across Europe and 
America.9 As Luc Boltanski says, in his influential study of how the rhetoric of 
’68 became incorporated into management discourses of the 80s and 90s, 'In the 
sphere of work and production...the dominant themes were denunciation of 
“hierarchical power”, paternalism, authoritarianism, compulsory work schedules, 
prescribed tasks...and more generally, the division of labour' (2005: 170). Yet it 
was not just management which fully absorbed the ’68 critique in the years 
thereafter. The ‘denunciation’, or in my terms, negation of hierarchy, 
subsequently reverberated in very powerful and not-always-conscious ways 
throughout the humanities and social sciences. This reverberation is most clearly 
visible in the social theories of French scholars such as Michel Foucault, Pierre 
Bourdieu, and Gilles Deleuze, whose texts went on to play a profound role in the 
philosophical turn in anthropology. 
 
 However at a more subterranean level, one can trace a trend towards the 
negation, or at least unprecedented critique of hierarchy, among the research 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  I	  am	  not	  including	  the	  ’68	  protests	  across	  the	  member	  states	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  which	  had	  a	  different	  gamut	  of	  critiques.	  
	   18	  
articles which began to appear in the 80s and 90s.10 The general tenor is of the 
inadequacy of hierarchy as an explanatory model for human behavior.11 Among 
those who attack hierarchy modestly, the emphasis is on its ‘limits’ (Marcus 1975; 
Appadurai 1988; Mosko 1994). While for many others, the focus is on how 
hierarchy is reciprocally bound to notions of ‘equality’ which undermine it (Bloch 
1981; Harrison 1985; Trigger 1988; Howe 1989; Boehm 1993; Parkin 1994). For 
a minority, hierarchy is rendered altogether useless, almost evil. Like a military 
opponent, there is an ‘alliance against’ it (Graham 1994) and it is ‘defeat(ed)’ 
(Mitchell 1988); it becomes ‘dismantl(ed)’ (Young 1994) and ‘distintegrat(es)’ 
(Thomas 1988). The reader should be aware that I am not suggesting an 
ideological conspiracy here, but simply highlighting one cluster among the routine 
borrowings and echoes which give form to the development of any academic 
discipline. 
 
 As Donna Haraway demonstrates for the biological sciences, paradigm 
shifts in collective thought are often (if not always) escorted by changes of 
metaphor (1976). This is certainly so for hierarchy’s negation, as new images of 
heterarchy have arrived in recent years to preside over our collective visual 
imaginations. The three most significant of these are the rhizome, the fractal, and 
the actor-network, which I will briefly sketch in sequence.  
 
 Deleuze and Guattari introduce the image of the ‘rhizome’ in their 
landmark work A thousand plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia (1987). A 
rhizome is a biological term for a root plant usually found underground (like 
ginger or turmeric), which grows outwards from a potentially infinite number of 
nodal points, reproducing itself vegetatively as ruptured segments can themselves 
continue growing. Indeed these authors are the most explicit of all about the 
attachment of metaphors to thought-paradigms (and thus their attack on 
hierarchy), as through the rhizome they arm themselves to engage in tropic 
warfare against the ‘root-tree’ (ibid: 16) signaling the hierarchical paradigms of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The	  argument	  I	  am	  making	  here	  is	  not	  a	  totalizing	  one;	  the	  trend	  towards	  negation	  runs	  alongside	  a	  ‘business-­‐as-­‐usual’	  treatment	  of	  hierarchy	  by	  other	  scholars.	  11	  These	  patterns	  in	  the	  literature	  have	  been	  tracked	  by	  means	  of	  a	  keyword	  search	  entered	  into	  the	  ‘Anthropological	  Index	  Online’,	  based	  on	  the	  journal	  collections	  of	  the	  Royal	  Anthropological	  Institute.	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earlier epochs. ‘We’re tired of trees. We should stop believing in trees…They’ve 
made us suffer too much’, they lament (ibid: 17). The rhizome as its image-
adversary is defined by many things: the most significant for us being its ‘flat’ as 
opposed to vertical dimensionality (ibid: 9); its potential for infinite connectivity 
as opposed to being fenced in by borders and ruptures; and its lack of central 
growth principle, unlike the tree it possesses no ‘pivot-unity’ (ibid: 9) ordering the 
relationships between and wholes.12 It should also be noted – as this is a common 
tendency among theorists of heterarchy – that the rhizomic alternative is presented 
as the more just and human-oriented of the two.13 The tree is ‘not a method for the 
people’ (ibid, 8). 
 
 The fractal is another biological metaphor which performs hierarchy’s 
negation. An idea first conceived of by Benoit Mandelbrot (1983), and occurring 
in both natural and cultural phenomena (Eglash 1999), fractals are very simply the 
reappearance of similar shape patterns at different scales. The introduction of the 
fractal metaphor into anthropology comes from ethnographies of Melanesia 
(Strathern 1991; Wagner 1991), a good regional vantage-point from which to 
negate hierarchy, as like Europe and America, its dominant ideology is one of 
egalitarianism (Robbins 1994). In any event, the fractal, like the rhizome, is again 
an effort to reconfigure the relations between parts and wholes. Except, where the 
rhizome thrives on multiplicity and open borders, is in essence the anti-whole, the 
fractal is instead a ‘holon’ (Koestler 1967): both part and whole together. What 
they share however is the absence of a pivot-unity: a superordinate holistic logic 
determining the interrelationships of parts.14 Instead the fractal, in the iterability 
of its proportions at different scales, instantiates its own ordering principle, the 
ultimate Melanesian value-idea: the relation.15    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  This	  pivot-­‐unity	  is	  synonymous	  with	  Dumont’s	  ‘pre-­‐eminent	  value-­‐idea’	  that	  we	  will	  encounter	  in	  full	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  13	  See	  Chapter	  6	  and	  Conclusion	  for	  data	  and	  analysis	  which	  controverts	  this	  powerful	  and	  insidious	  myth.	  	  	  14	  As	  Wagner	  states,	  ‘A	  holographic	  or	  self-­‐scaling	  form	  thus	  differs	  from	  a	  social	  organisation	  or	  a	  cultural	  ideology	  in	  that	  it	  is	  not	  imposed	  so	  as	  to	  order	  and	  organize,	  explain	  or	  interpret,	  a	  set	  of	  disparate	  elements’	  (1991:	  166).	  Strathern	  says	  something	  similar	  (1991:	  xx).	  15	  Robbins	  (1994),	  in	  an	  endeavour	  towards	  a	  ‘Dumontian	  anthropology’,	  looks	  for	  the	  pre-­‐eminent	  value-­‐idea	  in	  Melanesian	  society.	  He	  argues	  (the	  point	  at	  which	  I	  concur)	  that	  Dumont’s	  confusion	  over	  whether	  he	  believed	  ‘equality’	  or	  the	  ‘individual’	  to	  be	  the	  ultimate	  value	  of	  Western	  societies	  should	  be	  cleared	  up:	  it	  clearly	  is	  the	  individual.	  This	  then	  gives	  Robbins	  the	  opportunity	  to	  argue	  that	  in	  Melanesia	  the	  ultimate	  value	  is	  equality.	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 Finally we arrive at the ‘actor-network’, an idea which takes inspiration 
from the rhizome (principally the notion of assemblage), yet neglects its poetry, 
being a mechanist-materialist vision. Unlike the previous metaphors, the actor-
network is not borrowed from the natural sciences but is a conceptual invention of 
several social scientists (Michael Callon, John Law et. al.). If an actor-network 
betokens a particular shape of sociality, what then does it look like? There is an 
enormous literature on actor-network theory, but for the sake of brevity I will go 
straight to its godfather, Bruno Latour, and his definitive text on the subject 
(2005). The key thing is that the landscape within which actor-networks flourish 
is completely ‘flat’, therefore participating with both rhizome and fractal in 
hierarchy’s negation (the absence of a pivot-unity).16 Latour uses the word 
throughout the text, even making reference to ‘the metaphor of a flatland’ to 
picture the landscape he sees (ibid: 220).17 However unlike the rhizome and the 
fractal, this flatland is completely without colour. It is ‘negative’, ‘empty’ and 
‘blank’ (ibid: 221): total nothingness. Onto this white void one then overlays a 
‘grid’, of which the intersections are constituted by actors which are either human 
or non-human, forming a ‘star-like shape’ (ibid: 221-2). This star will look 
slightly different from each one of its actor-nodes, depending on which one the 
social scientist is pursuing.  
 
 It is significant that the non-human actors Latour has focused on 
throughout his corpus (cf. 1979, 1990, 2010) are technologies of commensuration 
– documents, forms, money, standards, quasi-standards and scientific instruments. 
The actor-network is forged through sameness, not difference, and it is here we 
rub up against the object of both mine and Kapferer’s chagrin: the abstract 
individual. Latour stakes his stance on subjectivity in no uncertain terms when 
saying, ‘The circulation of quasi-standards allow anonymous and isolated 
agencies to slowly become, layer after layer, comparable and commensurable – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  However,	  I	  feel	  Robbins	  is	  falling	  for	  the	  same	  trap	  as	  Dumont.	  Both	  societies	  share	  equality	  as	  the	  underlying	  basis	  for	  relationships;	  however,	  in	  Melanesia	  the	  value	  in	  which	  relationships	  are	  then	  configured	  is,	  following	  the	  work	  of	  Marilyn	  Strathern,	  not	  equality	  but	  the	  relation.	  	  16	  See	  Kapferer	  (2010)	  for	  a	  trenchant	  critique	  of	  Latourian	  ontology.	  17	  Dumont	  actually	  presupposed	  this	  intellectual	  development	  many	  years	  earlier.	  He	  identified	  flatness	  explicitly	  as	  a	  key	  expression	  of	  modern	  ideology,	  in	  which	  ‘a	  previous	  hierarchical	  universe	  has	  fanned	  out	  into	  a	  collection	  of	  flat	  views’	  (1986:	  249).	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which is surely a large part of what we mean by being human’ (emphasis added, 
ibid: 230).       
 
 To briefly recap then: the negation of hierarchy in the last forty years is 
traceable through the popularity of certain kinds of social theory, in the language 
used and arguments made in research articles of the 80s and 90s, and in the 
appearance of new heterarchical imagery. Nevertheless there is one final manner 
in which a powerful opposition to hierarchy has been made manifest: the 
treatment of Dumont himself. Rio and Smedal in their overview of his work enter 
what they call, ‘the highly charged field populated by the allies and enemies of 
this controversial figure’ (2009: 1).18 Yet why is it so highly charged? Yes, 
Dumont can make rather grandiose and sometimes too-simple statements, but the 
bile he has inspired does not quite seem proportionate to the crime. I cannot help 
but deduce that Dumont has in some senses become a cipher for Western attitudes 
towards hierarchy. Why else did his ‘symbolic capital’ in some quarters always 
remain scathingly low (Bourdieu 1990), and plummet like a stone in many others 
after his departure from academia? As Jonathan Friedman reports, even the groups 
who had been associated with him became ‘marginalized’ when he left (2012).19 
Dumont, as a metonym for hierarchy itself, could never be adopted by the 
mainstream, because in society at large hierarchical ideology was being 
progressively substituted for a ‘triumphant’ economic alternative which requires 
individualism to sustain itself (Dumont 1977).20 
 
 At this point then, I reach the sting in the tail. If, as cited at the outset, ‘to 
adopt a value is to introduce hierarchy’, by the same logic to abandon hierarchy is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  One	  of	  these	  is	  David	  Graeber,	  who	  opposes	  Dumont’s	  arguments	  about	  hierarchy	  at	  least	  partly	  on	  moral	  grounds.	  He	  states	  –	  after	  ostensibly	  agreeing	  with	  Dumont	  –	  ‘Still,	  the	  political	  implications	  are,	  as	  so	  often	  in	  his	  work,	  profoundly	  unsettling’	  (2007:	  47).	  	  	  19	  At	  the	  same	  conference	  panel	  session	  Richard	  Handler	  also	  linked	  the	  framing	  of	  ‘hierarchy	  as	  pathology’	  to	  a	  form	  of	  cultural	  imperialism	  which	  becomes	  enacted	  through	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  ‘development’	  in	  the	  non-­‐Western	  world	  (2012).	  This	  raises	  another	  interesting	  paradox,	  that	  exactly	  simultaneous	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  post-­‐colonial	  theory,	  colonialism	  was	  in	  fact	  extending	  its	  reach	  through	  the	  symbolic	  violence	  directed	  towards	  non-­‐Western	  hierarchical	  forms.	  20	  Joel	  Robbins	  expresses	  a	  casual	  surprise	  that	  what	  he	  calls	  a	  ‘Dumontian	  anthropology…has	  neither	  been	  fully	  codified	  or	  institutionalized	  as	  yet’	  (1994:	  25).	  However,	  in	  my	  analysis	  this	  neglect	  has	  been	  no	  simple	  accident	  or	  happenstance.	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to negate this self-same value and the role it plays. Indeed this is what all of the 
metaphors of heterarchy share, possessing no superordinating logic to determine 
the interrelationship of parts. It is therefore impossible not to see the historical 
trajectory of hierarchy’s negation as running parallel with the intensification of a 
particular exchange relationship which also negates this kind of value: that of the 
commodity-form. Many have debated over whether this intensification should be 
periodized as Neoliberalism, yet for our purposes its nomenclature is irrelevant.21 
What is unequivocal is that the period after 1968 inaugurated a strengthening of 
capital relative to labour, and the entrance of the commodity-form into arenas of 
social exchange which had previously fallen beyond its purview. 
 
 It will now be necessary to return to some of Marx’s most elementary 
statements on the subject, to explain what I mean by negating hierarchical value, 
and conclude the narrative I am drawing here. Negating value does not imply 
abandoning a value concept altogether, but it does mean abandoning the value that 
emanates from a hierarchy, that which as I have said, ‘rains down on all subjects 
from the skies of the whole’, such as the purity value-idea of Hindu caste 
(Dumont 1980). As Marx says, the only form in which ‘the value of commodities 
can manifest itself or be expressed’ is exchange-value (2008: 15). For the 
commodity-form to work, all competing forms of value must be annihilated (like 
hierarchy) to make way for the production of exchange-value. The latter arrives at 
itself through actions and transactions rather than – like hierarchical value – 
prefiguring them. Critically, exchange-value also rests on the ability to 
commensurate the commodities concerned. One part is equivalent to another (both 
parts thus forgetting the wholes out of which they were formed): as in Marx’s 
famous example, ’20 yards of linen’ may be deemed to be worth ‘one coat’ (ibid: 
23).  
 
 Yet this equation, 20 yards linen = one coat, also implicates another 
hidden logic which impacts upon my analysis of Max Planck employees: that of 
human labour. In commensurating the value of commodities, one is also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  The	  2012	  ‘Group	  for	  Debates	  in	  Anthropological	  Theory’	  –	  held	  annually	  at	  Manchester	  University	  –	  had	  the	  topic:	  ‘The	  concept	  of	  neoliberalism	  has	  become	  an	  obstacle	  to	  the	  anthropological	  understanding	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century’.	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commensurating the value of the human labour which produced them. Through 
these practices of equivalence labour becomes ‘abstract’ rather than situated (ibid: 
47-8), and undifferentiated rather than qualitatively alter. The story of capitalistic 
modernity is thus not as Durkheim would have it, one of ‘The division of labour in 
society’ (1997), but of its increasing uniformity. The more we invite the 
commodity-form into our lives, the more its hidden logic of abstract labour, thus 
of the ‘abstract individual’, plays itself out in our ontologies. At this point one 
might begin to look askance at Latour’s statement on subjectivity, that to be 
‘comparable and commensurable’ is to be human, because it turns a specific 
practice into statement of universality. If we now consider the quotation drawn 
from the Max Planck handbook which begins this thesis, we can see the careful 
logic of differentiation which is being laid down here. This is not a collection of 
‘abstract individuals’. Instead there are ‘clear divisions between the different 
levels in the hierarchies’: each one rendering, at the scale of the whole, a different 
kind of person.  
 
 
 iii) Consequences of this negation for the study of organisations 
 
 If the house that hierarchy built has been razed to the ground to make way 
for a jostling open-air market of spontaneous exchange relationships, then there 
are, following these final references to Marx, two symmetrical consequences for 
the study of organisations which proceed logically therefrom. These take the form 
of theoretical assumptions in the literature. The first is that the internal social life 
of organisations must be continually ‘produced’ by actors in order to have any 
coherence or meaning at all; and the second is that the actors concerned are 
fundamentally commensurable with one another. I shall now address both of these 
in turn. 
 
 Without hierarchy, any supra-personal entity which manifests itself must 
be actively manufactured by those actors it encompasses. This finds expression in 
all of the uses of the term ‘agency’, ‘action’, and ‘practice’ which began to appear 
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in the 80s and 90s.22 However, it is important to remember that such action-based 
approaches were nurtured throughout the twentieth-century under the wing of 
‘structure’ (Parsons 1968; Bourdieu 1977; Giddens 1984), born of its inadequacy 
when attempting to theorize social change. It is only relatively recently in fact, 
that action has grown up and out of the structure which gave birth to it, and, like 
an angry and rebellious teenager, rejected the existence of its parent-concept 
completely.  
 
 This recent shift towards the primacy of action is most visible in those 
who have been influenced by network analysis: whether ‘actor-network theory’ 
(Latour 2010; Law 1994), ‘action nets’ (Czarniawska 2008) or simply the concept 
of a ‘network’ (Riles 2000). It is also present in those organisational studies which 
ride on the theories of Foucault and Bourdieu and their visions of the interminable 
‘production’ of social life (Born 1995; Kunda 1992; Zaloom 2006). In Zaloom’s 
analysis of financiers in London and New York, her research participants are 
doing so much creative fashioning of culture and self that she takes to calling 
them ‘designers’ (2006: 177).  
 
 At this point the reader might start to raise an eyebrow. Doubts begin to 
assert themselves. ‘Does the hierarchy of the Max Planck Society not also have to 
be produced? Are you implying the presence of some kind of Platonic essence 
floating down through time?’ To this I would respond quite happily that no-one 
inside the Max Planck Society is producing its hierarchy. The hierarchy is already 
there and has been for some while. It simply has to be maintained, which is done 
relatively easily, through simple cues like the one with which this chapter began.   
  
 There is another sub-strand within action-based approaches that also 
deserves a cursory mention in its relation to hierarchy: those which have taken up 
Appadurai et al.’s injunction to follow the ‘social life of things’ (1986). The 
material turn has by and large been an insightful and important one for the study 
of organisations, jam-packed with material culture as they are. However it does 
have certain analytical dangers which I would like to raise here. If one is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  simplicity	  I	  will	  take	  ‘action’	  as	  an	  umbrella-­‐term	  for	  these	  three	  very	  similar	  ideas.	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following an artefact through each stage of its life inside the organisation, often 
being altered in some way in the process, then it will probably look as if each 
human encounter with the artefact has played an equally decisive role in its 
‘construction’. There are lots of examples of this (cf. Latour and Woolgar 1979; 
Latour 2010) but a particularly revealing one comes from Richard Harper’s study 
of the ‘careers’ of staff reports inside the International Monetary Fund (1998). He 
conceptualizes each stage of this career as ‘part of a plenum that reaches its final 
production with the acceptance of the report by the board’ (ibid: 285). However, 
having been denied access to the meetings of these Executive Directors, he has no 
evidence to show how the report is indeed treated in the final stage of its career.23 
In conceiving of the Fund as a ‘literary organisation’ (ibid: 233), obsessed with its 
texts, he denies the hierarchy which makes some interactions with texts of greater 
consequence than others. Likewise Latour and Woolgar’s argument that scientific 
facts are made through a cumulative ‘slow practical craftwork’ (1979: 236) would 
never hold water inside the Max Planck Society. The primary point of departure 
here is not the material but the ideal; it is first and foremost a director’s ‘vision’ 
which determines what scientific facts will be constructed and how. 
 
 This leads me to the second consequence I diagnose; all of this emphasis 
on the product of action has displaced one on the subject of action. If social 
meaning can only be made through practices, then logically the person doing the 
practicing is without prior meaning, effectively without culture. This is the 
abstract individual about which Kapferer and his co-authors are so vexed, the idea 
that someone, could in fact be, ‘anyone’ (Rapport 2012).24 Accepting that 
someone could be anyone is to argue for their fundamental commensurability. 
This is a pardonable assumption among natural scientists, who concern 
themselves with the biological body, but not for social scientists, who deal with its 
particular social location. I follow Dumont in stressing the need to dissociate the 
individual as a biological unit, from the individual as a conceptual unit. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  One	  of	  his	  participants	  even	  suggests	  that	  sometimes	  the	  Fund’s	  decision-­‐making	  about	  action	  in	  member	  countries	  is	  ‘not	  about	  the	  report’	  but	  international	  relations	  between	  governments	  (1998:	  252).	  24	  Incidentally,	  Rapport	  is	  a	  recurring	  reference-­‐point	  in	  Kapferer’s	  volume	  as	  ‘the	  most	  outrageous	  example	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  thinking’	  (Kapferer	  2005:	  12).	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 Before tracing the ways in which this assumption intersects with the study 
of organisations, I will first explain what I mean by incommensurability and its 
opposite, with particular reference to Elizabeth Povinelli’s seminal essay on the 
subject (2001). The concept originates in the philosophy of language, to refer to a 
situation in which an undistorted translation between two texts is decidedly 
impossible. Povinelli defines it thus, ‘incommensurability refers to a state in 
which two phenomena (or worlds) cannot be compared by a third without 
producing serious distortion’ (ibid: 320). The first example she gives to illustrate 
her point is a citation from philosopher W. V. Quine who is reflecting on a 
translation between English and Arunta.  
 
‘Assuming that English sentences have their meaning only 
together as a body, then we can justify their translation 
into Arunta only together as a body. There will be no 
justification for pairing off the component English 
sentences with the component Arunta sentences, except as 
these correlations of the theory as a whole come out right’ 
(ibid: 321). 
 
In fact this extract has a significant implication that Povinelli does not make fully 
explicit: the idea that meaning can only be truly conveyed ‘as a body’.25 Povinelli 
is telling us through Quine, that the very possibility of deeming someone or 
something ‘incommensurable’, requires accepting the precondition of some form 
of holism.26 The part of one whole (an English sentence in an English text) cannot 
be equated with the part of another whole (an Arunta sentence in an Arunta text) 
without symbolically distorting one or both parts.27  
 
 The practice of commensuration, by contrast, is precisely this process, of 
equating part for part, and to repeat myself with reference to the commodity, ‘both 
parts forgetting the wholes out of which they were formed’. Thus through the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Quine’s	  philosophy	  of	  language	  is	  in	  fact	  defined	  by	  his	  holistic	  perspective	  (1961).	  26	  I	  will	  pick	  up	  this	  idea	  of	  holism	  again	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  27	  Incidentally	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  recognition	  of	  social	  holism	  and	  its	  effects	  that	  defines	  Povinelli’s	  most	  recent	  intervention	  examining	  the	  unpleasant	  side-­‐effects	  of	  American	  liberalism	  (2011).	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assumption of human commensurability, we again return to the universalization of 
exchange-value, one which obliterates those alternative holistic value concepts 
that threaten its production. As Espeland and Stevens incisively remark, 
‘Commensuration changes the terms of what can be talked about, how we value, 
and how we treat what we value. It is symbolic, inherently interpretive, deeply 
political, and too important to be left implicit’ (1998: 315). 
 
 Heeding these final words of caution I now turn to the literature. In 
assuming commensurability, certain texts leave important questions of value 
unanswered. Gideon Kunda expounds very eloquently on the myriad of ways in 
which the culture of a Tech company is ‘engineered’, but fails to reflect on why 
one kind of culture is engineered rather than another, or indeed why American 
corporations have such need for manufactured ‘strong cultures’ (also cf. Garsten 
1994).28 In the anthropology of science meanwhile, why are John Law’s British 
technicians assumed to occupy the ‘low-status end’ (1994: 122), and why do 
Latour’s participants at the Salk Institute in San Diego indulge such a frequent use 
of economic metaphor (1979)?  
 
 There is a glaring statement which must be made now about this abstract 
individual, one which even Kapferer and his co-authors do not spell out 
completely. The most abstract, the most universal, the most commensurable of all 
subjects, is naturally, the Anglo-Saxon one. As a consequence it tends most 
frequently to be British and American organisational theorists who pursue this 
line of thinking. Annelise Riles studies the ways in which the concept of a 
‘network’ acts as an anchor for local mobilization among her Fijian participants, 
recognizing that different parties use the network differently. Yet this is not what 
interests her. For Riles ‘finding and describing difference is no longer enough’ 
(2000: 18). Instead she seeks to study ‘the points not of difference but of 
commonality, of universality even’ (ibid). This is an unusual and provocative 
direction for an anthropologist to go in. However in doing so she fails to 
acknowledge the political asymmetry which always inheres in commonality. Riles 
traces the roots of the network concept from American information science in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  There	  is	  an	  interesting	  suggestion	  by	  one	  of	  his	  participants	  that	  ‘Puritan	  values’	  might	  be	  at	  work	  which	  passes	  by	  unremarked	  (1992:	  179).	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1940s, but nowhere suggests the fundamental cultural imbalance that accrues from 
this American vision of relatedness being deployed by Fijian employees. There is 
what James Leach would call a ‘conceptual colonialism’ at work here (2007: 113), 
one which operates tacitly whenever universality rears its ugly head.  
 
 Likewise an increasing number of scholars have come to recognize the 
Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism which inheres in debates about ‘agency’ (cf. Peacock 
2013). The latter is particularly vivid in the work of Anthony Giddens. For 
Giddens, an agent is someone who 'could, at any phase in a given sequence of 
conduct, have acted differently' (1984: 9), and so for him is defined by choice, and 
by the visible manifestation of such choice. This ethnocentrism has recently been 
deconstructed from several quarters (Ahearn 2001; Frank 2006; Loyal and Barnes 
2001), the most elegant treatment of the subject coming from Saba Mahmood in 
her study of the neo-conservative Egyptian ‘mosque movement’ (2005). 
Witnessing the emphasis her participants place on internal as opposed to external 
transformation (what we would commonly think of as agency), Mahmood 
persuasively makes the case for defining agency only with reference to its 
differential ethnographic manifestations.29 Failure to do so is to enact the 
symbolic violence of commensuration. It compels the research participant to, in 
the words of Povinelli, ‘make yourself doable for us’ (2001: 329), without making 
plain the coercion involved.  
 
 One might feel now that we have strayed too far from the opening 
argument, so to conclude this subsection I will reiterate how the logic of produced 
worlds and commensurable subjects proceeds from hierarchy’s negation. To do 
this I must return to the Dumontian maxim with which I began, that to adopt a 
value is to introduce hierarchy. For Dumont hierarchy is intimately bound up with 
a priori assumptions about value, the idea that when we arrive in an ethnographic 
setting, the landscape is not ‘flat’ as Latour would have it, but already in 
magnificent relief. This landscape has ideas about what is important, which make 
some ways of being and modes of exchange more possible or more likely than 
others. To ignore these mountains and valleys and cliffs is to ignore the hierarchy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Interestingly,	  this	  notion	  of	  agency	  as	  internal	  transformation	  is	  also	  present	  in	  the	  German	  concept	  of	  Bildung,	  a	  philosophy	  we	  will	  meet	  in	  the	  next	  section.	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of value and its asymmetry of potentiality. With this is mind we will now take a 
closer look at the subtle alterity that Germany offers us: one which explodes the 
dogma that all organisations are made through individual action, that every one of 
its members is qualitatively the same. 
 
 
 iv) German holism 
  
 Holism – the notion, broadly speaking, that wholes are ontologically prior 
to the parts which compose them – has a long and largely venerable pedigree in 
the history of German thought. In the natural and social sciences you might think 
of nineteenth-century organic vitalism or twentieth-century ‘Gestalt’ psychology 
(Harrington 1996). Meanwhile in society-at-large, a good example of holistic 
thinking is manifested in Germany’s so-called ‘associations’ or Vereine. A 
registered association (eingetragener Verein, of which the MPG is one) is a group 
of at least seven members with a non-commercial objective – such as a sports club 
– who are endowed with specific rights and obligations. This is not simply a 
collection of individuals but a new legal entity distinct from its parts: indeed a 
‘legal personality’ as some have put it (Anheier and Seibel 2001: 13). There is of 
course a very dark side to the history of German holism, which appears to have, in 
the annals of cultural memory, nigh eclipsed all else. This is of course the Nazis’ 
apparently holistic concept of the Volk, drawn from Herder and the Romantics and 
reconstituted in racist terms. I say apparently, because some have argued that by 
means of their biologization of individual difference and mechanistic social 
vision, the Nazis did not in fact offer authentic holism – a priori cultural unity – 
but totalitarian individualism cloaked as such (Dumont 1986: 173-8, Harrington 
1996: 211). 
 
 I shall submit at this point that this holistic tradition has its philosophical 
origins in the writings of the German Idealists, and is moreover their defining 
metaphysic. This is visible at first glance simply from the language they use – I 
am thinking here of Hegel, Fichte and Humboldt – which consistently seeks to 
	   30	  
express a form of unity.30 Words like ‘whole’, ‘complete’, ‘totality’ pepper the 
texts, and the favoured metaphor is the ‘circle’: a line which reaches outwards 
only to meet itself, thereby encompassing a perfectly-rounded and distinct 
internality.31 It is visible at second glance from the philosophies they advance. 
Fichte’s whole is the totalizing whole of the ‘Ich’ (variously translated as ‘I’, 
‘self’, or ‘ego’), whose absolute existence forms his first principle. This self is 
pictured as a circle, and ‘completion is its distinguishing characteristic’ (1970: 
36). This self is not, however, cut off from the outside world. Rather it already 
contains this world within its own borders, in the form of the ‘not-self’, which 
becomes sensible to the self through ‘feelings’. This totalizing self is thus 
simultaneously self and world together, an important move which I will return to 
below. Holism also manifests itself in the form of Hegel’s ‘Idea’ (1977). The 
existence of the Idea ontologically precedes both subject and object, nature and 
mind, thereby dissolving these distinctions which become secondary to it. It is, for 
Hegel, an irreducible substance-universal which is ‘discerned’ or recognized 
(erkennt), by the mind, but significantly not constituted by it (Stern 1990: 117).32  
 
 The holism which comes to dominate German thought in the eighteenth-
century and after is not some philosophical accident. Rather, as many scholars 
have suggested (cf. Dumont 1986, Sahlins 2010) it is a classic case of 
‘complementary schismogenesis’ in Bateson’s terms (Sahlins 2010: 118), where 
one cultural group seeks to distinguish itself from another precisely because of 
their very proximity.33 This other was those European countries west of the Rhine 
whose thought was defined by the great philosophers of the European 
enlightenment: particularly John Locke, David Hume, Bishop Berkeley and René 
Descartes. The ontological cuts performed by these thinkers – between mind and 
body, humans and nature, knower and known, reason and the senses, to name but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  See	  Dahlstrom	  (2000)	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  holism	  of	  Hamann,	  Herder	  and	  Schiller.	  31	  The	  circle	  appears	  in	  Fichte’s	  Science	  of	  Knowledge	  on	  sixteen	  separate	  occasions,	  while	  in	  Hegel’s	  Science	  of	  
Logic,	  nineteen.	  Meanwhile	  ‘whole’	  and	  its	  cognates	  appear	  innumerable	  times	  throughout	  the	  corpus	  of	  both	  these	  authors.	  32	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  Hegel’s	  dialectic	  is	  so	  often	  misunderstood.	  Mind	  (Geist)	  does	  not	  synthesise	  subject	  and	  object	  into	  unity;	  this	  is	  precisely	  the	  transcendental	  idealism	  of	  Kant	  that	  Hegel	  was	  arguing	  against.	  Their	  unity	  is	  a	  
priori	  ,	  it	  is	  simply	  recognized	  by	  the	  mind.	  See	  Stern	  (1990)	  for	  a	  clear	  and	  incisive	  explanation	  of	  Hegel’s	  holism.	  33	  Freud	  perceives	  something	  very	  similar	  in	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  ‘narcissism	  of	  minor	  differences’	  (1962:	  68-­‐9).	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a few – were precisely what the Idealists sought to heal through their enthusiasm 
for the whole. For this reason, as a collective they are also sometimes considered 
spokespeople for the ‘German counter-Enlightenment’. Indeed their 
schismogenetic response to western European thought in the late eighteenth-
century, in many ways prefigures the contemporary critiques of the Enlightenment 
which have become so ubiquitous. It is now a cultural sport to decry Descartes’ 
mind-body dualism, yet Hamann in 1785, had already warned, ‘Do not forget for 
the sake of the cogito, the noble sum’ (Dahlstrom 2000: 79).  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      ENLIGHTENMENT   COUNTER-ENLIGHTENMENT 
 
 
 However there was also another powerful force closer to home which the 
Idealists were in dialogue with: the looming figure of Immanuel Kant. Kant’s 
Aufklärung differed from the British and French Enlightenment through exactly 
his insistence on this ‘noble sum’: the ability of the subject to transcend the gulf 
between subject and object through synthesis. This doctrine created the space for 
the Idealism which his British and French counterparts denied, leading to the 
description of his philosophy as a ‘transcendental’ or ‘subjective idealism’. Yet 
despite offering the first major interventions in Idealist philosophy, Kant was not 
a holist. The union of self and world was not ontologically prior as it would be for 
Fichte, Hegel and their contemporaries, rather he retained an insistence on 
Enlightenment dualisms, particularly between intuition and concept, which 
formed the foundation for the rest (Guyer 2000). German Idealism proper thus 
formally begins after Kant. His successors developed his idealism but abandoned 
his ‘pluralism’ (Stern 1990), forming a community of ‘absolute’ rather than 
	  	  	  SELF	  
WORLD	  
WORLD	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  SELF	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‘subjective’ Idealists defined by their commitment to the whole. It is possible that 
it is the historical stimulus of the French Revolution that incited the dramatic 
break with Kant. Certainly for Dumont, German thought is ‘goaded on’ by it 
(1986: 115), into becoming something quite different from its neighbours. 
 
 In any event it is true that seven years after the Revolution an 
anonymously authored document appeared, calling itself ‘The Oldest Systematic 
Programme of German Idealism’: a manifesto for the new philosophy which 
marked this break.34 A short extract gives some idea of their emphasis, and of the 
‘two kinds of holism’ I shall go on to outline. 
 
‘The first Idea is the notion of my self as an absolutely free 
being. Along with the free, self-conscious being an entire 
world emerges simultaneously - out of nothingness. The 
only true and conceivable creation out of nothingness’ 
(1987: 161). 
 
The first kind of holism I am identifying is manifested in the appearance of the 
self as a totality – ‘the notion of myself as an absolutely free being’, such as 
Fichte’s Ich. The second kind of holism is the world as totality – an ‘entire world’ 
– appearing alongside the self. However as is clear from this extract, this is a 
classic case of what Dumont would call hierarchical dualism: two entities exist in 
reciprocal relation, yet one is encompassed by, and thus subordinate to, the other. 
In this instance, the world is encompassed by the self (as per my diagram above). 
This means that the totality of the self concentrates the whole world within it, and 
the totality of the world finds its expression in the form of an individual– being 
the lesser partner in the dualism. One might recall the Vereine at this point, who 
despite being a group of at least seven members, become in their unity a new 
‘legal personality’, i.e. a collective individual. 
 
 The notion of the individual as a holistic entity is theorized in the form of 
‘Bildung’ – translated by Bruford as ‘personal culture’ (1975: ix). The idea of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  The	  authorship	  is	  still	  unknown	  but	  is	  generally	  attributed	  to	  Hegel	  or	  Schelling.	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Bildung appears in the writings of several Idealists,35 yet it is Humboldt who is 
perhaps most famously associated with the term, so I will treat his writings as 
representative of its popular meaning (cf. Humboldt 1969, 2000).36 Bildung is 
fundamentally about a union of self and world. More specifically, it is about the 
self incorporating the world into their humanity. It is a morally righteous process, 
as it is a route to becoming more complete, more human; those who manage it 
‘have achieved what is called living in the highest sense of the word' (Humboldt 
cited in Dumont 1994: 94). The method through which Bildung is ‘achieved’ is 
through praxis: the self interacting with, and reflecting upon its environment. It is 
critically not through thought alone but through practices, through Erfahrung 
(experience) that this union is created. It is very important for Humboldt that this 
is willingly enacted rather than ends-driven; any activity which does not totally 
align with the genuine will of the self cannot bring about true Bildung.37 Despite 
thereby interpenetrating through such activity, this dualism remains hierarchical. 
Outer is perennially subordinated to inner, ‘because sheer power needs an object 
on which it may be exercised…so too does a man need a world outside himself’ 
(2000: 58).38 The end result is the creation of members of a shared world. Culture 
is thus produced from the inside out, an idea captured in Bruford’s translation of 
the term. 
 
 The second kind of holism I diagnose – the whole as a totality taking the 
form of a collective individual – is variously expressed through concepts of 
‘Kultur’, ‘Volk’ and ‘Nation’ (culture, folk and nation). It would be prolix to 
articulate in depth the subtle differences between the three (quite apart from their 
own mutations) and a few cursory points here will have to suffice. The principal 
thing to note is that all refer to a greater or lesser extent to a cultural group: not a 
community of individuals, but an individual community. The semantic shift 
between the universal and processual eighteenth-century vision of Kultur 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Particularly	  Herder	  and	  Hegel.	  	  36	  Another	  reason	  to	  go	  straight	  to	  Humboldt	  is	  his	  relation	  of	  special	  influence	  on	  German	  scholarly	  institutions,	  having	  been	  invited	  to	  found	  the	  University	  of	  Berlin	  (now	  Humboldt	  University)	  in	  1809.	  He	  is	  also,	  it	  should	  be	  noted,	  a	  key	  influence	  on	  Adolf	  von	  Harnack,	  who	  cited	  him	  repeatedly	  in	  his	  speeches	  and	  writings.	  37	  This	  forms	  one	  of	  the	  struts	  for	  his	  strong	  argument	  against	  state	  intervention	  (1969).	  The	  state	  is	  seen	  as	  an	  alien	  entity	  imposed	  from	  above,	  rather	  than	  a	  cultural	  entity	  its	  citizens	  freely	  associate	  themselves	  with.	  38	  Here	  we	  hear	  the	  rumblings	  of	  what	  Nietzsche	  would	  later	  call	  ‘the	  will	  to	  power’	  (2003).	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promoted by thinkers such as Schiller, and the more static and particular visions 
of Volk and Nation promoted by later thinkers such as Herder and Fichte, is well-
documented (Elias 1996: 123-136).39 What is not however, is their continuity in 
the sense of being holist counter-Enlightenment alternatives to Anglo-French 
Enlightenment thought. Even Schiller’s Kultur which is claimed as the most 
universal of the three, rejected the Enlightenment abstraction of ‘elementary man’, 
arguing that humanity cannot come to be beyond its particular spatial-historical 
locatedness. The major difference is an ambition in scope. There is a transition 
from the early version of Kultur potentially encompassing the entirety of 
humankind, to later versions of Kultur, Volk and Nation in which this group is 
effectively scaled down to the size of nations. 
 
 By the late eighteenth-century the social whole represented by Volk and 
Nation (now the linguistic and cultural community of the Holy Roman Empire), 
comes more intensively to take the form of a collective individual, with its own 
unique personality (Dumont 1986: 115-131).40 For Dumont, this is a case of 
acculturation to the French Revolution by importing its rhetoric of individualism 
onto the collective plane. However, I would assert that this notion of the whole as 
an individual entity emerges too from their cosmological monism (generated by 
Lutheran Protestantism). The individual is one and the collective is one because 
God made them thus. Oneness has an ontological primacy that the multitude does 
not. This is particularly clear in Herder’s writings. As he says, ‘It is only the 
Creator who thinks of the whole unity of one, of all, nations in their manifoldness 
without having the unity thereby fade for him’ (2002: 293).41 To be one social 
entity is to exist in the eyes of God.  
 
 It should be said at this point that the incarnation of this ‘whole unity of 
one’ in the form of a single person, a product of the hierarchical dualism outlined 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Universal	  in	  this	  sense	  means	  global	  rather	  than	  homogenous:	  such	  as	  Schiller’s	  case	  for	  a	  ‘universal	  history’,	  i.e.	  a	  global	  comparative	  history	  (1882).	  40	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  for	  Herder,	  who	  is	  constantly	  making	  swift	  conceptual	  leaps	  from	  individuals	  to	  collectives	  and	  back	  again	  (2002:	  160,	  277).	  41	  Other	  Idealists	  (such	  as	  Fichte)	  are	  not	  explicit	  about	  the	  presence	  of	  religion	  in	  their	  philosophy.	  However,	  	  as	  we	  learn	  from	  Carl	  Schmitt,	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  personal	  sovereignty	  of	  one	  individual	  is	  a	  straightforward	  channeling	  of	  the	  Christian	  belief	  that	  ‘a	  sole	  God	  governs	  the	  world’	  and	  is	  its	  ‘sole	  architect’	  (1985:	  47).	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above, creates the space for the legitimation of absolutist leadership the Idealists 
are well known for. Because this person already contains society within 
themselves they are seen as a straightforward aggregate of that society, 
embodying the collective will in theirs. 
 
 Those familiar with Dumont’s opposition between ‘individualistic’ and 
‘holistic’ societies might be a little confused at this point (1980), and would be 
quite right to be. Germany as a European nation would fall firmly under the 
‘individualistic’ side of his dichotomy; yet here I am suggesting its dominant 
ideology is characterised by not one but two kinds of holism. Having offered a 
thoroughly ‘Dumontian’ interpretation thus far, it is at this point that I part 
company with Dumont, because despite clearly recognizing ‘the idiosyncratic 
formula of German ideology’ namely, ‘community holism and self-cultivating 
individualism’ (1994: 20), he never attempted to resolve the contradiction this 
brought to his earlier work on Hindu caste (1980). The fact is that Germany 
possesses both individualism and holism as dominant values, except that the latter 
is encompassed by the former – as he in fact elsewhere implicitly 
acknowledged.42 The individual is a holistic entity and the whole is an individual 
entity. Both values exist in a priori relation. 
  
 In demonstrating the holistic German philosophical tradition from which 
the Max Planck Society has sprung, it enables me not only to reposition the locus 
of value (from individualism to holism), but also to problematize some of the 
anthropological speculations which get applied to the West. In employing 
homogenising terms like ‘Euro-American’, they presume that the whole of Europe 
and America is governed by a unitary ideological system.43 By contrast, the Max 
Planck Society and the cultural history that wrought it, are iterations of what 
Dumont calls the ‘German sub-culture’ within modern European ideology (1986: 
113). I am in no sense attempting to reinvigorate tired and dangerous tropes of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Incongruously,	  Dumont	  does	  actually	  state	  that	  within	  German	  ideology	  ‘holism	  (is)	  encompassed	  within	  individualism’	  (1986:	  119).	  	  Despite	  his	  brilliance,	  this	  exemplifies	  something	  of	  Dumont’s	  inconsistency	  across	  his	  oeuvre.	  Another	  well-­‐documented	  example	  is	  the	  slippage	  between	  ‘the	  individual’	  and	  ‘equality’	  as	  the	  dominant	  value	  of	  the	  West	  (Robbins	  1994).	  43	  Statements	  such	  as	  Robbins’	  ‘an	  indigenous	  conception	  of	  the	  whole	  is	  absent	  in	  modern	  Western	  culture’	  fail	  to	  reflect	  the	  nuances	  I	  am	  arguing	  for	  here	  (1994:	  31).	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German ‘uniqueness’, but simply highlighting the subtle ontological differences 
between the Western Enlightenment and the German Counter-Enlightenment, 
which have enduring contemporary effects. It is these two kinds of holism which 
configure the relations between individuals and groups inside the organisation. 
 
 
 v) Hierarchy inside the Max Planck Society 
  
 It falls to anthropology and its methods of intimacy over distance, to 
reveal the inevitable distinction between a society’s official representative 
discourses, and the personal experiences of one’s participants. This is an 
important one to make in the Max Planck Society, because despite the cursory 
notes with which we began about respecting ‘levels’ before interaction, these 
levels as such do not make it into the representative Societal discourse of 
hierarchy.44 The only hierarchical principle which manages to sneak in the front 
door, clinging surreptitiously to the shirt tails of a venerated individualism, is the 
binary hierarchy of leader and led. In the Society, this notion of leadership is 
known as the ‘Harnack principle’: described as the ‘structural principle’ of its 
social organisation, and never far from the lips of presidents (Gruss 2011), 
directors, and Max Planck scholars and commentators (Laitko and Vom Brocke 
1996, Renn and Kant 2007).4546 It receives an enormous volume of air-time, and 
furnishes us with the raw material of what Dumont would call the ‘value-idea’ of 
the Max Planck Society, which I identify as one of the ‘charismatic individual’.  
 
 However, one of this thesis’ major claims, is that the Max Planck Society 
operates through three recognizable principles, rather than only one. These are: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  In	  reflecting	  on	  why	  this	  might	  be	  I	  am	  inclined	  again	  to	  return	  to	  that	  turn	  of	  the	  nineteenth-­‐century	  moment.	  For	  Dumont	  the	  German	  Idealists	  ‘worked	  under	  the	  spell	  of	  the	  French	  Revolution’	  (1986:	  129)	  in	  substituting	  hierarchical	  modes	  of	  thought	  for	  individualist	  alternatives.	  I	  would	  add	  however	  that	  they	  were	  also	  working	  under	  the	  spell	  of	  the	  equalitarian	  and	  individualist	  cosmology	  of	  Luther.	  In	  any	  event,	  as	  he	  says,	  this	  body	  of	  literature	  is	  ‘without	  any	  mention	  of	  hierarchy	  proper’	  (ibid).	  Multivalent	  hierarchy	  in	  Germany	  thus	  goes	  underground	  in	  the	  early	  nineteenth-­‐century.	  It	  is	  not	  negated	  as	  it	  is	  further	  west,	  but	  it	  is	  philosophically	  suppressed.	  45	  Cf.	  Chapter	  3.i.	  46	  http://www.mpg.de/183251/portrait	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the hero principle (giving rise to a form of leadership I call heroic headship), the 
longevity principle, and the precarity principle. Before fleshing out the value-idea 
of the Society and its principles, I will first very briefly define the Harnack 
principle and the particular genre of leadership it legitimates. 
 
 
 The Harnack principle 
 
 The formal hierarchical structure of the Max Planck Society is encapsulated 
in the Harnack principle (Harnackprinzip), taking its name from the founder of 
the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, Adolf von Harnack. The only textual explanation of 
its logic can be found on the Society's website: 
 
‘It represents a traditional policy of appointing the 
brightest minds as Scientific Members of the Max Planck 
Society and building whole departments around these 
exceptional individuals when they become departmental 
directors... Once appointed, the heads of department or 
Max Planck Research Groups do not follow a curriculum 
or research programme determined by the organisation or 
by market requirements. Instead they rely on their own 
intuition, which allows them as researchers to transform 
and advance the cause of science’.47 
 
Despite it being a purportedly ‘completely official strategy’, the Harnack principle 
is not written into the statutes and so constitutes no legal basis for the Society's 
internal governance. Instead it must be understood as an ideological discourse, 
which provides the MPG with a unifying structural premise, but also maintains 
those with the most authority in the organisation in a position of hegemony.48 In 
this respect it is no different from other cultural discourses of leadership such as 
kingship, chieftainship or bigmanship: which both conjure and legitimise various 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  http://www.mpg.de/39586/MPG_Introduction?clientIP=134.76.24.9&page=2	  48	  Cf.	  Chapter	  3:	  introduction	  –	  section	  i.	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forms of personhood, with their own blend of status and power. This principle 
constitutes one expression of scientific leadership I name ‘heroic headship’.49 
 
 The brand of authority reified in the Harnack principle is most 
propinquitous in kind to that identified by Max Weber as ‘charismatic’ (1979). 
Indeed it can be no coincidence that Weber and Harnack were contemporaries and 
correspondents (Scaff 1991: 157), although that is another question for another 
scholar. This propinquity works on several levels. Firstly charismatic authority is 
clearly defined by the personality of its leader, who should possess ‘supernatural, 
superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities’ (ibid: 241) 
(echoing outright the website's description of ‘exceptional individuals’). However, 
the claim to legitimacy of a charismatic leader comes not from the possession of 
such qualities, but from the capacity of community to ‘recognise its genuineness 
and to act accordingly’ (ibid) (the Harnack principle).  Another striking 
correspondence comes in the form of what Weber calls ‘economic considerations’ 
which are particularly ‘foreign’ to this sphere, even ‘despised’ (ibid: 244) (‘do not 
follow a curriculum or research programme determined by… market 
requirements’). Charismatic authority for Weber was also diametrically opposed 
to bureaucratic in its attitude towards rule-following. The language of ‘intuition’ 
signposts this here, but in any event the Society is frequently described explicitly 
by its employees as ‘non-bureaucratic’. Bureaucracy is the one of the 
organisational others against which they characterise themselves. Another close 
tie is the repudiation of history, and the necessity for the charismatic leader to 
prove themselves on their own terms. Charismatic authority is pure immanence . 
 
 Most of the differences between heroic headship and charismatic authority 
revolve around Weber's discussion of the latter's ‘routinisation’ (ibid: 246). 
Although there is a ‘problem of succession’ of a sort (‘this is where the system 
has its biggest problems’ they say), because the scientific community dissolves 
when the director retires or dies; there is no real succession in the way Weber 
implies it, only the founding of a new community through a new director. 
Similarly the authority of the heroic head is not inherently unstable and contingent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Cf.	  Chapter	  4.	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upon success like his Weberian counterpart (an instability and contingency the 
community seeks to minimise through routinisation); once appointed the director 
has his post and resource-stream for life. The reason why heroic headship does not 
progress developmentally from charisma to routine, is because it has already been 
routinised a priori. Directors claim to be ‘non-bureaucratic’, yet every Institute 
does have its own administration (not to mention the central administration in 
Munich). The Harnack principle eulogises ‘intuition’, yet there is a protocol to the 
director's appointment, allocation of property and resources, and subsequent ritual 
functions. In Weber’s terms, heroic headship must therefore be understood as a 
form of bureaucratised charisma.50     
 
  
 The Value-Idea 
 
 Although it is implicitly present throughout his corpus, it is seemingly 
only in his Essays on Individualism that Dumont spells out the concept of the 
value-idea.  
 
‘If for each culture one agrees to seek out the pre-eminent 
value-idea by which it is animated, all, as Marx said, the 
ether which lends colour to all things, one will perceive at 
one stroke – at any rate, from a comparative viewpoint – 
the main lines of organisation of the ideological whole, the 
necessarily hierarchical configuration of levels (1986: 
231).’  
 
The fusion of values and ideas – realised in the act of hyphenating – is his effort at 
effacing the ‘is/ought separation’ (ibid: 246) he holds to be central to modern 
European ideology. In recombining the ontological with the moral, the value-idea 
is a thoroughly ‘non-modern’ (ibid: 234) proposition. Joel Robbins explains what 
he understands by it with a rather nice analogy. It is, for him, like ‘a rather busy 
mobile with many separate and balanced arms that are all, in the last analysis, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  There	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  more	  to	  be	  said	  about	  the	  character	  of	  heroic	  headship,	  but	  this	  will	  be	  integrated	  into	  the	  ethnographic	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  4.	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dependent upon and coordinated in their movement by a central string. A pre-
eminent value would be like such a string’ (1994: 28). In Dumont's famous study 
of Indian caste, this central string is the notion of ‘purity’. It is this which in his 
analysis, configures the Hindu ‘whole’: according its ‘purest’ priestly class, the 
Brahmans (or Brahmins) the highest status. 
 
 As I have already suggested, the value-idea I propose for the Society 
contradicts Dumont's own dichotomy. In his schema the ‘ether which lends colour 
to all things’ was derived either from holism or individualism. He clearly states, 
‘either value attaches to the whole in relation to its parts, and value is embedded, 
prescribed, as it were, by the very systems of representation, or value attaches to 
the individual’ (1986: 261). I argue, conversely, that it is the value-idea of the 
‘charismatic individual’ – an individual which is also at the same time a whole – 
which configures the Max Planck Society, an argument which undercuts the 
either/or distinction he is drawing here. The very scope of Dumont's comparative 
ambition thus becomes his undoing.	  As Alan Macfarlane comments, in a 
perspicacious reading of his work, Dumont ‘completely overlooks’ the large part 
of continental Europe (i.e. excluding England, Holland, and parts of Scandinavia) 
which remains ‘Ancien’ – in other words, holist and hierarchical – until the late 
eighteenth-century (1993: 15). The Max Planck Society, through the mediation of 
the German Idealists and their impact on scholarly institutions, is a historical 
product of precisely this, what Hacking elsewhere calls ‘eastern...holism’ (1990: 
190). As stated it is a holism which in Germany acculturates to Western Europe 
by articulating itself in individual form. 
 
 Having imported the value-idea into my analysis – contingent upon a 
broadening of its analytical potential – it remains for me to explain what I mean 
by the charismatic individual as a value, and furthermore what work it does for us 
with respect to the Society. The usage of charisma as an analytic rather than 
simply a personality-based trait I clearly borrow from Weber, who was the first to 
do so (1978: 241–254, cf. Runciman 1993: 226–250 for an alternative version). 
Weber's ambition, however, was to explore it as a technology of ‘legitimate 
domination’ rather than a value in itself, so although his definition overlaps with 
mine, there are further characteristics I would add, and others I would spell out 
	   41	  
where he leaves them implicit (five in total). Firstly I shall submit that the 
political precondition for charisma is autonomy. Weber identifies this in the 
charismatic communities' ideological distanciation from bureaucratic and 
economic forces, but does not cite autonomy per se as a key foundation. In this 
landscape of autonomy the charismatic individual is then able both to self-
generate (with an attendant confidence on an ability to keep generating far into the 
future) and also to self-limit (thus curtailing its own scope for action). ‘Charisma 
knows only inner determination and inner restraint’ he says (Weber 1948: 246). 
Fourthly, charisma is a spiritual – rather than a political or economic – potency: 
(this forms the nub of Weber's definition). Charisma is thus invested in immaterial 
qualities like creativity and synergy rather than material accumulation. Finally, 
charisma is unique, sui generis, of its own kind. Dumont seems to be getting at the 
same thing when he states that ‘individual singularity, imposes itself as a value’ in 
German thought from Goethe onwards (1994: 191). In my understanding, 
singularity is just one strut in a larger architecture of the value of charisma which 
becomes concentrated in the individual. 
 
 So as with Dumont's study of Hindu caste, where the notion of purity runs 
like a red thread through the whole system, this value-idea has broad-reaching 
effects within the Society. The most obvious and graspable of these is that it is 
through embodying this value-idea most closely, that directors draw their pre-
eminent status. It also goes some way to explaining the curious position of the 
technicians – relative to other Western organisations – who also embody some of 
these characteristics (to a lesser degree). In terms of organisational practices, it 
also helps us to understand – in no particular order – the peculiar technology of 
audit, forms of iconography, motivational discourses, the distribution of 
resources, and pedagogical techniques. It might seem to the reader that it would be 
easier to identify ‘Bildung’ as the value-idea, rather than imposing this etic 
definition. Bildung after all, contains the notion of a ‘unique’ and spirited 
individual within it (Ringer 1969: 87). Yet Bildung is a philosophy of the self 
rather than of hierarchy, and thus neglects the aspect of social generativity, which 
is a key part of what the Society mean when they talk about the Harnack principle. 
The charisma of the directors is the spiritual resource out of which the whole 
	   42	  
social-scientific order emerges. As one of them says, ‘The chemistry between 
these people determines the success of the Institute’.   
 
 
 The three principles 
 
 At the beginning of this section, I asserted that a major claim of the thesis 
is the social significance of three distinct principles. It is now the moment to 
elaborate on this. In the MPG's understanding of itself, there is only one structural 
principle through which it is organised – that of leadership. However, there is an 
implicit contradiction here, because new recruits are also told ‘not to by-pass the 
individual levels in working relationships’: implying a multiple. In an effort to 
distil these ‘individual levels’, I split this one principle into three, of which the 
principle of leadership (the hero principle) is but one constituent.51 The difference 
between the other two principles (precarity and longevity, which relate to the 
scientific and technical strata respectively) is dominated by the prism of 
temporality – although includes other secondary dimensions. These dimensions 
will become clearer in the chapter summary below. 
 
 Analytically however, the relationship between the precarity and longevity 
principles can be understood, in Dumontian terms, as one of ‘complementarity’ 
(1980: 53-5). In Dumont’s analysis of Hindu caste, the ascription of one social 
group as ‘pure’ (the Brahmans) necessitates the existence of another as ‘impure’ 
(the Untouchables). These two poles are ‘conceptually inseparable’ (ibid: 54) in 
the functioning of a totality devoted to maintaining religious purity. Further, in 
contrast to his notion of ‘hierarchical opposition’ (Parkin 2003), neither pole 
encompasses the other, although they are unequal. An analogous relation is 
exhibited by these two principles. Both are equally necessary in serving the Max 
Planck hierarchy’s overarching function, which is to produce scientific research. It 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Although	  such	  a	  move	  would	  no	  doubt	  have	  been	  violently	  opposed	  by	  the	  man	  himself,	  I	  cannot	  help	  but	  see	  this	  suppressed	  three-­‐fold	  hierarchy	  as	  expressive	  of	  what	  Dumézil’s	  calls	  ‘tripartite	  ideology’	  (1958).	  His	  broad	  argument	  is	  that	  Indo-­‐European	  cultures	  in	  general	  possess	  a	  tendency	  towards	  tripartite	  social	  function.	  Indeed,	  it	  can	  be	  no	  happenstance	  that	  the	  first	  definition	  of	  hierarchy	  –	  coming	  from	  theologian	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysus	  in	  the	  5th	  century	  –	  is	  ‘three	  divisions	  of	  angels’	  (OED	  2013).	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is these two rhythms, fast and slow, short and long, that together bring the MPG 
into a productive equilibrium: the ephemeral presence of the scientists only being 
rendered effective through the lasting presence of the technicians. Similarly, 
neither principle encompasses the other, although both are encompassed by the 
hero principle in their different ways (the scientists by a director, the technicians 
by the Institutes). They are also politically unequal: technicians responding to 
scientific needs rather than vice versa. If one wished to picture this hierarchy 
diagrammatically, it would look something like this. 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi) Chapter summary 52  
 
 Chapter 2 opens with the founding ceremony of the Max Planck Society's 
predecessor, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, in 1911. A narrative of the 
organisation's one hundred plus years then unfolds as a sequence of historical 
moments. For an entity which, since its inception, has always been so intimately 
bound to German national consciousness, it should not be surprising that this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  In	  this	  summary	  I	  deliberately	  avoid	  explanations	  of	  how	  each	  chapter	  is	  embedded	  in	  its	  own	  set	  of	  scholarly	  discussions	  (as	  these	  frame	  the	  chapters	  themselves	  in	  any	  case),	  instead	  offering	  a	  prosaic	  overview	  of	  their	  substantive	  content.	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chronology reads like a summary of Germany's dramatic twentieth-century. From 
the diplomatic isolation of the First World War, to the horrors of the Third Reich, 
to a militant ’68 critique, the reunification of Germany in 1990, and the 
globalisation of the late twentieth-century and after, the MPG/KWG has always 
had the hand of history on its shoulder, pushing it this way and that. I then offer a 
quantitative overview of the organisation, to provide the vital broader context of 
its financing and personnel before the ethnography gets going. This chapter also 
confronts the important question of methodology: the how and the where and the 
who of this study, ending with a series of reflections on how I understood and was 
understood inside the organisation. 
 
 In Chapter 3 I address that quintessential Dumontian priority: the question 
of value. If to adopt a value is to introduce hierarchy, then an analysis of the Max 
Planck's hierarchy must be preceded by some discussion of its value(s), or as 
Dumont frames it in his later work, value-idea(s). This is not necessarily a 
straightforward task. The Harnack principle on which the whole social order 
hangs has never been formally codified in writing, and unlike other hierarchies 
there is no explicit cosmological schema that one can turn to for exegesis.53 
Instead this task has to be performed through synthesis: bringing a variety of 
expressions of Max Planckness together (in the form of discourse and material 
culture), to forge what Holbraad would call an ‘inventive definition’ (2009: 87) of 
what these values might be. In doing this I lay the groundwork for the subsequent 
chapter, describing the directors, where the dominant value of charisma is most 
expansively realized. 
 
 With Chapter 4 the ethnography proper begins. I tell the story of the Max 
Planck Society’s heroic stratum: the directors’ rise to prominence, their 
technologies of governance, and experience of selfhood. What makes this story of 
leadership a charismatic one, is the isomorphism between the directorial self, and 
the social relationships and scientific work which characterise their community. 
The departments are visibly infused with the director's own ideas and personal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Of	  course,	  implicitly,	  my	  argument	  is	  that	  much	  of	  this	  hierarchy	  rests	  on	  certain	  Lutheran	  precepts,	  but	  this	  is	  an	  etic	  assertion	  rather	  than	  one	  my	  interlocutors	  would	  themselves	  embrace	  –	  inhabiting	  as	  they	  do,	  a	  secular	  ‘theology’	  (Schmitt	  1985).	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inclinations. Alongside this ethnographic narrative is an analytic paranarrative: the 
similar characteristics exhibited by leaders of other kinds which have appeared in 
anthropological accounts, from Melanesian big men to the kings of Africa and 
Hawaii. Such comparisons enable us to break with that Dumontian dichotomy, 
between modern and non-modern societies, which obstructs an awareness of clear 
continuities between forms of leadership in different regions. I then dig deeper 
into their cultural specificities. Being a collective individual in an individual 
collective, there is a particular German quality to this form of charismatic 
authority that the MPG has institutionalised. They experience their positions with 
both agency and constraint in the manner of a Fichtean self. 
 
 In Chapters 5 and 6 I tread into areas of the Max Planck hierarchy that its 
representative discourses tend to neglect, beginning with the most invisible group, 
the technical staff. These are the people employed (almost always) permanently 
inside the Institutes to manufacture samples and devices, to outfit and maintain 
the laboratories, and to instruct inexperienced scientists in the daily work of 
experimentation. My encounter with this group is saturated with their cultural 
unfamiliarity, one which the ethnographic content of the chapter inscribes piece 
by piece. Not only do the technicians have a profoundly different temporal 
relationship to the organisation to that of the scientists, but their experience of the 
organisation also diverges in other ways. Meanwhile the technicians differ 
significantly from their counterparts in other organisations – scientific and 
otherwise – in their comparatively elevated hierarchical status (in accepting 
Dumont’s distinction between status and power). To explain this I look to some of 
the major tenets of Luther’s Beruf concept, elements of Idealist Bildung, as well as 
the historical roots of the German vocational education system which they have 
all, without exception, passed through.  
 
 Finally in Chapter 6 the last part of this hierarchical whole is slotted into 
place, with an ever-changing constellation of transient scientists. For many of 
these employees – particularly at the junior level – their experience within the 
organisation is simply the unfolding of a great adventure. They get the chance to 
use cutting-edge instrumentation, to go on yearly scientific ‘retreats’ financed by 
the Society, to meet other enthusiastic scientists from across the world, and to 
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bask in the reflected glory of the Max Planck brand. Others however, particularly 
at the senior level, may start to rub up against some of the Society's constraints: 
the lack of a permanent position for many, the incomplete social protection for 
non-Germans, and the ideological foreclosure of ascent into the heroic stratum. To 
explain all of this, I again look to German history for answers. International 
scientists can be situated within Germany’s long-standing relationship to foreign 
labour, in its temporary nature and high emphasis on productivity. Meanwhile, the 
seismic social difference between senior scientists and directors has its precedents 
in the ‘mandarins’ of the German university system in the nineteenth-century 
(Ringer 1969), demonstrating the resilience of the hero principle from another 
angle. 
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 2. Setting and methodology  
 
 
 As the title suggests, this chapter can be split into two main parts: setting 
and methodology. My description of the setting has several strands to it. As I 
made the bold claim in the introduction, that the hierarchy of the Max Planck 
Society is ‘already there and has been for some while’, it becomes incumbent 
upon me to include a historical perspective on the organisation – as a preface to 
its contemporary character. With respect to hierarchy, this history is largely 
oriented around the inception and development of the Harnack principle, i.e. the 
centrality of the directors and the ideas of autonomy which surround them; 
although the recent globalisation of the Society has also impacted upon the 
recruitment of scientists. I then essentially take a Durkheimian turn, exploring 
the organisation's ‘social facts’ (1982) through its statistics. In relation to the 
latest chapters, some of the most pertinent of these are: the very small number of 
directors relative to the whole population and the comparative ethnicities of 
scientists and technicians. By the third section, I reach the most prosaic meaning 
of a setting, offering physical descriptions of what I call the Primary and 
Secondary Institutes, where I spent the majority of the ethnographic process. 
 
 Methodology is another multivalent term. I first present the method in a 
bare quantitative manner: with a record of activity and a footnoted timeline, as 
well as the precise numbers of participants. I then problematize the definition of 
‘participation’ and follow this up with a description of how I obtained access to 
the Institutes. In the final two sections, the discussion of methodology becomes 
more particular to anthropology, as I acknowledge the reflexive turn from several 
vantage points. The first series of these address the peculiar nature of my 
position inside the organisation, which could change depending on whom I was 
interacting with, but which always deepened my understanding of the Society in 
some way. Finally, I inscribe the elements of my own subjectivity which 
recognisably influenced the way the thesis developed, from its research through 
to writing up. 
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 i) The history of the Max Planck Society 
 
 At the centennial celebration of the University of Berlin on 11th October 
1910, thousands of scholars, students and public figures gathered in its newly 
rebuilt assembly hall to listen to Kaiser Wilhelm II. ‘First with visible 
excitement, and then with deep emotion and solemn seriousness’, the monarch 
expressed his wish before the crowd, that ‘under my name and protection a new 
society will be founded, charged with the task of building and preserving 
research facilities’ to work ‘alongside the Academy of Science and the 
Universities…as integral parts of the whole scientific organism’ in Germany.1 
Through this, he claimed, the original vision of Wilhelm von Humboldt when 
founding the University of Berlin – of establishing a nation-wide scientific 
community – would finally be brought to fruition. The Kaiser saw this task as ‘a 
sacred challenge that the present demands’, its success the performance of his 
own ‘patriotic duty’.2 It would be called the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft 
(hereafter Kaiser Wilhelm Society or KWG).3 
 
 The speech was written by Adolf von Harnack, a Prussian Lutheran 
theologian at the university, and tutor to the monarch’s children. While the 
Kaiser would be the eponymous protector of the KWG, Harnack was in every 
sense, its founder (and would become its first president), and these narratives and 
connections are his. He was clearly taking pains to assert a historical continuity 
with the University of Berlin (now Humboldt University), having chosen to 
announce the establishment of the KWG on its centenary and inside its own 
buildings. Much like the turbulence in Germany and Europe at the turn of the 
nineteenth century, created by the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars, the 
turn of the twentieth was again beset by mass social unrest and combusting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  ‘Zuerst	  mit	  merkbarer	  Erregung,	  dann	  mit	  tiefer	  Ergriffenheit	  und	  heiligem	  Ernst…unter	  Meinem	  Protektorat	  und	  Namen	  eine	  Gesellschaft	  zu	  begründen,	  die	  sich	  die	  Errichtung	  und	  Erhaltung	  von	  Forschungsstätten	  zur	  Aufgabe	  stellt…neben	  der	  Akademie	  der	  Wissenschaften	  und	  der	  Universität…als	  intrgrierende	  Teile	  des	  wissenschaftlichen	  Gesamtorganismus’,	  (speech	  and	  its	  description	  published	  in	  a	  newspaper	  at	  the	  time,	  ‘Täglichen	  Rundschau’,	  (The	  Daily	  Review),	  cited	  in	  Vom	  Brocke	  (1990:	  27-­‐30).	  2	  ‘Eine	  heilige	  Aufgabe	  der	  Gegenwart’,	  ‘landesväterliche	  Pflicht’	  (ibid:	  30).	  3	  For	  early	  clarification,	  but	  as	  I	  will	  go	  on	  to	  show,	  it	  is	  this	  organisation	  which	  is	  later	  renamed	  as	  the	  ‘Max-­‐Planck	  Gesellschaft’	  in	  1948.	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diplomatic tensions. Indeed while this ceremony was taking place, bloody battles 
between striking workers and state police filled the roads not far away (Vom 
Brocke 1990: 31). The founding of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society – just like the 
founding of the University of Berlin – was presented as a soothing balm to heal 
the nation’s ills, one pillar of Wilhelmine Sammlungspolitik (the politics of 
national cohesion) to bring Germany’s warring factions together. At the opening 
of its first Institutes, children from the local Gymnasia were invited to occupy the 
vanguard of those who lined the streets: the embodiment of a healthy and 
prosperous posterity.4 His invocation of Wilhelm von Humboldt is also 
significant. Humboldt was a figure whom Harnack quoted often, and clearly 
drew great strength from (Vierhaus 1996: 138). The link I posit between the 
major exponents of German Idealism, and the philosophy of the Max Planck 
Society today, was thus already historically causal to its very inception. 
 
 The new society would be research-oriented – taking Minerva the Roman 
Goddess of Wisdom as its heraldic symbol – liberated from the pedagogy and 
bureaucratic excesses of the universities, and oriented around a principle of self-
governance. Its main fields of research would be natural scientific, although the 
humanities and social sciences were not necessarily excluded. It would start life 
in Berlin, but then expand across Germany. The first Institutes were thus 
grounded in the natural sciences: Institutes for Chemistry and Physical and 
Electrochemistry opened in Berlin-Dahlem in 1912, and Experimental Therapy 
nearby in 1913. However as early as 1914 the human sciences were also 
represented through the opening of the ‘Bibliotheca Hertziana’ – an art historical 
library based in Rome – and the announcement of an ‘Institute for German 
History’ to open on the site of the Royal Library of Berlin. Both got off to a 
fraught start however, as activity in the Bibliotheca was halted when the Italians 
entered the First World War in 1915, and the opening of the Institute for German 
History delayed as a consequence of the war until 1917. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Photographs	  published	  in	  Vom	  Brocke	  (1990:	  60-­‐61).	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 Despite taking the name of the imperial monarch, the KWG was in fact 
classified as a private company: a ‘GmbH’.5 This move distinguished it from the 
German universities still further. It would be financed through a mixture of a 
small amount of state support, and a large amount of private patronage from 
individual and corporate donors drawn from the ranks of Germany’s industrial 
class. Harnack’s expansive network of wealthy and powerful friends was critical 
in garnering the substantial financial outlay and maintenance costs the KWG 
required: the guest list of this opening ceremony reading like a ‘who’s who of 
German industry’.6 Indeed several key industrialists and financiers were 
appointed as members of its newly formed ‘Senate’.7 Another effect of the 
KWG’s private status meant that it was exempt from the laws governing civil 
servants. This in fact had many progressive consequences, as it meant the 
Society could legally employ women – Lise Meitner for example, the eminent 
experimental physicist, was given a permanent position in the Institute for 
Chemistry in 1913 – and was more open to the employment of non-Germans. 
 
 Such openness predictably came to a juddering halt with the 
‘Nazification’ of the KWG from 1933 - 1945: what former president Hubert 
Markl once called the ‘dark shadows’ (dunklen Schatten) of the Society’s history 
(1998: 9). Initially this took the form of purging Jewish and leftist scientists from 
the Institutes, and their replacement with others more amenable to the regime. It 
then became facilitation of the Nazis’ ‘Ayran Science Movement’ and ‘Aryan 
Technology Movement’ which prioritized research and development into racial 
hygiene, autarky and rearmament (Heim et al. 2009: 2). In following their 
ideological agendas, KWG scientists became intimately involved in some of the 
Nazis’ worst atrocities. The Institutes for Anthropology and Biochemistry were 
linked to some of the inhuman experiments carried out in concentration camps, 
while the Institute for Brain Research used the brains of victims of so-called 
‘euthanasia programmes’ at Auschwitz, in their efforts to find a scientific basis 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  It	  stands	  for	  ‘Gesellschaft	  (G)	  mit(m)	  beschränkter(b)	  Haftung(H)’:	  in	  other	  words,	  a	  ‘company	  with	  limited	  liability’.	  This	  particular	  legal	  status	  was	  established	  in	  Germany	  in	  1892,	  and	  means	  that	  it	  is	  a	  private	  enterprise,	  but	  that	  the	  accountability	  for	  debts	  and	  bankruptcy	  falls	  to	  the	  state	  rather	  than	  the	  owners.	  6	  http://www.mpg.de/946619/event2	  	  	  7	  Among	  these	  were	  Henry	  Theodore	  von	  Böttinger,	  a	  key	  player	  in	  the	  chemical	  industry,	  Walther	  vom	  Rath,	  a	  scientist	  and	  co-­‐founder	  of	  I.G.	  Farben,	  and	  Leopold	  Koppel,	  a	  very	  wealthy	  Jewish	  bank-­‐owner.	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for determining race (Schmuhl 2009). The Society even made use of around a 
thousand forced labourers to carry out its research, including scientists and 
technicians being made to work against their will. For many years afterwards, 
this bleak episode was effectively suppressed by the Society in what has been 
called its ‘whitewash culture’ (Sachse 2009). Key figures like president Adolf 
Butenandt, presented the Society as one of the many victims of Nazism.  
 
 This whitewash has now been stripped away, particularly through the use 
of documents which have only lately become available (Heim et. al. 2009).8 
Rather than being a victim, Heim maintains that ‘up until the very last weeks of 
the war, the KWS was an effective and dependable partner of the National 
Socialist regime’ (ibid: 8). One could even say that the KWG in some ways 
thrived under Nazism. The total budget trebled from 1933-1944, and rather than 
constraining research – much like the relaxation of legal protocols governing 
society (Agamben 2005) – the National Socialists expansively relaxed ethical 
protocols governing science, a fact which scientists could take unprecedented 
advantage of. KWG scientists entered into what Rüdiger Hachtmann has called a 
‘Faustian Pact’ with the National Socialists (2009: 44): in which they both 
accommodated themselves to their demands, while simultaneously exploiting the 
new financial and ethical freedoms they were given, to pursue their own 
scientific questions.9 
 
 After the capitulation of Germany to the Allies in 1945, the whole future 
of its foremost research organisation was thrown into question. It should not be 
assumed that the transition of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society into the Max Planck 
Society was in any way straightforward, or a simple act of renaming. Rather, the 
survival of the Society in Germany only came about through very active 
decision-making on the part of the Allied powers – in talks with leading German 
scientists – particularly the British who offered ‘exceptional’ support to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  The	  Max	  Planck	  Archive	  has	  a	  ‘sixty-­‐year	  rule’	  to	  safeguard	  the	  autonomy	  of	  its	  directors.	  This	  means	  that	  documents	  must	  rest	  for	  sixty	  years	  before	  being	  made	  available	  to	  historians.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  its	  archives	  from	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war	  were	  opened	  as	  late	  as	  2005.	  9	  In	  2001,	  under	  the	  presidency	  of	  Hubert	  Markl,	  the	  Max	  Planck	  Society	  officially	  accepted	  responsibility	  for	  the	  crimes	  committed	  under	  Nazism	  (Heim	  et	  al.	  2009:	  7).	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process (Oexle 1995: 7).10 It also rested on long discussions among the 
international scientific community about how the MPG would differ from its 
predecessor. As a result when the Society was officially founded on 26th 
February 1948 in Göttingen as ‘The Max Planck Society for the Advancement of 
Science, e.V’, ‘everyone breathed an enormous sigh of relief’ that its future as a 
research organisation was finally secured (Heinemann 1990: 407).11  
 
 Not only would the new organisation naturally be demilitarized and 
‘denazified’, it would change its legal status from a ‘GmbH’ to an ‘e.V’ 
(einvertragener Verein): a private enterprise to a not-for-profit organisation. It 
would be financed therefore – according to the ‘Königsteiner Agreement’ – 
partly by the Länder which hosted the Institutes, and partly by the Federal 
Government (Ebersold 1998: 158). This financial structure was intended to 
provide the material basis for the freedom outlined in Article 1.2 of its founding 
statutes, which has been cited by directors ever since.12 One major consequence 
of the KWG’s nefarious activities during the Third Reich, has thus been an 
ideological entrenchment of the notion of directorial autonomy in its successor 
(Ebersold 1998). 
 
 Fast forward now to the 1960s, when this notion of freedom enshrined in 
the statutes – which was at least partly freedom for individual directors to govern 
the Institutes as they will – came under increasing attack.13 In 1964 the directors 
attempted to mollify the charge of being omnipotent autocrats by diluting 
Harnack’s original concept of a ‘central figurehead’, around whom the Institutes 
were organised. The number of directors per Institute was increased from one to 
at least three, transforming this formerly individual position into a ‘collegial 
directorship’, in which each would take turn to act as its managing director 
(Gerwin 1996: 211). Yet for many this did not go far enough. In the wake of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Indeed,	  this	  historian	  argues	  that	  ‘The	  unavoidable	  conclusion	  is	  that	  without	  this	  support	  from	  the	  British	  	  there	  would	  be	  no	  Max-­‐Planck-­‐Gesellschaft	  today’	  (ibid).	  The	  first	  title	  of	  the	  new	  organisation	  was	  in	  fact	  ‘The	  Max	  Planck	  Society	  for	  the	  advancement	  of	  science	  in	  the	  British	  zone’	  (ibid,	  5).	  11	  ‘gab	  es	  ein	  grosses	  Aufatmen’.	  12	  Cf.	  Chapter	  3.i.	  13	  The	  statutory	  changes	  outlined	  in	  this	  paragraph	  however,	  bear	  little	  relation	  to	  the	  ideological	  entrenchment	  of	  the	  director’s	  position.	  
	   53	  
1968 revolt, the directors felt the force of its anti-hierarchical critique very 
directly when they were pelted with eggs by students on entering their General 
Meeting (Hauptversammlung) in June 1969 (Gerwin 1996). Three years later and 
armed with the knowledge that they had to change to survive, the members of the 
General Meeting in 1972 finally voted to introduce an ‘external advisory board’ 
(Fachbeirat), to which the directors would be rendered accountable, and a 
‘union’ (Betriebsrat) which all employees bar the directors were permitted to 
join (Henning et al. 1998: 219). Both of these institutions remain today as key 
structures in its internal governance, although the Betriebsrat tends to be 
dominated by the technical staff. 
 
 The next turning point came in 1989 with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and its German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republic). 
Consistent with Humboldt and Harnack’s belief that a community of scientific 
scholarship could facilitate national unity, there was an energetic move to expand 
the Max Planck Society into the states of the former East Germany as part of the 
process of reunification. The directors adhered to the idea that ‘The Max Planck 
Society should taken on the same role in the new states as it has in the old ones’ 
(Henning et. al. 1998: 399).14 In the 1990s the Society therefore ‘changed 
immeasurably’ (Lorraine Daston, pers. comm). New Institutes were constructed 
across the former DDR: in Potsdam, Halle, Dresden, Leipzig, Magdeburg, Jena 
and Rostock, and hundreds of formerly East German scientists invited to fill 
them.  
 
 Die Wende (the transitional period after reunification) also inaugurated a 
new era of more profound internationalisation for the Society. Since 1948, it has 
always remained firmly international in outlook; yet it is fair to say this was 
intensified in the 1990s with the reemergence of a unified Germany as a 
powerful nation state on the world stage. There was an increasing surge towards 
the recruitment of foreign directors, one which had a ‘snowball effect’ on the 
recruitment of foreign scientists (ibid): as they often brought compatriots with 
them, and other non-Germans were encouraged to apply for positions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  ‘Die	  Max-­‐Planck-­‐Gesellschaft	  solle	  in	  den	  neuen	  Ländern	  die	  gleiche	  Rolle	  einnehmen,	  die	  sie	  in	  den	  alten	  Ländern	  innehat’	  (from	  the	  speeches	  of	  Hans	  F.	  Zachers	  at	  the	  General	  Meeting,	  1993).	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Meanwhile internationalism became a persistent topic of debate. Symposiums 
and discussions were held at the Max Planck conference centre, Ringberg Castle, 
around the themes of ‘Mobility of researchers in the European Union’ (1993), 
‘The tension between nationalism and internationalism’ (1995), and 
‘Internationalism in research’ (1996). Like other ‘corporatized’ scholarly 
institutions, the MPG has also begun to expand more extensively abroad 
(Schrecker 2010). There are now no less than five standalone Max Planck 
Institutes outside Germany: in Italy, Holland, Luxembourg and the U.S, and this 
number appears to be one they are keen to increase. 
 
   
 ii) The Max Planck Society today 
 
 In Germany, the region of this study, the Society is a union of seventy-
five separate Institutes relatively evenly dispersed across all the Länder, each 
with an average of four directors and their own unique research direction. Oddly, 
this plurality and dispersion seems to be a remarkably little known fact. Indeed 
when explaining my research to others, so often did they assume that the ‘Max 
Planck Institute’ was just one place (and please could you say hello to so-and-so) 
that I began to see such confusion as ethnographic in its own right. An American 
scientist working for the Society believed the MPG did something ‘really smart’ 
by giving all their Institutes the same name. ‘It means that no matter who you 
talk to they think it's one Institute. They're like “Whoa! You're working at the 
Max Planck Institute!”…The brand name is really well known, so no matter what 
field people are working in, they'll know it’. For me however, this interpretation 
does not quite reach the nub of the problem. When the KWG was reincarnated as 
the MPG in 1948, there was significant pressure from the Allies to render the 
Society plural, calling the collective ‘Institutes’ rather than an ‘Institute’ or 
‘Society’, because of the toxic association of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society with the 
Third Reich (Heinemann 1990: 408). Way before any research organisation 
concerned itself with ‘branding’, the tenacity with which the idea of a unitary 
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entity was clung to – despite the significant influence of the Allies at this point – 
shows the degree to which it incarnated an important cultural logic.15  
 
 Consistent with the argument laid out in the introduction, this logic is the 
second kind of holism I identify: a social group articulated in individual form. 
The language of holism is even used in the Society’s official discourse, 'An 
important factor in the success of the Max Planck Society is the commitment of 
Scientific Members to think beyond their own departments in the interest of the 
Society as a whole’ (emphasis added).16 Calling the Society ‘Max Planck 
Institutes’ would fracture this we-principle. Any social group is ontologically 
prior: a unity (The Max Planck Institute), and a unity that is often expressed 
through the symbol of a single human being, in this case the Nobel-Prize 
winning German Physicist, Max Planck. 
 
 Before moving onto the particular context and unfolding of this thickly 
qualitative study, some basic quantitative demographic and financial information 
about the organisation will be necessary. At the time this research was 
undertaken there were 21,831 employees working across the Society as a 
whole.17 Of this sum: 277 were directors and scientific members (219 of whom 
work in the natural sciences), 6707 what I call ‘senior scientists’ (all those at 
postdoctoral level and above), 5908 what I call ‘junior scientists’ (all those at 
doctoral level or below), 865 visiting scientists (which may be either), 4261 
administrative staff, and 3813 technical workers. 
 
 The nationality of its employees also has a subsequent pertinence to my 
argument (particularly chapters 5 and 6), so I will also enumerate the numbers of 
Germans and non-Germans as far as the data permits. Of the directors, 30% of 
them claim foreign nationalities, while among all scientists the total percentage 
of foreign workers is 34.8%. There is no available data for the organisation as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Of	  course	  now	  the	  Max	  Planck	  ‘brand’	  is	  of	  the	  utmost	  important	  to	  its	  public	  relations	  team.	  But	  this	  kind	  of	  corporatization	  did	  not	  appear	  until	  (much	  like	  other	  research	  organisations	  and	  universities)	  the	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s.	  16	  http://www.mpg.de/39586/MPG_Introduction?page=3	  	  	  17	  Data	  valid	  as	  of	  1st	  January	  2012,	  see	  Annual	  Report	  2011	  (2012).	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whole, but in the first Institute I visited (the Primary Institute), this is highly 
concentrated at the postdoctoral level, 90% of whom come from abroad.18 Of the 
entire workforce however, just 17.3% claim foreign nationalities. This suggests 
that, although there is no explicit data for this group, among the administrative 
and technical workers in the MPG the number of non-German staff is almost 
negligible.    
 
 Meanwhile the current financial structure of the Society is reasonably 
similar to the one laid down at Königstein, with a few caveats. Taken as an 
aggregate, the proportion of public funding supporting the Society is now only 
80%: 40% of which comes from the Federal Government, and 40% from the 
State (Land) where the Institute is located. The remaining 20% comes from 'third 
parties'. These may be federal research organisations like the German Research 
Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft or DFG), the EU, extra-
European project-based funding or donations from private individuals. It is also 
partly drawn from industrial and commercial sources, although the Society likes 
to keep very quiet about that.19 Together, all of these funds meet its annual 
running cost of approximately €1.9bn, a comparatively small sum considering its 
spatial distribution, and roughly the same as just one American university – a 
director tells me with a measure of pride. 
 
  
 iii) Ethnography 
 
 I spent a total of fifteen months doing active and partially itinerant 
ethnography inside the Max Planck Society (including a three month break for 
data processing), spread over a period of twenty-six months from June 2010 to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Participants	  from	  other	  Institutes	  also	  suggested	  the	  number	  of	  foreign	  postdoctoral	  scientists	  was	  equally	  high.	  	  19	  The	  MPI	  for	  Iron	  Research	  and	  the	  MPI	  for	  Coal	  Research,	  both	  in	  the	  state	  of	  North-­‐Rhine-­‐Westphalia,	  are	  in	  fact	  both	  formally	  Gmbhs,	  financed	  half	  by	  the	  Society,	  half	  by	  Industry.	  In	  other	  ‘e.V’	  Institutes	  however,	  a	  small	  proportion	  of	  their	  funding	  will	  also	  be	  drawn	  from	  private	  sources.	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August 2012.20 During this time I visited four separate Institutes (all oriented 
around natural sciences), the Administrative Headquarters in Münich, the Max 
Planck archive in Berlin-Dahlem, and the Max Planck castle, Schloss Ringberg 
(Ringberg Castle) in the Bavarian Alps. Because all these locations had some 
intrinsic relation to the Society as a whole – a community forged through 
collective gatherings such as the Directors’ Hauptversammlung and the meetings 
of the Betriebsrat, not to mention the powerful ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 
1991) generated by an enormous volume of print culture and a slick website – I 
do not consider this methodology ‘multi-sited’ in the conventional sense (Marcus 
1998).21 I was not revealing relationships by moving through them. Instead I 
experienced all of these places as iterations of one phenomenon with its own 
existential integrity, which preceded and outlasted my passing. This integrity was 
particularly pronounced when I moved from the first Institute in Berlin-
Brandenburg (hereafter the Primary Institute) to the second Institute in North-
Rhine-Westfalia (hereafter the Secondary Institute): the sites at which I spent the 
first continuous nine months of the ethnographic process. Of course there were 
subtle differences in moving from East to West, yet what struck me most was 
how the ‘principles’ I identify remained constant. These Institutes will remain 
anonymous to protect the identity of those directors who welcomed me in, 
although I will now paint a picture of them to offer the reader a sense of place.22 
 
 The Primary Institute is situated on a science park on the outskirts of 
Berlin: the city where I – and many of my colleagues at the Institute – lived. To 
get there thus meant commuting from one of Berlin’s major train stations, and as 
so many of us had chosen to live in the city and make the trip each day, dozens 
of scientists tumbled out at the local station each morning to be greeted by these 
pleasant bucolic surroundings. In summer the ten-minute walk which ensued, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Fieldwork	  timeline:	  June	  2010	  –	  December	  2010,	  Primary	  Institute;	  January	  2011	  –	  February	  2011,	  Secondary	  Institute;	  March	  2011	  –	  May	  2011,	  data	  processing;	  June	  2011	  –	  July	  2011,	  return	  to	  Primary	  Institute	  and	  visit	  to	  two	  further	  Institutes;	  August	  2012,	  visit	  to	  Ringberg	  Castle	  and	  the	  Administrative	  Headquarters	  in	  Münich.	  21	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  comprehensive	  ‘Bi-­‐annual	  reports’	  every	  Institute	  will	  publish	  as	  part	  of	  its	  evaluation	  process,	  the	  Society	  also	  publishes	  several	  magazines	  and	  newsletters	  in	  both	  English	  and	  German.	  These	  include:	  ‘Max	  Planck	  Intern’,	  ‘Max	  Planck	  Research’	  and	  the	  ‘Max	  Planck	  Journal’,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  whole	  host	  of	  informative	  pamphlets.	  22	  The	  Institutes	  will	  still	  be	  recognizable	  to	  those	  familiar	  with	  them,	  however	  in	  the	  era	  of	  keyword	  searches,	  choosing	  not	  to	  name	  them	  gives	  their	  occupants	  a	  layer	  of	  anonymous	  protection.	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from the village station to the Institute, was a delight. We would chat convivially 
in sleeveless tops and sunglasses. As the sun beat down, a brightly coloured mass 
of long grass with wild flowers in yellow, red and purple that hugged the road, 
reached upwards to meet it. In winter the scene was rather more bleak. Armed 
with thick winter coats against the cold easterly wind, in temperatures of up to 
minus ten, we crunched silently along the shallow passage cut into the snow by 
previous footsteps, focused upon our destination like an Alpine battalion. A few 
hundred metres beyond the station the road curves to the left, and the compound 
of buildings which form the Institute come into view, until then occluded by 
boxy grey and blue start-up companies which sit alongside it. The first building 
one apprehends is the ‘Guest House’, a shining neutral white, in contrast to the 
sleek dark grey and flashes of colour of the buildings next to it, housing 
laboratories and offices.23 On reaching these, our professional home, we reach 
for our ID cards to open the large automatic glass door. 
 
 Inside the building colour abounds. Dirty pinks, terracotta oranges, and 
ocean blues cover the walls, while framed scientific technicolour photographs 
hang from them like modern art. A series of lush overlarge shrubs are planted 
directly into the ground floor, wonderfully disturbing the boundaries between 
inside and out, and a capacious airy library, spread over three levels, looks over 
them. Everywhere, large windows give the main spaces a generous open feel. 
The corridors into which scientists trickle off to reach their labs and offices, do 
not share this voluptuousness however: their walls and doors coloured in 
predictable ‘view-from-nowhere’ greys and whites. At the end of each of these 
corridors is a small break-out area: with table, chairs and sink, and again lined 
floor-to-ceiling with glass, giving us the opportunity to gaze outside, at the green 
and yellow fields in the distance, or the metallic modern sculpture in the 
foreground. 
 
 There are a few characteristics of the compound’s architectural layout, 
which both betray and encourage its social divisions and continuities. The first is 
that the Institute’s administrative offices are housed in an entirely separate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Cf.	  Chapter	  6.i.	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building to the one in which scientific research takes place, accessible by a 
covered walkway, or a short trip across the courtyard. Thus the oft-stated claim 
of being ‘non-bureaucratic’ is materialised through the expulsion of bureaucracy 
from the palaces of research. In this same central building are the mechanical and 
electrical workshops, giving the communities of ‘fine mechanics’ and engineers 
which populate them, more autonomy from the departments, than the laboratory 
technicians who share space with the scientists. Within the departments, 
scientists and technicians will share up to four to one room, with group leaders 
sometimes given their own small office. The directors, meanwhile will often be 
situated on the top floors of the building, with large comfortable offices 
accessible through the ante-chambers of their secretaries’. The substantive 
qualitative difference that I posit between a director and even his immediate 
subordinate, a group leader, is visible at a glance from the Institute’s 
architectonics. 
 
 The Secondary Institute is again near a city, this time in the Land of 
North-Rhine-Westfalia, on the French border, and my commute is now rather 
more straightforward, being just a fifteen-minute walk from my flat. As I make 
my way there each day, I begin to realise I do so on a maze of names; Germany’s 
heroic tradition is inscribed into its very streets. Each sunny morning I trot down 
Humboldtstrasse, bisect Herderstrasse, only to reach Schillerstrasse, finally 
ending up on Max-Planck Strasse, on which the Institute is the one and only 
resident. It is a simple but elegant dark brown brick rectangular building, with 
slim horizontal windows of those rather elongated proportions that one sees 
across Germany. On its right hand side sit the multi-storey offices of German 
communications and industrial companies – to which scientists often go for 
lunch – while in front is a small car park for Society employees. 
 
 This is one of the few remaining Max Planck Institutes that was founded 
under the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, and which continue to pursue research today 
inside the very same building. It is therefore fundamentally different in character 
to the shiny and exuberant Primary Institute which was designed and constructed 
in the 1990s. On entering, its dense historicity is immediately tangible. The entire 
wall adjacent to the stairwell – which one must ascend to reach reception – is 
	   60	  
covered with a striking bronze and stainless-steel low-relief, depicting booted 
and hatted workers labouring in steel production, a silver river of which runs 
from top to bottom. Meanwhile elsewhere in the interior, its comparatively 
antediluvian past is expressed through multiple material cues. Life-size bronze 
busts of eminent German scientists and former directors reside in corridors and 
stairwells. Small museum-style display cases are propped up against walls, 
holding treasure troves of obsolete technology: early scientific cameras and 
measuring devices, many aesthetically encased in hinged orange-brown wooden 
boxes. On one landing there is a photographic reproduction of Max Planck 
himself, with his characteristic gauche gentility, symbolically knocking in the 
Institute’s own foundation stone with a small hammer. One of the workshops 
even has a primitive metal forger – that still works – which was assembled along 
with the Institute in the 1930s.24 
 
 Nevertheless it is architecturally similar to the Primary Institute in the 
sense of being a compound of contiguous structures – some of which are 
conjoined by covered walkways – rather than one all-encompassing unit. The 
area I arrive at through reception comprises one of these, a building with several 
floors of laboratories and offices, with the small administration occupying one 
particular wing. The department in which I spend most of my days is in another 
one, as are the workshops. Here it strikes a contrast with my previous host, in 
which the latter are located separately, alongside the administration. On leaving 
the department’s main corridor which hosts the director’s office, I am steered 
perpendicularly onto another with a line of scientists’ offices on the left, and on 
the other side just a waist-high balcony with glass above it. The scene which 
manifests itself below as I walk forward consists of four successive warehouse-
like spaces: the first akin to a storage room, full of boxes of various kinds, the 
second an animated workshop, and the third and fourth also clearly workshops of 
a sort populated with metal-treatment machinery, but rarely ever people.25 
Manual work, as is evident too from that relief, is not something shameful and 
hidden away, but rendered fully – even voyeuristically – visible to anyone 
visiting the department. My office meanwhile, is situated in yet another unit of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Cf.	  Chapter	  5.vii	  25	  The	  second	  workshop	  is	  described	  in	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  5.i.	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the compound: a large atrium-like hall with single and multiple-occupancy 
offices and seminar-rooms along the side, and a host of bulky metal-testing 
machines – some over twenty-feet high – on the concrete floor in the middle. 
Like the machinery in the third and fourth workshops these appear to be rarely 
used. Some of them date from the 1960s and 70s, and I am told many are soon to 
be gotten rid of, to make space for the research programme of a new director. 
 
 The fieldwork process as a whole involved a total of eighty-six 
participants: fifty-eight from the Primary Institute, twenty-one from the 
Secondary Institute, four from the third Institute, two from the fourth, as well as 
one interlocutor from the Max Planck Administration. Of this eighty-six: nine 
were Directors, fifty-four scientists, and the remaining twenty-three technicians. 
 
 I have designated ‘participants’, those individuals who were willing to 
engage in at least one formal conversation, and whose testimonies are included in 
the fieldnotes, although may not have made it in any obvious way into the 
thesis.26 Some of these were digitally recorded, while others were recorded 
manually. In some cases I shared up to four of these semi-structured 
conversations with the same person. With the directors these almost always took 
place in their private offices; with scientists in some public area such as the 
Institute library, break-out area, or canteen, or even in a café or restaurant outside 
the Institute; and with the technicians most often in the laboratories and 
workshops they worked in.27 In contrast to the scientists, technicians were often 
more loquacious and relaxed when surrounded by the familiar comfort of their 
equipment, which often became elicitation devices for our discussions. This 
formal count does not include the extended group of people with whom I 
attended various social gatherings as a fellow member of the Institutes: seminars, 
group meetings, conferences and talks, as well as a four-day trip to the Baltic 
coast as part of one department’s annual ‘retreat’. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  As	  a	  consequence	  this	  does	  not	  include	  the	  many	  others	  whom	  I	  met	  and	  conversed	  with	  in	  a	  casual	  capacity,	  or	  those	  with	  whom	  I	  was	  familiar,	  yet	  who	  did	  not	  feel	  comfortable	  overtly	  taking	  part	  in	  the	  ethnography.	  27	  Although	  cf.	  Chapter	  4.vii	  for	  an	  account	  of	  conversations	  with	  directors	  outside	  their	  offices.	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 Access to all of these sites was relatively straightforward, and where this 
was not necessarily the case (as for instance with the castle) it has become part of 
my ethnographic account. Predictably, the single most important gatekeeper in 
each department is the director, and it was these individuals who were either 
open and excited at the prospect of an anthropological visit, or not as was 
sometimes the case. I first made contact with one director from the Primary 
Institute in early 2010, suggesting an initial visit of four months (which ended up 
being extended to seven), and he was enthused by the idea being keen on 
interdisciplinary collaborations in general. Near the end of my stay he put me in 
contact with another (‘who might be open to these kinds of things’) from the 
Secondary Institute, and with whom I spent a subsequent two months. I came to 
the third Institute in June 2011 through a friend of Michael Taussig, who had 
generously provided me with contacts in Berlin, and visited the fourth at around 
the same time simply by emailing its directors cold. One of them in fact turned 
out to already be the research participant of a well-known sociologist of science, 
demonstrating what was probably true for many of them: that they had prior 
sympathies for social research and thus were intrigued by the prospect of 
participating in such a study. 
 
 
 iv) Reflexive objectivity 
 
 Having provided an overview of the Society in historical and 
contemporary perspective, and laid out in a straightforwardly empirical manner, 
the context and content of the ethnography, it behooves me now to explore my 
own situatedness in more depth.28 If the person of the ethnographer is the 
primary research tool, how has that tool been put to use? I refer to two kinds of 
situatedness in the following sections: ‘reflexive objectivity’ and ‘reflexive 
subjectivity’. By reflexive objectivity I mean the manner in which I was 
apprehended, appropriated, understood or misunderstood in both conscious and 
unconscious ways as certain kind of ‘thing’ inside the MPG –researcher, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  The	  previous	  section	  in	  particular	  is	  significant	  for	  me	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  my	  obligations	  to	  my	  participants,	  many	  of	  whom	  have	  expressed	  an	  interest	  in	  reading	  the	  thesis,	  and	  as	  scientists	  would	  wish	  to	  know	  from	  exactly	  which	  sources	  I	  have	  drawn	  my	  data.	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scientist, spy, government agent, guest or mirror – and the spectrum of 
epistemological consequences this objectification had. Meanwhile reflective 
subjectivity implies the instincts, interests, and socio-political exposure I have 
and have had as a human subject while undertaking this project, again with 
reference to the specific impacts on the study. 
 
 On arriving at the Primary Institute, my immediate identity was one of 
fellow researcher. This was made particularly apparent during the first few days 
of fieldwork, when I am invited to join in the bi-monthly process of cleaning one 
of the large experimental labs. Keen to get stuck in, fade in, and with the doctrine 
of participant observation ringing in my ears, I make an attempt at being useful 
by washing up some beakers in the sink. The junior scientists seem a little 
surprised, but carry on with the frenetic business of filing away rogue samples 
and wiping down table–tops. Minutes later, the senior scientist in charge sees me 
there. Aghast, he instructs me to remove the marigolds immediately, ‘You don't 
need to help us, I thought you wanted to observe the cleaning process?’ So came 
the first lesson in community appropriation. The MPG takes the business of 
research enormously seriously, and so I as a researcher, should be allowed to 
perform my task unobstructed, as they saw it. As a consequence despite my 
protestations, I was accorded an almost entirely non-functional role throughout 
the organisation for the duration of fieldwork. The only tasks besides research 
that I was permitted to undertake, were those appropriate to a knowledge–
worker, namely: proof–reading scientific articles for English language and 
grammar, translating departmental protocols from German to English, or giving 
seminars about my project.  
 
 This is one particular way to encounter an organisation. Among 
anthropologists who have carried out similar studies, their methodology 
generally falls into one of two categories: what I call ‘omniscients’ (Born 2004, 
Kunda 1992, Sedgwick 2007, Traweek 1988) and ‘residents’ (Mosse 2006, 
Latour and Woolgar 1979, Pellegram 1998, Riles 2000). Omniscients – like 
myself – assume a non-productive role within the community, transcending 
social strata in the process. An omniscient methodology is more likely to be 
successful when this has been fully negotiated prior to beginning fieldwork, as it 
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may be difficult for communities to accept the degree of movement the 
ethnographer would wish for: full social mobility usually being the sole property 
of those with the highest status (Perwez 2008). If it is sanctioned however, 
omniscience presents a unique opportunity to view the organisation from 
multiple perspectives. The danger of course, is a lack of depth in any one of 
these. Residents meanwhile, are situated within one sphere of the organisation, 
often being employed in some formal capacity and performing some kind of 
formal work within it. A resident has the obvious advantage of being able to 
profoundly experience the organisation from one point of view. This is also its 
drawback, as it forecloses those of others. In short, if the organisation is an 
apartment–building, residents are tenants occupying one room with a formal 
contract with the landlord, while omniscients are more like porters, with keys to 
every door, from the basement to the penthouse suite. 
 
 As a result I was able to move up and down the ranks of this small 
society. From director, to group leader, to independent researcher, to post-doc, to 
Ph.D. student, to intern, to student–worker, I was theoretically free to ask 
employees about their histories and future plans, the nature of their work and 
their attitude towards it. In some cases I spent many days trailing single 
individuals, following the rhythms of their days rather than simply interrupting 
them. Crossing social strata could have its advantages. Scientists were often 
reassured, and sometimes even a little impressed, that the director was also 
taking part, ‘You mean you talked to him just like we are talking now?’ However 
it is impossible to ignore the fact, that it was precisely in crossing social strata 
that rendered them significant. It was the Society's refusal, in their veneration for 
research, to weigh me down with a practical role, that made possible the 
conceptual holism this thesis adopts. 
 
 As well as being a researcher in the general sense, it was also assumed I 
was a scientist in the specific. This stemmed partly from the German linguistic 
collapse of all academic activities into science, ‘Wissenschaft’ (which can mean 
both science and scholarship as a whole); but also from the ubiquitous 
assumption that ‘anthropology is a science’ through which my participants 
appeared to reassure themselves somewhat. The natural corollary of this was that 
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my project would be carried out using ‘the scientific method’: namely one which 
is linear, systematic, and always, always, always, hypothesis–driven.  
 
 The major consequence of this was a misappropriation of instrumentality 
on my part. My haphazard wanderings between individuals, based almost 
entirely on who I had gotten talking to, were described as ‘all part of the 
method’. They were always trying to work out what that method was, and 
presented me with a barrage of questions to find out: ‘So what is interesting for 
you?’, ‘What kind of data are you collecting?’, ‘In terms of your experimental 
planning, how do you plan?’ The extent of their inquisitiveness seemed to know 
no bounds. A director once told me a story about a Scandinavian film he had 
seen in which a management consultant was sent into a small Swedish 
community to observe how people lived. The consultant sat on a high chair in the 
kitchen of one of the houses, observing and noting down events as they unfolded. 
After a while, the old man who lived there became so irritated by this, that he 
went to the room above the kitchen, sawed a hole through the floorboards, and 
started assiduously observing the consultant and taking notes. Their endless 
questioning was a little like sawing through those floorboards, an attempt to 
scrutinize the reasoning behind my recording, just as they felt I was scrutinizing 
them. 
 
 However the assumption that I was following some kind of systematic 
method could at times diffuse into a generalised paranoia. One scientist asked if 
what he said would be going on his ‘file’, while another half–jokingly whether I 
was a ‘spy from Munich’, the site of the administrative headquarters. The 
problems this posed to my relations with the scientists were fairly minor. 
However it did introduce a level of second–guessing from some participants 
which made my interactions with them rather strained. It was only many months 
later after returning from the field, that I came to realise that there was in fact a 
structural pattern to these strained relations: they were all senior scientists in 
non-permanent positions. The affective character of my interactions thus later 
became a fundamental tool in forging some of the thesis’ major analytical 
positions. 
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 My identity as a Wissenschaftler among the technicians meanwhile, had a 
different range of effects.29 Where scientists were bubbling over with questions, 
the technicians seemed more comfortable accepting some degree of opacity, just 
as they did not need to understand the theoretical intricacies of every 
experimental project they assisted. On one occasion I overheard a technician 
joking benignly with her colleague in an aside, ‘Ich habe keine Ahnung worum es 
geht’ (I have absolutely no idea what it’s about). However, a lack of 
comprehension could again slide into personal projections, particularly about the 
practical purpose of such Wissenschaft. I was amazed to hear, in the very final 
weeks of my ethnography within one department with which I had had a lengthy 
relationship, and in which I had given numerous papers and answered numerous 
questions, that a technician I had worked with asked a group leader in all 
innocence, whether my study was related to the recent initiative of the German 
government to introduce ‘Leistungsorientiertebezahlung’: performance-related 
pay. In hindsight I recognise how unprecedented and confusing my presence 
within the Society must have been for them: particularly in hierarchical terms. If 
one of the effects of hierarchy is to fix definitions of the person, the uncanny 
quality of my identity as a scientist must have felt cognitively dissonant. I was 
told some of the technicians felt ‘uneasy’ because I did ‘not fit into the 
structure’: ‘they didn't know whether to obey you’. 
  
 My third identity meanwhile was as a ‘guest’. In the Primary Institute this 
was largely produced by one senior scientist, under whose care I was put for the 
duration of my stay. He was to be my first point of call for any questions or 
concerns, and maintained a watchful eye over my progress, expressing a kindly 
attentiveness that I was getting the information I ‘needed’, and shone with 
approval on the perception that I was ‘well integrated’. This was what Michael 
Agar would call the ‘professional stranger-handler’ of the community (1980: 59), 
as he sometimes made reference to the ‘looking after’ of other visitors besides 
myself. It was an activity which took up a great deal of his time he told me, ‘you 
have to organise a whole day for them. And we take this quite seriously. We 
want people to feel comfortable’. Unlike the visitors of the Stanford linear 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Incidentally	  my	  work	  with	  the	  technicians	  presented	  the	  greatest	  methodological	  challenge	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons,	  which	  is	  why	  some	  of	  this	  material	  has	  been	  integrated	  into	  Chapter	  5.	  
	   67	  
accelerator Centre – referred to as ‘users’ (Traweek 1988: 16) – I and all of the 
several hundred other visiting researchers in the Max Planck Society annually 
were there formally as ‘guests’ (Gastwissenschaftler). Another scientist there for 
just a few months, told me how overwhelmed he was by the generosity of time 
and energy he had been given: ‘Sometimes I feel like they will push aside 
everything they're doing because I'm there with a problem, and they want to deal 
with it right now because I'm a guest’. The extraordinarily thoughtful and 
carefully managed way in which I was apprehended as a guest in all of the 
Institutes I visited, brought me to a fuller awareness of how significant the 
guest/host relationship is to the Max Planck Society. It is one mode through 
which the logic of precarity is effectively managed, without diluting the socio-
centric integrity of its internal communities. 
 
 The final thing into which my identity shape–shifted was a mirror: one 
onto which participants could render visible some version of themselves or their 
own understanding. For some, this process of elicited reflection appeared to offer 
catharsis, a sense of relief almost, that in a world where individual biography has 
become intensely ‘individualised’ (Beck 1992) there was someone there to bear 
witness to their plans, projects, and experiences. Towards the end of my dialogue 
with one scientist over a glass of wine in Berlin, he concluded, ‘I must say, when 
I'm sitting talking with you, and I think back, I'm really proud of how things 
went’. It was generally among the international scientists that I assumed this 
mirroring function, although it could be the case for directors too if our 
encounter was a fleeting one. Among technicians, the mirror almost always 
reflected an image of proud industry, and how this contributed in some positive 
way to the work of the Institute. Unprompted, one workshop technician insisted 
on taking me round the whole compound, and it was only halfway through that I 
realised it was a guided tour of his achievements: technical artifacts he had 
designed and constructed himself. The only thing to say epistemologically about 
this role, was that it was in the glass of the mirror, that the majority of the 
individual testimonies that pepper this thesis first appeared. 
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 v) Reflexive subjectivity 
   
 The ‘meta-language’ (Moore 2009: 210) of research that I and the 
scientists shared, led to a series of discussions about epistemology: mostly 
orientated around the role of ethnographer and its impact. In the course of these 
discussions, I often found it challenging to impress that the data produced by a 
human being (rather than a machine) could also form the basis of scholarly 
knowledge. One participant maintained that the validity of anthropological 
knowledge was rendered void by the very nature of its production being ‘person–
dependent’ (somehow missing the irony that the Max Planck Society proudly 
proclaims itself as ‘person-oriented’). The most reliable study would result, in his 
view, from planting ‘hidden cameras’ and requesting ‘access to everyone's e-
mails’: a ‘mechanical objectivity’ (Daston and Galison 2007: 115-190) which 
performs its own truth claim by erasing the subject from view. On the contrary – 
quite apart from being ethically indefensible – as the previous section goes to 
show, it is precisely in the fires of interaction between research and researched 
that new forms of knowledge are authenticated. Ethnography does remain quite 
brilliantly person–dependent, and I shall now reflect as far as auto–analysis and 
relevance permits, what my person brought to the interaction, to make that fire 
crackle in a particular way. 
 
 The first thing to note is the epistemological stance I came to assume, 
namely that ethnography is an art and not a science. Here I run with an emerging 
pack of scholars who have made a departure from the swathe of ethnographic 
manuals published in the 1980s, which sought to renew ethnographic authority 
by means of systematic vigour (Agar 1980, Hammersley and Atkinson 1983, 
Bernard 1988). Like Holbraad's insistence, following Roy Wagner, on 
anthropological truth as ‘invented definition’ (2009: 87), Luker's thesis that the 
social scientific method should model itself on ‘salsa dancing’ (2008), or most 
comprehensively, Harry Wolcott's case for the ‘art of fieldwork’ (2002), the 
ethnographic method for me became a clear sub-species of the artistic rather than 
scientific genus. 
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 The guiding principle which draws ethnography into the world of artistic 
production is what E. L. Feinberg calls ‘the authority of intuition’ (1987: 147).30 
In other words, attempts at being ‘systematic’, i.e. progressing in a way external 
to the process of thinking, I always found somehow singularly unhelpful. The 
only way forward was to leapfrog from intuition to intuition, pursuing those 
which vibrated at the highest frequency. Fieldwork for me, was quite literally, 
feeled work. 
 
 Yet what did this mean pragmatically? Aside from being mostly very far 
removed from the instrumentalism projected upon me, the major consequence 
was a change of topic. It was feeled work and not fieldwork per se which 
nurtured my interest in, and understanding of, hierarchy. I had arrived in 
Germany with the intention of examining the implicit philosophy of a particular 
scientific practice – which for the sake of anonymity I will not describe. Yet even 
within the first few weeks there were large sub–headings in my fieldnotes 
reading ‘Max Planck Culture – time and flow’, ‘Max Planck Culture – hierarchy 
vs. egalitarianism’ and ‘Max Planck Culture – Director’, with anecdotes and 
reflections beneath. Hierarchy was inscribing itself into my account. However it 
took me more than six months to consciously recognise what was happening. So 
tenaciously did I cling onto the original project (and still under the spell to some 
degree of that 80s notion of systematicity) that the ultimate about–turn I took was 
a dramatic one. Letting go and acquiescing to the intuitive and spontaneous 
nature of the ethnography and where it was heading, I finally embraced the new 
topic with alacrity.   
 
 The second way in which my own subjectivity played itself out was in 
relation to ethnicity. Being a mixture of Scots (where I was raised), Iranian (from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Feinberg	  is	  not	  suggesting	  intuition	  has	  no	  role	  to	  play	  in	  science.	  In	  mathematics,	  he	  posits,	  intuitive	  guessing	  may	  predict	  the	  result	  of	  a	  given	  problem	  (1987:	  31),	  just	  as	  my	  participants	  might	  unabashedly	  refer	  to	  their	  “physical	  intuition”	  when	  interpreting	  a	  graph.	  However,	  a	  subsequent	  process	  of	  logical	  reasoning	  must	  calculate	  and	  thereby	  confirm	  that	  the	  result	  is	  correct.	  It	  is	  only	  this	  logical	  sequence	  which	  proves	  the	  result,	  in	  the	  final	  analysis	  the	  part	  played	  by	  intuition	  is	  discarded.	  As	  he	  says,	  ‘Here	  intuition	  plays	  the	  role	  of	  a	  temporary	  operation	  or	  an	  auxiliary	  weapon	  in	  the	  work’	  (ibid:	  31),	  ‘auxiliary’	  being	  the	  operative	  word	  here.	  In	  artistic	  activity,	  intuition	  plays	  a	  primary	  productive	  role,	  and	  the	  creative	  process	  may	  progress	  without	  needing	  to	  be	  retrospectively	  validated	  through	  other	  means.	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my mother's side), and English (from my father and part of my education), I was 
a fully paid-up member of the ‘international’ cohort of the organisation. In 
typical Max Planck style, where foreignness is integrated into the substance of 
the community through the ritual consumption of ethnic foodstuffs, I was 
pressed, ‘When are you going to cook a haggis for us Vita?’ (Sadly it is rather 
difficult to source in Germany). As a result the richest relationships I developed 
seemed to always be with non-Germans. Just as in my off–duty hours I became 
involved in the British, French and North–American social worlds of Berlin, a 
sense of shared deracination acted as a powerful social glue.  
 
 Finally, I feel it is important to be frank about the socio-political context 
in which this thesis was researched and written. This is in several ways a piece of 
work which emerged amidst the wreckage of the 2008 financial crisis. Not 
simply chronologically (I started in September 2009) but also in terms of the 
questions it raises and the critical narrative it draws. There was a particular flow 
of history which ended in 2008, instigating intense academic and social debate 
about the nature of the age it had concluded: a story which most traced back to 
the 70s and 80s. I see the rise of ‘agency’ and ‘action’ theory in the social 
sciences as intimately connected to the political settlement of this self–same age, 
and its passing necessitates an urgent reappraisal of these terms. All those having 
to cope with the deleterious effects of the new order are far more likely to be 
familiar with concepts of constraint, than any Panglossian notion of a universal 
‘agency’. Likewise an analysis of the so–called ‘tough decisions’ European 
governments are making under the banner of austerity, as to what parts of society 
should be protected, and what disposed of as ‘waste’, cries out for a Dumontian 
interpretation, to situate such decision-making within much broader hierarchies 
of value.31 It is significant that Elizabeth Povinelli has very recently edged 
towards a ‘post-Durkheimian functionalism’ (George 2012) to theorise late 
liberalism in holistic terms. At this early stage it is impossible to reflect fully at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Thankfully,	  the	  tide	  may	  finally	  be	  turning.	  There	  is	  recent	  evidence	  of	  a	  resurgence	  of	  anthropological	  interest	  in	  values	  ‘after	  a	  long	  period	  of	  neglect’	  (Robbins	  2013),	  accompanied	  by	  a	  resurgence	  of	  interest	  in	  Dumont.	  The	  journal	  Hau	  very	  recently	  published	  a	  Special	  Issue	  entitled,	  ‘Value	  as	  theory’	  (2013),	  with	  Dumontian	  contributions	  from	  Joel	  Robbins,	  André	  Iteanu	  and	  others,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  reprint	  of	  Dumont’s	  1980	  lecture	  ‘On	  Value’.	  I	  shall	  engage	  with	  some	  of	  the	  arguments	  in	  this	  Special	  Issue	  in	  the	  conclusion.	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the meta–level, on how the intellectual content of the thesis was influenced by its 
wider socio-political environment. Nevertheless these are some strands which are 
perceptible now.
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 3. Locating the Max Planck Society’s Value-Idea(s) 
 
  
  
  ‘This is how it is supposed to work’ 
 
      Group Leader 
 
  
 
 The overarching structure of the Max Planck Society is like a scaled-
down version of Germany’s Federal Republic. Many powers are delegated to the 
local level, the level of the Institutes, but others, the most significant ones, are 
retained at the collective level and apply to the whole Society. The following 
chapter approaches the question of how the organisation is cohered at this 
collective level. I will not describe in any comprehensive way the Society’s 
complex formal system of internal governance (such as the functioning of the 
sections), nor provide an exhaustive account of its bureaucratic operations, but 
rather highlight the features of collective life which are most anthropologically 
illuminating. I explore here how the Society is ideally ‘supposed to work’ 
without delving too deeply into how employees might themselves experience it 
(the subject of later chapters) – although some participant perspectives will still 
appear. These features are the following: the Society’s primary ideological basis, 
the Harnack principle, how this squares with its system of internal evaluation 
known as the Fachbeirat, the symbolic significance of its castle Schloss 
Ringberg, of its bureaucratic headquarters, and of its Minerva logo. Finally I 
highlight the notion of ‘excitement’ which is intended to govern the Society’s 
spiritual life.  
 
 The analytical focus of this chapter is two-fold. Its broad purpose is to 
reveal ethnographically, the ‘set of ideas and values’ (1980: 343) – which for 
Dumont is synonymous with ideology – that cohere the Max Planck Society as a 
social whole.1 This configuration of ideas and values, in which how the Society 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Ideology	  is	  a	  term	  Dumont	  uses	  throughout	  his	  work,	  and	  although	  brief,	  the	  definitions	  he	  offers	  are	  consistent.	  It	  is	  the	  ‘social	  set	  of	  representations;	  the	  set	  of	  ideas	  and	  values	  that	  are	  common	  in	  a	  society	  (1986:	  279).	  These	  ‘representations’	  for	  Dumont	  tend	  to	  be	  overwhelmingly	  linguistic.	  He	  emphasises	  the	  ‘common	  language’	  (1980:	  343)	  that	  members	  of	  a	  society	  share,	  which	  is	  the	  ‘vehicle’	  (1986:	  2)	  of	  their	  ideology.	  (My	  usage	  of	  imagery	  and	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operates is identical to how its members feel it should operate, is discernible in a 
whole range of phenomena its employees are exposed to. Whether the 
idiosyncratic mechanisms of internal evaluation, the periodic ‘retreats’ in its 
Bavarian castle, or the range of imagery and discourse, there is a basic 
commonality of experience shared by all of my participants while employed by 
the MPG. Consistent with the hierarchical precept that togetherness precedes 
differentiation, it is important to identify certain threads which bind this social 
whole together, before moving – later in the thesis – into variation. The second 
purpose is this. Although societies may incorporate a multitude of ideas and 
values, for Dumont, some will prevail over others in their relative significance. 
There is always one ‘value-idea’ – what he elsewhere calls ‘predominant 
ideology’ (1994: 199) – which gives shape to the hierarchy of value. This single 
value-idea is present, at least partially, in all of these phenomena as I will go on 
to show, but receives its fullest expression in the mythological force of the 
Harnack principle. 
 
 Those supra-personal phenomena which give organisations their 
character have long been a concern of anthropologists. Mary Douglas in her 
influential How Institutions Think (1987), made an effort to grapple with 
precisely this: arguing vociferously against individual rational choice theory in 
favour of the possibility of relational cognition through institutions. It was the 
latter – which for Douglas are ‘minimally…a convention’ (ibid: 46), but 
presumably maximally an organisation like the MPG – which did the thinking 
through the minds of individuals, encouraging certain kinds of thought and 
discrediting others. For Douglas, institutions confer identity, classify, remember 
and forget, and make life and death decisions. This is certainly the case with the 
internal conventions of the MPG as we shall see, which reproduce the forms of 
‘co-operation and solidarity’ (ibid: 1), that Douglas seeks to explain. However, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  material	  culture	  in	  this	  chapter,	  is	  thus	  not	  quintessentially	  Dumontian).	  The	  other	  kind	  of	  ideology	  that	  Dumont	  and	  others	  tend	  to	  contrast	  his	  with	  is	  Marxian	  (Dumont	  1980:	  343,	  Kapferer	  2010:	  196).	  There	  is	  nothing	  false	  or	  illusory	  about	  Dumont's	  ideology	  (as	  there	  is	  for	  Marx)	  nor	  is	  it	  the	  sole	  property	  of	  a	  ruling	  class.	  It	  is	  rather	  ‘central	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  social	  reality	  as	  a	  whole’	  (1980:	  343).	  However	  there	  is	  an	  implicit	  ambivalence	  here,	  because	  the	  whole	  premise	  of	  hierarchy	  assumes	  that	  some	  social	  groups	  (i.e.	  Brahmans)	  embody	  (and	  therefore	  stand	  to	  benefit	  from)	  a	  society's	  ideology	  more	  than	  others.	  My	  thesis	  perpetuates	  this	  ambivalence.	  While	  the	  value-­‐idea(s)	  give	  shape	  to	  the	  whole	  order,	  they	  also	  lend	  a	  powerful	  legitimacy	  to	  the	  director's	  pre-­‐eminence.	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from the perspective of this study, Douglas’ emphasis appears rather too 
democratic. Her fixation on the collective nature of thought – one which any 
anthropologist would applaud – neglects to explain how certain groups might 
benefit from certain kinds of institutional thinking and therefore encourage 
them.2 While recognising that communities are forged through shared values and 
ideas, she gives short shrift to their social fall-out: the negotiated ways in which 
elites and subalterns are created therein.3 
 
 On the contrary, Christina Garsten in her ethnography of Apple 
Computers (1994), is more emphatic about the asymmetrical social formations in 
which value-ideas are embedded. She documents the diffusion of an ‘Apple 
value system’ (ibid: 56) through videos, slogans, and simulation exercises at 
various corporate ‘orientation’ and ‘new employee integration’ programmes 
(ibid: 52), identifying four pairs of value-ideas in the process. For Garsten, these 
conventions are not simply expressions of collective cognition, sensu Douglas, 
but ones based fundamentally on a Hannzerian core/periphery model. Her multi-
sited research in Stockholm, Paris and Cupertino, California – the site of the 
company headquarters – enables her to trace the ‘effective dissemination of 
meaning from the organizational core’ (ibid: vi). This result of this is that Apple 
values – essentially a version of American values – are deployed as the primary 
frames of experience in the European periphery. Unsurprisingly, this 
dissemination is never completely successful. At these subsidiaries in Sweden 
and France, American value-ideas lose some of their potency, becoming mixed 
in with, or broken down by, competing versions.    
 
 It follows from this that any discussion of value-ideas (or ideology) has to 
confront the points at which they inevitably fail. Dumont made quite little of this, 
calling such contradictions in the caste system evidence of a ‘residual 
component’ (1980: 39) which simply gets tacked onto the predominant ideology 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  As	  Michael	  Herzfeld	  says,	  ‘She	  pays	  less	  attention,	  however,	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  systems	  may	  continue	  to	  be	  manipulated	  by	  canny	  actors’	  (1992:	  68).	  3	  She	  does	  however,	  relate	  an	  anecdote	  about	  the	  distribution	  of	  food	  in	  a	  famine.	  The	  social	  order	  in	  question	  defines	  who	  will	  survive	  and	  ‘who	  is	  predestined	  to	  starve’	  (1987:	  123).	  However,	  the	  very	  language	  of	  being	  ‘predestined’	  to	  starve	  neglects	  the	  processes	  which	  lead	  to	  some	  actors	  starving.	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in the equation o = i + r (observation = ideology + residual) (ibid: 38). For 
scholars like Gupta (2000), Dumont’s intensive scrutiny of Brahman value-ideas 
at the expense of those of other castes undermined his overall thesis; and while I 
cannot comment on the Indian case, it is true that this was the approach he took 
to the European material: his later texts on modern ideology based exclusively 
upon a few key texts in the European canon.4 Yet in my study, despite being 
profoundly productive of a certain category of person – namely the directors – 
the simultaneous failure of value-ideas/ideology to encompass the experiences of 
all actors remains significant. While chapters 5 and 6 are efforts to expound 
parallel principles to that of Harnack, I end this chapter indicating the failure of a 
discourse of excitement to be unanimously echoed in the senior scientific 
experience. The main problem with the ideology of charisma is that not everyone 
gets to be charismatic. 
 
 
 i) The Harnack principle 
 
 The Max Planck Society’s so-called ‘structuring principle’ is 
characterised by a curious blend of oral ubiquity and textual elusiveness. One 
director who is clearly a great supporter of the idea (a question which bifurcates 
directorial opinion), and makes great efforts to ask if I 'know about' it on three 
separate occasions with much enthusiasm, tells me with conviction that it is 
'written in the statutes'. Intrigued, I go straight to the source, which by virtue of 
the MPG's ethic of transparency is easily available online.5 It is no-where to be 
found; Harnack’s name is not mentioned on any one of the fifteen page 
document. In Article 28 there is a fifteen-paragraph description of a Director's 
'rights and duties', which one might expect, would constitute it without naming 
outright. Aside from various administrative and financial obligations, the main 
thrust is as that stated on the website, that a Director is 'independent in 
performing his scientific work', perhaps adding that 'he appoints and dismisses 
other scientific staff employees and other employees'. Still, this does not tell us 
very much. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Alan	  Macfarlane	  calls	  this,	  ‘intellectual	  history	  of	  a	  particularly	  limited	  kind’	  (1993:	  19).	  	  	  5	  www.mpg.de/197521/statutesMPS.pdf	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 Intrigued by this mystique, I question a number of colleagues in the 
Humanities employed in various Max Planck Institutes, whose responses centre 
unanimously around the conclusion that it is 'mythological'. Mythological 
because, as Rudolf Vierhaus writes, even during Harnack's lifetime, he described 
it only in very 'loose and labile' terms, and as a prominent public figure, this was 
generally in spoken form (1996: 130).6 There is no formal documentary source 
available which describes the principle in extenso. Indeed it is significant that the 
website says it is named 'after' Harnack, rather than by Harnack, as 'it was only 
after Harnack's death that the principle became canonized' by his successors 
(Vierhaus 1996: 137). It has since been passed down through 'oral tradition' 
(Annette Vogt, pers. comm.) by subsequent directors. With this in mind, the 
emphatic way in which I am informed about the principle by some of these 
individuals starts to make a little more sense. If the primary route of its cultural 
reproduction is through oral tradition, then it seems logical to tell the 
ethnographer of the Max Planck Society who will presumably go on to tell others 
(as I duly have).7 Hubert Laitko puts it succinctly when he says, ‘Harnack’s 
name functions as a personalised symbol for an institutional idea’ (1996: 585).8 
Consistent with the tradition of German holism, the Society represents this 
collective idea through the singularity of an individual.9 
 
 So what are precise contours of this ‘institutional idea’, this Dumontian 
value-idea, this ether that lends colour to all things? By bringing together a range 
of sources we can circumvent this elusiveness and make a few firm statements, 
all of which in some way describe the value-idea of the ‘charismatic individual’ 
already identified.10 I will proceed from its most explicit and clear-cut, to its 
most diffuse and implied, characteristics. It must begin then with the notion of 
autonomy, or as they like to put it, ‘freedom’. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  ‘Eine	  der	  ebenso	  lockeren	  wie	  plastischen	  Formulierungen’.	  7	  One	  paper	  I	  gave	  was	  entitled,	  ‘The	  Harnack	  principle	  and	  German	  idealism:	  inside	  the	  Max	  Planck	  Society’,	  3rd	  July	  2012,	  University	  College	  London.	  8	  ‘Der	  Name	  Harnacks	  fungiert	  dann	  als	  personalisiertes	  Symbol	  einer	  Institutionalidee’.	  9	  Cf.	  Chapter	  1.iv.	  10	  Cf.	  Chapter	  1.v.	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 Former president Hubert Markl once quoted a passage from the one of 
the MPG’s founding statutes of 26th February 1948 – itself a recapitulation of 
Harnack's own hopes for the KWG – which articulates this principle of 
freedom/autonomy very clearly. It was to be a ‘union of free institutes, that 
belonged neither to the state nor to the economy. They shall carry out scientific 
research in full freedom and independence, without being bound by contracts, 
only to the rule of law’.11 It could not be a better illustration of an organisation 
which seeks to define itself on charismatic principles. All major competing forms 
of social ordering: political, bureaucratic (both implied in the state), and 
economic, are explicitly excluded from its system of governance. In 
conversation, directors similarly take pains to distance themselves from this 
trinity. Yet of the three it must be said that it is their purification from politics 
which carries the most punch. As one says, ‘The fact that politics is not dictating 
what the Society is working on is our most highly valued commodity’.12 The 
manner in which such freedom is presented is also a perfect example of 
Dumont's is/ought collapse in the value-idea. Because it is governed 
autonomously, it performs more successfully. According to Adolf Butenandt it is 
the Institutes' ‘aloofness from government, industry and commerce which 
has...been an essential prerequisite for achieving important scientific results’ 
(1981: 282). 
 
 A second characteristic of this institutional idea is what they call the 
‘high trust principle’, which encapsulates that Weberian dyad of self-generativity 
and restraint. This is explained on the same internet page from which the original 
description in Chapter 1 is drawn. 
 
‘Appointments, made in accordance with the Harnack 
principle, involve the provision of funding based on a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  ‘Eine	  Vereinigung	  freier	  Forschungsinstitute,	  die	  nicht	  dem	  Staat	  und	  nicht	  der	  Wirtschaft	  angehören.	  Sie	  betriebt	  die	  Wissenschaftliche	  Forschung	  in	  völliger	  Freiheit	  und	  Unabhängigkeit,	  ohne	  Bindung	  an	  Aufträge,	  nur	  dem	  Gesetz	  unterworfen’	  (Henning	  et	  al.	  1998:	  17-­‐18).	  	  12	  Although	  directors	  make	  much	  of	  their	  distinction	  from	  politics,	  from	  an	  anthropological	  perspective,	  directors	  and	  politicians	  are	  very	  much	  aligned,	  being	  part	  of	  the	  same	  horizontal	  networks	  of	  power.	  Directors	  themselves	  may	  elect	  to	  take	  an	  active	  role	  in	  politics,	  meeting	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  ministers,	  and	  taking	  part	  in	  committees	  on	  science	  policy.	  Incidentally	  Angela	  Merkel’s	  husband	  was	  himself	  a	  former	  Max	  Planck	  group	  leader.	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profound leap of faith... At a Max Planck institute, when 
a scientist is appointed as director, he or she is provided 
with resources until his or her retirement as a scientific 
member. Depending on the age at which such an 
appointment is made, this allows for between 20 and 30 
years of independent research’.13 
 
The idea is that the directors, endowed with this trust in the form of a steady 
stream of generous funding, should be self-generating: following their own 
experimental and theoretical programmes, rather than squeezing themselves into 
extra-murally defined projects. This should also involve knowing what not to 
do.14 Of course, what the website does not say, is that if the appointment 
committee is the victim of a ‘false alarm’ and selects an unworthy candidate, 
‘you fail and waste 100 million Euros’. But the high trust principle is not just a 
matter of money. At its heart it is an attitude towards time. It demonstrates how 
gloriously far Germany has come from the ‘politics of cultural despair’ (Stern 
1961), and the confidence it now has in its own future. This kind of confidence is 
a charismatic one: the sense that the directors possess an inner force, that will 
change the world from within to without. It is a personhood akin to Fichte's 
absolute self, that strives into the unknown without causality. 
 
 The third premise on which the Harnack principle is based is an idea of 
uniqueness, or as Dumont puts it ‘singularity’ (1994: 191). This is clear from the 
language which surrounds the directors; they are ‘exceptional individuals’ with 
talents beyond the norm. Meanwhile those who do not match this ideal are 
‘second row’ or ‘second-best’ (Markl 1998: 22), exposing the very hierarchical 
conception of talent the Society maintains. The premise of singularity is also 
clear from their appointment processes. Having raked through possible 
candidates the committee will not then draw up a list, or compose a ‘ranking 
order’. There is only one person they want, only one proposal they put forward. 
If this candidate declines the call the whole process will begin again from 
scratch. ‘There is no second nominee’ to fall back on. What better illustration of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  http://www.mpg.de/39586/MPG_Introduction?clientIP=134.76.24.9&page=2	  14	  Cf.	  Chapter	  4.vi.	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the heroic personhood they reproduce through such conventions; the hero is non-
substitutable, irreplaceable. 
 
 Finally, I arrive at the least explicit premise of the Harnack principle: that 
these directors should be spiritual leaders. Indeed the language of the spirit is 
quite common in the Society in general, and that which surrounds the directors of 
a decidedly biblical ilk. We already know about the ‘leap of faith’ that their 
colleagues must take when appointing them, and that these leaders will ‘advance 
the cause of science’. Meanwhile directors themselves may refer to their 
‘mission’ or their ‘vision’. The beginnings of a department can sometimes sound 
a little like the founding of a charismatic cult, one director even drawing up a list 
of ‘ten commandments’ when he did so. More broadly, directors will emphasise 
that new appointees should exhibit a talent which is non-measurable. They scorn 
quantitative metrics like the so-called ‘H-index’ and instead look for elusive, 
ineffable qualities such as ‘promise’. 
 
 In short a range of processes and ways of thinking about time, talent, 
resources and societal relationships get scooped up into the Harnack principle, 
which becomes the primary medium for the Society's articulation of its principal 
value-idea. All of these bear some relation to charisma – as I with Weber's 
assistance have defined it – one which takes the form of an individual. Just like 
the Harnack principle itself – which was essentially invented posthumously by 
the scientific members of the KWG – it is upon an individual that the activities of 
the group are hung. Having begun with the value-idea, I now broaden the 
discussion out into the plural: the ‘set of values and ideas’ which circulate the 
landscape of the organisation like zephyrs. All of the phenomena we will turn to 
next relate to the value-idea in some partial way. Yet they also go far beyond it, 
fanning out into a whole complex of values and ideas in which this central 
institutional idea is embedded. 
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ii) Audit and autonomy 
 
 As we saw in Chapter 2.i, one of the ways in which the MPG survived 
the vociferous ’68 social critique was by introducing a Fachbeirat (external 
advisory board): an idiosyncratic procedure of internal audit to evaluate the work 
of the Institutes. In so being it would be tempting to explain away this procedure 
as yet one more expression of an encroaching ‘audit culture’ (Strathern 2000a), 
which, for Strathern and her contributors, threatens to engulf scholarly 
institutions in Europe and beyond. It is after all, the application of an accounting 
model (the reports submitted as part of this procedure are full of statistical 
illustrations which appear to fit the bill) to evaluate other domains, i.e. scientific 
research. The introduction and enforcement of the alternative bureaucratic 
authority of the Fachbeirat to counter the charismatic authority of the director, 
seems to express the symbolic violence through which auditors ‘create their own 
reality’ (2000b: 289) irrespective of context, like a virus replicating itself within 
the body of the host. 
 
 However this would be a mistake. For one thing the genealogy of the 
Fachbeirat should suggest otherwise. Strathern tells us that audit culture is a 
relatively nascent phenomenon, coming into being no earlier than the 1990s; 
while the Fachbeirat as we know entered the governing architecture of the Max 
Planck much earlier: in 1972. This practice often travels amidst the effluvia of a 
‘new managerialism’ (Shore and Wright 2000: 58), yet as the directors are the 
heads of their own administration, there is not a manager in sight. Finally, audit 
culture for Strathern, is fundamentally an expression of the ever-tightening 
stranglehold of the state over extra-governmental institutions, as part of a ‘taken-
for-granted process of neoliberal government’ (2000a: 3), yet we know that 
Article 1.2 of the Society’s statutes enables the Institutes to ‘pursue research 
freely and independently (Max Planck Society 2010: 1). Any explicit political 
intervention in the Max Planck Society is technically illegal. Instead the 
Fachbeirat is an autochthonous invention. As Peter Gruss himself says, ‘We 
firmly believe that evaluation can be effective and credible only when it is in 
tune with the mission of a research organisation’ (Max Planck Society 2010c: 4). 
The purpose of this section is then to explore precisely what it means to be ‘in 
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tune’ with the Society’s ‘mission’, and how this is distinct from the genre of 
audit culture which pervades other research organisations.15 
 
 First a formal description of this convention and its characteristics will be 
necessary. The Fachbeirat is essentially the periodic review of the Institutes by 
peer researchers who are not members of the Society. Ostensibly, it provides the 
Society with a formal mechanism to contain the ever-present threat of 
‘Entschdeidungsmissbrauch’: the directors’ abuse of their own decision-making 
powers (Butenandt 1981: 505).16 When it was conceived, it was proposed that 
this advisory board would be occupied, 
 
‘not simply by friendly neighbours, but rather critical and 
independent (and in that sense predominantly foreign) 
disciplinary colleagues. The advisory boards should thus 
be answerable not to their colleagues in the Institute, but 
rather to the president of the report committee’ (Gerwin 
1996: 213).17 
 
 Most of these reviews take place bi-annually in the manner of what the 
Society calls ‘ex-post evaluation’ (Max Planck Society 2010c: 12). The 
procedure runs as follows. Four board members are appointed per director, as 
proposed by the Institute and selected by the Vice-President. In advance of their 
visit, these board members will then be provided with a substantial ‘Status 
Report’ from the Institute, often running to a couple of hundred pages. This will 
contain a whole range of predominantly quantitative information including: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  What	  I	  do	  not	  explore,	  but	  an	  argument	  which	  is	  equally	  tenable,	  is	  that	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  Fachbeirat’s	  resemblance	  to	  conventional	  audit	  culture,	  as	  a	  formal	  evaluative	  procedure,	  which	  acts	  as	  a	  buffer	  against	  it.	  Thomas	  Fillitz	  in	  Strathern’s	  volume	  offers	  the	  example	  of	  the	  crisis	  of	  the	  Austrian	  University	  system	  in	  1996,	  which	  was	  prompted	  by	  the	  accusation	  that	  it	  had	  ‘not	  undertaken	  enough	  research	  upon	  itself’	  (2000:	  237).	  The	  system	  was	  subsequently	  subjected	  to	  intense	  –	  and	  damaging	  –	  bureaucratic	  scrutiny.	  The	  Max	  Planck	  Society	  has	  undergone	  no	  such	  crisis	  because	  it	  appears	  to	  evaluate	  itself	  so	  prodigiously.	  16	  This	  citation	  is	  taken	  from	  a	  volume	  collecting	  the	  speeches	  and	  writings	  of	  Adolf	  Butenandt:	  President	  of	  the	  Society	  from	  1960	  to	  1972.	  17	  ‘Nicht	  nur	  freundliche	  Nachbarn,	  sondern	  kritische	  und	  unabhängige	  (darum	  überwiegend	  ausländische)	  Fachkollegen	  sitzen	  würden.	  Die	  Fachbeiräte	  sollten	  denn	  auch	  nicht	  den	  Kollegen	  im	  Institut,	  sondern	  dem	  Präsidenten	  zur	  Berichterstattung	  verpflichtet	  sein’.	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personnel, budget, publications, an outline of research programmes with 
attendant photography, prizes, public relations etc., all published in exquisitely 
aesthetic A4-sized booklets (ibid: 13).18 After processing this, the board will then 
conduct an in-person inspection of the same Institute lasting anything from one-
and-a-half to three days. Afterwards they are invited to submit a confidential 
report to the President who, in light of which, may make suggestions and 
comments to the Institute. The latter is then permitted to respond. This response 
is then passed back through the president to the advisory board, and the whole 
thing wrapped up with some final documentation. The complexity of this to-ing 
and fro-ing is intended to provide the space for feedback and exchange, yet 
simultaneously protecting the secrecy of the board’s evaluations (and thus not 
jeopardizing the relationships with their international peers). 
 
 In one Institute I am present for one of these in-person inspections. The 
event in its entirety is profoundly theatrical, so I will lean on Erving Goffman’s 
renowned theorizing of performance to highlight its significant details (1990). 
This is undoubtedly what he names a ‘front’ performance: meaning, 
‘activity...during a period marked by…continuous presence before a set of 
observers’ and which serves to ‘define the situation for those who observe’ 
(1990: 32) – although arguably in this context the observers themselves are also 
co-constructing such a ‘definition’. Goffman articulates the mechanics of a 
‘front’ performance through its ‘setting’ (of the space in which the performance 
takes place), ‘appearance’ and ‘manner’ (of the actors performing) (ibid: 32-35), 
and I shall borrow his tripartite analytical set. 
 
 Occurring shortly after I arrive, I am unprepared for this major event, and 
what strikes me immediately as I enter the Institute one sunny morning is the 
radically altered ‘appearance’ of the scientific staff. Long habituated to the 
slightly grungy style which can characterize scientific day-wear (all trainers, 
jeans and comedy t-shirts), the sudden apprehension of female scientists in 
colour-drained skirt or trouser suits, wearing noisy high-heeled shoes, and their 
male counterparts in smart pressed suits and shiny leather brogues, comes as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Incidentally	  these	  ‘bi-­‐annual	  reports’	  provide	  fantastic	  statistical	  resources	  which	  have	  facilitated	  my	  research	  enormously.	  All	  graphs	  compiled	  in	  this	  thesis	  have	  these	  reports	  as	  their	  empirical	  basis.	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something of a shock. Apparently an email was sent round to the whole Institute, 
instructing them on how to dress, and being a neophyte, I missed the memo. I 
feel keenly the experience of ‘social facts’ as made manifest by the forms of 
‘resistance’ which surrounds them (Durkheim 1982: 53), when in the morning a 
group leader in a jet-black suit strides past me clearly in a hurry, but with time to 
direct a pointedly menacing glare at my blazing white trainers. Their woefully 
inappropriate colour and form burn hot into the soles of my feet, and, 
embarrassed, I ensure that when the event itself begins, they are rapidly occluded 
as I am one of the first to take a chair. 
 
 However it is the ‘setting’ which characterises the Fachbeirat visit most 
clearly as a Goffmanesque ‘performance’. The day before two large lorries 
arrive, packed with several hundred chairs and disassembled equipment, and 
very quickly one of the Institute’s main halls is transformed into a rather 
professional looking theatre: replete with raised stage and draped black curtains 
suspended from tall scaffolding. Elsewhere small circular tables with white 
tablecloths start to pepper various areas around the building, some of which are 
loaded up with a spread of appetite-inducing canapés and baked goods. 
Meanwhile another interminably long corridor is wallpapered with scientific 
posters on either side, and after the presentations we are all ushered towards it to 
take part in the ‘poster session’.19  
 
 The final element which defines the character of a ‘front’ performance is 
the ‘manner’ which performers (and arguably observers) adopt in its execution. It 
is here we that we begin to approach what the ‘definition’ of this theatrical 
situation might be. The main event which takes place in the temporary theatre of 
the large hall begins just after lunch. As stated, I take my seat early, and 
gradually the room begins to fill up: most employees choosing to occupy the 
back rows rather than those directly beneath the stage. There is clearly a logic to 
this, as by the time most people are seated, some twenty or so men in suits – the 
sixteen members of the Fachbeirat plus the Institute’s directors and those group 
leaders presenting – stride through self-consciously down the central aisle to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  This	  is	  a	  ritual	  in	  which	  each	  poster	  is	  flanked	  by	  the	  scientist	  who	  produced	  it,	  on	  hand	  to	  explain	  the	  methodologies	  and	  results	  of	  their	  scientific	  work.	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front rows of chairs. However, this self-consciousness (bordering on 
awkwardness) speaks volumes, as do the loud rumbles of collective laughter 
which sporadically erupt from this group as they chat before the formal event 
begins. When it does, one of these directors stands up to introduce the work of 
his department. However it is not in a manner of obsequiousness or nervousness 
prompted by the presence of the board that he does so, but rather one of 
merriment and self-deprecation. The group leaders are invited to explain ‘what 
on earth they are doing and why they are here!’: hardly the most aggrandizing of 
introductions.  
 
 Goffman notes the potential for a divergence between ‘appearance’ and 
‘manner’ (1990: 35) and this is certainly the case here. While the smart pressed 
suits, white tablecloths, and stage equipment all say ‘we take your visit “very 
seriously”’ as I am elsewhere told, the easy manner taken by the directors and 
board members says, ‘But at the end of the day we’re all scientists, and so share 
the same set of values and passions. These suits are just a ruse’. There would be 
a very different atmosphere were the Fachbeirat all representatives of a the 
managerial class. The jokes which are clearly being bandied about also do what 
Mary Douglas says they do when exchanged on ritual occasions, which is to 
‘denigrate’ the ‘dominant values’ of the ritual (1975: 102). But in denigrating, a 
joke also ‘celebrates something else…the irrelevance of one obvious level and 
the relevance of a submerged and unappreciated one’ (ibid: 104). The obvious 
level is of a formal evaluation procedure like any other: one based on 
bureaucratic principles, subordinating the qualitative to the quantitative, and 
making organisational decisions therefrom. Meanwhile the submerged level is 
human-oriented: one which respects the directors’ autonomy and personal 
authority, their own particularities and futurities, and their ability to determine 
themselves and their communities effectively. This divergence between 
appearance and manner suggests that while the Fachbeirat pays lip service to 
conventional audit culture, it still refrains from substituting the Society’s 
charismatic authority for a bureaucratic alternative.  
 
 This is most clear in what subsequent effects the report submitted by the 
advisory board may have. While conventional audit culture can have very direct 
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consequences in terms of the number of posts and the distribution of resources, 
the material consequences of the Fachbeirat are largely ill-defined. As one 
director says, if the advisory board decides that he has ‘failed’ it is simply, 
‘awkward’. It is critical that there remains a formal separation between ‘advice 
and decision-making’ (Butenandt 1981: 505), which means that despite a bad 
review, ‘no-body is going to prescribe anything to them’.20 It is more likely that 
if a director applies to the President for extra funds to purchase some expensive 
piece of equipment – which they may need to follow a new experimental 
programme – then the request will be very politely declined. If the Institute 
receives a bad review at the more extensive evaluation which takes place every 
six years, the President does possess the statutory capacity to reduce their ‘base-
level funding’ by twenty-five per cent. As one member of presidential board 
says, ‘that’s quite a lot’, however it is only ‘applied very rarely’. 
 
 The most likely consequence of the advisory board’s report is thus one 
which should not surprise us at this point, as it resembles other charismatic 
societies: a rise or fall in status among the other directors. Although the report 
itself always remains private, directors maintain that ‘you know if someone 
doesn't get a good result. You hear about it on the grapevine’. One extends a 
hunting analogy to explain what might happen. ‘We're back to the hunter society. 
Good hunters are accepted. Bad hunters are not killed, not at all. But the good 
hunters look at the bad hunter and think he is a bad hunter. And this will make 
him work harder on his hunting skills’. The intention is therefore that a director’s 
relative performance in the Fachbeirat should be introjected as part of a self-
regulating and self-improving autonomy, rather than resulting in deleterious 
material consequences which they then have to subsequently cope with. 
 
 The Fachbeirat and Strathern’s audit culture, do however come from the 
same place historically: the enthusiastic efforts by European nation-states in the 
eighteenth-century and after to tabulate their populations. As Ian Hacking tells 
us, the nineteenth-century was inaugurated by an ‘avalanche of printed numbers’ 
(1990: 3) among the bureaucracies of Europe. While all of these nations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  ‘Die	  Trennung	  von	  Beratung	  und	  Entscheidung’.	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maximised the recent advances of the printing press and numerical science to 
their own ends, it was the Prussian statistical bureau which outpaced them all. It 
energetically ‘published and published and published’ (ibid: 32), prompting 
Goethe to make caustic reference to ‘our statistically-minded times’ (ibid: 16). 
Under the leadership of the bureaucratically-inclined Frederick the Great, Prussia 
alone ‘brought to full consciousness the idea that the nation-state is essentially 
characterised by its statistics, and therefore demands a statistical office in order 
to define itself and its power’ (ibid: 18).21 
  
 Despite emerging simultaneously, there has always been a crucial 
difference between the role played by those national bureaucracies in Britain and 
France (which find their form in contemporary audit culture), and their Prussian 
counterparts (which lead to the subtly different protocols of the Fachbeirat). This 
distinction, which is the essence of Hacking’s argument, lies in the relation 
between the amassing of statistics and subsequent decision-making. While in 
Western Europe the rise of positivism and the formation of statistical ‘laws’ to 
predict human behaviour, seemed to be logical consequence of such data-
collection, this proposition was never accepted by the ‘holist’ East (ibid: 36). 
German thinkers resisted the idea that statistics could predict (and therefore 
should be used to govern) behaviour. For them society was not made up of 
separate Lockean actors making rational choices, instead society was prior to 
such actors, and thus their subsequent behaviour was irreducibly stochastic. 
Society could only be influenced at the level of the whole. At its heart lay a 
philosophical argument, reaching its apotheosis in the opposing definitions of 
social science offered by France’s Émile Durkheim and Germany’s Max Weber. 
 
 In short, the place of the Fachbeirat within the Max Planck Society, as a 
technology of evaluation which need not necessarily lead to action, 
communicates something powerful about its values and ideas. Strathern’s audit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  This	  kind	  of	  numerical	  ontology,	  a	  relationship	  between	  being	  counted	  and	  simply,	  being,	  still	  lives	  on,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  these	  bi-­‐annual	  reports	  which	  serve	  a	  social	  function	  beyond	  their	  submission	  to	  the	  Fachbeirat.	  When	  I	  meet	  a	  director	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  they	  might	  bring	  along	  a	  report	  to	  give	  to	  me,	  or	  if	  I	  stay	  for	  a	  while,	  ask	  repeatedly	  if	  I	  have	  seen	  the	  reports	  until	  I	  respond	  in	  the	  affirmative.	  There	  is	  a	  keenness	  to	  demonstrate	  an	  existence-­‐by-­‐numbers.	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culture is a clear expression of bureaucratic authority: the neoliberal state’s 
colonization of national institutions by subsuming other forms of social ordering 
under its own bureaucratic mode, a mode which is, as Michael Herzfeld says, 
fundamentally ‘inhuman’ (1992: 67). Bureaucracy’s ‘indifference’ to the human 
plight and its capacity for infinite variation arises from a culturally obliterating 
loyalty to its own logic, that of ‘rationality and efficiency’ (ibid), rather than ‘a 
world managed by identifiable spiritual forces’ (ibid). By contrast, Max Planck 
audit culture turns such characteristics on their head. Rather than acquiescing to 
the stranglehold of the state, the Fachbeirat is run by the Society itself, 
exhibiting a fidelity to the principle of political autonomy (variously described 
by its leaders using allotropes of awe, as ‘marvellous’, ‘wonderful’, or 
‘spectacular’). Rather than the domination of inhuman rationality, it is particular 
human beings which remain the source of organisational generativity, in the 
formal separation of advice and decision-making. Rather than negating spiritual 
forces, the directors must therefore ‘rely on their own intuition’ to progress 
scientifically. This negative definition leads us to a positive conclusion: the 
resilience of the value placed on the human at the expense of the apparently 
rational and efficient. It is for this reason that members and scholars of the Max 
Planck Society alike see more continuity than change in the governance of the 
organisation after 1972 (Butenandt 1981: 494-511; Gerwin 1996: 223). Despite 
now auditing itself on a near-constant basis, the Society has ‘remained true to the 
principle of its predecessor’ (Butenandt 1981: 494), and retains the Prussian 
philosophical inheritance which forged it.   
 
 
 iii) Schloss Ringberg 
 
 No discussion of the Max Planck Society’s constellation of values and 
ideas could pass by without some mention of its very own castle, Schloss 
Ringberg (Ringberg Castle, or simply Ringberg). The combination of the castle's 
powerful regional and historical materiality, with the current practices and 
discourses which surround it, tells us not only about the Society's vision of itself, 
but also the implicit contradictions therein. As a castle – albeit a twentieth-
century one – Ringberg transports the visitor immediately into Germany's pre-
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modern past: a world of absolutism (Vierhaus 1988), noble families, and 
hereditary status. Yet despite having taken the decision to acquire the castle in 
1973, the Society always seeks to sunder any connection to this older order. 
Similarly one of the main functions of the building is to host departmental 
‘retreats’ (Klausur), with all the associations of monastic privacy and seclusion 
that entails. On the other hand, the Society simultaneously cultivates an image of 
openness and transparency. Ringberg shows us the cultural continuities which 
transcend their overt negation, the rigorous policing of borders which makes 
such openness possible. 
 
 The castle is situated deep in the Bavarian Alps, amidst Benedictine 
monasteries and dozens of former aristocratic strongholds, and set high into the 
hillside of the mountains overlooking the picturesque Tegernsee (Lake Tagern). 
It essentially provides a remote venue where directors and their guests can work, 
rest and play, and is available to every department bi-annually for their three-to-
four day Klausur: a mixture of scientific presentations and leisure activities.22 It 
is also more broadly intended as a presentational venue for directors to bring 
their international colleagues, for conferences, workshops and symposiums. 
These can last anything between three days to a maximum of one week. As a 
consequence Ringberg really is put to continual use in all seasons, every one if 
its thirty-five guest rooms being booked up all year round, and two years in 
advance. By way of illustration: in 2007, the castle was host to no less than 
seventy-five separate events, attended by nearly three thousand visitors in total 
(Gruss 2008: 7). 
 
 I orchestrate a visit to the castle, one summer day in 2012, and discover it 
is in fact rather difficult to find, the gravel path which marks its entrance easily 
missed. The latter, very uncharacteristically, projects no Max-Planck insignia 
whatsoever, only a small and slightly worn-out sign reading 'Schloss Ringberg' 
in gothic script. As I begin the ascent of the steep hill-hugging road, under a 
canopy of trees and around precipitous hairpin bends, the fact that the castle is 
difficult to find begins to seem increasingly intentional. Intermittently, forms of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Cf.	  Chapter	  6.i.	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vaguely threatening signage come into view. 'Keine Besucher' (no visitors) and 
'Keine Besichtigung' (no visiting) approach like apotropaisms, serving to ward 
off the threat of casual or curious sightseers. After a ten-minute uphill drive, I 
arrive at the grey-brick castle front. It looms tall amidst the forest, with a 
triangular hat-like roof, small windows, and a large arched wooden door fitted 
with an oversized brass knocker. Still, the familiar profile of Minerva is nowhere 
to be seen. Only a small and simple brass plaque proclaims the building's 
function on the door, 'Tagungsstätte Schloss Ringberg: Keine 
Besichtigungsmöglichkeit; Zutritt nur für Befugte' (Ringberg castle conference 
centre: no visiting; admission for authorized persons only'). In a substantially 
smaller font underneath, the institution finally makes itself known: 'Max-Planck-
Gesellschaft zur Förderung für Wissenschaften e.V' (Max Planck Society for the 
advancement of science, association) it tells me quietly. 
 
 Arranging a visit to Ringberg is no straightforward matter. It is open to 
the general public for just seven hours every two years, meaning I am obliged to 
negotiate an exceptional private viewing. After sending my request, I receive a 
long reply from the caretaker explaining how important it is for the Society that 
no 'external visitors' are admitted. As she says, 'When we have our door closed, 
our guests know that they can work undisturbed. This is the way we manage to 
create an open, productive environment, in which our guests can get more done 
than they would if they were meeting somewhere else'.23 Scrolling through a few 
paragraphs of such statements, which are a little like the epistolary equivalent of 
those signs announcing 'Keine Besucher', I steel myself to accept the inevitable 
nein. It never comes. She is willing to make a brief and very rare exception for 
me: perhaps due to my previous affiliations with the Society, perhaps out of a 
cultural respect for research and its practitioners. In any case, while ushering me 
through its doors for two tantalizing hours, she leaves no room for doubt as to the 
social value ascribed to the privacy and seclusion of this holiday hideaway. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  ‘Wenn	  wir	  unser	  Tor	  schließen	  wissen	  unsere	  Gäste,	  das	  sie	  ungestört	  arbeiten	  können.	  Somit	  schaffen	  wir	  ein	  offene,	  produktive	  Umgebung	  in	  der	  unsere	  Gäste	  mehr	  erreichen	  als	  wenn	  sie	  an	  einem	  anderen	  Ort	  tagen	  würden'.	  I	  am	  struck	  by	  the	  oppositions	  in	  this	  statement.	  The	  emphasis	  is	  on	  having	  an	  ‘open	  and	  productive	  environment’,	  yet	  this	  is	  only	  enabled	  when	  the	  door	  is	  ‘closed’:	  all	  those	  not	  insiders	  resolutely	  denied	  access.	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 Schloss Ringberg took shape as a building project in 1912, dreamt up by 
a young Duke Luitpold (one of the Bavarian patrician 'Herzog' family) and his 
'personal artist' Friedrich Attenhuber (Himen 2008: 45).24 Having been originally 
conceived as an Italianate villa set in open countryside, after returning from his 
military service in the First World War, Luitpold's priority became increasingly 
to render the structure more  'fortress'-like. In the 1920s, but all the more so in 
the 1950s, he became obsessed with augmenting the 'fortifications' encircling the 
original complex (ibid: 55). Tall grey stone towers with their sharpened turrets, 
and newly-crenellated castle walls, sealed the transformation from a 
Mediterranean summer house to a '“labyrinth of stone”, shut off from the outside 
world' (Rühle 2008: 151). As one scientific participant puts it with gusto, it now 
looks, 'like a really defendable structure!'  
 
 The motives for Luitpold's change of heart can be speculatively 
interpreted as an architectonic response to Germany's traumatic twentieth-
century, particularly for its ancient ruling class. As Helga Himen – the building's 
historian – puts it,  
 
'Luitpold was working towards a private “retreat” of his 
own on the Ringberg, a refuge in which he might lead the 
life he envisaged, where he could withdraw from a world 
that had radically changed. There he would be fleeing an 
era marred by profound existential changes and 
uncertainties, a world in which the political importance 
of the nobility had vanished with the end of the 
monarchy' (Himen 2008: 55). 
 
The Duke was still working on his 'retreat' when he died in 1973 (and it then 
passed into Society hands) and even after six decades of construction, left the 
building unfinished.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  For	  an	  immensely	  thorough	  account	  of	  the	  building,	  its	  contents,	  and	  the	  historical	  relationship	  between	  these	  two	  men	  see	  Himen	  (2008).	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 The Duke's longing for privacy and seclusion however, persists, wilfully 
adopted by Society employees, but also with perhaps less intention, by the 
affordances of the setting he created. An intimacy and a separateness seems to 
unfurl itself over Ringberg, flanked as it is on all sides by dense forest, which 
rustles gently with a sibilant swish in the mountain breeze. The air around on this 
warm summer day feels strikingly close, thick with the sweet scent of wild 
flowers and the delicious pine must of the forest floor. Indeed, the castle feels so 
much a part of the forest around it that at certain points the latter appears to be 
reclaiming its territory. On the far side of the castle where the walls touch the 
lower slope of the hill, there is a large roofless space, enclosed only by a rather 
decrepit battlement, and overgrown with flora of all kinds. Beside it, ivy creeps 
up the figures of the towers, and bushes and leaves make self-confident forays 
into what were once pristine walkways and outposts. The whole atmosphere of 
the grounds feels as the caretaker desires: 'undisturbed' by the clamour and chaos 
of the mundane world below. It is like a glorious secret concealed in consort with 
the spirits of the forest. I half-expect to hear sleeping beauty snoring gently from 
the turret.  
 
 Inside, the castle plays on all the aesthetics of an extremely lavish hunting 
lodge.25 Every surface is saturated with colour.26 Vibrant orange varnished 
wooden floors meet the deep green tiles of old heating stoves, beside which pulse 
the rich reds of upholstered chairs. Every item of furniture, all made bespoke by 
local craftsmen, is generously proportioned: long wide sofas, oversized lamp-
shades, and chunky armoires populate the building's capacious high-ceilinged 
rooms. Meanwhile on almost every wall of the interior are suspended the 
paintings and tapestries of Friedrich Attenhuber, single-handedly responsible for 
the castle's entire artistic vision. These often depict hunting scenes: some 
portraits of himself and the Duke in full costume, and others mythical imagery of 
dogs and hounds amidst the undergrowth. Along with carved wooden deer-
heads, there is also an authentic array of antlers throughout, mounted on a plaque 
sometimes inscribed with the day of their former owner's death. Ringberg is also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Another	  of	  the	  original	  inspirations	  for	  the	  early	  version	  of	  the	  building	  was	  the	  'Ansitz'	  hunter's	  hut	  vernacular	  common	  to	  the	  region.	  26	  See	  Figure	  3.	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'lodge'-like in its strong orientation towards conviviality and leisure, just as the 
Duke had wished. A large chess set stands between two arm-chairs upstairs, an 
equipped fitness studio occupies one of the turrets, there is even a 'garden room' 
downstairs where one can sign off any number of the beer bottles available, 
overlooking a long outdoor swimming pool which can be used in summer.27 
Indeed it takes little to imagine the 'roaring fire' that is purportedly present all 
through the winter (Fred. F. Lange, cited in Rühle 2008: 155). 
 
 The setting both inside and out then, conveys so much of the sensual and 
sybaritic that it is not surprising visitors come to think of it as 'our scientific 
home' (Rühle 2008: 155). It is rather like the Alpine retreat of a wealthy 
aristocratic family, to which they would bring their guests in order both to 
impress them, as well as to deepen the relationship.28 It even has its own 
(remarkably sociable) house cat! The family is of course the Society’s 289 
directors, while all those who stay with them, their ‘guests’. 
 
 The castle strikes a particularly vivid contrast with the Institute’s ‘Guest 
Houses’, the white modern blocky apartment buildings which accommodate 
scientists new to, or visiting the Institutes.29 While the latter are mediated by a 
superfluity of 'texts' throughout, there is little to no signage in the interior of 
Ringberg, only the requisite fire-safety notices and the idiosyncratic naming of 
rooms.30 Visitors do not need to be guided by an unseen impersonal hand 
through the space, as presumably this role at Ringberg is performed by human 
beings: the building's caretakers, or their Max Planck colleagues already familiar 
with the castle. Likewise, the interior furnishing of the Guest Houses (all neutral 
whites, wood, and steel) is not only mediated but produced impersonally, 
through alienated modes of production, in all probability by extra-European 
labour. Set this against Attenhuber's single-authored paintings and tapestries, or 
even the giant-sized furniture produced by hand by craftsmen from the region. So 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  See	  Figures	  1	  and	  2.	  28	  Indeed,	  extending	  this	  parallel	  even	  further,	  apparently	  one	  of	  the	  turrets	  contains	  piles	  upon	  piles	  of	  the	  English	  upper	  class	  magazine	  'Country	  Life',	  which	  the	  Duke	  had	  been	  collecting	  since	  1935.	  29	  Described	  in	  Chapter	  6.i.	  30	  These	  are	  for	  example:	  'Hexenzimmer'	  (the	  witches	  room,	  which	  the	  Duke	  had	  intended	  as	  a	  gaming	  room)	  and	  the	  'Herzogliches	  Arbeitszimmer'	  (the	  Duke's	  writing	  room).	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inextricably tied is the material culture of Ringberg to the lives of two men, and 
to the castle and its environs, that these objects are as Annette Weiner would say, 
utterly 'inalienable' (1992). They cannot be detached from their original owners. 
Finally it should be noted that the 'non-place' of the Guest House is also a non-
time (Augé 1995). These lodgings attempt to exist as far as is possible outside of 
any identifiable historical epoch. Meanwhile Ringberg is so indelibly stained 
with twentieth-century aesthetics (as well as numerous retrograde inspirations), 
and sings with such pathos the swan song of a dying social order, that its place 
within time is unquestionable. Even before it was acquired by the Society, 
Schloss Ringberg was listed as a 'historic monument' by the Bavarian State 
(Himen 2008: 10).     
 
 On this point, directors have often been highly ambivalent about 
Ringberg. In contrast to foreign guests, for whom the whole setting is thrillingly 
exotic, German Directors in particular can be remarkably sheepish about its 
symbolic content and the messages it conveys. The current president himself 
says, 'Personally I have mixed feelings about the building. To today's tastes, the 
medieval fortress look is overdone, and the same holds true of many aspects of 
the interiors and paintings' (2008: 7). Another director articulates what the 
President could be hinting at, in more blatant and self-deprecating terms: 'Max 
Planck heads were known to behave in the outside world as if they were 
“monarchs of science” - and now to add insult to injury, a castle?' (Rühle 2008: 
151). Even when the acquisition was being discussed in the 1960s, 'enthusiasm 
for the idea was not held unanimously within the Max Planck Society' (Meitinger 
2008: 146). This remained true afterwards, as the castle's small information book 
says prosaically, 'At first, the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft was not too enthusiastic 
in accepting the inheritance' (Deutschmann and Globig 1994: 58). The booklet 
then offers some rationalist financial explanation, but the recurrent lack of 
enthusiasm for this exquisitely unusual conference centre goes deeper than that.  
 
 To understand this, the idea of 'inheritance' remains a useful one to apply. 
However it is not just the physical inheritance of the building – requiring a 
substantial financial outlay and running costs – which some directors are 
reluctant to accept. Rather it is the cultural inheritance of an old order of 
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hereditary privilege, one that Luitpold was trying to so tenaciously cling on to, 
and that after 1945 the Society has sought with equal tenacity to distance itself 
from, that endows these leaders with 'mixed feelings'. Unlike the UK, where the 
symbolic value of the monarchy becomes ever more entrenched, for Germany 
the changes wrought by the first and second world wars asserted a radical break 
with this tradition, substituting it for an equally powerful heroism earned by 
achievement (which already had its own precedents). This is expressed most 
obviously by the renaming of the 'Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft', as the 'Max-
Planck-Gesellschaft' in 1948.  
 
 In brief, Schloss Ringberg ties together a number of broader cultural 
strands to which the Max Planck Society is indubitably bound. The most obvious 
of these is the old hereditary order which preceded the break of modernism and 
its meritocratic mythology. It is not coincidental that, as Manfred Rühle says 
ironically, that directors are likened to ‘monarchs of science’. It is this very same 
political ontology that has accorded them their contemporary authority – albeit 
on very different terms. In the early nineteenth-century, the Idealists carved out a 
social space for German intellectuals which had formerly been occupied by the 
nobility of the Holy Roman Empire. Ringberg also exhibits a profound 
separation between inside and out. It is very important for them that there are 
‘keine Besucher’, only directors and their ‘guests’, something which tells us far 
more about the very real social limits through which the MPG governs itself, 
than a visit to one of its Institutes ever could. Lastly, it seems pertinent to 
mention the artist Attenhuber. Ringberg is a classic Gesamtkunstwerk: one 
individual's total vision for how a building should look and feel. It is impossible 
not to see the echoes in the personhoods of directors, who are encouraged to 
realise their own visions for science.31 Ringberg is like a palimpsest of the 
cultural history which produced them. 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Cf.	  Chapter	  4.iv	  and	  v.	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 iv) Visual representations 
 
 Having used Ringberg as a diving board into Germany's past to flag up 
some of the precedents for the Max Planck's values and ideas, it is time to return 
to the present and explore more of the messages that the Society is sending about 
itself. To do this, I explore two symbolic sites: one spatially concentrated, the 
Max Planck Society headquarters in Münich; while the other spatially 
distributed, being imprinted on its documents and other material forms, the Max 
Planck Society ‘logo’ featuring the Roman Goddess ‘Minerva’. Neither possess 
Ringberg's contradictions, having been self-consciously designed by the Society 
itself in recent years to articulate a ‘brand identity’. In reflecting on the particular 
imagery they invoke, we then get a better sense of what this brand is. 
 
 The bureaucratic beating heart of the MPG lies in the centre of the 
Bavarian capital, beside the Englischer Garten, and only a couple of hours drive 
away from Ringberg. Unlike the exteriors and interiors of other Institutes, whose 
often colourful heterogeneity speaks to the diversity of disciplines they house, 
those of the Max Planck Society Headquarters are focused purely on 
administering the organisation itself, and so remain focused upon the latter’s own 
basic identifications. Much like Ringberg, the architecture of the building and its 
environs again plays on the aesthetics of fortification (making the latter appear 
rather less coincidental). From the outside, its four-storeyed streamlined glass 
front, with row upon row of horizontally rectangular windows, is again partially 
hidden from view by tall lush green trees. Not only that, but there is a long thin 
body of water separating it from the pavement which runs alongside, one which 
invokes visually (if not functionally), the moats along medieval castle walls to 
ward off potential invaders.32 The drawbridge, so-to-speak, which crosses it, 
leads to a cylindrical revolving door flanked by two tall grey metal pillars.  
 
 Before one reaches the doors however, there is a very obvious threshold 
which must be crossed. This is marked on the left side by the profile of Minerva 
(who will be treated later), hewn somewhat roughly into a flattened stone 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  See	  Figure	  4.	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sculpture taller than human height. Simultaneously on the right-hand side is a flat 
stone sculpture of equal height, cut into the shape of a negative space into which 
this profile would exactly fit.33 This dyad embodies German holism in perfect 
form; the individual and the society which made them are cut from the same 
block of stone. The crack in the stone out of which the profile of the self 
emerges, is that moment of self-consciousness about which the Idealists was so 
enthused. Rather like the sinful bite nibbled out of the logo for Apple Computers, 
it signals the ontological transformation instigated by knowledge. One has to 
pass through this enlightenment to enter the Max Planck headquarters. 
 
 There is also another threshold which is crossed more inconspicuously, if 
one gazes down at the ground when doing so. On the stone paving underfoot is 
an inscription which reads in two lines of ancient Greek, 
 
Ποθου πληρης και στοργης 
αιεν αριστευειν και υπειροχον εµµεναι αλλων 
 
   
which can be translated as the following, 
 
Full of desire and love, 
always to be the best and distinguished above the sum of all others. 
  
The Society clearly envisions itself in some sense as an ideal Platonic Republic, 
its philosopher ruler and guardian warrior class motivated only by ‘desire and 
love’ rather than temporal power and wealth. It also seeks to be, as they 
sometimes say themselves, ‘the best’. According to Annette Vogt, when the 
KWG was formed in 1911 it did so with two founding ‘myths’: one of these 
being that, ‘we are, by definition, excellent’ (pers. comm.).34 The KWG was 
founded as a solution to the structural failings of the German university system, 
and to this day, the asymmetry in status between the two remains. The Max 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  See	  Figure	  5.	  34	  The	  other	  ‘myth’	  was	  that	  the	  organisation	  would	  depend	  entirely	  on	  private	  finance	  as	  opposed	  to	  state-­‐sponsorship.	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Planck Society is still ideally intended to be ‘the best and distinguished above the 
sum of all other (research organisations)’. The only difference now is that it not 
only competes with its ‘others’ within Germany, but also with the cream of the 
American Ivy League.35 
 
 Immediately on entering the building, the visitor is projected into a large 
central atrium reaching up to the ceiling, with four floors of offices visible from 
below. Adjacent to walls and nestled in corners throughout this atrium, rather 
like clusters of mushrooms sprouting from moist patches of the forest floor, are 
groups of three or four disembodied heads on sticks.36 I phrase it like that to give 
the reader a sense of their strangeness: for the effect is a peculiar one. Largely 
without necks, let alone bodies, life-size dark bronze busts of former Max Planck 
Nobel Prize-winners sit atop light grey marble plinths, marked only by a simple 
inscription of their full names in capital letters. These are almost all men, 
excluding one woman who is positioned prominently near the front doors, and 
the only one to be endowed with collar-bones.37 They are also identical in style 
to those I come across in other Institutes, often of Max Planck, but also Einstein, 
as well as the respective Institute’s former directors, and convey a sculptural 
articulation of the ‘heroic headship’ which will be outlined in the following 
chapter. On the fourth floor, lining the corridors leading to the offices of the 
presidential board, there are similar carvings of all the Society’s presidents to 
date. In addition to this, however, suspended from the walls are large colourful 
and expressive oil paintings of each one, pictured from the waist up while 
comfortably seated. Although the Nobel Laureates are represented as pure brain, 
as leaders and managers of the whole organisation, presidents as simultaneous 
‘men of action’ are apparently permitted a tincture of brawn. 
 
 Finally we return to Minerva, who appears again in the lobby in two-
dimensional form, as a several metres squared copper-coloured hologram on a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  'Max-­‐Planck-­‐Gesellschaft	  auf	  Platz	  drei	  im	  Nature	  Publishing	  Ranking.	  Große	  Dominanz	  der	  USA,	  nur	  zwei	  Forschungseinrichtungen	  aus	  Deutschland	  platziert',	  [Max	  Planck	  Society	  comes	  third	  in	  Nature	  publishing	  ranking,	  largely	  dominated	  by	  the	  USA,	  with	  only	  two	  research	  institutes	  ranked	  above	  Germany]	  25th	  March	  2011,	  http://www.mpg.de/1261613/Nature-­‐Ranking.	  36	  See	  Figures	  6	  and	  7.	  37	  This	  is	  Christiane	  Nüsslein	  Volhard,	  the	  extraordinarily	  successful	  developmental	  biologist.	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black background, gazing out over several of these Nobel prize-winning heads in 
a military helmet.38 As the most ubiquitous and iconic form of imagery within 
the organisation, Minerva deserves some reflection. Her left-facing profile is the 
contemporary face of a recently ‘corporatized’ Max Planck Society (Schrecker 
2010), in which the strict control over image which has become the sine qua non 
of the twenty-first century research organisation: decorating everything from t-
shirts, baseball caps, coffee mugs and pens, to formal documentation and public 
presentations.39 Yet her connection to the MPG is a long-standing one, having 
been selected in 1911 as the original heraldic symbol of the Kaiser-Wilhelm 
Society. Eight years after the king’s abdication in 1918, it was Minerva the 
directors chose to adorn their ceremonial bronze badges (Mitgleiderabzeichens) 
to replace his image (Vom Brocke 1990: 278). In contrast to her present form, 
the original Minerva was full-bodied: her right-facing stance, adorned with 
characteristic shield, spear, and military helmet, set in an oval frame. It was only 
in 1939 that the image of a simple severed head (much like that of Harnack on 
the original Harnack Medal (Vom Brocke 1990: 279)) first appeared, and elected 
as the single image to represent the whole organisation.4041 Minerva’s mid-
century incarnation was thus demilitarized and disembodied. 
 
 There are several points one can make about the symbolic connotations of 
the Minerva logo: the first being that it is self-evidently a classical deity being 
reproduced here. As the Roman goddess of wisdom and artisanship, the mythic 
heritage being drawn here is with ancient Rome (and by implication ancient 
Greece), and the birth of a tradition of scholarship which they see themselves as 
‘advancing’. It is interesting in this sense that the Society did not go down the 
route of Humboldt University and feature its founder Adolf von Harnack, in its 
logo, or even Max Planck himself. The Society is drawing a much longer lineage 
here than that of the recent past, allying itself to myth rather than history. 
Featuring Harnack or Max Planck, would somehow be too profane, too this-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  See	  Figure	  7.	  39	  See	  Figure	  8.	  40	  The	  Harnack	  Medal	  has	  been	  awarded	  since	  1924,	  to	  one	  scientist	  every	  few	  years	  for	  their	  ‘services	  to	  the	  Society’	  –	  its	  recipients	  often	  being	  standing	  or	  former	  presidents	  although	  not	  exclusively.	  41	  The	  current	  image	  of	  Minerva	  was	  first	  published	  in	  the	  Kaiser-­‐Wilhelm	  Society	  Annual	  Report	  in	  1939,	  and	  since	  then	  has	  had	  minor	  variations	  in	  its	  design.	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worldly. Minerva as mythological is ungraspable. She is also, clearly, female, 
and in that pre-feminist sense mother nature herself, the object of male desire, or 
‘curiosity’: the defining characteristic of the scientist’s humanity.42 
 
 The second point to make is that she is not simply a deity, but an 
anthropomorphic deity. This contrasts the Max Planck logo starkly with its 
counterparts in the Anglo-Saxon world – the logos of British and American 
universities – where the sacred is commonly presenced through the imagery of 
light, lions and books. On the other hand, the representations of human forms are 
similarly present on the logos of other German universities: such as the 
Humboldt, Heidelberg, Freiburg and Ludwig Maximilian. There is a profound 
human specificity to the God-like in the imagery of Germany's elite intellectual 
landscape, which is different to other countries' abstractions. This human 
centrality is part of the Max Planck's defining ethos. As one presidential board 
member puts it, the ambition of the MPG is to put ‘people first, people second, 
and people third’. 
 
 Finally, it is significant that Minerva is encased in a circle. It conveys 
something which has appeared already at Schloss Ringberg and the 
administrative headquarters: a clearly-defined border between inside and out, a 
cosmic break, a rupture. Interestingly, America's Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, originally conceived in the mid-nineteenth-century along the 
German research university model, recently expunged its similar circular logo. 
The complaint with the original was that, ‘The two white men exist in a vague 
historical era held in isolation from the outside world by the rings drawn around 
them. They are literally sealed off from the society that they might influence’ 
(MIT 2013). So for the public relations department of MIT these rings signify a 
border between scientific knowledge and its application. This is certainly a 
plausible reading, because none of Germany's technical universities or applied 
research organisations employ the same circular frame as part of their branding. 
Yet it also speaks to the imagery of the German Idealists, for whom as I have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  As	  the	  German	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  UK,	  Georg	  Boomgaarden,	  said	  at	  a	  recent	  UCL	  -­‐	  Max	  Planck	  Society	  conference,	  ‘Science	  is	  also…fun,	  because	  curiosity	  is	  part	  of	  human	  being.	  It	  is	  in	  us	  to	  do	  science’	  (2012).	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stated, it was a primary metaphor.43 A circle with a humanoid face inside it 
conveys the totality of the self: the ability of an individual to encompass a whole 
community, a whole society. 
 
 The values and ideas which inhere in the Max Planck Society’s brand 
image are in short, a great transhistorical mix. Ancient Greece and Rome are a 
frequent presence in the Society’s utopian ambitions: the purity of an ideal 
Platonic Republic, the purity of knowledge (whose detachment from application 
– at the conceptual level at least – they appear quite comfortable with). The 
medieval is also there. The moat and the drawbridge which mediate entrance to 
the administrative headquarters communicate all the associations of castles and 
fortifications that they shoo away at Ringberg. The German enlightenment is 
there too, the progress driven by knowledge about the world. Meanwhile Idealist 
visions of self and society are of course a constant reference point. There is also 
excellence, prestige, and the driving creative force of individuals. The rest of the 
thesis is devoted to exploring how some of these values and ideas have their 
anthropological consequences and contradictions, but it is important to examine 
each one like a precious stone, before scattering them to the ground. 
 
 
 v) Excitement 
 
 If the Harnack principle is the formal discursive expression of how the 
Society is ‘supposed to work’, then its informal expression is the principle of 
‘Begeisterung’ or ‘excitement’. It is the Society’s ‘main philosophy’. As opposed 
to the goals of education or application (undertaken by German universities and 
other research organisations), excitement is claimed as the goal of the MPG, a 
state of being to which Society researchers should strive, which will then 
naturally lead to the production of good work. The spirited, people-oriented and 
– quite frankly – libidinous character of such a goal also means conveniently, 
that it is something all scientists can apparently participate in, from the director 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Cf.	  Chapter	  1.iv.	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downwards, and even the lay public whom the Society ‘serves’. Indeed one 
director sees this as the primary way to maintain the latter’s sympathy. 
 
‘The only way to communicate basic science is 
excitement. I'm ready to pay my taxes for this, because of 
this excitement. The only way to motivate exploration 
beyond the known is excitement. People went into space 
for excitement, not for the space war...People landed on 
the moon, everybody was excited. This was a huge 
collective excitement, people bought TVs just to watch 
this...People are always happy when I speak if I got them 
excited’. 
 
Meanwhile another director explains how a collective outbreak of organic 
‘Begeisterung’ came to shape the research direction and social structure into 
which his department grew. 
 
‘When I started out, I thought that I would establish 
independent sub-groups which would work on different 
questions. I selected one question for myself which I was 
expecting to work on with my own sub-group. And then 
what happened is, my sub-group became bigger and 
bigger and also more attractive, because I think it's sort of 
my ‘Begeisterung’, my excitement about what I was 
doing, I could convey to many of the others. And more 
and more, it was sort of pulling in from all around. And I 
later on diagnosed that this is what scientific leadership is 
about, now to tell people to do such and such, but to 
convey the excitement so that people are drawn into a 
scientific question. I watched this happen…(Despite 
beginning with) very independent subgroups which each 
work on their own field, we have arrived at a structure 
where the groups all concern themselves with very 
similar questions… People sort of move in-between and 
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there are no fences and walls between the groups. We sit 
together and talk together’. 
  
Finally in a slightly different context, at a recent joint conference between 
University College London and the Max Planck Society to mark their 
collaboration, the same kinds of Idealist spiritualist imagery are manifestly 
present.44 Taking place in London just before the Olympics, one Max Planck 
director employs an Olympic metaphor in his impassioned speech on behalf of 
the Society, ‘Right now, the Olympic flame is being lit around the country. Here 
we can light a little flame of our own, the flame of excitement and inspiration for 
the research of tomorrow’.  
 
 By elevating excitement to such a key position in the Society’s intra-
mural and extra-mural discourse, directors are animating a dominant German 
cultural paradigm which places its ultimate value on ‘Geist’ (mind, spirit or 
soul). As Dominic Boyer argues, Geist came to prominence in the nineteenth-
century as one of the ‘key tropes of intellectual selfhood’ among the educated 
classes (Gebildeten) of the German Confederation (2005: 55), having been 
eulogized by Fichte (1988), and most famously, Hegel (1977). Borrowed directly 
from the religious discourses of eighteenth-century Lutheran and Pietistic 
Protestantism, its central meaning was to express ‘the inner genius and creative 
capacity of the enlightened individual’: one of the key visions of German 
Idealism/Romanticism (2005: 55). This then had several consequences. Inner 
genius is set off in contradistinction to an outer material world – of the body, but 
also temporal wealth and power. Fichte, in particular (much like the Society 
directors) contrasts those who animate a Geist to others who do not, more closely 
resembling a spiritless ‘business machine’ (ibid: 56). As such an acerbic contrast 
hints, this dualism between inner and outer is an asymmetrical one. Fichte is not 
simply drawing a contrast but making a moral statement. Geist, with its religious 
connotations, marks the presence of the divine, and thus its appearance elevates 
the individual who releases it in their worldly doings (thus in the nineteenth-
century it becomes a means for the Gebildeten to legitimate their own class 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Cruciform	  Lecture	  Theatre	  1,	  University	  College	  London,	  27th	  June	  2012.	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status). Geist is also a one way street, always actualising itself, ‘from within to 
without’ (ibid): beginning as a state of being and ending in some form of 
material impact. In the MPG it is not to do exciting science that is the primary 
end (although the implication is clearly there) but the achievement of excitement 
itself. 
 
 Nevertheless although Geist provides the precedent, Begeisterung is a 
slightly mutant offspring. Dumont’s ideology is not exempt from processes of 
historical change (Kapferer 2010). Begeisterung maintains a spiritualist 
dimension, though it is not simply spirit, but rather spirit speeded up. 
Begeisterung is Geist on amphetamines: Geist for a century in which the Max 
Planck Society has already multiplied its population by over sixty per-cent, Geist 
for an organisation whose output is legendary. It is not by accident that 
Begeisterung has reproductive overtones, synonymous not only with 
‘enthusiasm’ but also ‘ardour’, ‘passion’ and ‘ecstasy’, as thereby it invites ideas 
of fecundity, of growth.45 While Geist is ‘inner genius’ gazing in wonder at its 
own navel, Begeisterung is ‘inner genius’ translated into an avalanche of 
publications quantifiable in annual reports. 
 
 Part of Boyer’s argument is that tropes such as ‘Geist’ are used by actors 
to stake certain ontological claims, about the nature of what it means to be a self 
and to relate to others through that self. Tropes such as Geist (and excitement) in 
this sense, perform, as part of the political negotiation of social life. As he says, 
‘Tropes accomplish…the intersubjective processes of meaning formation 
through which social actors stake their semiotic-epistemic activity in dialogue 
with others, who may variously construe the intentions and significance of the 
tropes in question’ (ibid: 38). The ‘play of tropes’ thus mirrors the alliances and 
conflicts which assemble and disassemble in the unfolding of social life (ibid: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Imagery	  of	  fecundity	  can	  also	  be	  used	  by	  actors	  to	  produce	  or	  maintain	  a	  pre-­‐eminent	  social	  status.	  This	  is	  clear	  from	  all	  of	  the	  political	  rhetoric	  in	  Britain	  about	  economic	  ‘growth’,	  but	  also	  manifests	  itself	  further	  afield.	  Ingrid	  Hoëm	  and	  Niko	  Besnier	  whom	  she	  cites,	  both	  record	  instances	  in	  Polynesia,	  of	  imagery	  of	  natural	  reproduction	  being	  used	  to	  legitimate	  standing	  authority.	  The	  logic	  follows	  that	  if	  natural	  abundance	  results	  from	  the	  consequences	  of	  an	  action,	  then	  ‘that	  action	  bears	  the	  sign	  of	  being	  blessed’	  (2009:	  263).	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39). In this vein it is worthwhile asking what excitement ‘accomplishes’ for the 
Max Planck Society.  
 
 Here some remarks of David Graeber’s in his essays on hierarchy, are 
illuminating. He argues that hierarchy often attempts to disguise itself by 
‘positing some higher sphere, of economic values, or idealist abstractions’ (2007: 
101). These abstractions always contain ‘images of equality’ which efface the 
social differentiation hierarchy produces (ibid: 283). He adds that ‘the more 
hierarchical the society, the more this tends to happen’ (ibid: 101). Excitement 
does all of these things. It is a ‘higher sphere’ not only about human beings, it is 
implied, but about the mysteries of nature itself, which spontaneously makes its 
researchers ‘excited’. Much like the religious fundament of Indian hierarchy, 
excitement is fitted perfectly to the function the Max Planck order is intended to 
serve: the production of scientific research. Excitement is in this sense also a 
perfect ‘image of equality’. Although I do not hear it suggested that the 
technicians should get excited, and never hear them say so, this trope traverses 
all scientific strata. Directors and senior scientists are most likely to express 
themselves using the term and its cognates, but junior scientists might also draw 
on such terms to articulate their relation to their work, particularly when they are 
engaged in something non-prescriptive, such as looking at materials under the 
microscope. Even student workers can access such excitement osmotically. It is 
rather like the air which all Max Planck scientists get their chance to breathe. 
Lastly as Graeber says, the more hierarchical a society is, the more such 
abstractions appear. Excitement is everywhere, which can be read as a statement 
on the robustness of the Max Planck hierarchy. This is partly an effort by 
scientific members, particularly the presidential board, to disseminate it as part of 
how the Society is ‘supposed to work’. However, excitement is also wilfully 
taken up by scientists themselves. Indeed this word and its cognates appear in my 
fieldnotes and transcripts on over one hundred separate occasions! 
 
 Despite this eager take-up, Graeber’s first point must be kept in view, that 
idealist abstractions are hierarchy’s endeavour to disguise itself. On this note, I 
will end with a redacted transcription of a group exchange which follows the 
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final presentation I give at the Primary Institute, in which I had just raised the 
question of excitement as an important concept among Society employees. 
 
Senior Scientist One: ‘I have a question, I didn't want to place it in the audience 
because I thought it might be slightly provocative, it's not my intention to be 
provocative BUT...What came into my mind when I saw this talk was…Did you 
ever see yourself being the subject studied? Because what you presented today, is 
exactly how I see this Max Planck society, how it works, WHEN it works. When 
nothing is going wrong. When this charismatic authority works. So you were 
thrown into the Institute, and now you present this. And in my opinion it is 
exactly how the system is designed. So your observation is completely congruent 
with what we see ourselves. It is slightly provocative.’ 
 
Director: ‘I very often have discussions with local politicians. They are not 
interested in any of the excitement we have here. Where are the jobs created? 
Where are the results? Where are the products? They have this completely 
utilitarian approach. And if you want to catch them, you have to touch them 
personally, not as representatives of their Institution. As representatives of their 
Institution they are not interested in science. And therefore the excitement is 
deeply personal. An Institution cannot be excited, only a person can be. When 
you start to talk to them about the interesting science, well, either you touch them 
personally or they are not interested at all. So it's a deeply personal experience, 
that actually, makes you believe in it. So how do you transmit personal 
experience to other people?’ 
 
Senior Scientist Two: ‘But coming back to what (Senior Scientist One) said. The 
Max Planck Society also spends energy so that we know about the principle of 
the Max Planck Society. How it should function. And I think this was then also 
transported to you.’ 
 
(Senior Scientist One nods in agreement). 
 
Senior Scientist Two: ‘I heard the vice-president speaking recently, and he was 
putting it in very similar terms, talking about excitement. It would be interesting 
to know, whether these are genuinely our thoughts, or are we also receiving these 
thoughts by arriving here!’ 
 
Senior Scientist One: ‘You were quite quick. It took me much longer to realise 
how this thing should work, and how it is intended to work.’ 
 
Director: ‘I don't know how much intention there is. Well there is an intention, 
but there is also some personal thing’. 
 
Senior Scientist Two: ‘Of course you cannot create it artificially. You cannot just 
put in some excitement at the top!’ 
 
Senior Scientist One: ‘But then that is exactly the case where it does not work, 
where the system just does – not – work’. 
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 Max Weber saw charismatic authority as authority of the most radically 
democratic kind (1948: 248-9). Because the loyalty of their followers depends on 
the leaders’ constant display of personal strength, one which can easily be lost 
should such strength be seen to wane, charismatic authority – as opposed to other 
forms – is constantly being verified against demonstrable results. However, what 
these extracts show are the hidden costs of such a charismatic logic becoming 
institutionalised. The institutional structure of the Max Planck Society and its 
funding sources buttress the political dominance of its charismatic leaders, yet 
for these leaders themselves all that remains present is the purity of excitement. 
Notice the first two extracts which began this section, in which the directors talk 
about their excitement. It is situated in a political void. The competitive military 
industrial complexes of the cold war are shooed away as drivers of space 
exploration, instead ‘people went into space for excitement, not for the space 
war’. Meanwhile closer to home, another director argues that the reason for the 
growth of his sub-group was ‘my excitement about what I was doing’, one which 
‘more and more…was sort of pulling in from all around’. The asymmetry of 
influence introduced by his hierarchical dominance goes unacknowledged as a 
factor which might inflate the ‘pulling’ power of such excitement.  
 
 In this polyvocal exchange we again see excitement in Graeber’s terms, 
as the ‘idealist abstraction’ through which hierarchy attempts to disguise itself. 
Senior Scientist One (SS1) raises a point he sees as ‘provocative’ because it 
challenges the fit of the ideal to the actual. The Director simply changes the 
subject straight away. Either he simply does not see what SS1 is trying to say, or 
he is actively attempting to suppress it. Either way, he deploys all the rhetoric of 
Pietist, Idealist inwardness to argue against any alternative reading of what 
excitement might mean. It is ‘a deeply personal experience’ he claims. Senior 
Scientist Two (SS2) then brings the conversation back to what her colleague had 
initiated. There is clearly a consensus emerging among the senior scientists about 
the ambiguous implications of excitement. She engages in a meta-critique of my 
interpretation, and of the way excitement might become internalised by Society 
employees. After another intervention the Director again brings it back to the 
level of the personal. SS2 then concedes that in order for this abstraction to work 
it has to be appropriated at the level below the directors, you cannot simply add 
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excitement ‘at the top’. SS1 remains adamant however, presenting the alternative 
view, that in some cases ‘the system just does – not – work’, suggesting that he is 
thinking of a specific instance.  
 
 
 vi) Conclusion 
 
 Like any other form of social organisation, the Max Planck Society has 
its own myths, its own ways of rationalising, its own relationship to history and 
conceptions of what is important. It is these that make it, as one director says, 
‘really a society’ – as opposed to a rambunctious crowd of strangers, or a mass of 
selfish actors. As Dumont argues, when it comes to social wholes, there is no 
separation between the ontological and the moral. To be is to elect to be one 
thing and not another, to make a value judgement in that very act of being. And 
of course, as Douglas maintains, we become part of these phenomena larger than 
ourselves because it is cognitively satisfying. It is the values and ideas explored 
in this chapter which make possible the forms of organisational attachment we 
will encounter later on: whether manifested as allegiance to an Institute, a 
director, or to the Max Planck brand. 
 
 All of the ‘representations’ explored in this chapter relate to the value of 
charisma in some way. While the Harnack principle expresses it fully, the others 
connect to it partially. The suggestive rather than directive role played by the 
Fachbeirat respects the director’s own human decision-making powers. Schloss 
Ringberg is characterised by inalienability, idiosyncrasy, and meaningful social 
exchange. The Administrative Headquarters and the Minerva logo materialize 
the rupture which surrounds the charismatic self, enabling it to determine itself 
from within rather than without. While a discourse of ‘excitement’ indicates 
charisma’s generative aspect, its ability to flourish, as Fichte says, without 
‘causality’ (1970: 252).  
 
  Nevertheless any statement of value will always favour some types of 
person and fail others. It is clear why the directors of the KWG ‘canonised’ the 
Harnack principle and the charismatic authority it reified, passing this down in 
	   108	  
their speeches to subsequent generations. They even purportedly ‘communicate 
this to the people who give (them) the money’: Germany's political class. It is the 
mythic justification for the maintenance of ‘the sovereign as a personal unit and 
primeval creator’ that underpins their position, as opposed to the sovereignty of a 
‘people’ (Schmitt 1985: 47-8), which would mean extending privileges to the 
other scientists and support staff of the Institutes or the mass of the German 
population through its elected representatives. To be clear, when they say the 
ethos is ‘people first, people second, and people third’, they are talking about 
directors. Just as the dissemination ‘Apple values’ favours an American way of 
life over those of other regions, the dissemination of the value-idea of the 
charismatic individual favours directors over their subalterns. Other scientists in 
the Max Planck Society whose relationship to the organisation is a ticking clock, 
may not find their situation quite so exciting. It seems fitting therefore, to turn 
immediately now to the Society's heroic stratum: to see what kind of reality 
effects this predominant ideology makes possible. 
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 4. The Hero Principle: Directors 
 
'We are the heroes of the era where fighting with 
weapons is not allowed anymore. It is a Romantic idea...' 
             
         Director  
 
 
 The personhood of the director: the head of the basic social unit within 
the Max Planck Society – commonly referred to as a 'department', or sometimes, 
'group' – is a key concern of this study. Key, because, as this director 
metaphorically implies, there is an unabashed aura of heroism which surrounds 
him.1 You could say I am drawn to observe this position critically, simply by the 
sheer volume of consciousness he seems to occupy among Max Planck 
employees. He is the keystone in the social arch, without which the whole 
structure caves in on itself. It is this ideological centrality – enshrined in the 
Harnack principle – and the consequences this has on their mental and material 
realities that I call ‘the hero principle’. This chapter addresses the question of 
what the hero principle looks like substantively and in process. The answer I 
offer can be broadly split into two parts.  
 
 The first – carried through in sections i and v – portrays the directorship 
as representing a particular genre of leadership (heroic headship).2 This portrayal 
is carried through in its most abstract form in section i, while later sections are 
largely endeavours to demonstrate ethnographically its reality-effects. 
Empirically, all of these sections describe in sequence: the narrative arc of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  I	  use	  masculine	  pronouns	  throughout	  when	  referring	  to	  the	  director	  for	  several	  reasons.	  Firstly,	  all	  those	  directors	  I	  meet	  are	  men,	  and	  so	  it	  seems	  artificial	  to	  pretend	  that	  my	  ethnographic	  referents	  are	  anything	  other	  than	  male	  actors.	  Secondly,	  the	  MPG	  in	  its	  Statutes	  uses	  the	  male	  pronoun	  as	  a	  gender	  neutral	  term	  (i.e.	  when	  they	  say	  'he'	  they	  also	  mean	  'she').	  Thirdly,	  a	  substantial	  majority	  of	  directorships	  are	  held	  by	  men;	  for	  the	  natural	  sciences,	  the	  proportion	  of	  female	  directors	  is	  just	  over	  5%	  (most	  of	  which	  are	  in	  a	  sub-­‐field	  of	  Biology).	  This	  may	  ultimately	  change,	  but	  for	  now	  the	  directorship	  remains	  an	  overwhelmingly	  androcentric	  form	  of	  leadership,	  which	  I	  have	  reflected	  in	  these	  pronouns.	  2	  Heroic	  headship	  is	  my	  own	  neologized	  analytical	  term,	  which	  serves	  to	  articulate	  the	  kind	  of	  leadership	  specific	  to	  Max	  Planck	  Institutes.	  This	  is	  to	  avoid	  confusion	  with	  the	  kinds	  of	  leadership	  called	  ‘directorships’	  ubiquitous	  in	  corporations	  and	  companies.	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director's career through the foundation and expansion of their department, the 
often flamboyant quality of the director as social persona, the manufacturing of 
rituals and other ways in which the department acquires a specific character, and 
the slow and determined way in which a scientific vision is realised.  
 
 Embedded throughout (but particularly in the opening section) are 
comparisons to other forms of leadership which have appeared in extra-European 
anthropological accounts. Besides kingship, of particular pertinence are the 
charismatic ‘big men’ of Melanesia, who share much common ground with the 
directors. It is important to disclaim though, that I am not problematizing this 
literature as a regional specialist would do, but rather using it as a heuristic light 
to shine on a wildly different ethnographic context, to make its colours bolder. 
Moreover, there are various critical subtexts to the instrumental deployment of 
such comparisons. The first is to contravene what appears to be the prevailing 
tendency – in Anglo-American anthropology at least – to abandon the 
comparative project in favour of a post-modern concerns with limitless 
difference, or a cross-regional application of the same anthropological theory. 
The second is an intentionally provocative post-colonial reversal of one of the 
features of Modernist anthropology: the use of Western forms (such as class or 
the individual) to theorise non-Western contexts. In using non-Western social 
forms to better grasp Western ones, I invert some of the hidden ontological 
asymmetries which get smuggled into theories. Finally, in engaging in 
comparison I obviate one of the tendencies of the directors themselves: who, 
through the prism of their value-idea, see the directorship and the Society as a 
unique phenomenon, comparable to nothing and no-one. 
 
 Meanwhile the second part of this chapter – continued in sections vi - viii 
– looks more closely at the existential qualities of the directorship: of how it is 
experienced by its incumbent. I argue that this arises from a peculiarly German 
philosophy of the self, with particular reference to the writings of Johann Fichte. 
If the first five sections of the chapter address a director's relationship to his 
Institute, the following three look more broadly at his relationship to the 
personhood which is conjured by the organisation as a whole, and the cultural 
inheritance of holism (both individual and group) it reproduces. 
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 To the literature on organisations – particularly that inspired by actor-
network theory – this chapter has a statement to make about agency.3 The myriad 
of ways in which a director shapes the social and scientific character of their 
department is a plain illustration of agency: the ability to effect. However, the 
fact that the scope of the director's agency is so much larger than any other 
member, suggests that agency is not a primordial attribute of their humanity – 
they do not simply act in a cultural ‘flatland’ – but the secondary product of a 
cultural inheritance which eulogises the heroic scholar. Agency, as Saba 
Mahmood says of her participants, ‘does not belong’ to the directors themselves 
(2005: 32), but arises from within the holistic logic of this organisational context 
which continues this tradition. 
 
 
 i) The rise and rise of a directorship 
 
 As one senior scientist explained to me, the 'general progression' of all 
Max Planck departments is that they 'ramp up until the director retires'. 
Diverging therefore, from other forms of charismatic leadership, a directorship 
does not follow a period of slow ascendancy and then gradual or sharp decline. 
Rather, a momentum is built up in the early years which should last the 
professional lifetime of the director: sustained through the accumulation of 
human, material and financial resources. An abstract portrait of the shape of this 
typical narrative – the rise and rise of a directorship – will now be drawn. 
 
 The prospective director must have a glittering past, with the potential to 
extend this further into the future. Often, such potential is understood to be 
something very ineffable. When I press one director on what he looks for in a 
candidate, he refuses to identify any characteristic other than 'promise'. He then 
further circumvents description by resorting to an analogy, 'It's like the stock 
market, you buy cheap stocks which will soon be very expensive'. And note, the 
emphasis is on the buying. Although there have been calls for applications to the 
directorship, this has in the past been deemed a less successful method than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Cf.	  Chapter	  1.iii.	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actively seeking out promising young scientists, and subjecting them to a lengthy 
evaluation process which can last anything up to four years. These scientists 
however, must have already made their name in a given field. 
 
 In one department I soon become aware (or more precisely, am made 
aware) of how the director proved his potential, leading to his selection and 
appointment as the new fourth member of the Institute a number of years ago. 
The technique he developed – which led to his meteoric rise within the discipline 
– is almost always mentioned by senior scientists (the only junior I hear 
discussing it is using the technique itself) and always framed in a 'by the way did 
you know' fashion. 4 These asides have the unmistakable quality of an origin 
myth: as although they encircle the same tale, every telling is slightly different 
depending on the vantage-point of the speaker. There are variations as to the 
technique itself, the types of sample the director used, and even the impetus for 
inventing it. Such inconsistencies are irrelevant. What matters is that this 
narrative is so widely known and retold among the department's senior staff. It is 
an origin myth because without this potential having been proved in some way, 
the departmental community would not exist; it is the story of their own 
beginnings. Indeed one is constantly reminded of these beginnings by the 
presence of the very instrument the director built, in one of the laboratories 
downstairs. 
 
 The Melanesian big man must also prove himself to be a person of great 
talent. In Andrew Strathern's ethnography, this is talent for 'making moka': the 
facility for competitive exchange and the building of critical alliances (1971: 
197). One of his participants describes the attributes of those who are likely to 
become big men, 'Promising boys are those who speak well, learn quickly to 
make exchanges and to ask for things, and whose eyes are like a pig's, taking in 
everything around them'. Thus oratory, skill in negotiation, and the powers of 
intelligent observation are named as some of the vital qualities (ibid: 208). As 
this description implies, and Strathern notes, the big man system is ostensibly a 
meritocratic one. If a young boy has a father who is a big man it would probably 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Cf.	  Chapter	  6.v	  for	  an	  explanation	  of	  why	  it	  is	  for	  senior	  scientists	  that	  these	  founding	  tales	  have	  such	  import,	  as	  they	  are	  the	  most	  closely	  aligned	  to	  the	  director.	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assist his advance to big man status, but it is by no means necessary. A young 
boy does not inherit any title or rank, but rather must earn the status of big man 
by means of his own prowess. This is wildly different say, from Valeri's study of 
ancient Hawaiian kingship: in which nobles are only likely to succeed the king if 
they are able to demonstrate their superior genealogical right – even if this is in 
fact falsified, for rank rather than merit remains the society's 'regulating 
principle' (Valeri 1985: 157). This difference also has social consequences for 
the zeal of the big man's supporters. Because a big man has achieved his status 
by virtue of his 'exceptional personality' (Hogbin & Wedgwood 1952/3: 252), 
rather than by kinship, for those who choose to follow him it makes him 'not so 
much a leader as...some sort of hero' (Sahlins 1963: 290).  
 
 Another characteristic of the prospective director, is that they should 
ideally have proved this potential outside the Max Planck system.5 As one senior 
scientist tells me in no uncertain terms, 'This is not a structure which creates its 
leadership. The clergy of the Max Planck is extracted from those who have made 
their ascent in the public education system'. Glancing through the curriculum 
vitae of a random selection of directors, these are most commonly the 
universities and institutes of Europe and America. One could say therefore that 
appointment is not just a straightforward matter of potential or promise, but that 
a key aspect of its legitimacy is that it should have been demonstrated beyond the 
organisation’s borders. For this reason the directorship lends itself well 
ideologically to the appointment of non-Germans. Indeed both on the website, 
and among directors themselves, the Society enjoys making much of the fact that 
thirty-per-cent of these individuals come from abroad. 
 
 As an ideal, this makes heroic headship analogous in certain ways to what 
Sahlins famously neologized as a ‘stranger-king’ (1981). The general principle of 
the stranger-king is that, 
 
‘The ruler as above society is also considered beyond it. 
As he is beyond it morally, so he is from the beyond, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Although	  cf.	  Chapter	  6.iv	  for	  exceptions.	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his advent is a kind of terrible epiphany. It is a 
remarkably common fact that the great chiefs and kings 
of political society are not of the people they rule. By the 
local theories of origin they are strangers’ (1981: 111). 
 
So both the heroic head and the stranger-king participate in the condition of 
arriving from elsewhere: from the beyond, a stranger.  
 
 The difference between the heroic head and the stranger-king is a 
question of substance. The essence of the stranger-king is that he is not 
consubstantial with the community he governs: stranger-kings are not ‘of the 
people they rule’. Stranger-kingship is stranger-kinship, which is why their 
succession may involve the symbolic murder of this dangerous non-kin, and its 
subsequent rebirth as a domesticated deity. The heroic head on the other hand, is 
symbolically (rather than literally of course) kin to his community. When the 
Idealist self emerges ‘out of nothingness’, it conjures into being a whole world 
alongside (‘an entire world emerges simultaneously’): hence why these origin 
myths are so important.6 Both are fashioned from the same cosmic substance. It 
is significant that there is no community – in the true sense of the word – that 
precedes the arrival of a director (unlike that which comes to be reigned over by 
a stranger-king).7 It is formed when he begins recruiting.8  
 
 A final critical characteristic to note of the prospective director, is that 
there should be a perceptible synergy with the other directors of the Institute. 
When an extant Institute elects to bring on another director, they place a great 
deal of emphasis on the social and intellectual 'fit' which should be in evidence 
before appointing them.9 Rather than the idioms of fictive kinship which are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Cf.	  page	  32.	  7	  It	  is	  likely	  however,	  that	  the	  technical	  staff	  already	  employed	  by	  the	  Institute	  will	  be	  there	  when	  he	  arrives,	  having	  moved	  sideways	  from	  another	  department.	  8	  Cf.	  section	  iii.	  9	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  there	  are	  two	  types	  of	  directorial	  appointment:	  new	  directors	  and	  founding	  directors.	  A	  new	  director	  will	  be	  brought	  into	  an	  Institute	  with	  an	  already	  defined	  research	  agenda,	  while	  a	  founding	  director	  is	  invited	  with	  others	  to	  found	  a	  whole	  Institute	  and	  define	  the	  direction	  it	  goes	  in.	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sometimes used to describe the internal members of a department, it is fictive 
affinity which is deployed when expressing these horizontal relations. 
 
'Well, an Institute like ours with four directors. That is a 
very intimate setting. You get four very strong egos 
because we look for strong egos. The chemistry between 
these people determines the success of the Institute...In a 
university department you have twenty professors and if 
two of those don't like each other then – who cares? In a 
directorate of four people, if these people don't get along 
with each other this may hamper the Institute...It’s not 
always possible to judge this ahead of time. It's like 
marriage. When you get married you love the person, but 
ten years later many couples get divorced. Divorcing a 
Max Planck director is very difficult!' 
  
The choice of language here is telling as it complements the discourse of 
legitimate sex, animated through the trope of 'excitement'.10 The organisational 
complex is reproduced through such long-lasting 'marriages': these collegial 
directorships being the source of internal fecundity for the whole Institute (that 
generative aspect of charisma). This is in emphatic contrast to the discourses still 
to come of illegitimate sex – incest – which surround the idea of reproduction 
through promotion and inheritance.11 
 
 His assertion meanwhile that ‘divorcing a Max Planck director is very 
difficult’, indicates the lasting social transformation inaugurated by appointment. 
Only in highly exceptional cases would a director be forcibly removed from his 
position (for instance if he has ‘gone mad’). It is consequently on appointment 
that heroic headship demonstrates a major divergence from bigmanship. While 
the big man dominates precariously – as their status can be lost if not continually 
proven to their followers – directors once ‘called’ (berufen) to become a member 
of the Society, remain so indefinitely. In this sense, they are transformed into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Cf.	  Chapter	  3.v.	  11	  Cf.	  Chapter	  6.iv.	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what Godelier identified elsewhere in Melanesia as ‘great men’, who come to 
inhabit their social function (warrior, shaman, or hunter) by virtue of their 
participation in a series of initiation rituals (1986). Appointment and initiation 
are analytically identical in this respect: as once appointed/initiated the 
incumbent cannot then revert to their previous unappointed/uninitiated state. 
Even if a director is forcibly removed from an Institute, they still remain a 
‘scientific member’ or the organisation for life. 
 
 A director is usually appointed in his mid forties.12 Some directors may 
be as young as thirty-three, and others in their late forties or even early fifties; 
but although these two extremes exist on the spectrum, they are generally less 
common. The intention is that a department should last between twenty or even 
thirty years; and as the compulsory retirement age is sixty-five, one can see how 
an age-range between thirty-five and forty-five would be the desired median for 
new incumbents. This again, is echoed by what Strathern calls, ‘the major big 
men’, who are aged anything between thirty-five and seventy years old (1971: 
212). The Institute should then last the working lives of its directors. One way of 
ensuring the longevity of a particular Institute, is therefore to bring in new 
directors who are younger than usual, as its future is concentrated in the 
respective futures of these persons. 
  
 After a director is appointed, he is offered a substantial degree of agency 
in dictating the material culture of his domain. This might include the location of 
walls inside the building (the arrival of one director led to an entire 
reconstruction of the interior of one Institute's wing). For a founding director, it 
might even include dictating an entirely new section of the building: as these 
individuals can work together with the prize-winning architects to co-create the 
kind of space they desire.13 In this sense, a director's scientific vision is quite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  The	  appointment	  of	  a	  new	  director	  is	  a	  decision	  taken	  by	  the	  whole	  Society;	  however	  the	  existing	  directors	  of	  Institute	  will	  be	  closely	  involved	  in	  the	  whole	  process.	  The	  finer	  points	  of	  this	  process	  are	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study;	  although	  for	  reference,	  all	  Max	  Planck	  Society	  procedures	  and	  regulations	  can	  be	  found	  here,	  http://www.mpg.de/186606/Procedures_and_Regulations.	  	  13	  The	  Max	  Planck	  Society	  has	  always	  taken	  a	  contemporary	  and	  often	  ambitiously	  aestheticised	  attitude	  to	  its	  architectural	  culture.	  These	  are	  no	  drab	  labs.	  Each	  Institute	  looks	  starkly	  different	  from	  the	  next,	  often	  with	  a	  vivid	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literally sheltered in the most material of ways – as architectural form should 
follow scientific function – and if a director requires a home for new instruments, 
he should be given one. Walking round an Institute with one of its founders, he 
points to another multi-storey building in front of us. 'When this building was 
being built, I went up to the architect and told him “This is too small, we need 
space for the supercomputers”’. As a consequence, the architect and he agreed to 
build an entirely new wing to house these machines, which were to be a vital part 
of the new Institute's research purpose.  
 
 As the years roll by the director becomes – through such decisions – 
increasingly congealed into the material culture of an Institute. This is 
particularly vivid in the Secondary Institute. Its spacious high-ceilinged 'halls' 
contain machines over twenty-feet long or high, in which metals are shaped and 
tested. However, while some 'halls' are populated with working scientists, others 
lie completely dormant. One entire hall, full of such machines, is entirely devoid 
of people. On enquiring why this is so, the resident technician tells me that only a 
few years ago, this room would have been full of people. However, the 
respective director whose experimental programme they were realizing died not 
long ago, and the Institute has still not found a replacement. Only a director's 
personhood can animate an Institute's equipment; and when he leaves, these 
material residues have a strangely morbid, ghostly quality to them, like the 
archaeological remains of a glorious time gone past. 
 
 These material expressions of one individual's potency have been 
beautifully theorized by Jean-Pierre Warnier in his study of the 'pot-king' of 
Cameroon (2007). For Warnier, this form of kingship entrenches and reproduces 
itself socially in domains beyond the reach of language. The personhood of the 
pot-king is literally scaled up, extended: firstly into its 'embodied objects' (ibid: 
161) (the drinking horn, calabashes, and raffia wine etc), then into the walls of 
the palace, and at a higher level, the walls of the city, all of which through 
processes of ritual transformation and expulsion, enact a cosmic quality-control 
of the king's people. These three 'material ensembles' (ibid) are iterations of one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  play	  of	  shapes,	  colours	  and	  outdoor	  sculpture.	  This	  is	  true	  even	  for	  the	  older	  Institutes,	  such	  as	  the	  Institute	  for	  Iron	  Research	  in	  Düsseldorf,	  which	  was	  designed	  in	  the	  early	  1930s	  by	  Germany's	  celebrated	  Bauhaus	  School.	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cosmological entity, kingship, and it is through their inescapable materiality that 
the king's power reaches into every corner of social life: at its most expansive, 
his 'skin', a homologue of the city-walls, quite literally containing his subjects.14 
Warnier concludes, 'There lies the trick of power: like the masquerades of the 
palace, it proceeds under the cover of its masks. It hides itself behind a chattering 
of words that betrays nothing of the secrets written in the flesh' (ibid: 268). 
Heroic headship is equally embodied, equally inescapable, and for the large part, 
equally silent. It lies in the instruments, the walls, even in some cases, a whole 
architectural structure itself. A director's scientific vision exists beyond the realm 
of discussion: it is never up for debate as it is the very substance of collective 
life. 
 
 This substance does not come into being fully formed, but must be 
actively cultivated. Particularly in its early stages therefore, a department is an 
expanding universe. The director will start off with a small team of people and a 
cluster of equipment, which should then grow incrementally year-on-year.15 
Commonly he will bring scientists with him from his former workplace, setting 
them up as group leaders, and begin 'recruiting like hell' for new Ph.D students 
and postdocs. Within the first department I visit, still less than ten years old, this 
founding period is within the experiential memory of some current members and 
recent alumni, who communicate the sense of raw scientific potential that it 
offered.  
  
'We started kicking people out of the rooms which were 
being squatted by another department. Setting up a 
department from zero is a balancing act, there was no 
department just a lot of rooms. At that time it was very 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  The	  significant	  difference	  is	  that	  when	  the	  king	  is	  replaced	  his	  successor	  will	  have	  the	  same	  relationship	  to	  the	  same	  material	  culture.	  It	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  the	  same	  machines	  would	  be	  reanimated	  by	  a	  subsequent	  director.	  This	  contrast	  will	  be	  pursued	  later	  in	  the	  section.	  15	  Exceptions	  to	  this	  human	  'tabula	  rasa'	  –	  in	  which	  a	  director	  begins	  with	  a	  small	  number	  of	  scientists	  he	  is	  already	  acquainted	  with	  and	  builds	  from	  there	  –	  are	  those	  Institutes	  founded	  in	  the	  former	  East	  Germany	  after	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (cf.	  Chapter	  2.i).	  As	  part	  of	  the	  process	  of	  reunification,	  these	  founding	  directors	  were	  obliged	  to	  recruit	  former	  East	  German	  scientists.	  As	  a	  result,	  one	  director	  began	  with	  a	  ready-­‐made	  staff	  of	  150	  scientists.	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personal, we would sit down and discuss everything 
together. It was not even clear what the field was, so we 
had to define the problem we would address. We even 
came up with “ten commandments” to decide what we 
would and would not do. It was almost as if we had to 
form a club'. 
 
The biblical language of creation used here, suggests that a department is a 
similar ontological entity to the 'world' of the German Idealists, i.e. a social, 
material and moral order which emerges ex-nihilo, along with the directorial self. 
 
 There is also a certain nostalgia among these scientists – hinted at above 
– for the days when the department was more like a 'club', particularly for the 
intimacy with the director which was then possible. 
 
'One of the neat things about the department at the 
beginning was that it was very collegial. Before it was so 
much smaller. If I saw something I would say, “Hey – A, 
come and look at this under the microscope!” Now 
there's more administration, he's less accessible'. 
 
For members, the increasing social abstraction that is an inevitable corollary of 
any departmental growth can thus be felt as a loss rather than a gain, as the 
Janus-face of the director begins to look outwards rather than in. One index of a 
director's scientific involvement with his community is the proportion of 
publications of which he is a co-author. As you see from Figure 11 although the 
number of publications rises year on year, so the proportion that are co-authored 
by the Director A exhibit an overall tendency towards decline. This is not 
because he is expending less energy, but rather that there is a practical limit to 
how many scientific projects he can become involved with. 
  
 When I arrive at the Primary Institute, expansion had continued so 
steadily that the availability of space has become a pressing concern. The 
department I am hosted in has grown from 'zero to seventy', so its designated 
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walls are no longer able to contain it. Increasingly, rooms that were formerly 
laboratories have been converted into offices, and some Ph.D students who are in 
the process of writing up, and so have no need to be near their instruments, are 
relocated into an adjacent building a hundred yards away. For my part, I am 
moved week by week from one desk to the next, occupying seats that conference 
visits, holidays or illness have spontaneously made available. The group leader 
whose care I am in takes pains to kindly apologise for my enforced rootlessness, 
explaining that 'space is our biggest limitation here' – although in fact my ability 
to transcend office boundaries is an enormous advantage. Interestingly a subtext 
could be read into this statement: that is only spatial rather than material, 
financial, or intellectual resources, which curb the activity of their department. 
 
 That a department is able to expand beyond a certain point is not a 
prerequisite entitlement of every director, but depends on his ability to attract 
external resources. Aside from the consistent base funding provided by the MPG 
to every department, a director is expected to seek out 'third-party funding' to 
augment his domain's internal capacities. These 'third-parties', may be 
government-sponsored bodies such as the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 
(DFG), the European Union, the European Space Agency or the US-based 
National Institute for Health. They may be scientific prizes awarded to 
outstanding individuals, such as the Max Planck Prize or the Leibniz Prize: the 
latter involving a gift of 2.5 million Euros which must be spent over a maximum 
of seven years. Although 'basic research' directors make much of the Max Planck 
Society's independence from commercial science, these 'third-parties' may also 
come from industry. As illustrated in Figure 12, the quantity of third-party 
funding also evinces a sharp upwards tendency across time – particularly in the 
early years. There is some pride taken in the acquisition of these resources, made 
clear to me by the fact that senior scientists go out of their way to make sure I 
have been given a comprehensive list of third-party funds as part of my work. 
When a document is veritably thrust into an anthropologist’s hand, the latter 
must be aware that she has stumbled upon an entity in which pride and 
identification are invested. 
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    Figure 11.  
    Figure 12. 
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 Sahlins in particular, makes much of the skills in resource accumulation, 
which make possible a big man's rise to prominence. Although his ironical 
comparison to a rational money-making Western businessman is a caricature, it 
does distil the concept that a big man's wealth must be generated through his own 
energy and ambition. 'The Melanesian big man seems so thoroughly bourgeois, 
so reminiscent of the free enterprising rugged individual of our own heritage. He 
combines with an ostensible interest in the general welfare a more profound 
measure of self-interested cunning and economic calculation' (1963: 289). 
Following Malinowksi, Sahlins paints the big man as amassing a 'fund of power', 
by winning in the sphere of competitive exchange, and thus placing other people 
in his debt (ibid: 292). In Strathern's ethnography, this is 'moka': an intangible 
quantity, the relative difference between the value of one gift-giver's pigs, shells, 
and other 'extras' (1971: 101) and another. From a practical perspective, it may 
seem a little stretched to compare a director's seeking of monetary awards from 
global science funding bodies, to the competitive exchange of pigs and shells; 
but theoretically, both phenomena speak to the same Malinowskian 'fund of 
power', which must be accumulated if a group's productive activities are able to 
expand. Moreover, quite apart from their value as generative assets, 'moka' and 
multimillion Euro grants, are desirable accolades in the 'war of status' (ibid: 95). 
 
 Such resources are generally expended on either one of two things: 
equipment or people. As we shall discover in the following sections: it is the 
director’s prerogative to decide on which of these two things to spend, his 
decision to distribute resources this way or that.16 If he wants to purchase a new 
instrument for 300,000 Euros, this may mean sacrificing potential Ph.D students. 
On this point, while at the beginning of a director's career his team may be 
discussing a vision of science – laying out their 'ten commandments' in free-
floating discussions – as the years progress the research direction of each 
department is increasingly delimited by their experimental capacities. If a 
director does choose to make an outlay of 300,000 Euros on one particular piece 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Unless	  the	  'third-­‐party	  funding'	  has	  been	  applied	  for	  and	  awarded	  to	  a	  group	  leader.	  The	  latter	  may	  then	  bring	  in	  new	  doctoral	  students	  and/or	  postdocs,	  depending	  on	  how	  far	  the	  funding	  extends.	  They	  may	  also	  fund	  their	  own	  position	  from	  these	  resources	  and	  so	  generate	  a	  degree	  of	  financial	  (and	  correspondingly	  scientific)	  independence	  from	  the	  director.	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of measuring apparatus, this implicitly commits him to a specific research 
agenda in the long-term. While a department may start its life as something 
inchoate and unknown, expensive instruments such as these act like the ballast of 
a sailing ship, preventing it from rocking too far this way or that, steadying its 
course in a given direction. When one department does acquire a very rare and 
expensive device, the postdoc under whose care it will be placed is visibly 
delighted. He laughingly calls it 'my baby' and excitedly invites me to dip my 
nose in and smell the unsullied sterility of its new interior. The larger context of 
such a purchase thus has human consequences. The investment in the machine, is 
certifiably an investment in the specialist skill of this individual who will be its 
primary carer. As a director must commit to certain research directions through 
the purchase of new machines, so he must also commit to those who possess the 
knowledge to use it – at least in the medium term. 
 
 When a director reaches the age of 65, although he remains a 'scientific 
member', his active career as the leader of a department must come to an end. He 
may of course, die before this point, or in unusual cases, leave the position 
prematurely, but in almost all of these circumstances, a whole community will be 
dissolved and its members dispersed across Germany and the world. This 
dramatic dissolutions can create a lot of 'ill-feeling': particularly in one recent 
case, in which an entire Institute was closed down in the wake of several 
simultaneous retirements.17 According to some, the closure of a department is 
'where the system has its biggest problems', as fields which should have 
continuity are halted in their tracks, and 'the uncertainty of it all' can be 
paralysing.18 At this stage, it would be unheard of for a group leader to ascend to 
the position of director and carry on his legacy. However, in highly exceptional 
cases there is one means of continuity. In the wake of one director's recent 
unexpected death an invitation was extended by the Society to the director of 
another department in a similar field to take his place. So in effect one director is 
temporarily managing research communities in two different Institutes in two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  As	  is	  so	  often	  the	  case,	  when	  I	  press	  this	  particular	  interviewee	  on	  specific	  manifestations	  of	  such	  'ill-­‐feeling'	  I	  am	  met	  with	  a	  wall	  of	  silence,	  couched	  in	  the	  language	  of	  vagueness	  and	  ignorance.	  	  18	  The	  death	  of	  a	  big	  man	  can	  be	  equally	  chaotic:	  causing	  an	  'objective	  crisis'	  in	  the	  circuits	  of	  exchange	  (Strathern	  1971:	  191).	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different cities. It says something quite profound about the Society's investment 
in its elite when it decides to appoint one director to run two different 
departments instead of simply promoting a senior scientist in one of them.  
 
 So heroic headship, despite being similar to a stranger-king in bringing an 
outsider into the position of highest status, must be fully differentiated from 
kingship in general. If charismatic authority is pure immanence, kingship is pure 
transcendence, and no part of the social order can truly transcend a director’s 
departure or death (the previous exceptional case being a temporary solution).19 
This lack of transcendence is in evidence both materially and socially. The room 
full of abandoned machines I stumbled upon in the Secondary Institute are 
dissimilar to the embodied objects of Cameroon’s pot-king, in that when the 
director leaves they have not been simply transferred to a new owner. Similarly 
as I shall explore in Chapter 6.iv, it is critical to the Max Planck order that the 
directorship is – unlike kingship – a strictly non-inheritable position. The hunt 
for a new head in a new subject area must begin again from scratch. In these 
respects, heroic headship reveals its overarching allegiance to forms of 
charismatic authority and bigmanship, rather than their rank-oriented alternatives 
of kingship or chieftainship (White and Lindstrom 1997). 
 
 To sum up, although once appointed the heroic head achieves a position 
of relative safety and security – with a guaranteed steady stream of resources – 
the position retains some of its big man qualities. They still have to attract people 
and resources to their department by building up a fund of power. Despite all 
having the same hierarchical status – as fellow great men – directors thus still vie 
over that other alternative big man status which brought them into the position in 
the first place. Having traced this normative trajectory, I shall now turn to these 
individual directors with greater specificity. How do they inhabit this position? 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  For	  me,	  the	  busts	  which	  populate	  the	  Max	  Planck	  Administration	  and	  the	  Institutes	  (see	  Figures	  6	  and	  7)	  symbolically	  represent	  this	  lack	  of	  transcendence.	  While	  the	  king	  has	  not	  one	  body	  but	  ‘two’	  (Kantorowicz	  1957)	  –	  the	  second	  the	  transcendent	  social	  order	  concentrated	  in	  his	  person	  –	  the	  heroic	  head	  is	  not	  represented	  as	  a	  body	  at	  all,	  but	  a	  severed	  head,	  cut	  off	  at	  the	  neck:	  each	  face	  displaying	  the	  unique	  features	  of	  its	  countenance.	  Each	  one	  betokens	  an	  immanent	  social	  and	  scientific	  vision	  which	  rose	  and	  fell	  alongside	  them.	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 ii) Charisma 
 
 Describing heroic headship as part of a larger genre of charismatic 
leadership, does not necessarily mean that all directors are charismatic in the 
sense that it is conventionally understood. However, charisma as an analytic 
category and charisma as a personal quality do often converge. The position of 
director provides an occupational space within which such charisma is positively 
relished; and so in many cases it is a quality which flourishes as it is morally 
correct that it should. Just as Sahlins argues that the big men do not simply 
emerge by chance but rather are 'a specific institutional response to a particular 
type of society' (Godelier 1986: 164); so charismatic directors do not emerge by 
chance but rather are strongly encouraged to by the structuring effects of the 
Harnack principle. 
  
 Charisma is a famously elusive quality: whether understood as a personal 
attribute such as genius or creativity; or an intersubjective effect, such as magic, 
power or excitement, it is one which by virtue of its very nature transcends 
characterization. Nevertheless, I will try to demonstrate the charisma I feel 
intuitively, emanating from these directors, in ways which are empirically valid. 
 
 Firstly, directors show a strong tendency towards the usage of analogy 
and metaphor to communicate their thoughts. If we understand the capacity for 
syncretism across silos as the very basis of creativity itself, then it is here that 
directors demonstrate their cerebral proximity to the world of artists. These come 
in a myriad of forms: whether describing the very high turnover of scientists in 
the MPS as 'not a steady-state' (appealing to the scientific notion of homeostasis), 
or the postdoctoral period as a 'Walz' (the German medieval tradition of 
apprentices embarking on a long itinerant adventure before returning to the 
guild). However, those that seem to illustrate this point most powerfully are 
when science is compared to art itself. One department is engaged in modelling 
certain biological phenomena, and its director attempts to explain this process of 
modelling with reference to the painter Pablo Picasso. It was ‘no coincidence’, 
he tells me, that it is a highly gifted representational painter who ultimately 
developed and became known for a style as abstract as cubism. ‘The square only 
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means something if it is the essence of a really complex story’, his point being 
that one must understand natural phenomena in their complex concrete 
specificity, before one can build models and equations to simplify them. For him, 
the scientific mathematical model, just like the artist's gaze, is a form of 
interpretive abstraction based on a profound attention to empirical detail.  
 
 Secondly, several directors have clear extra-mural interests in non-
rational pursuits, whether literature, painting, or most commonly among 
scientists – particularly the sciences which have their roots in mathematics which 
is increasingly most of them – music. One director makes reference to various 
fictional works throughout the discussion, and insists on printing me out a 
reading list to assuage my own ignorance.  He also has an exuberant attitude to 
fashion, as I bid him goodbye he turns to leave the building with the affected air 
of an eccentric patrician gentleman, walking with the assistance of a large 
canary-yellow umbrella. Another, with his Spanish guitar propped up just behind 
his desk describes himself – apparently without any sense of contradiction – as a 
'professional musician'. He regularly plays in a band in his Institute's own small 
music venue nestled amongst the laboratories in the basement. While another, 
although conceding that he plays the piano, says that it is 'only privately, I don't 
perform'. As if it would be expected of him that he should be both a Max Planck 
director and a concert-level pianist! 
  
 I will conclude with specific reference to director A. In the estimations of 
his subordinates, A appears to embody the charismatic ideal. Juniors take pains 
to communicate to me how intellectually stimulating he is: the source of a 
'fountain' of original ideas, and one who can guide them with his remarkable 
insights through periods of confusion. This is made particularly clear in one of 
the group meetings which occur weekly, attended by around fifteen scientists and 
one technician, all working under the supervision of one group leader. These 
meetings are often an opportunity for the scientists of the group to present on 
their work and receive feedback. One postdoc stands up, and begins to explain 
the difficulties of using a particular piece of equipment, with a slide entitled – in 
slightly clumsy non-native English – ‘Correlation between experiments and 
personal history'. The slide shows a number of bullet-points, which initially 
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chronicle a series of scientific failures as rhetorical questions: the possible 
reasons why this instrument is not generating analysable data. As the points 
continue, the questions become more and more introverted – hence the 
correlation between experiments and personal history – and the scientists in 
attendance start to giggle. They soon descend into a tragi-comic existential panic, 
ending with 'What is work?' and finally, 'Are we alone in the universe?' The 
audience collapse into laughter as he clicks to the next slide. On it, is a picture of 
Homer Simpson looking vapid and confused (as a popular cultural archetype of 
lovable ignorance punctuated by moments of banal epiphany), with the caption 
underneath reading, 'But then I saw the light!'. He flicks to the next slide and a 
picture of the director's face comes up, followed by a picture of The Simpsons 
playing as a happy family below. Everyone is in hysterics, group leader included. 
The caption of his next and final slide deduces that 'we are not alone in the 
universe'.  
 
 The process this powerpoint narrates is fairly clear. The scientist, 
working away independently with an instrument, reaches a seemingly impassable 
wall. He keeps conducting experiments, but the data produced are little more 
than 'noise', utterly useless. He feels the despondency of scientific failure, which 
leads to a spiralling panic about all kinds of matters – as intellectual problems 
have a nasty tendency towards cognitive centrifuge. He meets the director, and 
the latter's input is nothing less than messianic. The biblical terminology evokes 
the god-like power that director A has unleashed ('then I saw the light'). This 
divine intervention resolves his scientific problems and ultimately banishes his 
existential crisis.  
 
 A ‘particular type of society’ can thus offer impetus to a particular 
expression of the human personality. Director A embodies the idealized form of 
the directorship in the sense that he should be intellectually pre-eminent 
(interestingly, the co-present group leader does not seem at all diminished by this 
postdoc's bold admiration), and act as an inspiration to his community. 
Personalities do not always match the ideal, but when they do this overlay is felt 
was the best of all possible worlds in the moral universe of the Max Planck.  
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 The following three sections will now engage with the prototypical 
questions one must ask of the charismatic leader. How is the community 
enlarged? And how are its activities designed and managed? 
 
 
 iii) Hiring 
 
 Unlike a university system, there is no institutional protocol for job 
applications to the Max Planck Society. Rather, a director handpicks every 
member of his department, without the need to accede to any higher chain of 
command, or obligatory bureaucratic process. To one, I pose the question of 
where precisely his directorial authority is located. His response is revealing, 
replying without taking a breath, 'If you tell me that you want to work here, and I 
have a certain budget and I say, okay I like you, you can start tomorrow. I can do 
this. I don't have to ask anybody, or to justify it.' To him elective personnel are 
power's illustration, that he could – even as the head of a department of the 
natural sciences – bring on board a social anthropologist without any questions 
asked. 'What we do is our business', he says quite forcefully. In this way the 
selection process may operate through the ineffability of intuitive judgement, as 
simple as 'okay I like you', rather than a thorough rummage of the curriculum 
vitae. Indeed directors – and sometimes their subalterns – often make much of 
this explicitly 'non-bureaucratic' approach to human-resource management. A 
director and his Ph.D student laughingly tell me a story, that when the latter rang 
up to inquire about professional opportunities, the former inquired 
spontaneously, 'Can you be here in twenty minutes?' The request was met, and 
employment granted there and then. That this is made much of in my presence, 
an anecdote enthusiastically volunteered, speaks to one of the key ways in which 
directors' understand their role. Only they know the watchword to open the gates, 
and can speak it on a whim, 'I don't have to ask anybody, or to justify it.' 
 
 This does not mean to suggest that they may not choose to delegate some 
of this responsibility, or attend to the responses of their colleagues before 
fetching the key. One director with a sense of history invents a tiny democracy 
when apprehending new recruits. He describes his self-generated 'Prussian three-
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vote system'. He has a vote, his group leaders have a vote, and the students have 
a vote, all of which are dutifully counted after a so-called 'application seminar'. 
Yet even in this context, democracy appears to be more food-for-thought than a 
sincerely institutionalised principle. He himself undermines it with self-satirizing 
candour, 'I listen to them, I ask them, and then I decide of course. It's called 
absolutism. Consultant absolutism.'  
 
 Now, a word or two on these 'application seminars'. These are 
presentations of scientific problems the prospective candidate has worked on, 
theoretically open to all department members, lasting around half an hour, and 
always followed by questions from the director and group leaders and sometimes 
others. All of those I witness involve potential Ph.D students. However, they are 
also given (albeit less commonly as there are far fewer openings) by those at the 
upper echelons of this hierarchy.20 They are referred to by multiple directors, but 
are by no means universal. In the Secondary Institute such seminars are 
conspicuously absent. As the Institute is located in a less attractive town for 
ebullient young twenty-somethings, and some distance from the nearest 
university, they suffer somewhat from a dearth of applicants. When I query this 
phenomena, 'we're just happy when people come' is the self-deprecating reply. 
They are therefore a familiar ritual form for Max Planck scientists, but are only 
installed according to the director's choice. 
 
 In one department I visit, application seminars are very frequent: so much 
so that in one month alone there are no less than three potential Ph.D students 
advertising their wares. These may be wildly effervescent or relatively somber 
occasions: depending on the mood of the day, and the tone set by the speaker. 
Most commonly there are between ten and twenty people in the audience, so it 
presents an opportunity for the department to commune, and take stock of those 
who wish to enter its hallowed walls. One such occasion involves a very smart 
and confident young woman who strikes up a skilful rapport with some members 
of the audience before she starts, with an impressive command of English given 
she is a non-native speaker. Her self-assured demeanour and slick powerpoint 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  This	  goes	  as	  far	  as	  the	  group	  leader	  level.	  If	  there	  is	  a	  question	  of	  inviting	  a	  prestigious	  scientist	  with	  a	  view	  to	  possible	  nomination	  to	  a	  directorship,	  this	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  'Colloquium'.	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presentation seems to engender sympathy in the audience. The director nods his 
head slowly and looks fairly satisfied. However, half-way through she is 
interrupted by a stern senior scientist, who launches a critical and rather 
aggressive attack on the nature of her data. The style visibly puts her off balance 
and she stumbles to respond cogently to this sudden critique. 'Is that from MIT?' 
he asks fiercely, querying the validity of her results. Some members of the 
audience exchange looks, and the atmosphere has shifted in an instant from 
enthusiasm to awkwardness. At this point the director intervenes, addressing the 
inquirer but also the clearly the rest of the room, 'You don't trust MIT?' He 
activates a playful rivalry between the MPG and a major American institution, to 
reframe the encounter as a collective joke rather than a personal attack, 
redirecting the criticism away from the speaker towards MIT, a subtle but 
effective intervention which modulates the room's emotional tenor. On cue every 
member of the room laughs and the atmosphere softens once more. Thus we see 
something akin to 'consultant absolutism' in action. The director is gauging the 
response of his underlings (positive as revealed by the easy rapport before the 
seminar, and incidentally afterwards) and all the while forging his own position. 
If this is sympathetic he will actively cultivate a mood among the others which 
reflects this. In this case, he chooses to step in before the lone wolf begins to 
form a pack, and rescue the young candidate from the threat of symbolic 
violence. Others are not quite so lucky.  
 
 Particularly for prospective candidates at the postdoctoral level and 
above, it is – and is expected to be – the director's renown and prestige which 
draws them towards a specific Max Planck department.21 One way this kind of 
fame can be dispersed in the wider scientific community is through departmental 
alumni (annually cultivated through 'alumni meetings'). Their subsequently 
mobility expands knowledge of him in the far reaches of the globe, creating 
personal channels through which others can flow back to the centre, 'the more 
role models there are, the more tracks, the better the students are who come'. In 
this vein directors often note than in the early years of their tenure they 
sometimes have trouble attracting enough applicants, a minority of scientists 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  One	  postdoc	  confesses	  to	  discovering	  the	  department	  'on	  Google',	  and	  appears	  so	  shame-­‐faced	  about	  taking	  such	  an	  impersonal	  route	  that	  he	  implores	  me	  never	  to	  tell	  the	  respective	  director.	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have to 'take the risk' by attaching themselves to a neophyte leader, but as the 
years fly by dearth more often than not inflates incrementally into glut, as 
scientists graduate and networks proliferate. 
 
 It is also very consciously cultivated by the director himself, actively 
giving seminars, lectures, attending conferences, symposiums and other forms of 
performance, at laboratories across the world, to attract potential applicants. 
'Name-building, reputation-building, brand-building. This is what we do'. Many 
current members record peripheral points in their careers, when they were 
actively looking for openings, and happened to meet the director at one such 
event, which quickly led to being offered a position. 'He didn't even ask for a CV 
or anything, he just said come here and give a talk (an application seminar). It 
was kind of...fast'. One member was even already enrolled in another Ph.D 
programme in a different continent, and decided to abandon it in favour of an up-
an-coming director's alternative offer of a place. The specificity of this individual 
was a big pull factor, one heightened by the reactions of his former colleagues, 
'everyone raved about ____ ____, how exciting it would be'.   
 
 Such 'name-building', is intended not only to encourage scientists to 
apply, but also to reassure them that their subsequent career is in safe hands. 
Following 'fame' is expected to be a more likely route to professional success – 
and thus fundamental for those scientists with research ambitions. As one 
director puts it, 'Life is a deal. They have to see that what you offer, the famous 
golden thread, will bring them a career'. Thus the 'golden thread', assiduously 
woven by the director, is not a distraction or a side-issue for everyone beneath 
him. As the individual through which the collective is expressed the 'fame' of 
director and department are synonymous: and as a result, it is something they 
take personal pride in. This is very similar to the unity that the big man 
concentrates on his person: the notion that 'the one man is likened to one clan, is 
its homologue' (Strathern 1991: 212).22 Being encompassed by a 'man of renown' 
means participating in a social unit with considerable caché (Sahlins 1963: 290). 
One Ph.D student who has decided, on finishing, to leave science altogether, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  However	  there	  is	  a	  subtle	  difference	  here;	  the	  director	  is	  a	  unique	  entity	  rather	  than	  a	  simple	  conglomeration	  of	  relations	  (cf.	  section	  vii).	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explains that if he did elect to stay, his attachment to the director would be a 
'huge advantage'. He continues, 'He's really well known in the community, this is 
a huge asset for my own personal development'. 
 
 
 iv) Social Engineering 
 
 Directors do not only minister the entrance of new incumbents; they also 
take a primary role in the unfolding of social life. Indeed the ubiquitous adage 
that 'every department is different' – which usually precedes my participants' 
explanation for why an anthropology of the Max Planck Society is impossible – 
sounds to my ears very much like the multiple iteration of something universal. 
Every director is united in their capacity to engender this difference as they see 
fit. Directors are, as a consequence, expected not only to be scientific visionaries; 
but also founding members of so-called 'intentional communities': with their own 
peculiar rituals, habits, and even languages. This social vision can be realized in 
any number of ways. 
  
 As I have suggested, in the beginning this may be through material 
culture. When the director of a mathematically-oriented department arrived at his 
new Institute, he positively relished this 'once in a lifetime opportunity' for social 
engineering through interior design, when asked how he wished the space to be 
furnished. 'So I said, I want some green, I want some plants in the hallways so 
that people feel comfortable here, and I want whiteboards so that people don't 
have to go in their offices to continue working. If I want people to communicate 
it must be possible for them to remain there'. The idea is that if members bump 
into each other in the corridor, and begin to talk about science, the tools should 
be available to facilitate the continuing of their discussion in a more ordered 
way, scribbling down equations or diagrams as they go. These kinds of 
reflections demonstrate a clear-eyed sensitivity to the behavioural effects of 
materiality: remarkably common among these scientists. 
 
 Director A possesses a very clear idea of the genre of social interaction he 
is aiming at: one he calls, 'the philosophy of mixing'. This involves first and 
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foremost arranging the seating plan. Each office will generally contain between 
three and five occupants, averaging around four, and Director A asserts that no 
two people from the same group are allowed to sit in the same office. As each 
group focuses on a different scientific topic, the purpose is to create a structured 
situation in which members explain their research to each other, and thus learn in 
an informal way about other subfields the department as a whole is working on. 
In addition to this, the female lab technicians – rather than being seated together 
in the same room as they are in the Secondary Institute – are scattered throughout 
all of these offices, and so in this way 'mixed' with the scientists. No more than 
two technicians occupy the same office, and in some cases it is only one. Again 
the technicians, as will be later developed, are carriers of specialist knowledge, 
so if they are scattered throughout the scientific cohort they can be queried 'as 
and when' in an unintimidating space. Director A explains his 'philosophy' to me 
quite carefully and without prompting, even asking whether I had 'noticed' these 
features independently. It is clear even before he articulates it explicitly, that 
these arrangements emerged from a very 'active decision' on his part. 'I didn't 
want clusters of groups', he remarks, with an assurance born of lengthy 
reflection. 
 
 The 'philosophy of mixing' extends further than the seating plan. There 
are frequent 'coffee and cake' rituals, to celebrate birthdays, weddings, arrivals 
and departures. Sometimes these would emerge simply from a playful round-
robin email declaring 'TGIF', 'thank god it's Friday', and at others from a member 
of the department going abroad and returning with some exotic foodstuff they 
wish to share out. Director A, despite being extraordinarily busy, always makes 
an effort to drop in at least briefly, to as many as he can. At first glance such 
occasions seem spontaneous, the natural consequence of gregarious social beings 
when cohered into a professional community. However on meeting the Director 
A shortly after one such event, it appears they too, are part of his 'philosophy'. 
'And these social events, even though they take time, and augment my body fat 
(he chuckles)...they have a very important function too in that context, that even 
though it's a social interaction, people can also communicate about science'. 
Even these small-scale potlatches, which occur once, twice or even three times a 
week, emerge from a functionalist vision, that if you wish people to 'mix' and 
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exchange about science, you must make sure the occasions exist in which they 
are able to do so. Social and scientific production are thus threaded together 
seamlessly (we will re-encounter this in the following section). 
 
 In addition to encouraging people to 'mix', director A is also 'striving...to 
have people feel loyal, and an integral part of the department': meaning that he is 
'ready to spend the time it needs...whenever problems come along on the 
personal level'. To this end, A is always surreptitiously watching over his flock, 
taking little interventions, and making mental notes about things said and 
responded to. In one case, on a day excursion's to a cathedral, some of us are 
taken on a tour of the cathedral's interior. Right at the beginning, however, one of 
the senior scientists is rather viciously told off by the tour guide for speaking to 
his neighbour out of turn. The former is clearly quite put out, and disappears 
altogether from the tour soon after, wandering the town on his own instead. 
When this incident is mentioned in passing to the director his brow furrows and 
he murmurs, 'hmmmm....strange' in a thoughtful drawl. Soon after, I see him 
sitting beside this individual in one of the seminars. They are clearly enjoying 
themselves, laughing, joking, and making asides. The scientist tells me 
emphatically later in the day, how 'great' the director is, he clearly feels pleased 
at the latter's attentiveness and seems to have contentedly returned to the fold.  
 
 Director A also micromanages a community of sentiment in a more 
obvious way, spontaneously organising what he names a 'Meckerstunde' for the 
whole department – 'for which there is no English translation' (effectively an 
hour dedicated to complaints). We are all gathered together in the seminar room, 
and despite calls from the audience to switch to English, the meeting is 
conducted in German: the reason given that the administrators and technicians 
are also there. The director speaks in hushed, quiet, soothing tones: telling us the 
intention of the meeting is to provide a forum for 'things you like or don't like' in 
the department or the Institute as a whole. However, this is qualified with the 
statement that 'if it cannot be aired in public, it should not be aired here', meaning 
that these should be complaints of a general, rather than an intimate, sort. The 
event ends up lasting much less than an hour, as, after a slightly awkwardly 
manufactured discussion about the unreliability of the local trains, no other 
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'complaints' emerge and we all disperse. This is the first of such meetings, an 
experiment designed by the director to test whether it serves to resolve issues 
before they settle and seethe under the skin of the community. Yet it may be that 
members register the warning, and are reluctant to voice any kind of complaint, 
for fear of acting out of turn. In any event, the occasion has the self-conscious 
feel of unfamiliarity, rather than the kind of habituated ritual which one wears 
with the comfort of an old coat. It serves to indicate the constant inventiveness of 
the director in ensuring that every member feels 'an integral part of the 
department'.  
 
 Returning to a more general level, although one which the previous 
example flags up, each department also constitutes a designated linguistic 
community: the language, of course defined by the director. The power over 
verbal exchange is assumed by those beneath him to be so great that 'it's not 
implausible for them to say, “Hey, let's only speak Spanish”'. I never hear of any 
Spanish-speaking department, but there is a subtle distinction between an 
English-speaking department and a German-speaking one. Most directors will 
announce that 'the language of the department is English': betraying that this has 
been decided upon rather than arising simply because the language of science is 
English.23 In one department in the Secondary Institute however – although 
never stated explicitly – the language is clearly German. This is the one in which 
lunch-table and coffee-break conversations are conducted, and the director 
appears visibly happier and more relaxed when we communicate in this tongue. 
If members speak too much English he chides them playfully, telling them they 
have to 'learn German'. Thus it should by now be clear that in many different 
ways, linguistically, spatially, and even emotionally, the director has a myriad of 
opportunities to define the character of his department (and often takes them but 
is not technically obliged to). 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Of	  course	  in	  offices	  and	  along	  corridors,	  I	  hear	  Spanish,	  French,	  German,	  Danish,	  Hebrew,	  Chinese,	  Italian,	  Farsi	  and	  Russian,	  and	  probably	  many	  others	  unwittingly;	  yet	  these	  do	  not	  form	  the	  designated	  language	  community.	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 v) Scientific Engineering 
  
 It is significant is that these social visions are by no means arbitrary. The 
potential functionality of such designs has already been hinted at, in the sense 
that 'coffee and cake' rituals enable members to 'communicate about science'. Yet 
with each director it often goes much further. The structure of social exchange 
should mimic, and thus effectuate, the relations necessary for scientific 
production. Director A’s utopian vision of a department in which all members 
are 'mixing' with each other daily, swapping practical and theoretical knowledge, 
is not the consequence of some peculiar partiality for syncretism, but rather that 
he wishes to establish a working culture of 'interdisciplinarity'. The disciplinary 
spectrum encompassed by this department is remarkably broad, containing 
representatives from Biology, Chemistry, Physics, Biochemistry, Biophysics, 
Biotechnology, Biomedical Engineering, Engineering, Mathematics and 
Materials Science, and one of his scientific ambitions is to bust existing silos in 
the service of unanswered questions. Thus the 'philosophy of mixing' people is 
utterly synonymous with the 'philosophy of mixing' disciplines. 
 
 Now one could suggest that Max Planck departments are always about 
'mixing' disciplines, because one of the avowed purposes of the MPG is to 
provide a space for research not possible within the strictures of the German 
university system, where the main purpose is train young scientists in the 
inherited specialisms. By orientating research around an individual rather than a 
discipline, it could be said that transdisciplinarity is thereby factored into the 
MPG approach. This is true to some extent, but within different departments, the 
particular form it takes can be imagined quite differently. To reiterate, this again 
relates to the material and social conditions necessary for a specific form of 
scientific production. It can be illustrated with reference to two further directors. 
 
 Director B runs what is an almost entirely computational department, i.e. 
one in which 'experiments' are carried out on computers in offices rather than 
with instruments in laboratories. Being the head of this virtual environment, 
director B has a slightly different approach to hierarchy and knowledge exchange 
than his experimentalist colleagues. This is made clear to me immediately on 
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entering his office before any words are said: as the act of entering itself 
undermines one principle of hierarchy, common to every other department I had 
visited. Each director has an official 'gatekeeper', a female secretary whose 
position as intermediary is structured architecturally, by being situated in a room 
one must pass through to access the office of the director. However, director B 
has another door which leads directly onto the corridor. It is wide open and I wait 
outside, between both doors, uncertain as to which one will be the route of 
access. When he arrives, he shakes my hand and beckons me through the direct 
door, thus bypassing the resident gatekeeper. His alternative attitude becomes 
even clearer as we talk.  
 
'In my department I see it rather as a spider-web, where 
there are many independent minds who communicate and 
come up with ideas through interaction...I rely on the 
Ph.D students. I try to instill ideas in their minds because 
I want to know the result. I'm building my image of how 
things work from all the results that the students produce. 
So if a student did not come up with an answer, then the 
piece of the puzzle in my mind, is not there. I am after 
the student because I want to know the answer'. 
 
 Using the metaphor of a 'spider-web' as a guiding principle for social 
relations is evocative. An image begins to appear in my mind as he speaks: of 
glistening silver threads, intersecting at many different nodes, in which all nodes 
and all threads are on the same two-dimensional plane. Suddenly, as the last 
sentence here is uttered, another figure looms into the image. The spider! A 
large, black, sleek and nimble beast which scuttles from node to node, following 
the vibrations which lead it instinctively to its prey. As he says, he is 'after the 
student because he wants to know the answer'. The director in this conceit is the 
spider, solving scientific riddles through the expanded surface-area of his web: in 
which whatever is caught can be carefully examined by him, and either 
discarded, or voraciously consumed with the help of more thread. Therefore it 
must be said at this point, that although a so-called 'flat hierarchy' constitutes this 
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director 's structural principle, he always remains above this; or rather, the web 
may be flat, but the spider is fully embodied.  
 
 Director C meanwhile runs a mathematics department, and his relation 
with his graduate students is even more tightly knit. It is not simply that he is 
'after them' because he wants to solve a puzzle, but rather that if they work out 
something mathematically and lose their way, he must go through the entire 
process with them and locate where they went wrong.  'On the blackboard I ask 
them what did you try? And why didn't it work?'. The practice of going through a 
problem 'on the blackboard' is vastly different from the strategy and delegation of 
the experimentalist director, 'It's very close, and very hands-on'. The latter would 
spend much of his time organising large-scale experimental programmes, but the 
idea of him carrying out such experiments himself is, of course, laughable. 'I 
always say I have thirty-three desks', C tells me, 'which is huge for a 
mathematician'. The reason this is huge is because of the intellectual 
independence of every student, each one solving problems with a certain degree 
of autonomy. Because of such independence, the quality of the student is 
paramount. C tells me he would rather 'leave a gap' than hire someone who was 
not 'excellent', and thus in his case, during the hiring process, greater emphasis is 
placed on the curriculum vitae than it would be among experimentalists. 
 
 What is striking in this instance is the numerical specificity of his 
community, his insistence that he has 'thirty-three desks', where as other directors 
might suggest they maintain it 'around forty', or 'around sixty'. It is partly the 
nature of mathematical knowledge production, and the kinds of social relations it 
brings with it, that determine the number. The other part is an emphasis on 
quality over arbitrary quantity. It is important that the director, or one of his 
group leaders, is theoretically able to chart the intellectual location of every one 
of the students, literally solving equations 'on the blackboard', rather than 
swelling numbers for a bigger output. C is more than able to do this with the 
financial resources available to him, but as with others, he expresses that it is the 
highest number he can 'handle'.  
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             Scale, for Sahlins and others, is one of the defining attributes of the big 
man complex (1963: 287). While the Polynesian chiefdoms which are Sahlins' 
comparators can encompass polities of tens of thousands of members, PNG 
Highland groups tend to oscillate between populations of only seventy to three 
hundred, often settling at the upper limit (Hogbin and Wedgwood 1953-4, Barnes 
1962, Lepervanche 1967, Forge 1972). This is the quantity, apparently, which is 
most amenable to the 'maintenance of internal order' among the community 
(Hogbin and Wedgwood 1952/3: 242). Eric Schwimmer cites a study by T. R. 
Barker among the Ai'i, in which a Wawonga big man explains why he did not 
agree to the marriage of one the female members of his group. The reason he 
gives is accordingly, that 'he did not wish to increase the number of siba 
marriages indefinitely, but wanted there to be just sufficient to serve his 
commercial ends and those of his community' (1991: 151). This big man 
subordinates the potential for further expansion through affinal networks, to a 
functionalist attention to the perceived limit of the community's productive work 
and needs. Although the kinds of activities a Max Planck director is governing 
are ostensibly intellectual rather than economic, the big man and the director 
both share a concern not to stretch the level of social abstraction too far, at the 
risk of sacrificing the loyalties of their subordinates, and/or the quality of their 
productive output. Just as expansion is important in the early years, the 
willingness to assert limits is equally important once momentum is built. 
 
 
 vi) Responsibility and failure 
 
 The question of limits takes us into another facet of the hero principle: the 
great weight of responsibility, self-monitoring, and work which is the corollary 
of this ideology of autonomy. Having emphasised up until this point, the many 
echoes which resound between this heroic headship and other forms of 
leadership, I will now follow a different path: a path which explores the position 
existentially and takes us deeper into the cultural particularism of German social 
ontology. 
 
	   143	  
 The old adage that ‘with great power comes great responsibility’ is 
acutely experienced by these figureheads. Former president Hubert Markl, in a 
speech celebrating fifty years of the Max Planck Society, made the following 
remarks. 
 
‘Only someone who has never felt the challenge of the 
responsibility which weighs upon a scientist, can think 
that the scientists of the MPG have an easy existence. A 
life dedicated to science is certainly an enjoyable 
existence, but by no accounts is it an easy one’.24 
 
 This sentiment is echoed by several directors, often with reference to the 
‘pressure’ of successful performance in the Fachbeirat.25 One director tells me 
about the dangers of burn-out.  
 
'One of the main qualities of a researcher is to know 
when I should continue and when I should stop. When 
you find a scientist with burnout it's probably because of 
this question. That's a nagging question that worries you 
all the time. People think that being a professor is an easy 
job, but its extremely stressful psychologically. And there 
is a strong danger of burn-out. What makes it so stressful 
is not the amount of work you have to do, but the 
uncertainty. If you are after a good question, there will be 
periods when you're desperate. You ask yourself – am I 
doing the right thing? Is it ever going to get better? You 
have to ask yourself – should I continue or should I stop? 
This is the most difficult question. I can fail in the end 
and then the advisory board a few years after the fact will 
say, “Hey, you've failed”'.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  ‘Nur	  wer	  niemals	  den	  Anspruch	  verspürt	  hat,	  den	  solche	  Verantwortung	  an	  einen	  Wissenschaftler	  steht,	  kann	  meinen,	  den	  Wissenschaftlern	  der	  MPG	  sei	  damit	  ein	  leichtes	  Dasein	  bereitet.	  Ein	  schönes	  Dasein	  ist	  sehr	  Wohl,	  ein	  Leben	  für	  die	  Wissenschaft,	  aber	  fürwahr	  kein	  leichtes’	  (Henning	  et	  al.	  1998:	  19).	  25	  Cf.	  Chapter	  3.ii.	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 Nevertheless, even if the advisory board does say ‘Hey, you've failed’ – 
as we learned in Chapter 3.ii – this does not mean he will be given any strict 
instructions as to how to succeed. Instead, this determination – as this participant 
hints – comes from within. In this sense, the ‘freedom’ codified in the Statutes, is 
coterminous with that proposed by Johann Fichte. Fichte – like all of the Idealists 
– was very keen on the idea of freedom: calling the Wissenschaftslehre 'the first 
system of freedom' ever truly envisaged (1994: vii). For him this means 
intellectual freedom: the freedom of mind or consciousness. He argues for its 
primacy through his basic proposition that, 'The self begins by an absolute 
positing of its own existence' (Fichte 1970: 99). No objective reality is able to 
emerge, before the self becomes aware of itself as a self, before its mind is able 
to observe itself as being. However, this is not some ego-maniacal free-for-all. 
Rather, the self is very carefully circumscribed; the crucial point is that this 
circumscription takes place internally. There is, as Fichte says, 'an original 
duality in the self' (1970: 258). Alongside this 'absolute self' sits a 'not-self': an 
external, limiting element contained within the self a priori, that is, before its 
own self-positing. The presence of the ‘not-self’ – sensed through ‘feelings’ – 
governs its activity by means of an internal 'check', or 'Anstoß’ (Peacock 2013). 
As Marina Bykova explains, 'This “check” or Anstoß is the original limitation of 
the I to its free, practical activity, but this limitation is posited by the I itself...by 
and through its own activity' (2010: 139). Thus the intellect acts freely in its 
practical engagements with the world (such as initiating a ten-year experimental 
programme) and it is limited not by the world which imposes external 
restrictions, but rather by its own internal mechanism, its own Anstoß. When this 
director tells me that 'one of the main qualities of a researcher is to know when I 
should continue and when I should stop' – rather than simply working hard, 
having ideas, being ambitious, or any other more predictable response – this is 
Fichtean freedom made manifest.  
 
 The great dyad directors posit between ‘freedom’ and ‘responsibility’ 
therefore necessitates a reimagining of what we understand as agency 
(presuming freedom-qua-agency). Rather than taking it is a universally 
distributed human potential, agency must be re-rooted within the cultural context 
to which it is being applied (Hilsdon 2007). In Germany, the concept of the inner 
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struggle has historically been a frequent reference-point: what Louis Dumont 
calls its 'schismatic introversion' (1994: 49), and Goethe's Faust names the 'zwei 
Seelen...in meiner Brust' [the two souls in my breast] (1872: 40). It is subtly 
dissimilar from the Cartesian cut between subject and object, instead it is a 
metaphysical cut within the subject itself, a dialectic not of, but 'within 
consciousness' (Ringer 1969: 93). The agency of the directors in the Max Planck 
Society comes to be, not only the decision to act and make a difference in the 
world (sensu Butler 1993, Giddens 1984), but the alternative decision to 
withhold from action – as this interlocutor says – to know when to ‘stop’. The 
inheritance of a philosophy of freedom which empowers the directors to act in all 
the ways this chapter has so far identified is consequently a double-edged sword. 
It is partnered with an equal and opposite inheritance of intense self-governance.   
 
 The prospect of any form of limitation however, remains largely invisible 
to the rest of his department: for whom the ideology of the Harnack principle is 
internalised to such a degree that the director's scope for action is perceived as 
infinite. This may be the 'limitless resources' directors are apparently awarded by 
their patrons, or the 'complete freedom' they have in all matters, scientific and 
otherwise. A frequent axiom among senior scientists is that a director can do 
'whatever he or she wants'. This is usually followed or preceded by a reference to 
their specific director: with the caveat that he could do whatever he wants, but 
chooses not to as his reign is one of benevolence. 'D could be a king if he wanted 
to. You do not feel it because he is very democratic, but in principle they could 
give the directorship to a person of thirty-five and give them money for the rest 
of their career'. One director is well aware of the circulation of exaggerated 
perceptions among his department, and is flatly dismissive of their claim to 
accuracy. He reaches for an analogy, 'In a feudalistic sense, this noble is seen by 
his people as a person of universal power. But the power is granted from outside 
and can be taken at’ any time'. This is not strictly true – all acknowledge that in 
practical terms the removal of a director from his post would be almost unheard 
of – yet what he is trying to emphasise is some of the fragility internal to this 
position, which often goes unacknowledged. 
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 What is visible however, is that in meeting their responsibilities (and 
fending off failure) the director is likely to be the hardest working member of 
any department. This social elite are not the 'leisure class' of Thorsten Veblen 
(1973), whose wealth enables them to remove themselves from the means of 
production and engage in 'conspicuous' time- and cash-rich pursuits. Nor are they 
the ritually immobilised kings of Africa or the Pacific, whose sacred position 
removes them from the daily affairs of temporal life (Quigley 2005: 2, Valeri 
1985: 149). Instead, again co-extensive with the Fichtean ‘ich’ – who comes to 
exist in the process of ‘striving’ (streben) – maximum status means maximum 
productivity. I have one particularly memorable encounter with this fact. In 
negotiating an interview with one director, he patiently explains that he has no 
available time in the foreseeable future, but is intrigued by my project, and has 
an 'extreme suggestion' for me. I could meet him off a plane at Tegel Airport, 
and we could conduct the interview in the pre-booked car which will take him to 
the Institute in Berlin. I agree with alacrity, and trundle down to Tegel with a 
home-made sign saying 'Anthropologist' scribbled in bold. The striking thing 
about this incident is not in fact that it happens at all, but that it happens twice in 
quick succession! As the vehicle begins to pull away the director receives a call 
from his secretary, and rather oddly, she asks to speak to me. (In the same flurry 
of emails in which I had communicated with this director, I had also written to 
one of his colleagues at the same Institute). She asks whether I would like to 
accompany this subsequent director, in another car back to Tegel Airport, as he 
would be happy to offer an interview in transit. So after a short tour of the 
Institute, I return to Tegel in yet more animated conversation, armed with a brief 
insight into the director's hyper-mobility and sardine-packed schedule. I discover 
soon after, meetings in taxis are not at all uncommon. One group leader in the 
Primary Institute tells me this is something he and his director regularly do, as it 
is often the only liberated time there is.  
 
 
 vii) The collective individual 
 
 In Chapter 1.iv I identified two variations of German holism: the first 
being ‘the individual as totality which concentrates the whole world within 
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itself’. One self thereby encompasses an entire community (as illustrated in the 
diagram on page 31).26 This holistic approach to persons and groups frames the 
director's relationship to his department in a particular way. Moreover, at 
different scales and to different ends, it also becomes a way of representing the 
whole organisation. 
 
 The rhetoric of the encompassing or collective individual, is used to 
describe the expansion or contraction of a department. As the department grows, 
so does 'he', as it shrinks, again the director shrinks too. One senior talks of his 
entry to the department as a Ph.D student when a director was on a recruitment 
drive, 'At that time, he was growing well. He was starting out, trying to get 
people'. Meanwhile, another director deliberates the pros and cons of the current 
size of his community, 'I always thought, maybe I should become a bit smaller, 
but I think it is about the right size from the point of view that I can manage it'. It 
should be noted that these linguistic habits trip off the tongue within a seamless 
string of words. They are communicated without irony or self-consciousness, but 
rather quite straightforwardly. The encompassment of a community by its 
director is not felt to undermine the community in question by placing them in a 
relationship of subordination, but simply becomes the language through which 
both are made present. 
 
 It should not be a surprise therefore that for the whole organisation, this 
collective individual becomes the president. The current incumbent Peter Gruss 
is a highly visible figure: his image perennially decorating the front pages of the 
plethora of print culture the Society produces, and his duties, biography, and 
political activities only one click away from the Max Planck homepage. The 
president's speeches throughout the history of the society, act and have acted as a 
mouthpiece for the position of the organisation relative to certain issues. They 
often confront the meta-issues of research, and are intended to have a rallying 
effect both within and outside the organisation. Consistent themes are the nature 
of research, the nature of the Max Planck Society, and perhaps most importantly, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  This	  is	  similar	  to,	  but	  subtly	  distinct	  from,	  Alfred	  Gell's	  notion	  of	  	  ‘distributed	  personhood’	  which	  is	  inspired	  partly	  by	  the	  big	  man	  systems	  of	  Melanesia	  (1998:	  21).	  Distinct	  from,	  because	  distribution	  implies	  a	  philosophical	  pluralism,	  whereas	  within	  this	  German	  form,	  self	  and	  world	  both	  participate	  in	  the	  same	  basic	  unity.	  
	   148	  
why Germany needs it.27 Just as the director is his department, the President is 
the whole Society. This can be illustrated with reference to one such speech of 
Prof. Adolf Butenandt, president from 1960 to 1972: 'The close cooperation of 
the Society with other scientific institutions is symbolized also by the fact that its 
President is a member of a great number of such institutions throughout the 
Federal Republic of Germany'. He then proceeds to list these institutions (1981: 
278). Without hesitation he directly equates the institutional memberships of the 
president, to the extra-mural collaboration of the Society as a whole.  
 
 Likewise, the Society tends to demonstrate its scientific excellence first 
and foremost, not by offering an aggregate overview of its products, but by the 
remarkable success of a small number of Nobel Laureates. President Gruss in a 
recent speech marking the organisation’s centenary, makes much the same 
assumption as Butenandt did more than three decades earlier, ‘For those outside 
the Society, our Nobel Prize winners are of course particularly high profile. Their 
achievements are a symbol of the creativity at work in our Institutes’.28 In this 
logic, the organisation is internationally recognized as being a creative place, 
because a tiny minority of its former and current members have been awarded 
the Nobel Prize: a mark of the ultimate original contribution to knowledge. These 
individual achievements are appropriated as a ‘symbol’ of the character of the 
whole Society. 
 
 Finally at the transhistorical scale, this collective individual is Max 
Planck himself. He in a sense, encompasses them all: transcending the arrivals 
and departures of directors, presidents, and Nobel Prize-winners. It is his face 
and aphorisms which adorn the Society's promotional literature, and whenever a 
new Institute is founded it is presented with a bronze bust of Max Planck on its 
inauguration.29 This is usually then placed on a plinth in some public area of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  http://www.mpg.de/190649/News	  28	  http://www.mpg.de/1024203/KWG_MPG_en.pdf	  29	  This	  is	  if	  the	  Institute	  bears	  his	  name.	  There	  are	  other	  Institutes	  within	  the	  Society	  that	  bear	  other	  names	  –	  such	  as	  the	  Albert	  Einstein	  Institute	  –	  which	  possesses	  a	  mounted	  bust	  of	  Einstein	  instead.	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building.30 On this point it should be noted that associating an organisation with 
a pre-eminent German scientist is also characteristic of Germany's other major 
research facilities: Joseph von Fraunhofer and the Fraunhofer Society, Hermann 
von Helmholtz and the Helmholtz Association, and Gottfried Leibniz and the 
Leibniz Association, not to mention the Institutes of Albert Einstein and Fritz 
Haber, both of which fall under the banner of the MPG.31 
 
 The specific form that all of these various collective individuals take, tells 
us something further. It matters that these are all intellectual heroes, rather than 
heroes of any other sort. The German Idealists exported another important 
precept besides whole, self-governing subjects, which became particularly 
influential after the trauma of World War II: that the activity of the intellect is the 
highest realisation of human consciousness. As Fichte says, the world only exists 
as far as our skill in unveiling it, so these intellectuals became like shamans, 
crossing boundaries and exposing dimensions lesser mortals could not conceive 
of. As Dumont says, by subordinating the political to the cultural, these 
philosophers granted themselves enormous power. As 'mediators' of German 
consciousness they assumed a national significance which might elsewhere be 
occupied by those with some form of political office. They became 
'representatives of their country' (Dumont 1986: 152), self-designated ‘culture-
bearers’ (Kulturträger) (Boyer 2005: 56). The belief in intellectual heroism is 
still a potent force in Germany, and one from which the hero-principled structure 
of the MPG undoubtedly benefits.32  
 
 
 
 
 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Sometimes	  however,	  he	  migrates.	  In	  one	  Institute,	  I	  stumble	  upon	  Max	  Planck's	  slightly	  grim	  countenance	  tucked	  away	  in	  a	  computer	  room	  full	  of	  garrulous	  Ph.D	  students,	  hiding	  under	  the	  leaves	  of	  a	  plant	  31	  This	  can	  be	  contrasted	  to	  the	  nomenclature	  of	  their	  possible	  equivalents	  in	  the	  UK:	  the	  Royal	  Society,	  and	  
Imperial	  College	  London,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  sufficiently	  infused	  with	  monarchy	  and	  empire	  to	  betray	  something	  of	  the	  historical	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  32	  This	  is	  in	  dramatic	  contrast	  to	  the	  societal	  negation	  of	  intellectuals	  Stefan	  Collini	  notes	  for	  the	  UK	  (2006).	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 viii) The individual collective  
 
 Before concluding this chapter, it is critical to note that a director is not 
only the leader of department, but a ‘scientific member’ of a ‘private club’.33 The 
horizontal relations between directors are consequently a very important part of 
their professional experience.34 As one director explains, 
 
‘The directors are extremely important, it's a bit like a 
monk's order’. 
In what sense? 
‘As a community. Because we are not so many people. 
All in all it's like 270 directors, and a major university 
has far more professors. The common spirit is very 
strong, and we cooperate a lot. So when we fill a position 
in, let's say, Munich: people in Rostock, Cologne, 
Hamburg, Jena, Leipzig, would convene with external 
experts to fill that position. And in this respect, there is a 
very strong sense of community’. 
 
A director is therefore not only a collective individual – a totality in themselves – 
but one participant in a wider individual collective – another totality. By 
‘individual’ I mean that the directors understand their club as an unusual one; the 
contrast drawn here to the university system is but one among a sea of others.35 I 
am always being told – for one reason or another – that the Max Planck Society 
is not ‘representative’ of German science more broadly. So together with this 
‘sense of community’, is a sense of its identity as exceptional. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Directors	  often	  refer	  to	  the	  Society	  as	  a	  ‘club’	  –	  apparently	  without	  any	  fear	  of	  being	  seen	  as	  cosy	  and	  nepotistic.	  Clearly	  this	  is	  largely	  because	  it	  is	  a	  club	  (Verein)	  in	  the	  legal	  sense	  (cf.	  Chapter	  2.i);	  but	  it	  is	  also	  because	  this	  kind	  of	  solidarity	  is	  not	  seen	  as	  shameful,	  as	  it	  might	  be	  elsewhere.	  However,	  this	  is	  a	  word	  scientists	  sometimes	  pick	  up	  on,	  referring	  to	  it	  rather	  sarcastically	  as	  an	  ‘exclusive	  club’.	  34	  This	  was	  not	  something	  I	  was	  able	  to	  explore	  through	  observation.	  All	  of	  the	  following	  assertions	  and	  analyses,	  relate	  to	  directors'	  testimonies	  of	  how	  they	  themselves	  experience	  these	  relations.	  35	  Another	  contrast	  which	  appears	  frequently	  is	  with	  American	  science.	  I	  also	  hear	  contrasts	  with	  the	  UK,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  more	  ‘applied’	  research	  organisations	  of	  Germany	  such	  as	  the	  Fraunhofer	  Society.	  Not	  once	  do	  the	  directors	  frame	  the	  Max	  Planck	  Society	  as	  similar	  to	  another	  organisation.	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 To picture this collective, a brief exposition of some of the Society's 
internal organs will be necessary. As well as being the member of a multiple-
headed Institute, each director is also the member of a 'section'. There are three 
sections in total which are organised relative to their research focus: 'Biology and 
Medicine, 'Chemistry, Physics and Technology’ and 'Humanities'. These sections 
are repeatedly socially reinforced through rituals: 'general meetings' which occur 
no less than three times a year. At these meetings, members will discuss 
prospective candidates for new directorships, proposals for new Institutes, and 
other 'matters of common interest'.36 Although I did not explore these meetings 
ethnographically, one can imagine that as with all rituals they serve a galvanising 
function, re-making an imagined community into a real one each time they 
coalesce. 
 
 Yet directors are not ghettoised in the sections. One of the purported 
reasons for the ‘success’ of the MPG, is ‘the commitment of scientific members 
to think…in the interest of the Society as a whole’.37 While the sections are 
important, there is a simultaneous effort ‘not to take these structures too 
seriously’. They do not have specific budgets, and the founding of a new Institute 
always involves the whole community. One recent initiative is the establishment 
of a new Institute of Empirical Aesthetics: bringing together scholars in 
literature, musicology, and neuroscience to name a few suggested disciplines. In 
order to ‘start thinking about people’ – who to bring on as its founding directors 
– a range of directors from across the sections met for a two-day symposium, 
together with celebrated artists and musicians for a ‘brainstorming’ session. The 
results of this were then reported back to the sections and the president. Directors 
are thus continually encouraged to think beyond their disciplines and sections 
when carving new fields of knowledge and bringing in new colleagues to do so.  
 
 For those who arrive from other countries, the unusual 'collegiality' of the 
social environment in which they find themselves, is acknowledged with an 
enormous feeling of warmth and gratitude. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  http://www.mpg.de/288798/Governing_Bodies	  37	  	  	  http://www.mpg.de/39586/MPG_Introduction?page=3	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‘Even before I got to the Max Planck I went to a meeting, 
a scientific conference at which there were a number of 
directors, of Chemists whom I didn't know.38 They came 
up to me and invited me to have dinner with them. They 
said how pleased they were that I was coming, that we 
were going to open up this Institute of Chemical Biology. 
Now up until that point in country X, Chemists would 
have slit my throat, I was taking money away from their 
favourite projects. I was used to having to fight. I was on 
friendly terms with a number of them, and they knew that 
the science was good, but they just hated losing the 
money. It pits you against each other all the time. But 
with the Max Planck since the first time I arrived, they 
were very welcoming, and I knew that we were going to 
have collaborators, and its that collegial kind of 
atmosphere which comes from the different way that the 
decisions are made and the money is allocated, and the 
security people have about their Institutes. So the Max 
Planck can go into an international project, and you can 
count on all the directors to be your allies’.  
 
 There is a pathos to this citation, the mourning of good social relations ('I 
was on friendly terms with a number of them'), which become helplessly 
transmuted into bad by a scrabble for resources. The sheer relief at the 'collegial 
kind of atmosphere' within the Society is vivid, the obvious comfort taken in 
commensality and a sense of belonging, which funding structures at his former 
university precluded. The alternative social landscape which is his comparator is 
also couched in at times very violent terminology, the most dramatic of which 
being his suggestion that in the past such scientists would be ready to 'slit his 
throat', evoking a positively medieval image of brutal murder in a battle to the 
death. But it is not the only one, combative imagery abounds. He was 'used to 
having to fight', and was 'pit(ted) against' other scientists, while his fellow 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  The	  names	  of	  disciplines	  and	  Institutes	  have	  been	  changed	  to	  maintain	  anonymity.	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directors now feel like his 'allies'.39 In fact, this kind of rhetoric is uttered 
frequently among my interlocutors: not least by the director at the opening of this 
chapter, who sees this community as a demilitarised modern warrior cult.40  
 
 The language of violence and war strikes an interesting juxtaposition to 
the religious and particularly biblical language whose use I have also noted 
throughout the chapter. In the world of their imagination, as well as being war-
like, these directors are also God-like. It recalls the image of the early medieval 
warrior-king: spear in hand, and with the moral righteousness of God’s plan 
behind them. This monk's order, these weaponless heroes, act together – as the 
Harnack principle explicitly states – to ‘transform and advance the cause of 
science’.41 
 
 
 ix) Conclusion 
  
 In this chapter I have explored the personhood of the director as a social 
form. Although this form is differentially expressed (‘every department is 
different’), each director is an instantiation of the same hero principle: one level 
in the tripartite logic of the Max Planck hierarchy.42 Within the Institutes, this 
principle accords them the authority to govern their communities charismatically: 
deciding who and how many scientists to bring on as members, how the 
admittance process should work, the forging of healthy internal social relations, 
as well as ensuring those relations will facilitate the work necessary to answer 
the scientific questions they are trying to pursue. Directors exhibit substantial 
creativity in all of these respective choices, managing their department like an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  The	  phrase	  'to	  pit	  against'	  first	  appeared	  in	  the	  mid-­‐eighteenth	  century,	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  'pits'	  in	  which	  cock-­‐fights	  and	  dog-­‐fights	  took	  place	  for	  gambling	  and	  amusement.	  40	  This	  suggests	  that	  Donna	  Haraway's	  critique	  of	  Latour's	  intensive	  use	  of	  military	  metaphors	  is	  misplaced	  (1997:	  34).	  Rather	  than	  a	  machismo	  etic	  conceit,	  Latour's	  propensity	  towards	  military	  metaphor	  should	  in	  fact	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  emic	  intervention	  (Latour	  and	  Woolgar	  1979:	  232);	  the	  reason	  being	  that	  scientists	  themselves	  often	  reach	  for	  warlike	  imagery	  when	  describing	  the	  kinds	  of	  social	  struggles	  they	  engage	  in.	  41	  Cf.	  Chapter	  1.iv.	  42	  Like	  Marshall	  Sahlins'	  depiction	  of	  big	  men	  tribes,	  local	  cultural	  differences	  do	  not	  negate	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  homologous	  source	  of	  power,	  'The	  indicative	  quality	  of	  big	  man	  authority	  is	  everywhere	  the	  same:	  it	  is	  personal	  power'	  (1963:	  289).	  
	   154	  
intentional community. Like charisma, in these matters, they appear to know 
only ‘inner determination and inner restraint’ (Weber 1948: 246) (‘I don’t have 
to ask anybody, or to justify it’). Such displays of charismatic authority – and 
even of charisma itself – are some of the ways in which the ideology of the 
Harnack principle becomes a social and material reality. 
 
 The Harnack principle and the agency it offers them, arises from a 
particular German vision of the heroic intellectual self. My argument in this 
respect is analogous to Dorinne Kondo’s study of a Japanese company (1990). 
According to Kondo, the company’s employees ‘craft themselves’ from within 
the discourses of Japanese selfhood: one which is fundamentally relational and 
defined through complex webs of obligation. In forging such relational and 
reciprocal identities Kondo’s participants can exhibit a profound and ongoing 
creativity. It is – on the other hand – emphatically distinct from Caitlin Zaloom’s 
analysis of Anglo-American financiers (2006), who appear to occupy the cultural 
flatland Latour is so convinced of. In conducting ‘practical experiments’ (ibid: 
164) on a daily basis, which are ‘never binding and rarely durable’ (ibid), they in 
fact perform the ideology of liberal self-fashioning – just as Kondo's Japanese 
employees perform the ideology of social obligation. Yet Zaloom does not reach 
this kind of meta-analysis, as Kondo does. Instead of framing their activity as the 
performance of a particular Anglo-American liberal self, it becomes her own 
analysis. It is this kind of disentanglement I am referring to, when describing the 
entrapment of organisational anthropologists ‘in an ideological cell the walls 
which they cannot see’. Agency is always a second-hand gift, awarded to certain 
persons for certain historically-constituted reasons. To represent the actions of 
agents as primary, is to fall for one of the great myths of European modernity. 
 
 The agency of the directors thus has a specifically German dual character: 
as one says, they occupy a ‘strange and hybrid position’. They are both collective 
individuals – mavericks and visionaries who encompass their communities 
totally – as well as being members of a rigorously policed ‘private club’, an 
individual collective. As the latter, they are perennially pushed to work ‘harder 
on their hunting skills’, to succeed in the Fachbeirat and be viewed as ‘good 
hunters’. Agency is thus inextricably tied to Verantwortung, the ‘responsibility’ 
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to take a risk which will pay off in the long-run: a responsibility born of their 
membership in a broader community. In the following chapter I will now turn to 
the personhoods of technical staff. How are the technicians similarly formed by 
what Saba Mahmood calls ‘historically contingent discursive traditions’ (2005: 
32)? Among this stratum, the relevant questions circulate not so much around the 
agency which emerges from within the hierarchy, but the status.  
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 5. The Longevity Principle: Technicians 
 
‘The scientist says, “I need this like so and like so”, and 
he's thinking thinking thinking and i'm doing doing doing, 
and then he says it's wonderful’ 
Workshop technician 
 
 
 If the directors and the Harnack principle that spawned them receive the 
highest volume of air-time in the Society’s public discourse, it is fair to say that 
the technicians receive the least. As the Max Planck website says quite candidly, 
‘They operate in the background’ of the organisation.1 The binary hierarchical 
ideology of leader and led reified in the Harnack prinicple, therefore fails to 
differentiate between those who are led: scientists below the director and 
technicians. It is this under-theorisation that the following two chapters confront: 
the primary difference between them that I posit being one of rhythm. While 
scientists come and go inside the organisation at breakneck speed, a technician 
could potentially spend their whole working life within the same Institute, 
beginning as a trainee (Azubi) and moving into a permanent position. I introduce 
the ‘longevity principle’ in an effort to capture the vastly different kind of 
relationship to the organisation technicians enjoy as a result of such a long-term 
commitment. The substantive purpose of the chapter then – like the previous – is 
to solve the enigma of technical personhood. On meeting them I strain my ears to 
the sounds of distant echoes, of a way of being rooted in Germany’s medieval 
past. While scientists are among the familiar cosmopolitan neophiles conjured by 
late modernism, technicians seem to carry the secrets of forgotten centuries, 
which whisper quietly in their thoughts and gestures. 
 
 One of my primary concerns is the comparatively elevated social status of 
technicians in the hierarchy.2 As the workman tells us above, his ability to 
produce a bespoke experimental device garners a great deal of scientific respect 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  http://www.mpg.de/279304/Services	  2	  See	  diagram	  on	  page	  43.	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(‘he says it’s wonderful’). To address this, it makes sense to begin with Dumont 
and the distinction he famously drew between status and power. In his study of 
the Hindu caste system, Dumont maintains that spiritual power or status – based 
on the hierarchy of relative 'purity' – is both separate from and superordinate to, 
temporal power, which he calls 'the monopoly of legitimate force' (1980: 153) – 
principally oriented around rights to land ownership. Thus the Brahmans or 
priests, the highest spiritual caste, encompasses the Kshatriyas or warriors 
hierarchically, the caste from which Kings are drawn, because worldly power is 
of less value than religious status.3 Status for Dumont always has its roots in 
religious precepts, which is why I appeal to the cosmology of Martin Luther 
throughout the chapter, to seek the basis of these scientists’ awe.  
 
 Accepting Dumont’s thesis in this regard transports me into a particular 
position vis-à-vis my interlocutors. Other organisational theorists, particularly 
those in Science Studies who offer their own ethnographic accounts of technical 
workers (Latour and Woolgar 1979, Law 1994, Shapin 1989), do not 
acknowledge this distinction.4 The result of this is effectively an analytical 
collapse of status into power, and the emplacement of those who respond to 
instructions at the bottom rung of a political ranking. This collapse and its 
consequences also erupts in organisational studies second-hand through the 
application of Foucauldian theory (Born 1995, Law 1994). The far-reaching 
influence of Foucault’s vision of a ‘microphysics of power’ (1977): a power 
which is universal and inescapable, lent weight to the assumption that it was 
political relations which forged social ontologies rather than anything else. The 
workman with whom we began is implicitly telling us that in the MPG this is not 
the case, that status and power are two separate quantities. Technicians have 
indubitably less power than the scientists: the chain of command is clear (‘the 
scientist says “I need this like so and so”’); yet this does not deny them status 
(‘and then he says it’s wonderful’).   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  fact	  that	  his	  distinction	  has	  been	  so	  ‘widely	  berated’	  (Parry	  1998:	  151)	  is	  yet	  more	  evidence	  of	  the	  pathologies	  that	  surround	  Dumont,	  as	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  one	  which	  has	  been	  similarly	  documented	  by	  others,	  in	  other	  ethnographic	  contexts	  (White	  and	  Lindstrom	  1997).	  4	  Although	  see	  Pearce	  (2011)	  for	  a	  possible	  turning	  tide.	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 As I begin beneath, another main concern of the chapter is the 
fundamental difference of the technicians. This is one which emanates from 
within the hierarchy: in which its various groups serve a different function in the 
operation of the whole. The function of the Max Planck Society’s several 
thousand technical staff, is in a basic sense to ensure that directors and their 
scientific teams are provisioned with all the material resources necessary to carry 
out their experimental programmes. While lab technicians purchase and maintain 
the strictly regulated material cultures of laboratories through which the 
universality of scientific knowledge is controlled, workshop technicians often 
produce one-off pieces for a specific purpose.5 Their function is thus dominantly 
practical rather intellectual (although can involve a high level of technical 
expertise). As this workman puts it rather nicely, their work is oriented around 
‘doing’ rather than ‘thinking’. Anthropologically, this different function leads to 
different kinds of persons being constituted. As sections iv – vii show, 
technicians have profoundly different experiences of time, of space, of what 
constitutes knowledge, and of attachment, to those of their scientific colleagues. 
This kind of personhood has its origins in Luther’s notion of the Beruf (vocation 
or literally ‘calling’) which endowed practical work with a spiritual significance 
and a set of relationships. However as Weber famously told us (2001), it was not 
Luther’s Beruf but its Calvinist equivalent which came to define the cosmology 
of labour during the rise of industrial capitalism. These technicians are therefore 
different – not only from Max Planck scientists – but also from their counterparts 
in other Western organisations. 
 
 
 i) Bildung and Beruf 
 
 All of the material in this chapter is suspended in the theme of difference, 
the basic incommensurability of scientific and technical employees. It is 
important to state from the outset that this is not simply an etic category, but a 
word scientists themselves reach for when describing technical workers. One 
scientist says of the men in the workshop,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  See	  Figure	  9.	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'They have different interpersonal abilities. When you 
consider the language barrier and the cultural barrier, it's 
not so straightforward. They also have different manual 
abilities'. 
 
He is conveying a great deal of information here from which we can advance 
analytically. The first is that these repetitive references to ‘they’ indicate the 
particular difference of a group rather than the universal difference of 
individuals. As Dumont says – not incidentally following Hegel – the difference 
between Hindu castes comes from hierarchy and its ‘differentiation of functions’ 
(1980: 42), and cannot be understood independently of this.6 The difference of 
technicians likewise arises from their differential social function within the 
organisation’s totality. This is a stark contrast to the difference born of 
egalitarian ideology: a universally distributed human potential with no need for 
totalities (Haraway 1997, Deleuze 2001), indeed a basic fact of life itself (Tarde 
1999).7 Secondly, this difference is clearly not a superficial one, but deeply 
rooted in those acquired substances out of which human expression is formed: 
language, culture, even the skills sedimented into the body itself. It is a 
difference which is internal and indeed total, one which reaches into the very 
depths of being. Such ontological differences will structure the later sections of 
the chapter. Finally, there is a desire here, to overcome these differences. As 
Espeland and Stevens tell us (1998), what makes commensuration so powerful is 
its ability to collapse the distance between people, to make them legible to each 
other, to facilitate the longing for human closeness. The very fact that interaction 
is ‘not so straightforward’ demonstrates this very distance, this 
incommensurability. In short – as the thesis as a whole proposes – these are not 
personhoods forged through the interactions of individuals, but which precede 
them, and which have to somehow be coped with or transcended in the very 
process of that interaction.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  See	  Appadurai	  (1988)	  for	  a	  critique	  of	  Dumont’s	  use	  of	  Hegel.	  7	  Of	  course	  the	  great	  irony	  of	  the	  universalization	  of	  difference	  is	  the	  logical	  corollary	  of	  universal	  sameness,	  each	  entity	  participating	  in	  the	  shared	  condition	  of	  difference.	  At	  its	  heart	  again	  we	  encounter	  this	  abstract	  individual,	  as	  Ernst	  Troeltsch	  railed	  in	  1923,	  ‘the	  barren	  abstraction	  of	  a	  universal	  and	  equal	  humanity’	  (Ringer	  1969:	  100).	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 As the section title suggests, these profound differences of function and 
social being have a history: a history which can be traced through the tropes of 
Bildung and Beruf – self-cultivation and vocation – which have shaped German 
education and group formation since the early nineteenth-century.8 As the 
Idealist notion of Bildung was in itself ‘a secular recasting of calling’ (La Vopa 
1988: 249), we shall begin with Martin Luther’s definition of the Beruf – the first 
appearance of the term in its contemporary usage – and proceed from there on.9 
 
 Luther’s understanding of the calling across his oeuvre is a wide and 
complex one (cf. Wingren 1957 for a full elaboration), so I shall limit its scope 
here to a few key features. His most radical proposition is that God’s grace is not 
achieved through the ‘ascetic withdrawal’ (Weber 2001: 40) of the cloistered 
Catholic monk, but the ‘this-worldly work’ (ibid) of peoples of every rank and 
function going about their affairs. Luther’s ethics is thus a profoundly concrete 
and mundane one: ‘sanctification’ becomes ‘hidden in offensively ordinary 
tasks’ (Wingren 1957: 73). In performing these ordinary tasks – without 
complaint or hesitation one should add, but in full willingness and love – the true 
believer should orient themselves towards the service of their fellow beings. ‘It is 
the neighbour who stands at the centre of Luther’s ethics’, Wingren says (ibid: 
43), as Luther makes the link between faith in God and the willingness to assist 
them. The proper answering of God’s call therefore requires the subordination 
the self to the ‘socially defined common welfare’ (La Vopa 1988: 192). Here we 
come to the crux, or some might say, the paradox of the Beruf. Despite being 
called individually by God to perform spiritually-invested tasks which they 
should willingly carry out, every citizen has an external ‘Stand’ (location) or 
‘Amt’ (office) which is similarly ‘a direct manifestation of Divine Will’ (Weber 
2001: 43). Acceptance of, or indeed ‘resignation’ (ibid: 44) to one’s social 
location and function, is thus another important avenue for expressing religious 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  On	  the	  Max	  Planck	  website	  the	  binary	  distinction	  between	  scientists	  and	  technicians	  is	  represented	  in	  the	  hypertext:	  ‘science’	  and	  ‘services’	  http://www.mpg.de/working_at_a_max_planck_institute.	  	  9	  There	  are	  explicit	  anthropological	  reasons	  for	  the	  smuggling	  of	  Lutheran	  precepts	  into	  Bildung.	  Most	  of	  the	  German	  Idealists	  who	  formulated	  the	  philosophy	  had	  some	  direct	  exposure	  to	  Lutheranism.	  Herder	  was	  an	  ordained	  Lutheran	  pastor,	  Schelling’s	  father	  the	  same,	  Hegel	  an	  orthodox	  member	  of	  the	  Prussian	  Lutheran	  church.	  Even	  Fichte,	  despite	  overtly	  rejecting	  his	  conventional	  Lutheran	  upbringing,	  simply	  ‘reformulated	  Lutheran	  themes’	  in	  his	  secular	  works	  (La	  Vopa	  2001:	  13).	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devotion.10 It is this paradox inherent in the Beruf, that as La Vopa says, enables 
it by the eighteenth-century to ‘sanction self-determination without relaxing an 
overriding insistence on collective imperatives’ (1988: 14). Further references 
will be made throughout the chapter to Luther’s concept of the calling, so now 
we shall turn to its secular offspring, Bildung. 
 
 The new ideology of Bildung, grew out of, and indeed to some extent 
resolved this paradox inherent in the Beruf.11 Developed by the German Idealists 
in the late eighteenth, early nineteenth-century, this ethic did not prescribe 
submission to one’s Stand and the duties accompanying it, but active 
encouragement of a constant process of ‘becoming’ (Boyer 2005: 58). A far cry 
from the previous central tenets of Luther’s vocation: namely ‘merit, service, 
duty and usefulness’ (La Vopa 1988: 264), this philosophy maintained the 
‘absolute “individuality”’ and ‘unique particularity’ (ibid) of every personality. It 
therefore paved the way for the ‘autonomous self-realization’ (ibid: 278) that 
Luther and his followers would have despised, and legitimated the possibility for 
social advancement through education. It is hardly surprising therefore, that as 
the nineteenth-century progressed, Bildung – a cultivation only achieved through 
the passage points of the new German Gymnasia (elite secondary schools) and 
the universities – became the ultimate ‘badge of membership’ (ibid: 249) for 
Germany’s expanding educated middle-class. 
 
 It should now be fairly clear why I am animating a historical distinction 
between Bildung and Beruf in a chapter concerned with Max Planck Society 
technicians. These two terms became the conceptual crucible for Germany’s two-
tier education system (Greinert 2007): Bildung, an academic education 
undertaken by the middle and upper class and Beruf, a vocational system of 
craft-based training for the manual working-class, modelled on the old medieval 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Luther	  becomes	  even	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  social	  stasis	  inherent	  in	  the	  calling	  after	  the	  peasant	  uprisings	  of	  1524-­‐5.	  	  11	  In	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  human	  will	  which	  is	  spontaneously	  animated	  in	  being	  called	  to	  God’s	  work,	  does	  not	  have	  to	  inhibit	  itself	  in	  an	  equal	  and	  opposite	  submission	  to	  social	  immobility.	  I	  say	  to	  some	  extent,	  because	  BIldung	  was	  inextricably	  linked	  to	  tropes	  of	  national	  selfhood	  such	  as	  Volk	  and	  Kultur	  which	  encourage	  the	  same	  submission	  to	  the	  ‘socially	  defined	  common	  welfare’.	  Yet	  it	  still	  provided	  much	  more	  space	  for	  individuality	  and	  self-­‐realization	  than	  its	  antecedent.	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guild system. Technicians are quick to correct me when I ask what precise 
qualification it is that they studied for ('Was haben Sie studiert?'). 'Ich habe nicht 
studiert, ich habe gelernt', they reply (I did not study, I learned). This semantic 
distinction, between 'studying' and 'learning' is a product of a prevailing 
educational dualism. While a minority of children pass through the Gymnasia 
and take the Abitur (the only route to university), two-thirds of young people 
attend a Hauptschule (secondary modern), Realschule (intermediate school), or a 
Gesamtschule (comprehensive) and undergo a three-and-a-half year Ausbildung 
(training course) leading to a vocational qualification. This bifurcation begins 
around the age of ten (Führ 1997). German society at large is thus unusually 
hierarchical, i.e. organised around a principle of the differentiation of functions, 
in the broader institutional context in which research facilities like the Max 
Planck are embedded. 
 
 Before moving on, there are a few things to mention about the 
development of Germany’s vocational education system, as it has consequences 
for the meaning and treatment of technicians in the MPG. The last quarter of the 
nineteenth-century was characterised by significant social unrest in the new 
German Empire. Universal manhood suffrage and the development of mass 
production had inaugurated a new ‘age of the masses’ (Greinert 1994: 23), which 
presented the old Bourgeoisie with an increasingly powerful social adversary in 
the form an expanding labouring class. The first proto-vocational schools in fact 
were invented to plug the gap between the end of elementary schooling and the 
start of military service, a gap which these masses might otherwise fill with 
political involvement in new socialist revolutionary movements. These so-called 
‘further training schools’ – which included an intensive programme of political 
education – became compulsory for all male commercial apprentices after 1891, 
and female after 1900 (Greinert 1994). It was these institutions, conceived as a 
means to contain the social ‘threat’ (ibid: 31) to bourgeois society through the 
inculcation of bourgeois values, that in 1899 became the first formal vocational 
schools. Such beginnings go a long way to explaining why Germany’s venerated 
vocational system has survived so consistently into the following centuries. Their 
purpose was never a purely utilitarian one – creating a labour pool to meet 
industrial requirements – but fundamentally about the making of placid and 
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productive German citizens.12 It might be tempting to see this in purely Marxian 
terms, a typical case of domination by a ruling, academically educated, class. 
This is certainly one aspect, yet the association between vocation and citizenship 
has also served a prophylactic function, buffering this group against economic 
change. For instance during the slump of 1976, the Federal Republic passed a 
law committing itself to quotas of training places, in order to prevent a spike in 
youth unemployment (Führ 1997: 146). The technicians of the MPG are 
accorded a similar kind of protection. The policy of the MPG as regards the 
closures of Institutes is to do ‘everything in its power’ to move those technical 
staff with permanent positions into another Institute.13 This is very different to 
the scientists, the majority of whom would be forced to look for positions 
elsewhere without help. 
 
 Methodologically, the difference of the technicians fundamentally 
structures my engagement with them, presenting a not insignificant challenge. 
On a return visit to one of the Institutes I attempt to organise some research with 
several laboratory workers. I write to the resident gatekeepers, querying whether 
it might be possible to shadow them as they go about their routines. This proves 
to be a surprisingly tricky issue and leads to the redacted email exchange below. 
 
Dear Vita, 
With this 'shadowing' of technicians, I am not sure 
whether this is a good idea. I am afraid that the 
technicians could feel controlled. They are 'doing their 
job' and they have probably the least understanding of 
your work. In any case, it has to be voluntarily, and I 
would suggest that I talk to the technicians first. I would 
really like to give them the option of saying no, or that 
they define the terms. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  This	  is	  exactly	  the	  kind	  of	  logic	  we	  see	  rolled	  out	  in	  Britain	  today.	  At	  a	  recent	  conference	  Alison	  Wolf	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  no	  use	  creating	  more	  apprenticeships,	  as	  	  ‘Training	  doesn't	  create	  innovation	  or	  growth',	  (cited	  in	  Elwes	  2012:	  50).	  The	  lives	  and	  skills	  of	  young	  workers	  are	  subordinated	  to	  an	  abstract	  economic	  rationality,	  'growth'.	  It	  is	  growth	  that	  counts,	  not	  the	  making	  of	  British	  citizens.	  	  13	  ‘alles	  zu	  unternehmen’	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The director of the department is then brought into this conversation, and his 
response echoes that of his colleague, Johann. 
 
Dear Vita, 
Your plan to accompany technicians (rather than 
scientists) might need some discussion and probably 
careful preparation. Technicians might get the impression 
that they are being controlled, if not asked and informed 
properly. I discussed this with Johann and he is going to 
talk to the technicians you want to follow beforehand. I 
certainly want them to agree to the procedure. I hope this 
is not a problem for you.  
 
So much delicacy and care reverberates in these inscriptions. From both parties 
there is the distinct sense that this is a complex proposition that must be very 
sensitively negotiated. It is by no means a simple matter of exerting authority, 
and obliging the technical workers to engage with me and my project.14 They 
should willingly participate: in both excerpts, the voluntary nature of their 
involvement is the sine qua non of this proposition being realized. Connected to 
this, there is clear concern about 'control'. If the technicians are not given the 
explicit opportunity to agree, the boundaries of their autonomy will be 
transgressed, leading to potentially negative and anxious feelings on their part. In 
brief the complexities raised by my suggestion are never truly resolved, and for 
this reason the ethnography in which technicians feature is less dense than that of 
their scientific colleagues. As a result references to scientific ontologies will 
erupt as contrasts throughout the chapter, through which the understanding of 
technicians will be refracted and enriched.  
 
 I shall end this section on a note of contradiction. Although I follow 
Greinert (2007) in positing a historical dichotomy between Bildung and Beruf , 
which stands for the bifurcation of the German education system in the 19th 
century and after, these two terms and the ideas they contain still significantly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Not	  that	  I	  would	  have	  desired	  this	  under	  any	  circumstances,	  but	  it	  could	  have	  been	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  my	  query	  was	  appropriated.	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interpenetrate. After all, one is a recasting of the other. Technicians will naturally 
describe their work not as their Arbeit (job), but as their Beruf (‘Es ist mein 
Beruf’ they say, with a palpable satisfaction). However, we know from Weber 
that science is also a ‘Beruf’ – in the sense of ‘profession’ (1992), and that when 
a director is appointed he is ‘berufen’, called to the position. Meanwhile the 
vocational training qualification contains Bildung within its own sign 
(Ausbildung). Bildung is the general German word for education, and the 
philosophy of self-cultivation and uniqueness similarly shapes how young 
trainees are taught, and how those so trained and cultivated conceptualise their 
knowledge. Thus although, as the most of the chapter argues, the framing of 
technical personhood is dominated by central tenets of Luther’s Beruf concept, it 
should be kept in mind that there are elements of the Idealists Bildung which also 
shape these persons. One is the importance of autonomy just shown, while others 
are their individuality and unique particularity of their knowledge, a particularity 
wrought by inner transformation.  
 
 
 ii) Status and the Beruf 
 
 The expansive multi-disciplinary area known collectively as ‘Science 
Studies’ has had an odd relationship to technicians. As late as 1989, Steven 
Shapin noted that ‘in the now vast academic literature in the history and 
sociology of science there still does not exist a single study systematically 
documenting and interpreting technicians’ work, past or present’ (1989: 556). 
Presumably this is because scholars have fallen for scientists’ own narratives 
about their significance in the production of knowledge, and the peripheral 
relationship played by physical practices (and therefore those most associated 
with them). Aside from a generalized neglect, where technicians do appear in 
this literature, the statements about them can emit that recognisable effluvia of 
universality and ethnocentricity, characterised by the set of (unacknowledged) 
Anglo-American biases with which I introduced the thesis.15 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Cf.	  Chapter	  1.iii.	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 These biases begin with the assumption of commensurability, which 
leads to subsequent assumptions about hierarchy and personhood. For Bruno 
Latour, who carried out his ethnographic study at the Salk Institute, California, 
technicians and scientists are variations on the same kind of person (Latour and 
Woolgar 1979). Not only do technicians appear to value themselves using the 
same metrics as scientists, i.e. one oriented around intellectual flair ('I don't have 
the ability to get a Ph.D...to do research you need imagination, originality... I 
cannot reach that level' (ibid: 218)), but there is also significant overlap between 
technical and scientific careers. Latour notes that while he was carrying out his 
research, five young technicians left their positions to pursue doctoral study, 
while several other 'super-techs' (higher-ranked technicians) were in fact Ph.D 
holders, with names appearing on scientific papers. The corollary of 
commensurability means that subjects can be ranked in a linear hierarchy along a 
single axis: in this case the axis dictated by scientific value-ideas of intellectual 
knowledge and skill. This is then the line taken by John Law, who carried out his 
ethnographic work in the UK. He refers to the technician or ‘crew’ world as the 
‘low-status end’ of the laboratory (1994: 122), has a sense of their 'frustration' at 
being so positioned (ibid), and relates how they 'resented the Physicists' as a 
consequence (ibid: 125). This brings him to the overarching conclusion that, 'In 
the modes of ordering performed by the Physicists, the room for initiative left for 
the crew is very small...That is in the “nature of technicians”...They rank less' 
(ibid: 123-4), quite clearly spelling out that these individuals are subordinates in 
a linear hierarchy. The only way for technical workers to move up this axis and 
achieve status, is therefore becoming more scientist-like. According to Steven 
Shapin, technical work is accorded value in those laboratories where the line 
‘between technicians and scientists, is blurred’ (1989: 562).  
 
 All of the above-mentioned works are based on historical or ethnographic 
work in the Anglo-American world, thus it is quite natural – indeed imperative – 
that they should reveal a set of Anglo-American assumptions about social 
organisation and ontology. However, the cultural location of the objects in such 
studies goes without anything more than a cursory comment; and more often 
than not, empirically-based arguments segue into speculative statements on the 
experiences of technicians in science globally. Even Steven Shapin, whose 
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article was intended as a politically and analytically trenchant critique of the 
‘invisibility’ (1989: 563) of technicians in the science studies literature, tends 
towards this. He says that the work of technicians, ‘is the sort of work that both 
seventeenth-century and present-day scientists tend to regard as of no importance 
to the production of knowledge’ (ibid: 557).  
 
 Max Planck Society technicians continually presented me with a nagging 
cultural conundrum, as their position could never be reconciled within this 
paradigm. Indeed, the following testimonies from the lips of scientists directly 
contradict all of the previous arguments about value and status.  
 
'Technicians are really important. Especially when you 
think about samples preparation. When you want to do 
something really new, they have prepared a lot of 
different samples along the course of their career and 
they can combine different techniques that you might not 
know. Things you've never problematized before, and 
you don't know the tricks'. 
 
'Mr Panovsky is a wonderful guy.  He does some of the 
samples testing for me and is a real wizard on all the 
machines.' 
 
'I'm sort of going back and forth in terms of how much I 
want to rely on (the technicians) because they're much 
better at what they do than I am. But at the same time I 
want to learn some of it. So they help me with the 
embedding, then I do the sectioning and polishing. 
They're incredible, those two in particular, I mean 
everyone here is incredible. But they're insanely good. 
And patient'. 
 
The use of language such as 'tricks', ‘wizard’, ‘wonderful’, ‘incredible’ and 
'insanely good' insinuates that the technicians possess a knowledge which is awe-
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inspiring and out of one's grasp, indeed almost magical in its enigmatic spiritual 
potency. I do not think it is incidental that some of these words have their roots 
in expressing the omnipotence of a Christian God (wonderful, incredible).16 It is 
a far cry from the perceptions of inadequacy, frustration, and resentment, 
habitually attached to technicians like those above. I shall confront this ‘nagging 
cultural conundrum’ by returning to Luther. 
 
 Not only did the Beruf ennoble this-worldly work, but Luther’s schema 
infers the moral equality of each and every one. As Weber says, 'It and it alone is 
the will of God, and hence every legitimate calling was of exactly the same 
worth in the sight of God' (2001: 81). To perform one’s vocation is to carry out 
God’s work, to be touched by God’s grace: this is why I read the use of formerly 
biblical imagery to describe technicians as non-incidental; it is a marker of the 
residual grace which remains in the performance of a Beruf. Now to argue for the 
equality of the technical staff in a system I am claiming is profoundly 
hierarchical may seem contradictory. However, it is a common mistake to 
assume that hierarchy and equality preclude each other. In fact the opposite is 
true, in the most stable hierarchies they often interpenetrate.17 Indeed Luther’s 
conception of the Beruf contains this interpenetration, as already noted. All 
callings were valued equally, yet this only true when they were the assigned 
tasks in a given social order. One’s Stand was fixed within a hierarchy, yet one’s 
Beruf was as equally close to God as every other. 
 
 
 iii) Workshops and laboratories 
 
 Having set the historical and cosmological scene for the curious position 
Max Planck technicians occupy, and how this differs from other social studies of 
science, it is now the moment to wade deeper into their ethnographic realities. To 
initiate this immersion I will present a 'sketch' of one workshop, and two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Both	  appear	  in	  the	  King	  James	  Version	  of	  the	  bible.	  17	  David	  Graeber	  argues	  that	  'something	  inherent	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  hierarchy...	  always	  tends	  to	  create	  images	  of	  equality	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  side-­‐effect'	  (2007:	  283).	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'characterizations' of laboratory workers (Emerson et al. 2011: 69-77), which will 
remain largely underdetermined by analysis.18 All of the employees in the 
workshop are male, and it is an architectonically-bounded space which operates 
autonomously from directorial leadership.19 Meanwhile both lab workers are 
female, and work in and among the scientists in the departments, under the 
auspices of a specific director; although like the workmen, they are employed by 
the Institute rather than by him. As such, there are slight differences in 
association, spatial movement, and identity which characterize these two groups. 
Nonetheless they are substantially more similar than they are different, all falling 
under the banner of 'Techniker', technicians. It is this nomenclatural collapse I 
will use most of the time for ease of analysis. It should be noted that these 
descriptions are intended to index other workshops, other workers. Thus, while 
they are not ethnographic composites drawn from a variety of instances, they still 
serve the function of standing for.  
 
 The workshop is a large, airy, generously-proportioned space, 
approximately ten metres in width and twenty-five in length. It is a little like 
factory floor, populated with a number of large-scale machines and their 
attendants placed at even intervals, its soundscape saturated with the gentle 
thrum of machinery, and the occasional loud clang of metal meeting metal. 
Except the ambience escapes the agitated claustrophobia of a factory; its easy, 
inhabited feel is in fact its antithesis. The whole space is bathed in natural 
daylight which enters through the large skylights in its very tall ceiling, and the 
air is cool and fresh as the door leading directly outside is often left open. The 
operators work patiently and methodically, sometimes clustering spontaneously 
into small groups, punctuating the thrum with a murmur of male voices and 
laughter, solving problems or sharing jokes. An old fifties-style radio is propped 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  The	  authors	  in	  their	  fieldnotes	  guide,	  define	  a	  'sketch'	  as	  a	  'static	  snapshot',	  in	  which	  the	  fieldworker	  'describes	  a	  scene	  through	  particularly	  detailed	  imagery	  (2011:	  75).	  It	  is	  intended	  to	  offer	  a	  sense	  of	  ambience	  and	  context	  without	  the	  onward	  march	  of	  an	  episodic	  or	  dialogic	  narrative.	  Another	  genre	  of	  writing	  is	  the	  'characterization'.	  This	  is	  the	  technique	  of	  describing	  an	  individual	  in	  their	  daily	  activities,	  or	  painting	  a	  portrait	  of	  some	  sort,	  all	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  'presenting	  characters	  as	  fully	  social	  beings'	  rather	  than	  just	  a	  mouthpiece	  of	  relevant	  utterances	  (ibid:	  69).	  19	  See	  Figure	  10.	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up on top of one of the machines, providing an unobtrusive soundtrack of 
contemporary pop music.    
 
 I will offer a virtual tour of the space to give this sensual picture more 
specificity. Walking through this workshop then, from the back of the hall which 
leads outside, to the front, which is attached to their other buildings of the 
Institute, there is a large German flag hanging down on the right-hand side. 
Above the exiting door is an analogue clock, with another identical clock facing 
it at the opposite end of the room. There is a central aisle flanked on either side 
by machines around a metre and a half in width and length, all decked out in a 
uniform cool leaf-green coloured metal, behind which sit shelves and storage-
space backed against the walls on either sides, containing their instruction 
manuals and whole concrete catalogues of various material appendages.  
 
 Many of the machines are highly aesthetic feats of mechanical design, 
purchased in the 1960s and 1970s, and still perfectly operational. Roughly half of 
them have small computer screens attached, and are called 'computer numerical 
control', or CNC machines, through which the user can change the settings with 
which to cut the metal into a desired shape, automating many actions which 
would have previously been manual. It seems that this genre will ultimately 
phase out their mechanical counterparts. The disadvantage of this is that, as the 
workshop manager (Werkstattmeister) mourns, while those machines from the 
60s and 70s will continue working with the required maintenance, because CNC 
machines require specific computational programming they must be replaced 
every ten years. He relates this with some scorn, taking pride in the fact that 
when mechanics come to repair their older versions they always comment, 'Oh 
it's so nice that you have such old machines'.  
 
 Every workspace (Arbeitsplatz) has between one and three machines, and 
more importantly a sole proprietor. The latter is expected not only to use them, 
but also to care for them, tidying away metal shavings at the end of the day, and 
making sure all of its working parts are well watered and oiled. Of course being a 
proprietor often makes one proprietorial, and these spaces often have a very 
'homey' feel to them, revealed through their material culture. Here the realm of 
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the personal makes itself felt. There is clearly continuity between the personal 
and the professional in some senses, as these practical metal-working men often 
affix pictures of helicopters and motorcycles. The latter in particular are fairly 
ubiquitous, one operator has a small model perched on top of his machine ('a gift 
from my mother') while another has restored a vintage motorbike to its former 
glory, and it sits proudly next to his machines. It is also quite clearly 'a male 
domain', (‘eine Männerdomäne’), as a workman once remarked, and these 
workplaces often display another kind of ‘interest’ quite apart from these feats of 
engineering. Images of erotic female models posing in calendars or perched 
suggestively on motorbikes, index too the testoteronic heterosexual masculinity 
of the workshop. Quite apart from the clocks overhead, every workplace also 
exhibits a substantial degree of what Nancy Munn via Malinowski calls 'time-
reckoning' (1992: 102): the various practical techniques through which time is 
counted, measured and periodized according to some collectively defined 
standard (in this case clock-time). Each one has a yearly planner, sometimes with 
every day so far meticulously crossed off, as well as illustrated calendars and 
small circular clocks of their own. It is quite visibly an intensely 'reckoned' 
space, not only by the time-keeper, the workshop manager, and the permanent 
fixtures of the hall, but also very actively and keenly by the workers themselves.  
 
 Towards the front of the hall sit the inexperienced trainees (auszubildene, 
sometimes termed in the diminutive as 'Azubis'): young men of sixteen to 
eighteen years, working through their three and a half year training programme 
(Ausbildung) using smaller equipment. While completing their practical training 
here to be an industrial mechanic (Industriemekaniker), they must return to their 
technical college every couple of weeks to complete the written element of their 
course. One of these affable, shy boys shows me the project he is currently 
working on: a model tractor-truck (Sattelschlepper). To construct this he must 
consult certain textbooks, one of these dates from 1976, with another from 1982. 
It is quite plausible that young men have sat here producing model tractor-trucks 
for the last thirty years. At the very front, attached then, to the rest of the 
Institute, is the office of the workshop manager, a relatively small room sheltered 
by a glass door (although this only seems to close during meetings), containing a 
desk, computer, and several chairs. The workshop manager is often on hand to 
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answer questions from the trainees and supervise their progress. However, the 
onus is on them to work through the projects themselves, learning predominantly 
with the help of manuals and the dialectics of trial and error. 
 
 Frau Steiner is in her late 60s. She is small and sleight, with short grey 
hair and eyes which peer with patient attentiveness through moon-shaped 
spectacles, but with a certain toughness and a clear sense of ownership over the 
space she takes up. Steiner has been working in the Institute for over forty years, 
and as a consequence has a strong sense of its own historicity, telling me with 
confidence the dates of both its foundation, as well as when it 'changed over' to 
the Max Planck (it is one of a minority of Institutes which was formerly part of 
the KWG).20 Her job is to prepare samples for the scientists who will then carry 
out mechanical tests on them, and she attempts to describe this process to me 
with another appeal to history. 'Here (in the Institute) we're trying to identify the 
point at which one can use as little material as possible, but have the same 
mechanical effect – our forefathers, some 400 years ago, had no idea about these 
kind of things'. Another technician whom she is instructing sits beside us as we 
talk, and at this point intervenes eagerly, 'Yes, if you were the village smith, you 
would make knives that had a certain function but you wouldn’t know why it 
worked. We want to know why'. Thus although Frau Steiner (or her colleague for 
that matter) would be unable to relate the chemical composition of the materials 
she is working on, describing them extremely vaguely as 'alloys' or 'nikkel 
composites', she has a broad sense of their ultimate purpose. Her contrast to a 
medieval pre-scientific ignorance, with the highly technologized activities the 
scientists are engaged in, is one which betrays a pride in historical progress, at 
the same time as expressing a certain commonality and continuity with 'our 
forefathers', medieval Europeans.  
 
 Having prepared metal samples for so many years, she emphasises the 
'Erfahrungswert' (which can be loosely translated as the ‘value of experience’) of 
the profession which grows incrementally over the course of one's working life. 
For her, this Erfahrungswert can only be transmitted between people in a limited 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  	  	  Scientists	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  will	  often	  be	  unaware	  the	  MPG	  was	  even	  built	  in	  the	  shell	  of	  a	  predecessor.	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way, by and large it is gained independently through the repetition of practices. 
'There are certain definite things people can tell you, but most things you simply 
have to experience yourself. There is no way I can store up the experience of 
other people’. Erfahrungswert for her is 'nothing other than learning from your 
mistakes. It's like a child burning it's finger, it hurts, and then it doesn't do it 
again'.  
 
 Her work takes place in two laboratories on the ground floor of the 
Institute. One is bright with large windows and is designated for samples 
preparation, and the other just across the hallway, for experiments, has no 
windows and is small, dark and cave-like. It is dominated by a large instrument 
on which the samples will ultimately be tested. The large part of Frau Steiner's 
work involves moving methodically between these two rooms, and more 
specifically, three dominant pieces of equipment inside them. The principal one 
is a computer-operated device to cut the material to the desired thickness, on 
which she carefully inputs parameters before running a scan and looking at the 
graph it has produced. She knows what the 'ideal image' of the graph should look 
like (i.e. the ideal thickness) – quickly sketching it for me on the piece of paper 
beside her – and is trying to approximate that as best she can. At a certain point 
she decides that the graph is a reasonable one, and removes the sample to the 
light microscope further along the bench, taking some time to look its surface 
carefully to make sure there are no 'artefacts' which would hamper an 
experiment. She then transports this tiny morsel of metal to the large instrument 
in the room next door, placing it in a sample holder which is then inserted into 
the machine. Finally, a picture of white dots, only a few nanometres long 
according to the scale bar, appears on the screen. This is the surface of the metal. 
She concludes matter of factly at this point, that 'This is what a doctoral student 
would like to see, so my work here is finished'. 
 
 Anna is in her early 30s, the same age as many of the scientists she works 
with, and has been employed by the department for only three years. She 
attended a Gesamtschule (a comprehensive): a school without the entrance 
requirements of the other schools in Germany's tiered education system, and was 
always interested in science-based subjects, but it was never clear when she was 
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a teenager which direction she would go in. The only thing she was certain of 
was that on leaving school at sixteen she wanted to 'learn' (lernen) (i.e. complete 
a practical training course) rather than 'study' (studieren) (i.e. complete the 
Abitur, Germany's equivalent of A-levels which is then a route to university). At 
the time she was open to any kind of practical training.  
 
'I applied to lots of other things, to be a nurse, a carer, 
whatever else. I was also thinking of studying to be a 
vet...I applied to lots of positions. But I was too young to 
be a nurse, and I was too skinny to be a carer – because 
you have to really be able to manage people physically – 
then the Lab Technician position just worked out. 
Everything that interested me I applied to, then you wait 
and see what you get'. 
 
After her three-and-a-half year training course, she worked in various limited 
contract (befristet) positions in companies, before ending up in the industrial 
research institute next door. It was there that she found out about the position she 
now holds through a local advertisement, 'the receptionist just left it on my 
desk!', she says, clearly gratified. She communicates with clear satisfaction that 
her current position is permanent and so she plans to stay as long as she can. 
Thus when the department is dissolved she will simply be transferred to another 
one, just like many of her current colleagues who have arrived from elsewhere. 
 
 Anna grew up in a suburb on the outskirts of Berlin, then was schooled 
and trained not far away, in two other areas around the city. She has only ever 
lived in Germany, but does not seem embarrassed about this, simply rather 
relieved, ('Luckily I was never forced to go away'). German is her native 
language, and she has some familiarity with English, although she concedes it is 
'not so good'. When she is speaking to the scientists it will thus mostly be in 
German (unless they are visibly struggling), as being non-natives most of them 
want to learn German and she is happy to provide them with practice. 'Us 
technicians are really part of the German-learning process, we've made it part of 
our job! There are several of us who try to talk German with the scientists, even 
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if its only very slowly, and to use words which they will understand, and if they 
don't understand, to try another word.' 
 
 Her contact with scientists is largely instructional. She is 'responsible' for 
two machines, and usually has appointments in the morning with those who 
would like to use them. They will convene around 10am beside the machine, and 
discuss in detail what the scientist wishes to do with it. These are sometimes 
'guests' (visiting researchers) but mostly other members of the department. She 
describes the interaction, 
 
'The first two or three times, when they're new, I'm 
always with them, and only when I notice that they can 
work well without questions, doubts or even...you 
know...fear, then I let them work alone. I also often just 
sit beside them, and tell them what they should be doing, 
so that they can learn to handle the technical stuff 
themselves. When someone sits beside you and explains 
it makes it a little easier for you, as opposed to showing 
them once that you should click here and do this and do 
this. Then they're like, what was that again?! So I sit 
beside them, and say to them where they should click, 
what they have to pay attention to, so they can do it by 
themselves'. 
  
 She is emphatic about how much she enjoys the work, because although 
she is always working with the same two instruments, it always involves meeting 
new people, and encountering new problems which different kinds of samples 
present. She has fixed diurnal rhythms, but within that there is the opportunity 
for flux, based upon other scientists and their wishes, as well as the technical task 
at hand. She makes a point of trying to explain why the work is satisfying for 
her, 'You see something' (her paused intonation emphasises this) 'You see what 
you've done and you see what's come out. And when it works it's even better. In 
industry you're always doing the same thing. I know people who only look at 
blood, or only look down microscopes. I think research is always surprising, 
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something new is always turning up. When one project is finished, another 
comes along'. 
 
 Several of the themes raised in these portraits will be taken up in later 
sections. Nevertheless, there is one glaring point which cannot pass by now 
without comment: namely, the sexual division of labour. Game and Pringle in 
their study of ‘sex-typing’ (1984: 19) – the ascription of some work as ‘men’s’ 
and other work as ‘women’s’ in the industrialised world – identify several key 
dichotomies. Three of them in particular would be familiar to the technical 
world: that men’s work is habitually ‘heavy’, ‘dangerous’ and ‘dirty’, while 
women’s work is ‘light’, ‘safe’ and ‘clean’ (ibid: 29-30). They also note the 
association of large machines with masculinity, which may be the subtext to the 
claim that the workshop is ‘eine Männerdomäne’. Meanwhile, Alvesson and 
Billing chart the historical associations of femininity in organisations, with those 
roles oriented around nurturance and care (1997). This is very vivid in Anna’s 
testimony, when she explains that her task is not simply to impart technical 
expertise, but to manage the scientists’ doubts and fears so they have the 
confidence to work without her. Her case is one example of the ‘emotional 
labour’ (Guy and Newman 2004) women often take on in organisations. Finally, 
the spatial differences between these two groups also have a gendered 
dimension: the association of women with domesticity and men with public life. 
The material separation of the workshops gives the workmen greater autonomy 
from the majority-male directors, while female lab technicians slot very easily 
into the quasi-households of the departments in which the director is the head 
(like a modern patriarchy).21 One scientist makes this link outright when he 
likens one elderly technician to ‘our mother in a lot of respects’. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  The	  autonomous	  relationship	  the	  workmen	  have	  to	  the	  directors	  is	  made	  clear	  to	  me	  during	  one	  conversation	  with	  two	  of	  them.	  They	  explain	  that	  if	  they	  want	  to	  take	  a	  holiday	  they	  need	  one	  of	  the	  directors	  to	  sign	  off	  their	  sheet.	  When	  I	  ask	  why	  it	  is	  this	  director	  rather	  than	  another,	  one	  answers	  ‘Keine	  Ahnung.	  Einfach	  so.	  Schnick	  
schnack	  schnock’	  (‘No	  idea.	  It’s	  just	  like	  that.	  Paper	  scissors	  stone’).	  He	  has	  very	  little	  interest	  in	  giving	  the	  directors’	  processes	  of	  decision-­‐making	  any	  cognitive	  space,	  ‘paper	  scissors	  stone’	  being	  an	  idiom	  of	  arbirtrariness.	  It	  betrays	  an	  unwillingness	  to	  engage	  in	  what	  David	  Graeber	  calls	  ‘interpretive	  labour’	  (2009:	  516):	  the	  work	  it	  takes	  to	  imagine	  what	  the	  world	  looks	  like	  from	  another’s	  point	  of	  view.	  As	  we’ll	  see	  again	  in	  Chapter	  6.iv,	  hierarchy	  does	  not	  just	  delimit	  people	  but	  also	  their	  willingness	  to	  cogitate	  on	  certain	  matters.	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 iv) Time 
 
 As posited by my ‘principles’: differential time-consciousness is the 
primary way in which the difference between scientists and technicians manifests 
itself. This is one which is predominantly framed by their varying contractual 
relationships to the organisation: between the befristete (limited) contracts of the 
bulk of scientists, and the unbefristete (unlimited) working contracts of almost all 
technicians. This legal foundation has a range of ontological consequences for 
how they experience temporality in general. It can be represented by the 
following set of binaries, some of which have already been shown in the 
previous section, while others will be developed below. 
 
   Technician  Scientist 
   
   Long-term  Short-term 
   Early   Late 
   Gerontocratic  Youth-dominated 
   Fixed hours  24-hours 
   Patience  Urgency 
   Historical  Neophilic 
    
 The most obvious rhythmic difference is diurnal. Men from the workshop 
will arrive as early as 7am, while female laboratory technicians may arrive 
slightly later, at 7.30 or 8am in the morning. This has consequences in the 
afternoon, as by around 3 – 4pm most technicians are getting ready to leave. As 
one scientist puts it, 'The German people arrive early and leave early'. Scientists, 
on the other hand, arrive much later in the morning, regularly as late as 10am, 
but are also more likely to stay later, particularly if they are adhering to a 
deadline. One Ph.D student stayed at the Institute until 4am carrying out 
experiments, as they needed to be concluded quickly, while I hear rumours of 
scientists sometimes working all night at the Institute, because they enjoy the 
'peace'.  
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 Weekly rhythms are also different. None of my technical interlocutors 
would usually be expected to come in on the weekend; indeed on Friday they 
often leave at lunchtime to begin their 'Feierabend' – literally, 'party-evening' – 
the period of leisure-time after work, much cherished in Germany.22 The 
Institutes meanwhile are open to scientists twenty-four hours a day, seven days a 
week. Experimentalists, particularly those working on cell-cultures, might be 
obliged to come in at the weekend to maintain these activities, which for the 
latter involves 'feeding' the cells at precise intervals. Of course scientists do not 
have to come into the Institute to work at the weekend. Some will use the time to 
write papers at home, as they feel better able to concentrate without the 
distractions of their colleagues.  
 
 Yet this difference extends beyond days and weeks, to the course of their 
working lives over many years, and the meanings ascribed to youth and age 
within this. The world of the technical workers resembles a gerontocratic society: 
one in which social status rises proportionately with age. This is clear from the 
diminutive description of the young trainees as 'Azubis', coupled with their 
gaucheness in the social space of the workshop; while their elders who have been 
working metals for twenty or thirty years are distinctly more relaxed, often with 
a playful twinkle in their eye marking their contextual confidence. This 
gerontocracy is bound up with ideas of material and technical expertise. It is very 
different from the young mathematician who has peaked by their mid-twenties. 
Technical skill is accumulated in a very linear fashion, beginning with several 
years of training, and ending at the height of one's experience and dexterity. As 
Frau Steiner says, this is the 'Erfahrungswert': a self-cultivated knowledge which 
is accrued over decades with no downward tendency. 
 
 Unlike the scientists, technicians maintain a strict division between 
labour and leisure, thus their working hours as an aggregate amount, are 
‘reckoned’ intensively. This is made very clear to me on entering the office of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  See	  a	  recent	  Guardian	  article,	  which	  emphasises	  the	  importance	  of	  Germany's	  'Protestant	  leisure	  ethic'	  to	  the	  country's	  social	  and	  economic	  well-­‐being,	  http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/mar/18/germany-­‐protestant-­‐leisure-­‐ethic-­‐british-­‐admire.	  	  The	  importance	  of	  leisure	  for	  German	  workers	  in	  general	  goes	  strangely	  unacknowledged	  in	  popular	  stereotypes	  of	  ‘Germanness’:	  oriented	  as	  they	  are	  around	  hard	  work	  and	  efficiency.	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the Werkstattmeister. Its walls are veritably wallpapered in temporal 
representations. When I ask him to expand on them he takes up the task with 
alacrity, visibly relaxing into descriptions of the means by which the temporal 
order is reigned. One of these is a table with the months of the year down the y-
axis, and three headings at the top along the x-axis which read 'Öffentlicher 
Dienst' (public service), 'Stahl/Eisen' (steel/iron), and 'Beamte' (civil servant': the 
three different contracts in the Institute which oblige the holder to work either 
thirty-six or thirty-nine hours a week. At the intersection of these two indexes are 
a series of numbers running into the hundreds: the total number of hours which 
must be performed by individuals under these contracts in each month. This is 
not a strict upper limit however; there is also the opportunity to 'put extra hours 
in your account' by working overtime, through which one is awarded a 'Gleitag', 
literally a 'flexible day' (i.e. a day off). On the other side of the wall there is 
another table, with the surnames of all the workmen along the x-axis, with 
columns along the y-axis indicating months of the year. There are four different 
colour codings, 'holiday', 'illness', 'free' and 'Gleitag', each of which is a different 
reason for absenteeism from the workshop. On this table there is a mark all of the 
days in which the worker is present in the workshop. One of the main reasons for 
this is to make sure that those with the same formal functionalities ('cutter', 
'miller', 'turner' etc) are not absent on the same day, slowing up the process of 
production.  
 
 At first reading it would appear quite straightforward that these workmen 
are governed and controlled through the ‘time-discipline’ famously exposited by 
E. P. Thompson (1967). In his analysis of the rise of industrial capitalism in 
Europe after 1650, labour became increasingly ordered through the marking of 
time with clocks, bells, whistles, time-sheets, wristwatches and other devices, 
rather than the seasonal ‘task-orientation’ which had preceded it. Temporal 
unfolding was therefore reified into units which were themselves commodities, 
and could be accumulated and abstracted into purchasing power. (The idea of 
putting ‘extra hours in your account’ is an apt illustration). As time – through 
wage-labour – became the ultimate language in which labour was valued, it then 
also became a site of political struggle between ‘time-keepers’ and those who 
were kept: the former ascribing a certain value to labour, and the latter using 
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temporal resistance such as strikes to dispute this. The Werkstattmeister’s 
recording of time in the workshop, then simply becomes another iteration of the 
use of temporal control to extract surplus value from labour within capitalist 
modes of production.  
 
 Yet to follow this extractive argument would be to misread the 
technicians’ attitudes towards and experiences of their work. Although the time 
accorded to labour and leisure is strictly delineated, during the working day their 
time is oriented solely around whatever task is at hand. Thus when I ask lab 
technicians to fill in time-maps of their days, in the best case, they ignore these 
elicitation devices completely, in the worst, they become irritated that I have 
somehow missed the point. This 'point' is that the productive unfolding of their 
day is always situated within a social relationship, and thereby contains that 
unpredictable element inherent in any social exchange. For the lab technicians 
this might be saying that they simply work 'as people come along' ('wie Leute 
kommen') and for the workmen, whatever 'workpiece' (an item they must produce 
so that an experiment can take place) has come their way. In one case, a lab 
worker and a guest scientist are working together with the instrument the former 
is 'responsible' for. They are having some difficulty slicing the sample in the 
correct way, and the guest apologizes for using up the lab worker's time so 
inefficiently. The latter responds with a phlegmatic shrug, 'it's your time, we can 
use it as you like' (my emphasis). 
 
 The importance of working ‘wie Leute kommen’ or according to a 
‘workpiece’ rather than the hours of the clock, exhibits an attitude towards time 
maintained in Luther’s Beruf. He uses the word ‘Stündelein’ – variously 
translated as ‘the time’ or ‘the hour’ (Wingren 1957: 213-234) – to indicate the 
temporal context of action in the performance of vocation. Stündelein is the 
liberation of action from any external time measure. The time which work takes 
is designated by God: so any planning for the future, or instrumentality about the 
use of time during work, becomes meaningless. ‘When the hour has come’ action 
‘breaks forth in an unpredictable way’ (ibid: 213). The concept of Stündelein is 
also closely bound up with Luther’s ideas about autonomy. As Wingren says, in 
Luther’s schema ‘the bondage of all actions to time is a death blow to the 
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freedom of the will’ (ibid: 216). Performing one’s Beruf according to the time it 
takes, rather than one decided in advance, thus becomes an important expression 
of human freedom. This is why technicians can get irritated that I have missed 
the point when I ask them which part of the day is allotted to what task. Their 
liberation from assiduous time-planning during work hours is in fact an 
important expression of personal sovereignty. As one tells me, ‘Es kommt alles 
wie es kommt, dann man reagiert’ (Everything happens as it happens and then 
you react) adding as an afterthought, ‘Und ich bin froh darüber’ (And I’m happy 
about that). Yet again the Stündelein contains that Lutheran paradox of autonomy 
and subordination. As the vocation is directed perennially towards the service of 
one’s neighbour, it is in practice the needs of others that define the manner in 
which ‘the hour’ is used. Technicians do not tell me they use their time as they 
would wish to, but as others require: wie Leute kommen.  
  
  
 v) Space 
 
 In striking contrast to the cosmopolitanism and hyper-mobility of the 
scientific class, technicians have a consciousness of space I would call 
chthonic.23 It is more than simply 'local', identity claims to which emerge more 
often than not in tension with national or supra-national forces; it is rather an 
ontology which makes no apologies for being intensely rooted within the 
respective Institute and its surrounding environs. This rootedness expresses itself 
through language, education, print culture, and often upbringing, as well as the 
objects which mark space, the material culture of offices and laboratories, which 
– like the director's multifarious forms of institutional embodiment – index the 
permanence of the technical contract. From the perspective of the organisation it 
is expressed most clearly through their job title: each technician occupies a 
designated Arbeitsplatz, literally working-place. Just like Foucault’s description 
of the spatial practices of the ‘disciplinary society’: 'each individual has his own 
place; and each place its individual' (1977: 143).24 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Cf.	  Chapter	  6.i.	  24	  Again	  I	  am	  playing	  devil’s	  advocate	  here,	  part	  of	  my	  larger	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  technicians	  inhabit	  a	  world	  subtly	  distinct	  from	  that	  described	  by	  Foucault.	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 Like Anna, technical workers are almost universally native Germans, 
with German as their mother tongue. They are also likely to spend the majority 
of their working lives speaking their native language. If scientists are really 
struggling, or from the Far East, they will muddle away in English, but they do 
not require anywhere near the level of fluency that a scientist would. For the 
workmen, English is even less necessary. Some, indeed, are taking on the project 
of language learning simply to amuse and improve themselves, but would rarely 
require it for their work. There is also a visible generational difference in 
linguistic abilities. As Anna is young, her English is fairly good. Yet the older 
technicians are much less likely to be conversant in English. For Frau Steiner for 
instance, it is an entirely different matter. Bar one exception in the workshop, a 
Sri-Lankan who is in every way an outlier, none of my technical interlocutors 
know any more than these two languages.  
 
 This chthonic personhood almost always extends to upbringing as well. 
Technicians have often been raised in the Land where the Institute is based. 
When I question one on this pattern she responds with a smiling shrug, 'Well, it 
could just be because we come from the region, and so I think, it's just easy to 
stay here, so-to-speak'. They seem to exhibit no signs of what Germans call 
fernweh, the longing for distance, an adventurous curiosity which often 
characterises globe-trotting scientists, ('it's just easy to stay here'). As a 
consequence, they are more likely to make fine-grained distinctions between 
much smaller geographic distances, while global consciousness for the scientific 
class always comes (and perhaps is cognitively necessary) at the expense of local 
specificities. To give one example, in the Primary Institute, many scientists 
choose to live in Berlin and commute to the periphery where the Institute is 
based, conceiving it as simply a particularly distant extension of it. On the other 
hand, technicians will make impassioned distinctions between 'Potsdam' (the 
town nearest the Institute) and the capital of Berlin. When one laboratory worker 
explains that before coming to the Institute she was trained in a local school of 
applied science (Fachhochschule) I take it from this that she is a 'Berliner'. 'No!' 
she responds vigorously, 'a Potsdamer. There is a big difference!' Instead of 
living in the cosmopolitan centre and commuting, technicians will also reside 
much nearer to the Institute, in Potsdam or elsewhere.  
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 Dumont charts the close relationship between commensality and caste in 
Hindu hierarchy, in which one’s meal partners are almost always of the same 
caste (1980: 137-141), and it is one which has many echoes in the technical 
world of the Max Planck. This is particularly vivid in one department in the 
Primary Institute. Female laboratory workers all take their Tupperware lunches 
collectively, in the bright glass-walled coffee room of the third floor.25 They cite 
this as an important time to relax and pool the problems of the day on a model of 
generalized reciprocity, in which any of the others might know the answer to a 
particularly perplexing scientific problem presented by one. Meanwhile, the 
scientists almost always buy their lunches at one of the canteens. There is an in-
house Max Planck canteen with a range of foods, a large proportion of which 
tends towards the quintessentially Germanic: with a range of Wursts, salty stews, 
and mash, which one can access from the department without going outside. 
However, many of the scientists will take the eight-minute walk across the 
science park to another canteen, to indulge in its more pricey, but also more 
exotic range of curries, risottos and spaghettis. The men from the workshop, the 
janitorial staff with their royal blue overalls, and the administrators, all frequent 
the Max Planck canteen in various sub-groups, and while some female lab 
workers may occasionally take their lunch with the scientists, it would be 
uncommon if not unheard of, that a workman would do so. If one were to unfurl 
the symbolic significance of these lunch rituals, quite apart from being instances 
of hierarchical segregation, the ingestion of certain foodstuffs is also a statement 
on spatiality and cultural consciousness. Cosmopolitan scientists will quite 
happily travel, leaving the confines of the Institute for a range of non-German 
foods, while the technicians remain fixed within the Institute, and consume the 
traditional foods that they are likely to have been raised on. 
 
 Spatial consciousness also reveals itself through the 'imagined 
communities' of the printed word (Anderson 1991). While the three-floor library 
in the Primary Institute is full of scientific journals, old texts, and a small cluster 
of novels in English and German – designated for its scientific patrons – there is 
a space upstairs, with several tables and comfortable chairs, which displays the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Indeed,	  this	  coffee	  room	  is	  both	  three	  storeys	  up	  and	  adjacent	  to	  the	  director's	  office,	  another	  spatial	  indication	  of	  the	  status	  of	  the	  technicians.	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local newspapers of the region, such as the 'Märkische Allgemeine: Zeitung für 
das Land Brandenburg' and the 'Potsdamer Neuste Nachrichten'.26 This is 
frequented by the permanent staff, who use it to take a short break between bouts 
of work. The consumption of local media is also often how workmen and 
technicians originally found their way to the Institute, seeing their subsequent 
position advertised in the job sections of the newspapers. Apart from that it may 
have been an opportunistic tip-off from a local contact, or even both, such as 
Anna's experience of having a receptionist put the local advertisement on her 
desk. 
 
 The most visible way in which technicians indicate their rootedness 
within the institution is through the material culture of their desks and 
laboratories. In Germany, where greenery of all kinds in public domains tends to 
be larger, and generally more ubiquitous than my instinctive comparator, the UK, 
this materialization often finds its form in potted plants.27 Very occasionally a 
scientist may decide to flex their green fingers and acquire a plant to decorate 
their workspace, but largely this cohort has a functionalist attitude to the natural 
world (at least when they are at work).28 The technicians on the other hand, 
particularly female laboratory workers, are likely to decorate large parts of their 
workspaces with a multitude of flora, often several different pots with stems and 
leaves reaching up towards the ceiling or hanging lazily down to the floor. 
Sometimes these items are the direct consequence of, rather than having a 
symbolic relationship to, the longevity of their positions. One lab worker points 
to the different plants surrounding the microscope she operates, and explains that 
many of them were left behind for her as presents from departed scientists. 
Sheerly by virtue of being present in the Institute for over three decades, she has 
accumulated several. More often than not, the care of plants throughout the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  By	  contrast,	  scientists	  will	  often	  pool	  erudite	  books	  among	  themselves:	  one	  particularly	  popular	  example	  of	  which	  is	  Richard	  Holmes'	  Age	  of	  Wonder	  (2008).	  27	  The	  other	  individual	  who	  is	  embodied	  through	  indoor	  flora	  is	  the	  director.	  In	  nearly	  every	  directorial	  office	  I	  visit,	  there	  is	  a	  very	  large	  potted	  plant,	  or	  indeed	  a	  tree	  standing	  to	  human	  height.	  Often	  this	  arrives	  on	  the	  department's	  inception.	  For	  one,	  he	  explains	  his	  shrub	  is	  a	  'sign	  of	  persistence',	  and	  he	  'grew	  it	  from	  a	  single	  branch',	  being	  reflexive	  enough	  to	  see	  the	  shrub	  as	  a	  symbolic	  extension	  of	  his	  own	  department's	  growth.	  28	  At	  my	  goodbye	  party	  in	  one	  department,	  I	  present	  the	  group	  with	  a	  small	  potted	  plant.	  On	  asking	  one	  biologist	  who	  researches	  plants	  how	  one	  should	  care	  for	  it,	  he	  is	  aghast.	  'I'm	  not	  a	  gardener!',	  he	  exclaims	  indignantly.	  'Maybe	  I	  could	  tear	  off	  one	  of	  the	  leaves	  and	  test	  its	  mechanical	  properties!'	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Institutes also falls to the technicians. In one case a group leader reports that one 
of the lab workers even came back from holiday early to water the plants: 'It's 
quite dedicated', he says, awed and a bit bewildered. 
 
 Aside from plants, such workspaces often display all the other 
accoutrements which may a space 'homey': boxes of herbal teas, arrays of mugs, 
small toy animals, photographs of families and friends, birthday cards, even 
items which would usually belong at home, such as hand creams, sportswear and 
changes of clothes. Meanwhile the homey accoutrements of the workshops have 
already been described. By contrast, scientists are often unlikely to have anything 
other than a few paper articles or conference posters scattered around, some 
weighty textbooks, and the usual office stationery.  
 
 For Grant McCracken, ‘homeyness’ becomes an analytic category 
through which the to articulate the symbolic properties of particular 
environments (2005). He arrives at his argument from research in North-
American households, but it could just as easily figure here in these professional 
spaces.29 A space made ‘homey’ is recognisable by – among others – its 
‘diminutive’, ‘variable’, ‘mnemonic’ and ‘informal’ characteristics (ibid: 28-36): 
all of which could be used to describe the material cultures which saturate these 
Arbeitsplätzen in workshops and laboratories. The most interesting point 
McCracken makes about this phenomenon for our purposes here is its 
relationship to status. He argues that ‘homeyness’ is used as a ‘status corrector’ 
(ibid: 41). ‘Homeyness allows the individual to defend against status strategies. It 
allows for the containment, management, and repudiation of these strategies’ 
(ibid). If technicians were truly subordinate, they would deploy these strategies 
in the privacy and safety of their domestic environments. However, the fact that 
they deliberately give their professional spaces a decidedly homey feel, is a 
visible repudiation of potential scientific status strategies. It situates them as 
belonging in a firm and lasting way inside the Institutes, environments in which 
they often appear more visibly at ease than their transient scientific colleagues. 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Indeed	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  public/private	  distinction	  in	  these	  examples	  which	  McCracken	  in	  his	  study	  polices,	  also	  communicates	  the	  technicians’	  attachments	  which	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  final	  section.	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 To conclude this section, a reference was made at the beginning to 
Foucault's 'disciplinary society' (1977), and I will now take this up again. For 
Foucault, the control of subjects through architectural encompassment from the 
eighteenth-century onwards was the primary means through which bodies were 
'disciplined' and thus rendered useful for whatever political end. By enclosing 
people in functional sites (workshops, factories, military training grounds) they 
became objective nodes in an overarching '“anatomy” of power'. This 'anatomy' 
overwhelmed the specificity of particular selves, and conceived of human beings 
as little more than productive occupants of the spaces which enclosed them, and 
– particularly in workshops and factories – prosthetic extensions of the machines 
which dominated them.30 However, analogous to the appropriation of the 
temporal logics of 'time-discipline' without the attendant exploitation, technicians 
are organised by means of 'enclosure' without their humanity being reduced to 
serving the designated purposes of these spaces. The MPG does not conceive of 
its technical staff as object-like nodes in its political 'anatomy', rather the 
specificity of individual selves transcends their spatial enclosure. The material 
culture of 'homeyness' is one example of a manifest eruption of the personality 
into the professional domains of the Arbeitsplätzen. Another is the impetus 
placed on embodied knowledge. Like Frau Steiner, whose working life involves 
moving between two rooms, it is not these rooms which define her but rather the 
Erfahrungswert, the hard-earned value of her own technical skill.  
 
 Although they appear superficially similar, the reason that technicians 
have a slightly different experience from Foucault’s subject, brings us back once 
more to the cosmological basis of their Beruf. As Weber argued, it is not in 
Luther’s, but Calvin’s conception of the calling that forms the foundations of the 
so-called capitalist ‘spirit’ we are well familiar with. Indeed Luther's statements, 
would be considered 'from a capitalist viewpoint, definitely backward' (Weber 
2001: 81). The Calvinist impulse, rather than being concerned with questions of 
'meaning and of life' through worldly engagement – as Luther had been – was to 
'tear the individual away from the close ties with which he is bound to this world' 
and force them to confront an 'unprecedented inner loneliness' (ibid: 60). There 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Much	  like	  the	  predicament	  of	  the	  coal	  miners	  in	  Émile	  Zola's	  Germinal	  (1993).	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was also not the sense – as with Luther – that all callings were equally valid 
paths to salvation. Only a minority, the elect, were blessed with 'eternal grace' 
(ibid: 59-60), while the rest were 'damned' and conceived of as a lesser form of 
humanity. The consequence of this is that one cannot simply apply Marxist-
inspired scholarship, i.e. one resting on a theory of capitalism – whether E. P. 
Thompson’s time-discipline or Foucault’s disciplinary society – uncritically to 
the technicians’ experience. The cosmological roots of their Beruf lie in 
Lutheranism rather than Calvinism, making them subtly distinct from manual 
workers under capitalism. 
  
 
 vi) Knowledge 
 
 Technicians are not as cerebrally-oriented, nor verbally or mathematically 
analytical, as their scientific colleagues, but rather are individuals who have 
spent their lives since at least the age of sixteen, working in practical domains 
and learning how to navigate such tasks by praxis. Thus although much has been 
made of scientists' prosthetic relationships to their instruments (Traweek 1988, 
Gusterson 1996), compared to the technicians the latter remain very much in 
their heads. Instead, technical workers use their whole gamut of conscious senses 
to carry out their work, but also too forms of sensing which are unconscious. 
Frau Steiner's description of Erfahrungswert, is emblematic of a wider emphasis 
on 'Gefühl' (feeling), which is sometimes invoked to verbalise how their activity 
is guided. In the MPG, feeling is not necessarily subordinated to thinking, as it 
might be in many others.31 
 
 Interestingly, as we’ve learnt, theirs is not a form of knowledge which the 
scientists rank upon, but which can inspire wonder and awe. The reason for this 
brings us back to Luther’s most defining proposition, that God is placated 
through ‘this-worldly work’ of a concrete kind. In his Sermon on the Mount 
Luther tells the audience,  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  One	  of	  the	  explanations	  of	  the	  Harnack	  Principle	  (cf.	  Chapter	  1.v)	  is	  after	  all	  that	  directors,	  ‘rely	  on	  their	  own	  intuition’.	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‘If you are a craftsman you will find the bible placed in 
your workshop, in your hands, in your heart; it teaches 
and preaches how you ought to teach your neighbour. 
Only look at your tools, your needle, your thimble, your 
beer barrel, your articles of trade, your scales, your 
measures, and you will find this saying written on them’ 
(cited in Wingren 1957: 72). 
 
The work of the craftsperson thus becomes a spiritual activity, even a form of 
religious worship (‘you will find the bible placed in your workshop’). This 
ennoblement of material engagements gets carried through to some extent by the 
Idealists, and then subsequently bound up with good citizenship in Germany’s 
vocational schools.32 The end result is that manual craft is something the 
technicians take enormously seriously, cultivating their sensual dexterity in the 
performance of their Beruf without embarrassment or shame.  
 
 Laboratories and workshops are very sensually rich spaces. Their 
soundscapes are thickened through a succession of beeps, clicks, whirrs, and the 
perennial sound of cutting, the material expression of the intervention of 
experimental science in the messy entanglements of the cosmos (Barad 2007). 
One workman shows me how he works his machine, a 'miller' which removes the 
thick scaly black layer formed by the metal-casting process, and renders the 
surface shiny and smooth. While the machine is whizzing away, he leans in to 
the device, subtly tilting his head sideways with an absent gaze of non-visual 
concentration, 'You do a lot with your ears' he explains. He beckons me closer 
and despite the loud background noise we both hear a quiet ticking sound, of the 
surface being scraped off the metal at just the right number of revolutions per 
second. This is not a numerical judgement, but rather a 'feeling' for the correct 
rhythm of the ticks which prior work has given him.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  As	  Humboldt	  says	  in	  the	  Limits	  of	  State	  Action,	  ‘All	  peasants	  and	  craftsmen	  might	  be	  elevated	  into	  artists;	  that	  is,	  men	  who	  love	  their	  labour	  for	  its	  own	  sake,	  improve	  it	  by	  their	  own	  plastic	  genius	  and	  inventive	  skill,	  and	  thereby	  cultivate	  their	  intellect,	  ennoble	  their	  character,	  and	  exalt	  and	  refine	  their	  pleasures’	  (1969:	  27).	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 At the same time, although the centrality of vision in scientific expertise 
has been well-documented (Daston and Galison 2007), those laboratory 
technicians preparing samples are likely to spend more time using their eyes as 
tools than their scientific colleagues: like Frau Steiner's perambulation from 
ascertaining the 'ideal' image on the graph, to checking there are no 'artefacts' on 
the surface of the sample. Often when technicians are working with scientists in 
a pedagogic mode, like Anna's description of training neophytes, it is only they 
who are able to 'see' the difference between the sample and the embedding 
material. Scientists, at first, will have no idea what they are looking at. Thus as 
with all technical work, although 'there is a (scientific) level beyond which I 
cannot go' – as one technician related – the experienced use of vision is a critical 
part of the technicians’ skill.  
 
 It also surely goes without saying that all technical work which involves 
the transformation of materials is extraordinarily tactile. Scientists often describe 
samples preparation as 'boring' and a part of their work which is a 'necessary 
evil', complaining that it is arduous and difficult to keep their hands steady. For 
scientists, the conceptual rupture between the work of the head and of the hand, 
makes the obligations of the latter feel tediously painstaking.33 Meanwhile the 
technicians require no such flexibility and indeed often relate how much they 
enjoy these activities. When I briefly attempt to cut a fibrous material under the 
microscope, armed with a very fine and sharp scalpel, I am struck by how 
awkwardly unfamiliar the process feels, and how any slight movement in my 
hands is multiply magnified through the lens (and its image incidentally, an 
inverted version of the practical reality). It brings home how much embodied 
skill such delicate work requires, necessitating, as Schaffer et al. put it, an 
extraordinarily 'mindful hand' (2007).  
 
 In short there is a great deal of technical consciousness bound up in the 
body: not only in mindful hands, but also mindful ears and mindful eyes. In all 
probability a mindful smell may also be significant, although this is never 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Schaffer	  et	  al.	  trace	  the	  origins	  of	  this	  rupture	  to	  the	  Aristotelian	  distinction	  between	  'episteme'	  and	  'techne'	  (knowledge	  and	  its	  practical	  application),	  subsequently	  taken	  up	  and	  reified	  by	  Francis	  Bacon	  during	  the	  'birth	  of	  modern	  science'	  	  (2007:	  xiii).	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manifested to me. One of the difficulties of my ethnographic encounter with the 
technicians is their largely non-verbal relationship to their work; yet in hindsight 
this is an utterly logical eventuality, as non-verbal skill is very much the basis of 
their professional personhood. Over and over again, the word ‘Erfahrung’ 
(experience) turns up as a catch-all term: to express the peculiarly embodied 
form of knowledge which technicians acquire over the years.  
 
 What is fascinating is how enormously scientific work at the Max Planck 
Society relies on this ineffable, unconscious domain of 'experience' to carry out 
its various costly and high-profile experimental programmes. This is a very 
different world from the initiative-constrained crew of John Law’s British lab. 
One experiment I follow particularly closely, involves many weeks of sample 
preparation and sample holder construction, culminating in a two-week slot at 
the local 'synchrotron radiation device', a very expensive operation which must 
be booked many months, if not over a year in advance.34 The material in question 
which is being explored is a very sensitive one, and must be prepared and 
encased in exactly the right way if the experiment is going to generate readable 
data. The weeks before the experiment are punctuated by group meetings, in 
which it becomes clear that this preparation hinges on the embodied skill of one 
sole technician in the department. It is repeatedly stated that she has a 'special 
technique' and 'special knowledge' in preparing these kinds of samples, and so it 
is paramount that she has enough time before the start date to do so. The group 
leader in charge meets the technician in question multiple times to make sure she 
understands the desired thickness and texture they are looking for in the samples, 
i.e. what kind of data they wish to draw from it. Likewise, the sample holder, a 
'chamber' in which the material will be positioned and protected inside the 
synchrotron, is produced over the course of many weeks by one member of the 
workshop, from designing the object on the computer, to cutting and assembling 
its respective parts with the help of the on-site machinery.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  This	  instrument	  is	  a	  enormous	  circular	  device	  housed	  in	  a	  building	  the	  size	  of	  several	  tennis	  courts.	  	  Its	  usage	  is	  anthropologically	  analogous	  to	  Sharon	  Traweek's	  study	  of	  the	  'Beamline'	  (1988)	  at	  the	  Stanford	  Linear	  Accelerator	  Centre	  (although	  it	  is	  technically	  an	  electron	  storage	  ring	  rather	  than	  a	  particle	  accelerator).	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 This incident is a classic case of what Latour and Woolgar called the 
'social construction of scientific facts' (1979), in which layers of practical and 
material work are successively erased in the production of scientific knowledge. 
Except it is also a comment on the relationship between hierarchy and work 
inside the Max Planck Society, as the erasure of materiality is also the erasure of 
the contributions of those with the most material engagements: the names of 
these technicians will not appear on the scientific publications which may result 
from the experiment. In Latour's thesis he does not make a substantial analytical 
distinction between scientists and technicians, both are equally involved in the 
material dissolutions which are a sequential stages in a 'dialectic of 
enlightenment' (Adorno and Horkheimer 1997). However, this event, in which it 
is principally the labour of two technical workers, which produce the entirety of 
the material assemblage which will generate the numerical quantities 
subsequently analysed, demonstrates a much sharper divide in who is involved in 
which stage of 'construction'. 
 
 Yet it is not only practical, nor professional knowledge, that the 
technicians embody, particularly among the female lab workers. 'Experience' 
extends not only to manipulating material assemblages, but also to inhabiting the 
Institute and having a deep knowledge of its contents. One very long-term lab 
worker is in the process of retiring, and so her successor has been shadowing her 
for the past one-and-a-half years in order to apprentice to the position. However, 
because the retiree has been in the department 'since forever' it will be impossible 
for the successor to absorb all of the knowledge she has managed to accumulate 
in that time. Up until now, scientists were used to asking the retiree where 
miscellaneous pieces of scientific equipment can be kept, 'because she knows in 
whatever cupboard in the basement things can be found!', and her successor is 
anxious that her paucity of experience in the department will mean that she will 
not be able to act as a sufficient substitute for her predecessor, at least for several 
years. 'I certainly don't have all her knowledge yet', she tells me sincerely. As 
with Frau Steiner, the kind of knowledge lab workers embody cannot simply be 
transmitted from one individual to another ('there is no way I can store up the 
knowledge of other people'), but rather must be accrued individually over a long 
period. 
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 In short, when it comes to knowledge, technicians exhibit a different 
realization of what those other organisational analysts would call agency.35 I 
would refer the reader again at this point to the diagram on page 31, as agency 
must be understood as one particular development in this Enlightenment vision 
of self: in which the transformation of the world beyond can only take place 
through manifest action on the part of that self. The technicians’ agency, on the 
other hand, is strictly Counter-Enlightenment. It does not have to be constantly 
demonstrated through action, as this action, this transformation, takes place 
within the self. In Aristotelian terms, it is inner – rather than outer – ‘entelechy’ 
(La Vopa 1988: 161).36 This emphasis on inner transformation, if one wished to 
dig deeper, originates in the tracts of the German mystics like Johannes Tauler, is 
carried through in Lutheran and Pietistic Protestantism through the idioms of 
Beruf and Bildung, and subsequently eulogised by the Idealists. As Humboldt 
famously said, ‘He who can say to himself as he dies, “I have seized as much of 
the world as I could and have changed it into my humanity”, has reached his 
target, has achieved what is called living in the highest sense of the word’ (cited 
in Dumont 1994: 94). To be inwardly transformed is thus to be human, to be, in 
Maussian/Dumontian terms, a person. 
 
 
 vii) The Institutes 
 
 Finally, I turn to the dynamics of encompassment as it effects the 
technicians through their relationship to the Institutes. Again, it is with the 
assistance of Germany’s own texts that we can theorise the shape of technicians’ 
relationship to the organisation. Ferdinand Tönnies distinguishes between two 
types of human ‘will’ – ‘natural will’ (literally ‘being will’ Wesenwille) and 
‘rational will’ (Kürwille) (2002: 103). While the former is ‘the will which 
includes thinking’ – a way of relating to something organically in which action 
proceeds naturally therefrom – the latter is ‘the thinking which encompasses the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Cf.	  Chapter	  1.iii	  and	  iv.	  36	  I	  first	  came	  across	  this	  different	  understanding	  of	  agency	  in	  Saba	  Mahmood’s	  extraordinary	  critique	  of	  the	  concept	  through	  her	  work	  with	  Egyptian	  Muslim	  revivalists	  (2005).	  As	  to	  why	  this	  particular	  strand	  of	  German	  Protestantism	  echoes	  a	  form	  of	  conservative	  Islam	  I	  leave	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  another	  scholar.	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will’ (ibid) – in which the thinking subject is themselves the author of the will to 
action. When John Law describes the technicians’ urge to be ‘distant from the 
organisation’ (1994: 133), fantasising about boating holidays or relaxing at 
home, their attachment to the laboratory would be a case of rational will. (If they 
long for distance then logically they are only at work because they are willing 
themselves to be). Meanwhile Max Planck Society technicians, who intentionally 
come back from their holidays early in order to water the plants, exhibit the will 
to act Tönnies would call ‘natural’. By now it should be clear that this kind of 
natural will is already present in Luther’s Beruf, and his insistence upon the 
‘inner willingness to do and bear all that is required by vocation’ (Wingren 1957: 
64).  
 
 To explore this through the concrete: the first thing to note is that 
technicians are not employed by a director, who they often precede (and 
sometimes outlast) but by the Institute at which they work. As a consequence, 
there is quite a bit of traffic of technicians between directors of the same 
Institute. At the founding of one department, several of the technicians were 
simply transferred from others to fill the posts. For the newly-hired scientists, it 
was the technicians who 'showed them the ropes' and functioned like a 
welcoming committee, ('They were all really friendly, asking us all where we'd 
come from'). The embeddedness of the laboratory workers within the Institutes is 
often felt to be of great benefit to the scientists. As it is through the networks of 
these (almost universally female) exchanges, that instruments and equipment can 
be shared among departments, even when the relationship between their 
respective directors may be marked by a playfully competitive edge. One group 
leader describes his experience of the female lab workers in his department, 
 
'You could say I inherited them from the Institute. 
Science is quite dynamic and these people on Institute 
contracts end up joining us, they have a lot of knowledge 
about the Institute as a whole which can be really helpful. 
They're the glue that keeps the lab together. They can use 
their connections if we want to use other resources or if 
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things need to get repaired, they know who to talk to. 
Having someone who's been around for a while is great.' 
  
 Here again, we see the intimate connection between the velocity of 
science, ('science is quite dynamic') and the stasis of the technicians ('someone 
who's been around for a while') in the smooth functioning of research. Indeed, 
the powerful phrase – 'they're the glue that keeps the lab together' – suggests the 
absolute necessity of this group in making anything possible at all. This is the 
‘complementarity’ of the precarity and longevity principles in action.37 
 
 The upshot of this particular contractual arrangement, is that technicians 
are not encompassed by the hero principle through their alignment to a single 
director, but to the ‘collegial directorship’ of the whole Institute whose 
incumbents come and go. It is the Institute which then becomes the object of 
their natural will, the Institute which is the focus of their attachment and 
motivation for work.38 This is particularly true for the workmen, who are 
ostensibly autonomous from specific directorial leadership: a fact which is 
impressed upon me during one vivid encounter. In the midst of interviewing the 
men in one of the workshops, I meet one particularly energetic member, who, 
understanding vaguely that my work is a 'social study of science', takes my visit 
utterly in hand. The moment I arrive, he announces excitedly, 'First - we will go 
to see the foundation stone!' Without time to pause for breath, I am whisked out 
of the workshop into the bracing January air, to another building not far away, 
one of the original buildings of the former Kaiser-Wilhelm Society. As we 
descend stairs, duck under overhead beams, and pass through labyrinthine 
passageways, the journey is infused with the electric thrill of adventure. He is 
taking me to a part of the building no scientist ever would (or perhaps could, 
being unaware of its existence). We go deeper, and the walls give off that musty 
smell of cold damp stone, finally reaching a low-ceilinged room which appears 
to be full of junk, stuffed with miscellaneous pieces of metal and scrappy piles of 
obsolete technology. In the very far corner sits the foundation stone, with a 
carving of the Institute’s founding date in thick clear letters. 'It's down here 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Cf.	  Chapter	  1.v.	  38	  Indeed,	  in	  Lutheran	  terms,	  the	  Institute	  becomes	  the	  site	  of	  the	  neighbours	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  his	  ethics.	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because no-one will see it', he explains, 'at that time it was all Heil Hitler (at this 
point he gives a mini- mock- Sieg Heil) and the stone provides a memory of the 
past'. That the foundation stone is the very first thing he wants me to see is 
critically important. The MPG through the medium of its scientific members has 
always had a complex and fractured relationship to its predecessor the KWG, but 
in this Institute at least, there was a great deal of continuity.39 Indeed some large 
mechanical devices in the workshop date from its inception. As such, it is almost 
as if this character is intentionally revealing to me, the Institute's own 
unconscious: a 'memory of the past' down in a far forgotten corner of the 
basement, where 'no-one will see it'. He wants me to understand what the 
Institute means to him: a meaning on which elite organisational narratives have 
no bearing. And for him, it was an Institute founded not in 1948 but in the 1930s. 
From the vantage point of this kind of historical time, even individual directors 
are a fleeting presence.  
 
 Meanwhile, in the tradition of organisational ‘sex-typing’, for women 
their attachment to the Institute becomes channeled into tasks of nurturance and 
care. Beate has been working at one Institute for many years. Alongside all of 
her technical obligations, looking after equipment and giving induction sessions, 
she spends half the week working as the Institute's 'women's representative'. She 
takes this role 'really really seriously', as it involves being the first port of call for 
any female staff member (scientific or otherwise) who feels discriminated 
against, or has any other gender-related professional issue. A large part of her 
work involves organising childcare for staff members' children: connecting them 
with babysitters and day-care facilities. She is happy at the moment. Having held 
the position for over eight years, she has been campaigning for the last three to 
open up a Kindergarten on-site, and has finally been successful. 'It's nothing to 
do with science, but it's also necessary', she tells me matter-of-factly. In truth, 
women who take on these roles in the MPG have a great deal to do with its 
capacity to produce science, particularly in the context of its youthful workforce 
of parenting age. Technicians thus play a critical role in the cultural and social 
reproduction of the Institutes. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Cf.	  Chapter	  2.i.	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 viii) Conclusion 
  
 My identity as a Wissenschaftler makes ethnography with the technicians 
problematic. However this chapter has been an effort to turn this very problem 
into an analytic advantage: the resistance to the ethnographer’s transcendence of 
hierarchy bringing hierarchical ruptures into greater relief. It provokes my 
awareness of the profound differences between Wissenschaftler and Techniker at 
the level of being: whether one articulates this as consciousness, ontology, or 
personhood. Technicians reckon their working hours intensively, but within this, 
abandon themselves to whatever time it requires to do their scientific neighbours 
service. They, by and large, remain within the Land they were raised in, converse 
with each other in German, and make their workspaces a home from home as 
they plan to remain there indefinitely. They focus on the practical and technical 
knowledge that surrounds the use of instruments and equipment: constantly 
endeavouring to improve themselves and taking pride in the singularity of their 
skill-set. The Institutes are their axis mundi, which means they often go beyond 
the call of duty to make sure that they run smoothly. None of these habits and 
attributes are exactly synonymous with those of scientists, as we shall discover 
more fully in the following chapter.  
 
 Such differences arise from the different purpose they serve within the 
organisation’s totality: their ‘doing doing doing’ is complementary to the 
scientists’ ‘thinking thinking thinking’. On closer scrutiny this opposition the 
workman proffers is a very ancient one: the old association of hierarchical 
difference with different parts of the body, recalling Plato’s distinction of the 
‘hands’ from the ‘head’ (2003) in his Republic. The functional separation of 
hands and head, of intellect and practical skill, means they do not evaluate 
themselves, and are not themselves evaluated, according to the metrics of 
scientists – like those documented by Law, Latour and Shapin. There is, if you 
like, a deference to their difference; scientists are often humbled by the 
technicians’ craft. ‘They’re much better at what they do than I am’, one scientist 
tells us.  
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 I have interpreted this ontology and the social status that comes with it, 
by embracing Dumont’s distinction between status and power and threading in 
Luther’s Beruf concept (and to a lesser degree, its philosophical offspring 
Bildung). Lutheran precepts, and their secular mediation through the Idealists, 
explain certain key characteristics of this ontology. A conception of time as 
unfolding in the service of one’s neighbour, and of practical work as ennobling 
and engaged rather than damning and coerced, can all be traced back to Luther’s 
understanding of vocation. Meanwhile Beruf shades into Bildung when it comes 
to the way technicians experience their agency and their knowledge. Directors 
are collective individuals, but so too are the technicians: they embody an internal 
diversity of experience and go through an inner entelechy which makes them not 
easily replaced. All of these culminate in what I perceived ethnographically as 
the defining difference of technicians to their various ‘others’: that they did not 
treat the organisation instrumentally and were not treated instrumentally by it.  
 
 In the next chapter we turn to the final group in this triumvirate. If the 
longevity principle is one face in a complementary dyad – the other is precarity. 
However, a similar overarching argument applies. The particular experiences of 
Max Planck scientists must also be understood on their own terms, rooted in their 
own antecedents, and not simply conceived of as one iteration of a 
philosophically homogeneous global system.
	   198	  
 6. The Precarity Principle: Scientists 
 
 
 'It's quite clear I won't stay here forever because no-one really does' 
         Ph.D student 
 
 
 Max Planck scientists talk constantly about nature's movement: of plants, 
of cell walls, of energy, of molecules, movements which they increasingly come 
to know through computer simulations. Early twentieth-century visions of 
natural homoeostasis – it seems – have gone somewhat out of fashion. Any 
philosopher of science with an ear for metaphor would read a deeper meaning 
into this (cf. Brown 2003). It is not simply nature they are thinking through here, 
but themselves. ‘The Max Planck is all about movement’, I am simultaneously 
told. Not only is there a ‘soft maximum’ of five years to all post-Ph.D. contracts, 
but even if this is somehow circumvented using different funding sources, 
Germany's Wissenschaftszeitvertragsgesetz (limited scientific contract law) 
means that all those who do not get permanent positions within twelve years of 
employment are obliged to leave the profession.1 It is unclear how many 
permanent positions there are for Max Planck scientists below the director. Most 
will say he can bestow ‘one or two’ at his discretion. In any event it is a 
negligible quantity. Usually it is quite certain these scientists will not stay inside 
the organisation ‘because no-one really does’. It is predominantly the organised 
transience of this stratum that I call the ‘precarity principle’. 
 
 Part of my argument is that the precarity principle is, in Dumontian 
terms, complementary to the longevity principle which defines the technicians: 
meaning that both play differing but equally necessary functions in the 
organisation’s totality. The detail provided in this chapter, thus presents a picture 
of what this function is and, more importantly, the way it is experienced by the 
scientists in question. Broadly, if the technicians’ function is to stay at the 
Institute for most if not all of their working lives so that they accumulate a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  Wissenschaftszeitvertragsgesetz	  or	  WissZeitVG	  came	  into	  effect	  on	  12	  August	  2007.	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practical knowledge which can be passed onto scientists, and to maintain the 
Institutes, then the function of the scientists is to do the very opposite. They 
should come for a limited time only, always be cultivating new skills and 
techniques, and participate in the ‘excitement’ of the Institutes by 
enthusiastically discussing and working on new scientific problems. While it is 
in later sections that I offer cases of what this function involves for scientists at 
different stages, most of the chapter is devoted to exploring what kind of a 
person this function produces: one I theorise using the language of precarity. 
 
 Precarity as an analytical term has, in the last few years, ‘inserted itself 
into the heart of anthropology itself’ (Muehlebach 2013: 298): having become 
increasingly widely used. It remains however, as most theorists acknowledge, a 
very broad-reaching one: which can encompass human experiences of 
ecological, economic or existential crisis (and sometimes all three). It has 
seemingly become (particularly in American scholarship) ‘a shorthand for those 
of us documenting the multiple forms of nightmarish dispossession and injury 
that our age entails’ (ibid). This kind of breadth however, will not really do. As a 
consequence in this chapter I break the term down into three significant chunks, 
the first two of which collect most of the ways it has been taken up by social 
scientists: precarity as a way of life (with its ontological, affective, and 
proprioceptive aspects), precarity as a labour relation, and a far lesser used 
meaning whose relevance will become clear, precarity as dependence. 
 
 The long history of precarity has been précised many times so I shall not 
do so here (de Bloois 2011, Neilson and Rossiter 2008). Suffice to say that this 
narrative starts becoming very relevant for social scientists at the dawn of the 
twenty-first century, when precarity (and its cognates, precarious and 
precariousness, as well as its European linguistic equivalents) emerges as the 
defining trope of an incipient labour solidarity movement. In this context it 
signifies the shared state of economic insecurity arising from temporary 
employment and an interstitial relationship to social care. In part ii, I explore this 
version of precarity as it ramifies inside the organisation. Yet while listening out 
for global echoes I also localize the relation. The most important site of 
specificity is perhaps Germany’s historical precedents for the employment of 
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temporary workers, which are repeated in some of the ways in which scientists in 
the MPG are managed and conceived of. In any event a few years later, 
precarity’s narrative changes course, when Butler (2004) takes up the term as an 
ontological category. Thereafter, within the academy precarity is unmoored from 
its roots in labour theory and rendered more anthropological, acting as a 
placeholder for the way subjects experience and cope with all kinds of insecurity 
(Allison 2012, Berlant 2011, Berlant et. al. 2012, Stewart 2012). It is this 
anthropological sense with which I begin in part i: tracing precarity as a way of 
life which extends to all aspects of the scientific person, from grammatical habits 
to a fondness for extreme sports. What, however, binds the two parts of this story 
together, is the prevailing assumption that precarity is the reality-effect of the 
contemporary state of capitalism, even the ‘norm’ of capitalism itself (Neilson 
and Rossiter 2008: 64).   
 
 It is this assumption I break with later in the chapter. I argue that to fully 
comprehend the Max Planck’s precarity principle, one cannot limit the relation 
of precarity to a capitalist mode of production. Instead it is the feudal 
etymological origins of ‘precarious’ – signifying land held at the will of another 
– which conveys a large part of how precarity materializes as an autochthonous 
social form. The symbolic landowner is of course the director, who distributes 
the lion’s share of the resources inside the departments. It is senior scientists and 
their lack of formal ‘tenure’ so-to-speak (another dead metaphor of landholding), 
who are most affected by their relation of dependence upon the director. An 
‘informal hierarchy’ (Diefenbach and Sillince 2011) comes into play among 
them, in which some senior scientists go favoured, while others do not. How 
long and in what manner they are permitted to remain inside the organisation, is 
at the behest of their heroic leader.  
 
 Before developing this medieval notion of precarity, I describe the 
different experiences of the organisation scientists have at different stages of 
their career. Here I rely on the distinction Dumont posits between hierarchy and 
stratification, as two different logics of social ordering (1980: 2-4). Stratification, 
the ranking of subjects along a linear axis, has its metaphysical foundation in the 
principle of 'elementary man': the cultural belief in universal likeness. All those 
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who are stratified, despite being politically unequal, remain essentially 
commensurable. The members of a hierarchy, on the other hand, are 
incommensurable due to fundamental ontological ruptures between the levels. 
Max Planck scientists then, while occupying the one level of the Max Planck 
hierarchy, are themselves internally stratified – they possess varying capacities to 
act. While stratification permits mobility between positions, as all members are 
essentially the same kind of person, the collectivist schema of hierarchy 
precludes it, as their inherent difference considers this an unimaginable 
transgression. Thus while in theory, a young 'student worker' – who we will meet 
in a moment – could potentially move up to a 'group leader' position (in all 
likelihood after at least one extended professional foreign sojourn), the latter 
could never move into a directorship in the same department. Dumont’s fine-
grained distinction between stratification and hierarchy is thereby performed 
through the strict prohibition of inheritance. The mutability of the stratified 
meets the intransigent stasis of a true hierarchical system. 
 
 
 i) Precarity as a way of life 
 
 In Kathleen Stewart’s articulation, precarity is one of a number of 
‘emergent forms’ (2012: 518): writing technologies through which new 
ethnographic realities can be strung together, analogous connections made 
between ‘attachments, tempos, materialities and states of being’ (ibid: 524). 
Precarity, in this respect, is not reducible to any one of these potentially disparate 
phenomena, but becomes a way of theorizing the experiential continuities 
between them. It is, in short, no less amorphous than a ‘way of life’ in which 
some contemporary subjects are caught up (Berlant 2011: 192). For the scientists 
of the Max Planck Society, the precarious way of life plays out in a variety of 
different registers. It involves a particular relation to temporality, to speech, to 
place, to food, to sociability, and to the body. I shall explore these different 
registers as they appear ethnographically. 
 
 Despite the polysemy of precarity, most scholars agree that one of its 
central defining features is a particular temporality. To be precarious is to live in 
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a transitive, exposed, and potentially exhilarating, present, unprotected 
(unencumbered?) by the ‘shadow of the future’ (Standing 2011: 12). Indeed the 
transience of this population is visible straightway as I enter the grounds of the 
Primary Institute, in the form of the ‘Guest House’ which is the first building one 
meets.2 A blindingly neutral white – a colour which lends itself to 'flow' better 
than any other (Young 2004: 9) – the Guest House is intended as a form of 
accommodation for short-term visiting interns or guest scientists, or new 
medium-term members who have yet to find a place to live. Its forty-one 
serviced rooms are available for anything between one night, up to a maximum 
of three months, and often fully-booked all year round. The interior tells us a lot 
about its social function. It is, as Marc Augé would describe it, very much a 'non-
place': one in which the semiotics of 'place' are hollowed out, and replaced by the 
impersonal mediation of 'words' and 'texts' (1995: 94). These include 'house 
rules' in English and German, as well as a whole host of 'instruction' manuals for 
how to apprehend the rudimentary accoutrements of the space (the blinds, the 
TV, the telephone, the bins), as well as telephone lists and emergency 
procedures. The Guest House is intended to be a fully-equipped (but culturally 
blank) substitute to proper accommodation: with communal kitchens, laundry-
facilities, individual post-boxes, and even its own shoe-polishing area. 
Everything has been considered. Indeed many of my interlocutors set themselves 
up there on arriving at the Primary Institute, appreciating the reasonable cost and 
proximity to the labs. However after a few weeks an existence entirely oriented 
around work begins to tire, and most end up ‘moving to Berlin as fast as 
possible’, as this hollowed out non-place starts to hollow them out too.    
 
 The present-oriented quality of their lives is also sensible grammatically. 
The scientists often indulge a frequent use of the present-participle to describe 
their work. When I ask what they get out of their experience at the MPG, they 
will probably respond with some reference to ‘learning’. When explaining their 
scientific experiments they talk a great deal – not about knowledge or truth or 
publications – but about ‘playing’. Science, for them, is more often than not a 
question of ‘playing around’ with something: parameters, instruments, software, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Every	  Institute	  I	  visit	  is	  host	  to	  a	  Guest	  House;	  yet	  not	  every	  Institute	  has	  one.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  the	  Institute	  in	  question	  will	  endeavour	  to	  help	  visiting	  scientists	  find	  a	  place	  to	  stay.	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or any other variables. Interestingly, these speech habits are particularly 
characteristic of those who seek to carve careers in research science, who are 
prepared to embrace its long-term insecurity and nagging threat of failure. For 
those who aim towards the comparative safety of industry (in companies which 
maintain a Fordist model), rather than the precarity of research, these processual 
practices can invoke a kind of fatigue, an exhaustion. One Ph.D student, with his 
sights on applied science testifies that its ‘frustrating to start a new topic, it's 
more efficient when you know something, you can get far in that field'. For him 
knowledge is not a way of life, an unfolding, but a thing, a fixed entity: which 
can sit in his mind like a book on a shelf, to be consulted whenever he needs it.  
 
 It is also there in their relation to futurity. Scientists stumble on the 
subject of their long-term plans. Only those leaving the profession or entering 
industry are cogent and relaxed on this topic. For those who wish to remain in 
research the question is a loaded one, and sometimes sparks a prickly or irritable 
response, 'Well I'm not actually able to predict the future you know', one answers 
sarcastically. Another senior scientist sums it with more benign resignation when 
he says, 'You've just casually stepped into a well-trodden but very pungent topic 
as far as I’m concerned. There is no clear answer'. This vagueness is usually 
followed by some statement of pragmatism: scientists say they will simply 'go 
with what comes up'. One senior scientist in his 40s – with no immediate 
prospect of a permanent job – has been forced to acknowledge the possibility of 
being a grant-hopper for the rest of his career. If no such position is forthcoming, 
he will simply move 'from project to project like a butterfly looking for 
funding'.3  
 
 This precarious existence involves not only moving from ‘project to 
project’, but from place to place. Indeed when one visiting intern cites two major 
differences between the MPG and his home institution in another European 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  concept	  of	  a	  self-­‐authored	  biography,	  twinned	  with	  a	  heightened	  reliance	  on	  the	  opportunities	  offered	  by	  institutions,	  is	  an	  important	  dimension	  of	  the	  'risk	  society'	  as	  outlined	  by	  Ulrich	  Beck	  (1992).	  In	  his	  words,	  ‘The	  place	  of	  traditional	  ties	  and	  social	  forms	  (social	  class,	  nuclear	  family)	  is	  taken	  by	  secondary	  agencies	  and	  institutions,	  which	  stamp	  the	  biography	  of	  the	  individual	  and	  make	  that	  person	  dependent	  upon	  fashions,	  social	  policy,	  economic	  cycles	  and	  markets,	  contrary	  to	  the	  image	  of	  individual	  control	  which	  establishes	  itself	  in	  consciousness’	  (ibid:	  131).	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country, while the first is that ‘a scientist can only stay for a limited period of 
time’, the second is ‘the number of foreign people’. This itinerant group are 
intensely international, an internationalism which rises statistically proportionate 
to status. In the Primary Institute, 45% of Ph.D students are of non-German 
origin, while among the postdoctoral researchers, this figure leaps to an 
astonishing 90%.4 These figures are very similar for the Society as a whole.5 
 
 Clearly in spite of the paucity of permanent contracts therefore, the Max 
Planck Society remains enormously attractive to scientists from all over the 
world. Precarity is – as some scholars recognise – at root a morally ambivalent 
condition. It can mean hardship and psychic strain, but also ‘new forms of 
collective coming-together’ (Allison 2012: 349). This stratum of the Society is 
one particular ‘coming-together’ of scientists from an extensive list of countries, 
who have been inspired to apply by the ‘fame’ of the director, or the ‘brand’ of 
the organisation. Indeed I would go as far as to describe many of these 
participants as 'scientific migrants', not simply scientists who happen to be 
migrants, but actors analogous to those described as 'economic migrants', i.e. 
persons who move from one region to another with the primary goal of bettering 
their economic prospects. Scientific migrants come to Germany from a plethora 
of other countries, even the less wealthy nations of Europe, because the facilities 
inside the MPG are said to be unrivalled, and there are a high number of 
positions for those prepared to live the precarious lifestyle. 
 
 As we sit in the sun-dappled atrium after a long lunch, sipping espressos 
to the rippling sounds of the nearby water feature, with the cuckoos of wood-
pigeons sweeping overhead, one senior scientist turns to me with an expansive 
satisfaction, 'This place is really a paradise'. Given the tranquillity of that 
moment, I had to agree. It is only sometime later I discover the true depth of this 
statement, in light of his background. Boris is one of those scientists who has 
lived in several different countries, and so speaks four to five languages with 
almost complete fluency. Yet he is not simply just another member of the global 
middle class, whose cosmopolitanism and professional mobility was a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Data	  drawn	  from	  the	  bi-­‐annual	  report	  2009-­‐10,	  referring	  to	  the	  Primary	  Institute	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  5	  http://www.mpg.de/272172/Facts_Figures	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straightforward ascent from a good secondary and tertiary education. Only 
fifteen years ago he was living in the barracks of a refugee camp in the Middle 
East, after his family's home was razed to the ground. He was a barely a teenager 
when he arrived, and luckily for him, contrary to official policy he was allowed 
by a benevolent headmaster to attend a local school. There he was given two 
choices, to study either ‘Infrastructure’ or ‘Physics’. 'I had such huge options!' he 
laughs with a generous dose of sarcasm, 'Okay let's do Physics!' he decided. It 
quickly became clear it was a subject at which he excelled: 'The Maths was just 
there - ready to go'. Within two years he was competing in national competitions, 
and winning. By this point, both his parents had left the camp to start a new life 
in a safer place; yet Boris made the painful decision to stay because he realised 
that, 'It was the only field in which I could really compete'. If he had left he 
would have had to start at a new school in a new country from the bottom class, 
losing the status he had gained so far. Eventually, he was befriended by some 
humanitarian aid workers who arranged for his removal to Portugal, where they 
were able to enrol him in an undergraduate degree. From this point onwards his 
scientific career developed in the usual way, and he has been at the Max Planck 
for a couple of years now. He appropriates our dialogue as a form of pleasurable 
introspection, enabling him to reflect on the unusual path his life has taken. 
 
'What i'm really proud of is that decision, that struggle. 
All those years, and that experience, and it really worked 
out well. I'm really happy now. Because in the end I 
believed in one thing – that studying is the way to make 
your own role in life. And I was talented. Maybe I would 
never have discovered that talent in a small village in the 
Middle East.' 
 
 Boris is obviously an extreme case, one example of a tiny minority who 
actually represent the oft-overstated meritocratic potential of late modernity. 
However this pattern, of moving from a country where one has a very limited 
range of scientific options, to the Max Planck Society and Germany, I encounter 
from many quarters. There may be many reasons for the desirability of Germany 
and the MPG: for those from Iran it might be the 'political situation' they are glad 
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to leave behind, for those from the US, the dominance of 'directives and money', 
or for those from Italy, a perceived cronyism and a lack of roles in research 
science. On this final point, for many, the science carried out in other countries is 
simply not 'basic' enough. Most nations are far more likely to focus on 
application-oriented engineering or developing technology, than to provide 
generous funding for scientific work with no immediately visible use-value.6 The 
Society’s self-image of being driven only by intellectual concerns obviously has 
practical contradictions, yet it is still sufficiently legitimated to be a magnet for 
curious young scientists.  
 
 Interestingly, the ethnicities of these scientific migrants are 
predominantly expressed inside the Institutes not through clothing or other forms 
of decoration, nor through work, but through foodstuffs. It has been previously 
suggested, that one of the markers of social difference among the technical staff 
is their repetitious consumption of German foods in the canteen, and the same 
pattern emerges among scientists, although at the heterogeneous end of the 
spectrum. An Iranian will have pistachios on their desk which they offer out to 
other office occupants; an Indian will invite everyone for a curry on his final 
week in the department; a Chinese scientist will bring cold green teas and bowls 
of Chinese sweets to their leaving party; while a couple departing for the Middle 
East will invite everyone to join them in consuming a range of chick peas, 
couscous, flat breads, and herbed yoghurts. This expression of ethnic difference 
through food is also harnessed to a dissolution of this difference into the mouths 
of the community. Culturally inscribed food is thus most commonly used to 
mark the social passage points of arrival and departure. It becomes a means of 
presencing distant lands, while creating shared substance among those distantly 
present.  
 
 In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Durkheim argues that 'dietary 
communion' creates bonds of kinship among those who participate in it. 'Food 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  being	  so	  grateful	  for	  the	  opportunity	  to	  carry	  out	  'basic	  research'	  in	  a	  financially-­‐supported	  scientific	  environment,	  many	  scientists	  tend	  towards	  hyperbole	  when	  describing	  the	  Max	  Planck's	  resource	  base.	  Utterances	  such	  as	  'they	  throw	  money	  at	  you',	  and	  'the	  resources	  are	  limitless',	  contradict	  those	  of	  directors	  and	  technicians	  who	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  stress	  the	  financial	  ceiling	  under	  which	  they	  must	  operate.	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constantly refashions the substance of the organism. A common food can 
therefore produce the same effects as a common origin' (2008: 249). His concern 
was with the sacred nature of the animal or plant being consumed, and how its 
ritual ingestion enabled those communing to share in its perceived spiritual 
potency. The same might be said of these ethnic snacks and meals. While 
creating bonds which imitate kinship, their consumption also betokens the sacred 
character of cultural difference. An important facet of the precarity principle is 
therefore a profound xenophilia. One director stresses that, 'One of the most 
important things about the Max Planck is that it is so international. There are so 
many different cultures passing through', a sentiment oft-echoed in the Society's 
own promotional literature.7 One might also choose to pick up on the phrase 
‘passing through’. Despite providing these fantastic opportunities for non-
German scientists, very few of them segue into a position of any endurance. 
 
 Precarity thus invites particular intersubjective events. The consumption 
of multicultural foods is one small way in which scientists manage their 
geographical deracination, and the enforced ‘stranger sociality’ (Povinelli 2006) 
which characterises this ever-shifting human landscape. Another, more 
significant way, comes from within the practices of the organisation itself. A 
rabble of strangers could easily be discordant with the organic relations 
necessary for scientific production, and so the forging of affinities among 
scientists around the director is a functionally necessary one. As a consequence, 
every year, once a year, a department will converge for their Klausur: a three-to-
four day communal ‘retreat’.8 The trip provides 'an opportunity to just talk, to get 
to know everyone', and takes place alternately in a location of the department’s 
choice (which in the first department I visit becomes a small town on the Baltic 
coast) and Schloss Ringberg.9 In addition to the current scientific members of the 
department, departmental alumni, friends of the director from other 
organisations, and technicians all attend. Not surprisingly, a substantial chunk of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  http://www.mpg.de/272172/Facts_Figures	  8	  The	  German	  word	  comes	  from	  the	  cordoned-­‐off	  section	  of	  a	  monastery,	  to	  which	  monks	  could	  privately	  retreat	  for	  quiet	  and	  reflection.	  The	  most	  common	  contemporary	  meaning	  of	  Klausur	  is	  now	  a	  written	  examination.	  9	  I	  attended	  one	  Klausur	  during	  fieldwork	  while	  attached	  to	  a	  department	  in	  the	  Primary	  Institute,	  which	  forms	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  ethnographic	  description.	  However,	  I	  also	  learnt	  more	  about	  other	  departmental	  Klausurs	  from	  the	  testimonies	  of	  members	  of	  other	  Institutes.	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these of these are new scientists who have been in the department for less than a 
year. Indeed one guest friend of the director, who had attended a previous 
Klausur, seems rather taken aback by this sea of strangers, confessing in his 
presentation that, 'There are so many new faces i've never seen before!' 
 
 Directors may have different ambitions for the kind of effects they wish 
these trips to elicit, but they are mostly a mixture of scientific presentations and 
large-scale meals, as well as several non-scientific outings (in the case I 
experience a physically demanding 'dragon-boat' trip, and an 'engineering-tour' 
of the inside of a cathedral).10 The social and the scientific are thereby fairly self-
consciously spliced together, and it must be noted that most outings, all 
accommodation, and all meals are financed by the Society.  
 
 Despite the busy itinerary and instrumental approach to leisure it 
produces, the Klausur is also re-appropriated by the scientists as a space of play. 
Every evening, once the formal schedule which ends with the evening meal has 
drawn to a languorous close, scientists gather on the beach to explore their 
Dionysian sides. Sounds of 'Ja'!... 'Oui'!... 'AQUI!' burst forth from those playing 
group volleyball in the twilight, while the distant notes of a piano can be heard 
from the hotel, as a senior scientist plays from memory. Meanwhile, other 
scientists skit around the beach after glow-in-the-dark shuttlecocks in their 
badminton games. When darkness falls, wrapping everyone in its black cloak of 
conspiratorial intimacy, they curl up tightly together on beach rugs clutching 
generously-proportioned vodka mixers in plastic cups and sharing cigarettes. As 
the hours roll by the talk becomes more animated, the jokes more risqué, the 
laughter more brazen. This lot know how to have fun. It is frequently the early 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Day	  one	  begins	  at	  8.30am,	  when	  all	  of	  us	  meet	  at	  the	  Institute	  to	  clamber	  onto	  the	  bus	  which	  brings	  us	  in	  a	  three-­‐hour	  journey	  to	  the	  coast.	  After	  lunch	  on	  arrival	  no	  time	  is	  wasted;	  we	  immediately	  begin	  with	  presentations	  from	  senior	  and	  guest	  scientists,	  in	  a	  session	  chaired	  by	  the	  director.	  The	  afternoon	  session	  features	  more	  presentations	  from	  senior	  scientists,	  and	  the	  working	  day	  ends	  at	  6.30pm,	  followed	  shortly	  by	  dinner.	  The	  subsequent	  day	  is	  'Student's	  day',	  in	  which	  all	  students	  are	  asked	  to	  give	  a	  presentation	  of	  ten	  minutes	  on	  any	  topic	  of	  their	  choice.	  This	  is	  then	  followed	  in	  the	  afternoon	  by	  a	  'cultural	  program'	  (the	  cathedral	  tour).	  Much	  the	  same	  happens	  the	  following	  day.	  It	  should	  be	  noted,	  that	  every	  hour	  is	  scheduled	  in	  an	  itinerary	  which	  is	  pre-­‐circulated	  beforehand.	  Although	  it	  integrates	  spaces	  of	  leisure,	  this	  is	  by	  no	  means	  a	  holiday.	  Rather	  it	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  very	  focused	  and	  highly	  structured	  form	  of	  social	  bonding.	  
	   209	  
hours of the morning before the last souls finally clamber back up to the hotel 
and to bed.  
 
 What this last scene shows us is one of the key ways in which precarity 
has been taken up by social theorists (cf. Berlant 2007, Butler 2004), as an 
affective relationship: a relationship to the body and its patterns of feeling, its 
proprioception. Excitement and ebullience is one of these: ‘Max Planck Culture 
– Joy’ becomes one of my tags. Another is a self-confident and daring 
physicality. These scientists do not just play volleyball, they throw themselves 
headfirst into the sand to keep the ball elevated. They do not just go on a boat 
trip, they go on a dragon boat trip – which means paddling a longboat in unison 
as fast as they can, to the rhythm of a loud banging drum. These episodes are 
representative of their attitude to sports more broadly: as they are, in the main, 
adventurers and daredevils who like to push themselves physically and 
psychologically. This is often done collectively. They go rock-climbing together 
on a regular basis. They go on substantial cycle rides, go-karting, snowboarding, 
surfing, mountain-climbing, and are even taken up in a glider plane by one 
aviation-enthusiast postdoc at the weekends. 
 
 Sports in any place and time, can and have functioned as ways to enact 
social roles and ideals, and become practices through which social ontologies are 
explored or reproduced. The fondness for collaborative extreme sports among 
this group thus crystallizes their relationship to the mode of scientific production 
in an analogue manner: one which is at the same time social and precarious. With 
respect to the latter, it is not that there is any obvious causal relationship between 
extreme sports and the ‘risk society’ (Beck 1992) – the socio-economics of 
which we shall come to shortly – but as Jonathan Simon argues, the processes 
and discourses of extreme sports can 'function as resources of self-fashioning. In 
that sense they provide practical experiences, ideas and narratives around which 
new kinds of subjectivity are being created and popularized' (2002: 180). Rock-
climbing and flying in glider planes become unconscious strategies for 
‘embracing risk’ (Baker and Simon 2002): taking one’s body out of its habits of 
comfort into a space of experiential uncertainty. But yet there is always someone 
else standing by: belaying the rope from which you hang, steering the plane in 
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which you glide. Scientists support each other in their precarious states, as they 
climb ever higher with no safety mat. 
 
 
 ii) Precarity as a labour relation 
 
 The definition I have just advanced, of precarity as a ‘way of life’, is – 
historically speaking – a later incarnation of the term. The idea of precarity first 
emerged in 2003 as ‘the central organising platform for a series of social 
struggles that would spread across the space of Europe’ (Neilson and Rossiter 
2008: 52). At mayday protests which began in Milan in 2001, and in eighteen 
further cities in the following years, precarity meant a new kind of political 
subject with a new relationship to the mode of production: one defined by 
‘precariousness of residency, of labour and work, and of social protection’ 
(Standing 2011: 3). Inaugurated by 1980s labour market deregulation and its new 
‘individualization of risk’ (Beck 1992: 136), it is one which was increasingly 
replacing the subject of the twentieth-century Fordist model – in which welfare 
states had been tied to a parallel systems of permanent employment. For activists 
and scholars alike, such a comparable socio-economic condition made those 
living precariously a class-in-the-making: the ‘precariat’ (Karin Amamiya cited 
in Allison 2012: 349, Standing 2011).  
 
 The language of class however, lacks anthropological nuance. As Neilson 
and Rossiter point out (2008), one of the reasons for the failure of precarity as a 
term around which solidarity could be mustered in these years was its sheer 
scope: being a labour relation which could connect domestic workers in Hong-
Kong to software programmers in India (and therefore neither). In this section 
therefore, while exploring some of the ‘global’ characteristics of precarity as a 
labour relation which many of the scientists of the Max Planck Society share – 
defined largely by its temporary quality and fractured relationship to social 
protection – I will also note the way in which it is situated within a particular 
German history. There are several different strands to this particularity. Firstly, 
the exponential expansion of transient labour begin slightly later – after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union – when the Society became far more international in 
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population and outlook. Secondly, the complete exclusion of the directors from 
any of these trends towards precarity mimics the exclusion of the ‘full 
professors’ from the crisis in the German university system in the late 
nineteenth-century (making it expressive of a prevailing historical distinction 
between the hero and precarity principles). Finally, the cultural idea of the 
temporary foreign worker has a number of antecedents in Germany: most 
famously in the form of the Gastarbeiter, the people-power behind West 
Germany’s post-war economic miracle. 
 
 Most of the discussion in this section will have its basis in statistics. To 
begin: the current contractual arrangements among natural scientists in the MPG 
can be illustrated by a graph taken from one of the Secondary Institute’s annual 
reports.  
 
 
       Figure 13. 
 
Of a total of 141 scientists, only ten have 'unlimited contracts', i.e. permanent 
positions. Considering this already includes the four resident directors, this is an 
average of 1.5 per department, or just 7% overall.11 In brief, as the Ph.D student 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Meanwhile,	  the	  longevity	  principle	  is	  also	  very	  clear	  here.	  Of	  a	  total	  of	  64	  members	  of	  technical	  staff,	  only	  five	  are	  on	  'limited	  contracts',	  which	  means	  with	  permanent	  positions	  constitute	  78%.	  The	  enormous	  gulf	  between	  7%	  and	  78%	  shows	  statistically,	  the	  profound	  sociological	  difference	  between	  precarity	  and	  longevity.	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with whom we began this chapter tells us, no scientist really expects to ‘stay’ 
inside the Max Planck Society. Although there are permanent positions, they are 
extremely scarce, and thus do not constitute a reasonable horizon of ambition.   
 
 Yet was it always like this? In brief, no. However, the Society’s bizarre – 
and quite frankly obfuscating – approach to statistical representation makes any 
longitudinal study of employment inside the organisation extremely difficult.12 
The metrics which appear in their annual reports change constantly, obscuring 
the analysis of long-term trends. In the 1980s, they assiduously count the number 
of scientific guests from the ‘Ostblock’. From 1991 onwards, the number of 
female staff makes an appearance. As for the nature of contracts, by the twenty-
first century the metrics become so diverse that the graphs which follow are at 
best an approximation. From the 1960s onwards a binary distinction was posited 
between ‘wissentschaftliche Planstellen’ (which I am assured by the Max Planck 
archivist means permanent scientific posts) and ‘Gastwissenschaftler und 
Stipendiaten’ (guest scientists and scholarship-holders, i.e. those working on a 
temporary basis). By 2002 the distinctions between scientists have multiplied and 
the true aggregate number of those on temporary contracts becomes difficult to 
assess. Nonetheless, I have compiled the following graphs from the information 
available in the Society’s annual reports (Jahresberichte), stored in the Max 
Planck Archive in Berlin.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  The	  Statistical	  Office	  of	  the	  Max	  Planck	  Society	  refused	  my	  request	  for	  assistance	  in	  compiling	  these	  statistics:	  saying	  that	  because	  every	  department	  is	  different,	  this	  kind	  of	  quantification	  is	  impossible.	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                      Figure 14 
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Figure 15 
	   215	  
 From 1974 to 1994, the number of 'wissenschaftliche Planstellen' 
(permanent scientific posts) begins just above 2000 and climbs slowly but 
steadily until East Germany is dissolved in 1990, and its Länder furnished with 
new Institutes. In the report of 1992, a new metric enters the equation for the first 
time, 'Zeitverträge bei Wissenschaftlern' (scientists on temporary contracts), 
which cuts into these permanent posts, reducing their numbers.13 If one considers 
the second graph, these numbers have been fairly steadily declining right up to 
the present day, with a lower number of 'Planstellen' than that recorded in 1974. 
 
 Meanwhile, the other major cohort of scientists from the 70s - 90s is 
constituted by 'Stipendiaten und Gastwissenschaftler', (junior scientists on 
scholarships and guest scientists), and rises steadily at a much faster rate than 
their colleagues in formal scientific posts. Again we see a significant change 
after reunification: with this figure almost doubling in the years after 1989. These 
categories then come to signify something rather different. While the number of 
guests and scholarship-holders before 1990 might plausibly be interpreted as 
emblematic of a centuries-old system of scholarly training and exchange, during 
the Wende the particular meaning of these employees takes on a different hue. 
Their increasing statistical dominance comes to look a little more like the 
organisation taking advantage of the informalization of work contracts, which 
had by that point become increasingly common in the private sector (Barley and 
Kunda 2006). 
 
 The second graph shows the more complex and opaque way in which the 
scientists’ employment status comes to be recorded by Max Planck statisticians 
in the 21st century. This will require some explanation. Instead of a dual system 
of those with posts and those without, there are now a whole range of different 
categories. The green 'temporary' line indicates not only guest visitors and those 
on scholarships but, 'student workers, fellows of the international Max Planck 
Research Schools, doctoral students, postdoctoral students and research fellows': 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  By	  necessity,	  the	  figures	  from	  1992	  onwards	  are	  my	  own	  mathematical	  calculations:	  worked	  out	  by	  multiplying	  the	  total	  number	  of	  'wissenschaftliche	  Planstellen'	  with	  the	  percentage	  recorded	  on	  permanent	  contracts.	  These	  percentages	  are	  steadily	  declining	  as	  the	  years	  roll	  by:	  1992,	  68.6%;	  1993,	  59.6%;	  1994,	  59.5%.	  In	  1995	  the	  metrics	  change	  again,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  detail	  on	  how	  many	  ‘Planstellen’	  are	  temporary	  or	  permanent.	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all of whom now make up an astonishing majority of all scientists inside the 
organisation.  
 
 Meanwhile senior scientists are segregated still further. The blue line 
indicates those formally employed: directors and members, heads of independent 
research groups, senior research scientists and academic staff, essentially all 
scientists above the level of postdoctoral researcher. Until 2008, the MPG 
assiduously records the percentage among these on temporary contracts. As the 
graph indicates, the number of employed scientists with permanent contracts (the 
orange line) is on a downward trend. In 2002 55.8% of scientists with posts are 
on permanent contracts, and by 2008, this figure has decreased year upon year to 
40.6%.14 However, something very interesting happens in the report of 2009, by 
which point this trend is unequivocal. A new category is introduced: 'scientists 
outside appointment scheme'. These are effectively senior scientists inside the 
organisation who become informally employed, and thus removed as a separate 
quantity altogether. It is then only the percentage of those scientists inside the 
appointment scheme, whose contractual status is recorded. The percentage of 
those with permanent positions then starts to rise, transforming the statistics 
entirely (2009: 58%, 2010: 58%, 2011: 59.8%). When the statistical office 
decides to count something, they then shoot it back into the past to indicate a 
pattern. From 2009 – 2011, those 'outside the appointment scheme' are thus 
retrospectively counted from 2004. 
 
 Possibly the most interesting line however is the purple, the number of 
'directors and scientific members': the organisation’s elite we met in chapter four. 
Relative to the whole scientific population – which is now positively booming – 
this number is almost completely stagnant, a flat-lining of those with the most 
security and status. In 2011, 277 scientific members are effectively governing an 
organisational population of 21,831: to be precise, a ratio of 1.3% to 98.7%.15 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  The	  permanent	  line	  is	  again	  data	  drawn	  from	  my	  own	  calculations.	  I	  have	  multiplied	  the	  total	  number	  of	  scientists	  on	  institutional	  funding,	  by	  the	  percentage	  of	  those	  given	  as	  being	  not	  on	  temporary	  contracts.	  Thus	  for	  the	  year	  2002	  this	  means	  2629	  ×	  0.0558:	  as	  there	  are	  2629	  scientists	  paid	  from	  institutional	  funding	  and	  44.2%	  of	  these	  are	  listed	  as	  being	  employed	  on	  a	  temporary	  basis.	  15	  Much	  like	  the	  proportion	  of	  dominance	  which	  inspired	  the	  political	  rhetoric	  of	  Occupy	  Wall	  Street.	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 As a big picture these graphs then offer three analytical conclusions. The 
first is the statistical evidence for what much of the previous section rests on, the 
transient relationship of the majority of scientists to the MPG as a whole, and the 
beginning of this trend after reunification, when the Society becomes more self-
consciously international in vision. Particularly after 2002, the organisation has 
thus come to rely very heavily on a young, itinerant, scientific workforce to make 
possible its ever-increasing outputs. Secondly, the increasing trend towards 
precarity is not simply about employing a larger share of young scholars, but 
about incrementally removing the security of those more senior. Much like 
several of my participants, those in their 30s and 40s are now systematically 
placed 'outside appointment scheme', i.e. in the same insecure relationship to the 
organisation as those in their 20s. Lastly, relative to the whole organisation, there 
is a clear concentration of power at the very top. Although the reforms of the 60s 
and 70s were introduced to contain the dominance of the directors – as 
manifested in the earlier version of the Harnack Principle – by the twenty-first-
century their influence in a quantitative sense has dramatically increased.1617 In 
this sense, the Max Planck Society dovetails with parallel tendencies towards the 
concentration of elites across the world at large. 
 
 Because of such symmetries we might be tempted to explain these 
numbers away in global terms. However such an explanation would only provide 
part of the answer; there are deeper autochthonous hierarchical processes at work 
here. After all, if precarity is an ever-expanding phenomenon, why doesn’t it 
affect the directors, who remain security incarnate? A historical perspective can 
take us the rest of the way. In Fritz Ringer’s classic study of the German 
academic crisis in the late nineteenth early-twentieth century, The Decline of the 
German Mandarins (1969), he paints a strikingly similar picture. In the 
nineteenth-century the German university hierarchy was organised around full 
professors (age fifty and up), associate professors (in their forties) and instructors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Cf.	  Chapter	  2.i.	  17	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  even	  in	  the	  very	  earliest	  years	  of	  the	  Kaiser-­‐Wilhelm	  Society,	  the	  number	  of	  scientific	  members	  is	  quite	  similar.	  In	  1914	  the	  annual	  report	  records	  200	  members.	  With	  some	  periodic	  exceptions,	  the	  aggregate	  number	  usually	  hovers	  in	  both	  societies	  between	  200	  and	  400.	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(Privatdozenten, in their thirties).18 Before 1870 the population of the latter two 
was fairly proportionate to the former, and they were not expected to do much 
actual teaching, considered ‘apprentices and journeymen of learning’ before 
settling down into a salaried teaching post (ibid: 54). However, from 1890 
onwards, as enrolment increased substantially – due to an expanding population 
and broadening aspiration – the number of associate professors and instructors 
increased by a multiple, while the number of professors rose only very 
incrementally (analogous to what we see on the second graph). Increasingly, it 
became the former two who performed the bulk of the pedagogical labour in the 
universities (which prevented them from advancing professionally) while at the 
same time remaining ‘totally excluded from the agencies of academic self-
government’ (ibid: 55). The hierarchy of the universities thus became more 
pronounced as numbers grew, creating social divisions and tensions which had 
not been there previously. As Ringer says, ‘The academic pyramid tapered very 
sharply at the top’ (ibid: 54). We could see all those I have called ‘senior 
scientists’ (cf. section iv) as cultural descendants of these associate professors 
and Privatdozenten, while the directors are self-evidently those of full 
professors.19 At heart is the principle of incommensurability between those at the 
top of the scholarly tree and those just beneath it, and the subsequent dependence 
of the latter upon the former: an idea we shall return to in later sections.   
 
 Finally it should be restated that precarity as a labour relation is about 
more than temporary employment. It extends to the relative provisioning of 
social protection: particularly against unemployment, illness, injury and old age. 
In this respect, there is evidence that non-natives working in Germany on a 
temporary contract lose out on such privileges. In 2004, a number of Italian Ph.D 
students employed by the MPG, appealed to the European Parliament and the 
European civil court against the discrimination which applied to the contractual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Privatdozenten	  were	  named	  as	  such	  because	  they	  were	  afforded	  no	  regular	  salaries,	  but	  drew	  their	  income	  from	  private	  lectures	  for	  students	  in	  return	  for	  fees,	  a	  historical	  precedent	  for	  the	  precariousness	  of	  contemporary	  knowledge	  workers.	  19	  Even	  the	  age-­‐ranges	  are	  very	  similar.	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arrangements of non-Germans.20 They claimed that while 99% of German Ph.D 
students at the MPG had regular contracts which included health, unemployment, 
and pension benefits, 84% of the non-German Ph.D students were given 
'scholarships', i.e. formal contracts from which such benefits were omitted 
(Burgermeister 2004). This meant that non-German students were obliged to pay 
these social security costs separately, resulting in a lower overall net income. The 
European Court approved their case and ordered the Max Planck to change its 
contract policy, although there is still some ambiguity as to whether this was in 
fact systematically implemented. Indeed the slippage between scholarships and 
contracts is mentioned by one participant as 'a trick they have to keep you 
working longer', being a route around the 'soft maximum' of five years. 
 
 The position of non-Germans and non-Europeans relative to the question 
of social protection is raised as a concern by some of my participants. One extra-
European complains, 
 
'You're definitely worse off if you're a foreigner. You're 
less secure...You have to pay your own health 
insurance...Some things aren't quite kosher, aren't quite 
fair...There's different pay scales, and foreigners don't get 
a pension in their home country. So you're paying money 
into a pension fund which you won't be able to use' 
 
The issues he notes echo those of the Italian Ph.D students, as they concern the 
loss of several different forms of social protection. Although explicit questions 
regarding the specific contractual nature of these scientists' relationship to the 
MPG were not part of this research, comments like these suggest several issues 
regarding the rights of non-Germans remain unresolved. Indeed another non-
German senior scientist takes his critique one step further, 'Everyone gets the 
feeling that they are scientific Gastarbeiter. Come and do some work and then 
go; but don't stay, we don't really want you to'.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-­‐//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-­‐2004-­‐1301+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN	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 This comparison to the West German 'Gastarbeiter' of the 1960s and 70s 
is a charged one, but not without pertinence. From 1955 onwards, the Federal 
Republic of Germany signed recruitment treaties with Italy, Spain, Greece, 
Turkey, Portugal and Yugoslavia, in order to solve its labour shortage by 
offering their inhabitants one-year work permits.21 These so-called ‘guest 
workers’ (Gastarbeiter) were the quintessence of precarity: as the prospect of 
permanent migration had been foreclosed in advance by German legislation, 
which until 2000 still based citizenship on the ‘Law of the blood’.22 Theirs was 
to be an unequivocally temporary condition.23 They were also denied that second 
aspect of labour-related security: social protection. While paying income and 
social security tax through their wages, thereby ‘subsidizing the social welfare 
system’ (Chin 2007: 45), they were ineligible for benefits awarded to native 
Germans therefrom, such as unemployment insurance. Guest worker policy was 
designed to serve a purely economic function, and those granted permits were 
likely to be the young and physically strong: able to put in a demanding days 
work in the factories without complaint (ibid: 1).   
 
 However it should not be forgotten that guest worker policy had its own 
antecedents. During the boom years of the Prussian state (after 1871), when its 
agricultural sector was expanding rapidly, it suffered a similar dearth of workers. 
Polish migrants were invited across the border to meet the intensive demands of 
sugar beet cultivation. Less than a year this time, their work permits were 
seasonal, lasting only for the summer months (April to November), forcing them 
to return East when their labour was no longer needed.24 Again they lacked 
adequate social care. Not only were they denied the enduring advantages of the 
patriarchal and semi-feudal systems of estate agriculture (Herbert 1990), but they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Although	  it	  was	  the	  Turkish	  ‘guest	  worker	  question’	  which	  came	  to	  dominate	  the	  cultural	  debate	  which	  followed	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  onwards	  (Chin	  2007,	  Mandel	  2008).	  	  22	  The	  legal	  term	  is	  Jus	  sanguinis,	  based	  on	  genealogy,	  rather	  than	  jus	  solis,	  based	  on	  the	  inhabitance	  of	  place	  (Mandel	  2008:	  210-­‐217).	  The	  guest	  worker’s	  relation	  to	  German	  citizenship	  was	  therefore	  different	  from	  their	  fellow	  economic	  migrants	  in	  Britain	  and	  France	  during	  the	  same	  period.	  Most	  of	  these	  were	  former	  colonials	  so	  possessed	  citizenship	  or	  the	  right	  to	  permanent	  residence	  by	  virtue	  of	  that	  status.	  23	  Although	  as	  Chin	  notes	  in	  practice,	  the	  West	  German	  government	  kept	  renewing	  their	  visas	  and	  extending	  the	  length	  of	  their	  residence	  (2007:	  52).	  	  24	  These	  conditions	  were	  in	  practice	  before	  then,	  but	  not	  officially	  legislated	  until	  1908	  (Herbert	  1990:	  34).	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were uninsured against disability, old-age, and most health problems.25 Prussian 
industrialists and the state could thus reap the huge financial rewards of their 
work, without having to meet any of the costs of social reproduction. Those 
granted permits were all unmarried young men. As one Prussian estate owner put 
it, ‘There are no expenses for school, churches, and relief for the poor when 
foreign workers are involved’ (cited in Herbert 1990: 30).     
 
 Clearly all of Germany’s foreign workers have had very different kinds of 
treatment.26 The situation of the Gastarbeiter was a great a improvement on that 
of the Poles, and that of the foreign Max Planck scientists much improved again. 
As we learnt in the previous section, most scientists are simply grateful for the 
resources the Max Planck can offer them. For those like Boris, the organisation 
really is a ‘paradise’. However the grumblings which erupt every so often – like 
those above – suggest residues of the past remain. Indeed I would posit three 
strands to this continuity which emerge in light of the data assembled. The first is 
the link between non-German ethnicity and a temporary employment status. We 
can see this in the graphs: as the demographic of the Society becomes more 
international in the 1990s, the proportion of temporary employees explodes. 
Secondly, there is a similar relationship to social protection. Scientists are paying 
into a pension they ‘won’t be able to use’, thereby subsidizing the German 
welfare state and putting their future at greater risk. Finally, there is also great 
emphasis placed on achieving the most productive workforce possible. The 
horsepower of the Max Planck comes from its ‘young, motivated, excited’ 
employees, so much so that those who turn thirty feel ‘old’, while those in their 
forties already ‘dinosaurs’. Topically, we will now turn to the perspectives of the 
Society’s most youthful cohort. 
 
 
 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  There	  was	  some	  provision	  of	  accident	  insurance.	  	  26	  I	  have	  intentionally	  omitted	  the	  forced	  labourers	  (Fremdarbeiter)	  Germany	  used	  during	  the	  Second	  and	  First	  World	  Wars	  from	  this	  discussion;	  as	  despite	  the	  continuities	  posited	  by	  Herbert	  (1990),	  coercion	  is	  a	  very	  different	  drive	  to	  action	  than	  economic	  betterment.	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 iii) Junior scientists 
 
 Having explored precarity in some of its quotidian and economistic forms 
– as a basic condition in which all scientists participate – now the argument 
changes tack to meet the points at which their experiences diverge. While being 
commensurable members within the hierarchy, the scientific tier is itself 
internally stratified, and precarity can take on a very different flavour depending 
on one’s professional location. Broadly speaking, I categorize two overarching 
types of scientist who share a common relationship to the organisation (and thus 
attitude towards precarity): junior and senior. Junior means student workers, 
Master’s students and interns, and Ph.D students; while senior means 
postdoctoral researchers, independent researchers and group leaders. Essentially 
the distinction is between those who are still explicitly at the stage of training 
and apprenticeship (usually aged below 30), and those who have learned, or are 
beginning to learn, how to apply that knowledge in the service of original 
research (30 and above). Before meeting the senior scientists in subsequent 
sections, we shall rise through the ranks of the junior. 
 
 The very bottom tier of the scientific hierarchy in the Max Planck Society 
is made up of 'student workers' or 'student assistants', (two translations of 
'Studentische Hilfskräfte', or the diminutive and ever so slightly condescending 
'Hiwis').27 Their positions might be financed directly by the MPG, or in a 
minority of cases by 'third-parties' (for instance funds may be directly allocated 
for 'two student workers' as part of a successful grant application).28 All the 
student workers I meet are from the Primary Institute, and are German nationals, 
recruited from the universities through personal contacts. One student worker 
may inform a fellow student of a vacancy, or the scientists within the Institute 
might put someone they know forward. Unlike all other scientists in the first 
department I visit, the student workers are not appointed through a public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Among	  the	  scientific	  population	  of	  the	  MPG	  overall,	  student	  workers	  make	  up	  a	  surprisingly	  large	  proportion:	  over	  11%.	  (This	  is	  calculated	  from	  1504	  out	  of	  13508,	  i.e.	  not	  including	  technical,	  IT,	  administrative	  or	  other	  miscellaneous	  Max	  Planck	  staff	  (http://www.mpg.de/4500179/Annual_Report_2010)).	  Indeed	  in	  2010,	  there	  are	  189	  more	  student	  workers	  than	  there	  are	  postdocs	  working	  in	  the	  Society.	  	  28	  In	  the	  2010	  annual	  report,	  218	  student	  workers	  are	  paid	  for	  by	  third	  parties,	  and	  1286	  by	  the	  MPG.	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'application seminar' process, as they are not considered researchers in the 
normal sense.29 The denotation – 'student worker' – provides a significant clue 
here. These individuals and others often refer to their role as 'work', or 'a job' 
(terms which would be unheard of among scientists). The only other members of 
the departments doing ‘work’ are the technicians, and the parallel is not 
incidental. Student workers, like technicians, are contracted to work a certain 
number of hours per month (usually under 80), and are paid according to these 
hours. Time is thus 'reckoned' in the same way for both (Munn 1992): as a 
commodity. The duration of a student worker's contract is not fixed, but in the 
cases I encounter it hovers around one calendrical year. Student workers may be 
completing work they are required to do for a Bachelor thesis alongside their 
'job' – or  may simply, as one scientist puts it, be 'cleaning the tubes basically', 
performing the most menial tasks on offer. However beginning at the MPG as a 
student worker is not without its opportunities. Student workers may end up 
staying longer to carry out a 'Diploma thesis', and from there remain still longer 
as a Ph.D student. This is the way some of my German scientific participants 
began their careers.  
 
 Student workers are also different from scientists in the sense that they do 
not participate in what Barley and Kunda call the 'network of practice' (2006: 
276): the binding and unbinding of social ties as projects begin and end. When 
asked to identify their links within and beyond the department, they can really 
only name one: the senior scientist whose professional care they fall under. This 
individual will set their student worker small, simple and repetitive, tasks which 
need to be completed as part of their research projects – although a student 
worker would not carry out experiments which end up in publications. These 
senior scientists often take an avuncular manner towards those in their charge: 
'checking up' on them to see how they are getting on, and modulating the tasks 
set, depending on how quickly or slowly the student worker is able to pick them 
up and carry them through. Student workers can sometimes be pseudo-outsider 
figures within the departments, being separate from research scientists and their 
networks. The senior scientist may thus choose to invite them for lunch, or take it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Cf.	  Chapter	  4.	  iii.	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upon themselves to introduce the student worker to a wider spectrum of people, 
and improve their overall experience inside the Institute. 
 
 Despite not being fully integrated, and being sometimes charged with 
'cleaning the tubes', student workers seem to relish their role. Not only are they 
receiving a moderate tax-free income to supplement the costs of undergraduate 
life, but they also benefit from a real 'exposure to scientific work...brushing 
against hard-core science'. This is different to their presence at the universities 
because it is self-consciously hands-on. The social logic of the 'Hiwis' and their 
work practices, must therefore be seen as symmetrical to the young 'Azubis' of 
the workshops (even the diminutives echo each other): one governed by Bildung 
or as they like to put it, 'learning by doing'.3031 One student worker articulates it 
thus, 'It's the kind of work which will educate me more than a university could 
do. It's practical working'. For him, this practical work is not supplementing his 
academic work, instead it is surpassing it, educating him 'more' than a university 
ever could. 
 
 Interns or 'Praktikants' are fewer in number than the student workers.32 
Analytically, they share most of their salient features with Masters students and 
may even become Masters students at the end of their internship, so for that 
reason the two will be treated here together.33 The main qualitative shift which 
occurs from student worker to intern is their identification with research and 
researchers, rather than 'work' and wage labour. Aside from some obligatory 
meetings they – like the rest of the scientific community – are given 'total 
freedom' to manage their time efficiently. They usually have a specific project 
they are carrying out and will do so fairly independently. Unlike the student 
workers, interns will fall under the jurisdiction of a group leader, and be allied 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Cf.	  Chapter	  5.	  i.	  31	  The	  relationship	  between	  senior	  scientist	  and	  student	  worker	  also	  bears	  some	  resemblance	  to	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  'Workshop	  manager'	  and	  the	  Azubi.	  32	  Only	  43	  out	  of	  13508,	  or	  less	  than	  1%	  overall	  if	  the	  statistics	  are	  accurate	  http://www.mpg.de/4500179/Annual_Report_2010.	  33	  The	  official	  number	  of	  Masters	  students	  is	  not	  recorded	  in	  the	  MPG	  annual	  report,	  so	  they	  must	  be	  counted	  as	  amongst	  the	  761	  'visiting	  scientists'.	  The	  most	  notable	  similarity	  between	  Masters	  students	  and	  interns	  is	  the	  length	  of	  their	  stay,	  ranging	  from	  a	  few	  weeks	  to	  several	  months.	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with the other members of that working group. They will often work quite 
closely with the technicians, who induct them into specific practical tasks, but 
are likely to have very little contact – if any – with the director. However, similar 
to student workers, their arrival has been instigated through personal networks 
rather than an anonymous application process. In their case, it is not the local, 
largely German, networks of the technical universities, but rather professional 
affinities on a global scale. All of the interns I meet are of non-German origin. 
 
 Although interns are formally included in the research community, they 
are the most aligned to the material culture of the laboratories, and are likely to 
be set highly repetitive, unstimulating work. One among them has spent several 
months working with a small twelve litre fermenter, carefully inscribing 
protocols for how to use it most effectively, while harvesting a particular strain 
of bacteria. The main thing that can go awry in the harvesting of bacteria from a 
fermenter is contamination, as the ecology inside is extremely delicately 
balanced. 'This has been happening since day one...it's old news', he explains, 
irritation swirling beneath the utterance. Despite working with the other 
technicians and scientists of his group, it appears this intern's primary relation is 
to the fermenter, and its issues and problems seem to dominate a great deal of his 
consciousness. Attachments are often unveiled through anthropomorphism and 
sure enough, the electronic hardware which controls this device, he names 'the 
brain', while the liquid contents of the fermenter itself is likened to a 'GI tract'. 
 
 Meanwhile, another intern has been charged with the task of carrying out 
a very carefully-timed chemical process. As a consequence, whether she is in a 
seminar-room, a tea-room or an office, the schedule of her work pursues her in 
the form of a canary yellow alarm clock clipped to her clothing. Every so often it 
beeps noisily, informing her that a particular stage is complete, and she dutifully 
gets up to return to the lab. The whole process takes six hours, and she carries 
out this same procedure every day. Although the Ph.D student whom she is 
helping is happy to delegate the 'boring stuff' to her, like other interns, she does 
not mind this, and is simply pleased to be apprenticed into new scientific 
domains.  
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 Indeed this placidity towards the necessity of paying one's dues, is 
common among the junior scientists, particularly at these lower levels. One 
participant rationalizes it in the following way, 
 
'The idea behind my internship is to do some basic work 
that does not require lots of qualifications, in order to 
step into...a low hierarchy position before having the 
chance later to lead and supervise people'. 
 
The sacrifice these individuals make in ‘cleaning the tubes’ is one they are fully 
prepared for, and moreover see the purpose and benefits of. For them there is a 
clear sense of upward progression.  
 
 Unsurprisingly, the most populous of all junior scientists are the Ph.D 
students.34 They are also probably the most familiar, scholars like myself, aged 
between 25 and 30. The Ph.D scientist is distinguished from the intern and 
student worker in that they are given a longer-term research project (generally 
three years), which they are expected to carry out autonomously, but with regular 
help from their respective group leader, and if necessary the director.  
 
 The Ph.D is not a time for radical originality; most argue that the moment 
to distinguish oneself scientifically comes later. Ph.D students may have a 
project set for them by the director and funded by the MPG, or the project may 
originate externally and be funded by a third-party, but still involve research in 
which the director has a vested interest. A Ph.D student's response to the strong 
delineation of their projects by those in authority can go either way. For one, 
despite the fact that the material being investigated, the scale being focused 
upon, and the instruments with which to do it have all been decided upon in 
advance, describes herself as 'absolutely free'. While another says he sometimes 
feels like a 'marionette' (a puppet), because despite having his own ideas around 
the topic he is working on, he is obliged to follow the set projects to the letter. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Ph.D	  students	  constitute	  28%	  of	  the	  total	  scientific	  population:	  3749	  out	  of	  a	  total	  of	  13508	  http://www.mpg.de/4500179/Annual_Report_2010.	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This difference thus has little to do with objective conditions (there do not seem 
to be relative degrees of freedom), than the individual's reaction to them. In this 
sense it follows Franz Boas' notion of freedom, which has meaning 'only in a 
subjective sense. A person who is in complete harmony with his culture is free', 
while a person feels 'unfree' when they see the cultural limitations imposed upon 
them (1942: 51). It is a given that Ph.D work will be determined either by the 
director – or externally – depending on how they are financed, but the sensation 
of freedom can vary widely, relative to how this maps onto the individual's own 
interests and desires. Freedom is the personal pleasure taken in fulfilling one's 
social duty. 
 
 The most interesting characteristic of Ph.D students is their relation of 
attachment to the organisation. While senior scientists will often apply to work in 
the department on the back of personal contacts, and be motivated by the desire 
to work specifically with one director, Ph.D students arrive in the department for 
a variety of reasons, which often relate to the director only indirectly. Here we 
see a clear native German/non-native-German dichotomy.  
 
 For Germans, the kudos of working in the third best research institution 
in the world after Harvard and CNRS is not their main motivation for attaching 
themselves to a Max Planck Institute rather than a university.35 Instead it will 
either be defined by place, particularly the attractions of a large and idiosyncratic 
city like Berlin, or rather the material conditions which the MPG provides. 'It 
was not so important that it was a Max Planck Institute, but it was important how 
the Institute is organised', is a common sentiment among German Ph.Ds. They 
are less concerned with the MPG's brand identity than the material and social 
environment in which their research will be carried out: some arguing that the 
MPG is a more supportive environment for research in Germany than the 
universities.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  http://www.mpg.de/1261613/Nature-­‐Ranking	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 At the same time it is markedly at the level of the Max Planck's 
international cohort (some 45% in the Primary Institute), where name and fame 
seem to matter. One extra-European explains his logic when applying, 
 
'Working in a research institute was the main thing, and 
Max Planck was one of the most famous. You carry the 
name in your resume until the end. So it's like, okay he 
has done his Ph.D there. I thought about this stuff, 
because sometimes you have to think about it. There is a 
name on the CV that you recognise'. 
 
That the Max Planck is ‘famous’ is his central motive for applying, as he 
anticipates that contact with it will consecrate his subsequent career. For another, 
the prestige of the organisation functions intermittently to buttress his ego when 
he needs it to, 'If I ever do get down about myself...I can say, well I do work at 
the Max Planck Institute!' In sum for international Ph.D students, the global 
cachet of the MPG is enormously significant – not only for its promise of future 
employability, but also in a more abstract sense, the swell of pride they feel in 
being aligned with something 'excellent'. Among this group the fame of their 
director is less central (although never irrelevant), it is enough to have 'a name on 
the CV that you recognise': the name of the Society. 
 
 
 v) Senior scientists and the inheritance taboo 
 
 The anatomy of attachment is rather different at the senior level: for 
postdoctoral and independent researchers, as well as for group leaders. While 
junior and senior alike are encompassed by the director's extended social reach; 
for seniors this relationship is often closer, more personal, and of more 
professional significance. For them the decision to work with a specific director 
is a very deliberate one. His 'fame' – or ‘reputation’ – serves the same function as 
the prestige of the organisation for the junior international scientists: it is the 
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source of a magnetic pull which attracts their application.36 Just as juniors 
emphasise the importance of the Max Planck 'brand' for their Curriculum Vitae, 
seniors will scale this down to the level of the department: co-extensive with the 
director. It is likewise characterised by a form of pride.37 'This department is the 
aim of everyone in Germany', one tells me confidently. Another uses audit data 
to say much the same thing, 'The scientific advisory board tells us, something 
along the lines that this is one of the best places to do this kind of research in the 
world!' For seniors therefore, 'It is not really the Max Planck itself', but the 
scientific vision and charisma which one particular director can afford them. One 
independent researcher tells me what drew her from abroad to the department she 
now works at, 
 
'I knew I wanted to get involved in this field, so I asked 
around other researchers and everyone was pointing me 
to the same person. I started to look at the website, and 
everything looked interesting, but it was really about him. 
I'd obviously heard of the Max Planck, so I knew it was a 
big thing in Germany. It was a nice side effect, but the 
reason was really the director.' 
  
She strikes a bold contrast to the junior scientist who uses the name of the Max 
Planck to cheer himself up! For her, the fame of the society is relegated to being 
'a nice side effect': a phrase which sums up neatly, the marginalising of the 
primacy of the Society-bond as one ascends the scientific ranks. Its 
marginalisation is correlated to the magnified significance of the director. 
 
 The relationship between directors and senior scientists is of substantial 
significance to my overarching argument, as it is at this interface that the hero 
principle and the precarity principle collide head-on. For seniors, this is the point 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Cf.	  Chapter	  4.iii.	  37	  Marshall	  Sahlins	  once	  called	  this	  form	  of	  pride,	  the	  coherence	  of	  a	  community	  around	  a	  leader,	  'hierarchical	  solidarity'	  (1983:	  522).	  He	  argues,	  'We	  need	  a	  notion	  of	  "hierarchical	  solidarity"	  to	  go	  alongside	  Durkheim's	  mechanical	  and	  organic	  types.	  In	  the	  heroic	  societies,	  the	  coherence	  of	  the	  members	  or	  subgroups	  is	  not	  so	  much	  due	  to	  their	  similarity	  (mechanical	  solidarity)	  or	  their	  complementarity	  (organic	  solidarity)	  as	  to	  their	  common	  submission	  to	  the	  ruling	  power'.	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at which upward social mobility within the Max Planck screeches to a juddering 
halt. The future is no longer an exciting unknown but – for those without 
permanent positions – a potentially daunting unknown. This is because a group 
leader can never ascend to the position of director in the same department. It 
would be an utter violation of the moral order. Indeed, one director finds this 
idea such a sickening proposition that he uses the language of incest to deride it.  
 
'It is regarded to be asocial. Inbreeding. We have a bad 
experience with that in former German society. Bosses 
were able to promote their own sons. They invited 
genetic sons and intellectual sons into their positions and 
it led to a degrading of the quality of science. You should 
not have babies with your own daughters. It is even felt 
like that. It's regarded as so immoral that something like 
that should happen. It's intellectual incest. Nothing but.' 
 
 He is not alone in equating the promotion of senior scientists to the 
directorship to fictive incest, and it is important to pause for a moment and 
consider the implications of this.38 For Claude Levi-Strauss, the incest taboo in 
its varying forms was not simply an aspect of culture, but nothing less than the 
very essence of culture itself: ‘it is the intervention’ in the social order (1969: 
32). Like Tylor before him, Levi-Strauss’ main argument was that rules 
prohibiting incest are inextricably related to the rules governing exogamy, or 
‘marriage alliances’, and thus in fact serve a positive function. Through the 
specific form that incest taboo takes, the anthropologist can thereby discover the 
culture’s norms governing social exchange and reciprocity, existing within and 
between social groups. We can apply this argument here very easily, despite the 
fact that it is fictive rather than actual incest at stake. Firstly the inheritance taboo 
is clearly the negative space cut by the positive function of the hero principle – 
the very essence of Max Planck culture – a leader who arrives from beyond the 
group to create a department ex nihilo. As the same individual puts it, the 
directorship is not supposed to be ‘a linear extension of your previous life, but a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  discussion,	  fictive	  shall	  be	  treated	  as	  identical	  to	  real	  incest.	  In	  this	  instance,	  fictive	  incest	  performs	  precisely	  the	  same	  function,	  namely	  to	  underline	  the	  basic	  rules	  governing	  cultural	  life.	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whole new system’. Secondly it raises the question of ‘to whom’ (ibid: 51) Max 
Planck scientists are subsequently ‘married out’ so-to-speak. This will be briefly 
touched on ethnographically below, but essentially this is predominantly the 
universities, beyond – but often within – Germany.  
 
 What is striking is the degree to which the inheritance taboo becomes 
internalised in the landscape of senior scientific aspiration. The stranger-king 
mentality is enormously successful at fortifying an imaginative firewall around 
the limits it sets up. When I ask senior scientists whether they aspire to be a 
director at some point in the future they might exhale slightly in disbelief – 
'pfffff' – that the question is even being asked of them. Usually they couch their 
almost universally negative response in the language of personal lack, 'To 
become a Max Planck Director you have to be a really good, I mean a really 
good scientist, and I don't think I'm capable of this'. Or alternatively, as directors 
are the hardest workers in any department, this lack may not be a paucity of 
talent, but a paucity of commitment, 'I think I'm not devoted enough to be a 
director...it's your life'.39 Finally, another genre of response is that to become a 
director is to bid farewell to direct involvement in science. Therefore it may be 
viewed as an occupation of undesirable abstraction, because it is more about 
'paperwork' and 'politics' than the nitty gritty of scientific problem-solving. All of 
these positions senior scientists would defend as perfectly rational. There is no 
obvious self-deception going on here. Nevertheless, if the position was open to 
them, if it was felt that there was the option of succeeding the director of their 
department when he retired or left for another position, it is likely the space 
would open up for them to rationalise things very differently. This metaphysical 
compromise is what David Graeber calls 'the political ontology of the 
imagination' (2009: 512): the notion that ideologies do not simply slice up 
phenomena, people and things, but can also determine one's sense of what is 
possible or even desirable.40  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Cf.	  Chapter	  4.vi.	  40	  This	  lack	  of	  upward	  aspiration	  is	  –	  in	  a	  sense	  –	  the	  antithesis	  of	  Lauren	  Berlant’s	  ‘cruel	  optimism’	  (2011).	  It	  shows	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  desire	  itself	  emerges	  from	  within	  extant	  architectures	  of	  value.	  Cruel	  optimism	  –	  which	  arises	  when	  ‘something	  you	  desire	  is	  actually	  an	  obstacle	  to	  your	  flourishing’	  (ibid:	  1)	  –	  is	  a	  phenomenon	  born	  of	  
	   232	  
 But is the inheritance prohibition in reality so steadfast? All of my 
interlocutors seem to think so. It runs that a directorship is putatively not a 
position which is a senior scientist's expected due, but instead can only be earned 
through the display of exceptional skill. As the theory would have it, all senior 
scientists are competing against their peers on a global plane, as the only criteria 
the Max Planck Society has when appointing a new director is to find the best 
mind for the job, regardless of national origin. If this is taken seriously, then 
statistically the vast majority of candidates must clearly be drawn from outside 
the Society and indeed Germany.  
 
 Again, it is the Society’s own records which enable us to uncover the gap 
between ideology and what is in fact happening in practice. By tracking 
biographical trajectories from the available data, for 199 of the existing 229 
directors in the natural sciences, we can easily assess the empirical validity of the 
stranger-king idea. For a generous majority this is indeed the case: 70% of the 
present directors have had no prior Max Planck affiliation whatsoever before 
being invited to join the Society.41 Of the remaining 30%, a further 31% of these 
completed their Ph.Ds and Postdocs at one Institute, usually before becoming 
director of another, anything between four and twenty-five years later.42 Thus 
they would still count as having largely 'made their ascent' elsewhere.43 
However, the remaining 69% of this 30% portion, some forty-one directors, have 
in the past held had some group leader or senior scientific staff member position 
at a Max Planck Institute: twenty-one directors have moved from a group leader 
position in one Institute to a directorship in another. This leaves a final twenty 
directors who go from being top senior scientists to being directors in the same 
Institute. Almost half again of these – eleven directors – move from leader 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  egalitarian	  ideology.	  In	  societies	  with	  a	  hierarchical	  ideology	  such	  as	  that	  here,	  the	  gulf	  between	  the	  precarious	  and	  heroic	  tiers	  is	  so	  wide	  that	  scientists	  do	  not	  even	  imagine	  themselves	  into	  the	  director’s	  shoes.	  41	  140	  out	  of	  199	  directors	  in	  the	  natural	  sciences.	  All	  statistical	  information	  gleaned	  here	  is	  drawn	  from	  the	  available	  curriculum	  vitae	  of	  existing	  directors	  (http://www.mpg.de/115929/scientific-­‐members).	  42	  18	  out	  of	  59	  directors.	  43	  This	  data	  leads	  me	  to	  group	  Ph.Ds	  and	  postdocs	  together,	  and	  treat	  group	  leaders	  and	  senior	  staff	  members	  separately.	  This	  runs	  against	  the	  previous	  separations	  of	  'junior'	  and	  'senior',	  because	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  quantificatory	  exercise	  is	  to	  assess	  the	  relative	  opportunity	  for	  Max	  Planck	  group	  leaders	  to	  become	  directors.	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positions to director positions straightaway.44 Consequently what this litany of 
figures tells us, is that despite the reality of the inheritance taboo at the level of 
belief, empirically it is currently being flouted by eleven standing directors in the 
natural sciences. Being well-known researchers within an Institute before filling 
newly-vacant directorships of the same, certainly looks like inheritance if it is not 
in name. This data makes one powerful point, that, despite evidence to the 
contrary, the hero principle is enormously successful at propagating itself.  
 
 In any event, as they stand outside the closed door, unless they are one of 
the tiny minority with permanent positions, the only forward movement must 
lead to another building altogether. To do this, it is imperative that a senior 
scientist carves out an independent niche which is linked but clearly separate 
from, the scientific interests of the director. The importance of nominal 
autonomy in assuaging senior scientific future-angst is made clear to me on 
speaking to one senior scientist – Leo – on two occasions, either side of a gap of 
several months.  
 
 At our first formal meeting, Leo clearly has an axe to grind. Despite 
being habitually affable and gregarious, when I meet him he appears visibly 
depressed, slumped slightly over his computer with a look of ill-concealed 
malaise. He immediately takes charge of the conversation which ensues. 
 
'I'm a specialist in (a technique). When I arrived a 
technician had organised the whole set up, purchased and 
assembled the equipment, and was running it. Then they 
left. And the director suggested I focus on (this 
technique) and use it to find out about (a particular 
scientific problem the department is interested in). So this 
gave me expertise on the technique, I got really into it 
and became this technique-oriented guy. And this is what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  20	  directors	  have	  possessed	  a	  group	  leader	  or	  senior	  staff	  member	  position	  in	  one	  Institute	  some	  years	  before	  becoming	  director	  in	  the	  same	  Institute.	  Eleven	  directors	  have	  ascended	  immediately	  from	  being	  a	  group	  leader	  or	  senior	  scientific	  staff	  member,	  to	  a	  directorship	  of	  the	  same	  Institute.	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i'm now trying to change! I'm not a technician and i'm not 
going to be a technician'.     
 
His role within the department had become circumscribed by a particular 
instrument the department possessed. Soon everyone was asking him to help 
them use it, and he spent a most of his time assisting other scientists with their 
projects. Although his name then appeared among the list of co-authors on the 
ensuing posters and publications, as a 'technique-oriented guy' he was never 
handed the 'trump card': final author status.45 The problem was that, although 
contributing technically, he was 'part of someone else's piece of cake' and 'not 
defining his 'own piece of cake', as he puts it. 
 
 Several months later and the colour of Leo's world has taken on an 
entirely different hue. When I ask him what his future plans are he sounds 
confident and optimistic. 
 
'I will stay in this city probably. It looks very promising. 
From the last time we talked there are now lots of 
projects that are really taking off. The technique is 
becoming more and more a part of the department's life, 
but it looks promising, because now I am carrying out the 
scientific part of the application of the technique.46  
 
He goes on to explain how this change came about.  
 
'In my case it is very exciting, because I managed to 
integrate what I was doing before, into the framework of 
the work at Max Planck. With all the experience I had, I 
managed to convince (the director) of a nice project. So 
there are several things that I am just publishing now, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  In	  the	  political	  order	  of	  inscription	  this	  is	  the	  person	  who	  purportedly	  contributed	  the	  'principal	  intellectual	  input'	  to	  the	  experiment.	  	  46	  This	  participant	  uses	  the	  expression	  'it	  looks	  promising'	  on	  several	  different	  occasions	  throughout	  our	  conversation.	  He	  is	  a	  very	  different	  fellow	  from	  his	  former	  self.	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where (the director) is not the co-author. Now, the plan is 
to be surrounded by a few students, and to go for some 
big applications. So hopefully in the next three years I 
will be able to compete for some kind of nice position at 
a university'.47  
 
This is the best constellation of activities a senior scientist could wish for. 
Although remaining under the umbrella of the department, he is being given the 
tools with which to fashion his future (students around him, independent 
publications, the encouragement to apply for large grants). As he says, in the 
next three years he will be 'able to compete'. For those senior scientists who do 
not have these tools, and carry out work much closer to the director, competition 
appears a far more daunting prospect. 
 
 
 vi) Senior scientists and precarity as dependence 
 
 One of the aims of this chapter is to show that precarity is a ‘transversal 
concept’ (Neilson and Rossiter 2008: 64): at which affects, ontologies and socio-
economic conditions intersect. All of these different registers resonate with the 
experiences of Max Planck scientists. Nevertheless in this penultimate section, I 
take precarity's transversality along a line it very rarely goes. Here I rely on 
Lauren Berlant's understanding of the term as ‘at root...a condition of 
dependency’ (2011: 192). She reminds us that the etymology of ‘precarious’ 
originates in seventeenth-century leaseholds, to signify land ‘held or enjoyed by 
the favour of and at the pleasure of another person’ (OED 2013).48 It is this 
medieval meaning – bringing precarity right back to the simplicity of contractual 
relationships between human beings – that takes us furthest in outlining the 
MPG's precarity principle. Whether they are there permanently or not, whether 
their patronage comes from the Society or third-parties, every scientist in the 
Society is present ‘at the pleasure of’ the director. It is the latter’s scientific 
vision which defines the character of the department, and all work undertaken 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Several	  details	  of	  this	  pronouncement	  have	  been	  obscured	  to	  ensure	  anonymity.	  48	  http://www.oed.com.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/view/Entry/149548?redirectedFrom=precarious#eid	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must bear some relation to it. The reason to embed this argument within a 
discussion of senior scientists, is that it is among this group that precarity as a 
state of dependency is most vivid. 
 
 It is visible at first glance from the haziness of their roles. I do not assert 
any kind of analytical distinction between 'postdocs', 'independent researchers' 
and 'group leaders' – as I did with junior scientists – because at the upper 
echelons stratification starts to get extremely protean, and these roles may fold 
into one another or there may be mobility between them. Postdocs and 
independent researchers describe the circumference of their positions 
respectively as 'amorphous', 'not defined', or even 'kind of nothing'; while even 
group leaders will confess that when they assumed the position, they were not 
sure of what it 'really means'.49 Indeed there are some Institutes which 
purportedly have completely ‘flat hierarchies’ – meaning simply that there is no 
distinction whatsoever at the senior level. A comparable polysemy is observable 
on the curriculum vitae of those current directors who were Max Planck senior 
scientists some years ago. There is a whole range of job titles they might have 
had, including 'scientific co-worker', 'scientific collaborator', 'academic staff 
member', 'scientific staff member' and 'scientific officer'. The variability of such 
labels shows how ill-defined personhood is (particularly in contrast to the very 
well-defined director) at the level just below the top. This is a conscious 
organizational choice, what former president Adolf Butenandt calls its ‘internal 
flexibility' (1981: 278), which like most of its hierarchical distinctions, is 
rationalised in utilitarian terms (Sahlins 1976).50  
 
 Thus while the departments as a whole have an explicit hierarchical 
trinity of directors, scientists and technicians, and junior scientists themselves 
have fairly well delineated functions and titles, the social location of senior 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  The	  group	  leader	  position	  is	  often	  the	  most	  defined	  of	  the	  three,	  involving	  the	  ostensible	  'leadership'	  of	  a	  small	  group	  of	  anything	  between	  four	  and	  ten	  Ph.Ds	  and	  postdocs.	  However,	  while	  the	  director	  is	  described	  as	  'big',	  the	  group	  leaders	  are	  'little'.	  In	  status	  they	  are	  not	  so	  dissimilar	  from	  postdocs	  or	  independent	  researchers;	  according	  to	  participants	  they	  are	  situated	  on	  roughly	  the	  same	  pay-­‐scale.	  50	  Adolf	  Butenandt	  articulates	  this	  logic	  in	  his	  writings	  of	  the	  time,	  'As	  the	  internal	  organisation	  of	  the	  institutes	  is	  not	  modelled	  according	  to	  any	  fixed	  formula,	  it	  can	  be	  adapted	  to	  varying	  requirements	  by	  organisational	  changes	  at	  any	  time'	  (1981:	  278).	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scientists is implicit. It is one which hinges on personal rather than impersonal 
relations. Two business scholars have explored the dialectic between these two 
kinds of social ordering, or what they call 'formal and informal hierarchy' 
(Diefenbach and Sillince 2011). In their typology 'formal hierarchy' is the 
transcendent, vertical, sometimes cosmological, but always official and overt 
kind we are most familiar with, in which members are given 'formal roles and 
positions'. Meanwhile 'informal hierarchy', is 'person-dependent social 
relationships of dominance and subordination which emerge from social 
interaction and become persistent over time through repeated social processes' 
(ibid: 1518). 
 
 Where formal hierarchy transcends individuals and their respective 
working relationships, informal hierarchy is – by contrast – entirely predicated 
on relative sympathies between members. By analysing a variety of empirical 
studies of organisations, the authors make three very provocative points. The first 
is that 'whenever formal hierarchy decreases, informal hierarchy increases' (ibid: 
1517). In practice then, this means that the postmodern trend towards 'flatter' or 
even 'hierarchy-free' organisations is largely a conceit, because it is simply a 
substitution of the formal with the informal (ibid: 1515). The second point is that 
informal hierarchies tend to feed back into and entrench any formal hierarchies 
that may already exist. In this way, the informal hierarchy at the upper tier is still 
oriented around the formal primacy of the director, and will rest upon those who 
have favoured relationships with him. Finally, they argue that when hierarchy is 
ill-defined, it can in fact hold a tighter grip, as its silent character makes it more 
oppressive. All of these arguments reveal something about the predicament of 
one senior scientist, Adam. 
  
 Adam is in his 40s, and has been working in the department for several 
years as an independent researcher. In contrast to Leo, Adam never managed to 
convince the director of a 'nice project' in the area that he is interested in, and so 
rather than ascending to the position of group leader, he will be leaving at the 
end of the year. His imminent departure perplexes one of the Ph.D students he 
has worked with, who tells me separately why it seems so unjust. 
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'I think he is a good scientist, and he's very independent. I 
just don't understand why he didn't get a position as a 
group leader. No idea. While another scientist could be 
there for eight years, and I think the normal time to stay 
is five.51 I was like – “What's this?” This is sometimes 
surprising. When you see people that are really good and 
really nice, and they have to leave. He (the director) gives 
the money so I guess it's up to him.'  
 
Relative to other senior scientists then, Adam is in a position of 'subordination' 
with respect to the highly 'person-dependent' informal hierarchy. The latter 
remains based on the formal primacy of the director, who refuses to support 
Adam's independent niche as he does Leo's.  
 
 Those who are subordinate in a hierarchy, tend to see its limitations most 
clearly.52 Because Adam has not succeeded in aligning himself with the director 
in a mutually beneficial way, he bears witness to all the hard edges of this 
hierarchical system.  
 
'The reason I didn't fit into the Max Planck environment 
was this hierarchical structure that you speak of. You 
have a director who gives general directions but then 
meets with his deputies, and then they execute their 
director relationship with the Ph.Ds and postdocs, who 
then work with technicians. There is the tight control of 
the director, who is then tightly linked with his network 
of peers'. 
 
He is implying that these 'peers' or 'deputies' are those senior scientists who 
occupy the top spots of the informal hierarchy (i.e. not him). Adam then goes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  He	  is	  suggesting	  that	  the	  'soft	  maximum'	  of	  five	  years	  for	  any	  scientist,	  can	  in	  practice	  be	  extended	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  the	  director.	  	  52	  Meanwhile	  for	  those	  at	  the	  top,	  the	  vista	  from	  their	  vantage-­‐point	  may	  appear	  as	  a	  flat	  landscape.	  It	  always	  those	  either	  in,	  or	  intimately	  aligned	  with,	  those	  in	  power,	  who	  make	  the	  strongest	  argument	  for	  social	  'flatness'	  (cf.	  Chapter	  4.v).	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onto explain why the situation is problematic for senior scientists as a whole, 
what he calls the 'intermediate tier'. He begins from the perspective of the 
director, 
 
'When you have fifty people in your group, you cannot 
interact with each of them individually. You introduce a 
layer, an intermediate tier, and the people who you 
introduce have a very difficult problem. They cannot do 
their own research because they have to fit in with other 
projects which are going on. And they are placed in a 
situation where they have to educate the next generation 
of researchers, they have to supervise.53 
 
So all the pressure is on the intermediate tier, who are 
there only three to six years after completing their degree. 
But up to ten years after completing your degree, they are 
expected to no longer be there. Because if you do get 
stuck there, there are legal issues and the MPI has to take 
you on as a permanent employee which is not going to 
happen'.54 
 
 Nonetheless it is important not to take such a critical perspective as 
universal. While Adam sees the effects of hierarchy in the difficulties faced by 
those in his position, another senior scientist might not. Leo, for instance, has 
much the same role, but in our second discussion takes a wholly positive rather 
than a negative slant. Because Adam is unfavoured by the director, all he feels is 
constraint. This is clear from the kind of imagery he appeals to when describing 
his position: terms like 'tight control', 'fit(ting) in', 'pressure' and 'stuck', all imply 
a sense of constriction. However, it is also true that another senior scientist may 
experience an equal and opposite sense of 'absolute freedom'. Senior scientists' 
articulation of autonomy thus always depends on their status vis-a-vis the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Again	  one	  witnesses	  symmetries	  with	  the	  predicament	  of	  associate	  professors	  and	  Privatdozenten,	  and	  their	  excessive	  teaching	  burdens	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth-­‐century.	  54	  These	  'legal	  issues'	  relate	  to	  the	  Wissenschaftszeitvertragsgesetz	  already	  cited.	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informal hierarchical order. This explains some of the wild inconsistencies which 
appeared in my field-notes in what I began to term as they surfaced, 'the paradox 
of hierarchy'. This 'paradox' is that to one member the system is declared to be 
'completely non-hierarchical' while to another it is 'very, very hierarchical'. 
 
 Finally, as Diefenbach and Sillince argue, 'informal hierarchy' can in fact 
be more pernicious than its formal sibling because it asserts itself at a level 
below explicit articulation. This is clear at a seminar I give to the department 
Adam is a member of, during the discussion which follows it. We begin to 
deliberate on the function of scientists within the organisation. For the director, 
scientists are there simply to 'produce knowledge' which will then trickle down to 
society in some form of product application. Like other senior scientists who go 
unprivileged in the informal hierarchy, Adam takes a more sceptical view than 
the Panglossian idealism which is often presented by directors. 'Is that really 
realistic?' he asks. 'Or is the scientist working for Nature or the patent or 
whatever, which has nothing to do with knowledge'.55 The director quickly 
overrides him. 'That's not science that's technology'. But Adam again, chips in. 
'Are we really here to create knowledge, or is it to get our names on the papers 
and all kinds of different...', at this point the director interrupts his line of 
reasoning. 'That's a different story', he offers definitively. By now everyone is 
laughing in alliance with the director. Adam again pursues his argument. 'It may 
be very different, but I think it is very dominant in the context of the 
anthropology of science'. At this point, his alternate perspective is dismissed 
entirely, and the director simply carries on with a different remark as if the latter 
had never spoken. 
 
 At the time, I laugh too alongside the rest of the audience at this 
exchange, as it appears to us all that Adam is simply being contrary and perhaps 
rather silly. It is only long long afterwards when re-examining my notes, that the 
politics behind this event strikes me with a jolt. Adam is in fact presenting me 
quite clearly with a highly plausible alternative analysis of the situation: that the 
production of knowledge may be driven by self-serving goals, in which scientists 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  He	  means	  the	  UK-­‐based	  journal	  'Nature',	  rather	  than	  the	  natural	  world.	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are more concerned with their career-paths than simple curiosity. However, the 
director dismisses this alternative so effectively that at the time it is rendered 
ridiculous. As even I in the role of ethnographer, was blind to the dynamics at 
work here, it seems unlikely that any of the rest of those laughing were conscious 
that a particular social relationship was being enacted. As a loser in the 'informal 
hierarchy' which hinges on his personal relationship with the director, Adam is 
bereft of discursive authority; and this is made manifest in a way which is 
entirely tacit.  
 
 
 
 vi) Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter I have documented the scientific life at the MPG from a 
variety of perspectives. Beginning with qualitative descriptions of their 
transience, their multicultural consciousness, and their capacity for adventure and 
ebullience, I then applied quantitative methods to ascertain what the contractual 
basis of this personhood is, and how it came to be. Thereafter the discussion 
became more visibly oriented towards hierarchy, as I rose through the stratified 
layers of scientists at different ages and stages. On reaching the ‘top’, the 
comparative rigidity of the Society’s tripartite order became ever clearer, and 
previous arguments about the specific character of the hero principle supported 
from another angle. Embedded within these qualitative and quantitative records 
are the figures of Boris, Leo, and Adam. Each story was selected for its 
representativeness, its ability to stand for many others. They illustrate the 
diversity of the Max Planck experience, its winners and losers, and what winds 
of history carried them there in the first place. 
 
 Just as in chapter four I arrived at an alternative reading of agency, here I 
am in conversation with another analytic category: precarity. One of the 
difficulties in deploying precarity and its cognates, is the broad range of contexts 
and wide spectrum of political ends to which it has hitherto been applied. For 
Judith Butler, precariousness is both a common strain of the human condition, as 
well as a way of imagining the common psychic vulnerability of US citizens 
after the trauma of 9/11 (2004). Acknowledging human precariousness for Butler 
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is a critical pose, directed against the aggressive response of the US government 
to the attacks, and the American media’s – and to some extent academy’s – tacit 
support for that response. Meanwhile for Guy Standing and the European 
mayday movement, precarity is a way to theorize the sociological fall-out of 
labour market flexibility policies, and to rally this ‘class-in-the-making’ (2011: 
vii) together in nascent solidarity. Meanwhile for Kathleen Stewart, precarity is 
an ‘emergent form’ of writing culture (2012: 518): a mode of textual 
representation rather than an ethnographic entity in its own right. It becomes a 
way to reflect on her elderly parents’ frailties, the non-place of the road, the 
transience of a crowd in a freshwater pool. Indeed, the ability of precarity to 
encompass the varying agendas of actors would make it a worthy object of 
analysis in itself. The popularity of the term in certain circles recalls Boyer’s 
‘lexical totems’ (2005: 39) of Germany’s nineteenth-century middle class, and 
would render an intriguing account of shifting twenty-first century social 
constellations.   
 
 In spite of this concern, precarity remains a major pillar of my argument 
in the form of the precarity principle. Junior and senior scientists alike do 
participate in the condition of what could be called a precarious existence, which 
is produced within the logic of the organisation’s hierarchy. It is one which 
delights in internationalism, in youth, in movement, and in the reliance of all 
upon the will of the one. The rational purpose of this logic is production: ‘It’s 
really a system geared towards productivity…people work their *ss off and then 
disappear and the whole thing’s very efficient’. Like the Poles and the guest 
workers before them, this talented and youthful demographic are selected to meet 
the organisation’s human requirements. Yet there is also a fundamentally cultural 
basis for this logic. As former president Adolf Butenandt once phrased it, ‘It is 
and always will be the achievements of the individual which in the final analysis 
will lead the way to new knowledge’ (1981: 304). The best way to assist this 
individual is then to make all of those around him, dependent upon him. 
 
 
	   243	  
	   7. Conclusion 
 
 
 i) A study of hierarchy 
 
 I began this thesis with a critique of the popularization in organisational 
studies of what Eric Wolf has called the ‘abstract individual’ (2001: 333). This is 
the idea that organisations are populated by bland and inert subjects – like robots 
waiting to be switched on – who only need to ‘act’ to ‘produce’ what we can 
then come to recognise as society or culture. Channeling the Enlightenment 
invention of ‘elementary man’, the assumption is that any larger entity which 
exists beyond this basic form has to be self-consciously made: no making, no 
society or culture. 
 
 In contrast, my intention throughout has been to slide to the other end of 
the conceptual continuum, and to reassert the significance of an abstract whole. 
The thesis – in the original Greek sense meaning ‘position’ – is that this whole is 
the Max Planck Society which produces persons within itself along hierarchical 
lines. The overarching culture of the Max Planck Society is not produced by the 
actions of its employees, but rather is a concentration of particular configurations 
of value it has inherited from Germany’s social, political, economic, and perhaps 
most importantly, cosmological and philosophical past. This ramifies in the 
present in producing a particular ontology of leadership, division of labour, and 
throughout, in asserting the value of charisma as a legitimate governing force. 
 
 To do this, I have relied significantly on the work of Louis Dumont – 
born the same year as the Kaiser Wilhelm Society in 1911 – who has been a 
constant intellectual companion. With regard to this German material, I have 
accepted several of his principal theses: the interdependence of hierarchy and 
holism, the differences between hierarchy and inequality, status and power, the 
existence of a predominant ideology or value-idea, and the dynamics of 
complementarity and encompassment. Yet if anthropology is an art then the 
‘inventive’ act (Wagner 1975) has not been to bring Dumont’s insights from 
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their Indian origin into a different context (more of which later) but to draw a 
fuller picture of what this partially suppressed hierarchy looks like from the 
material gathered. This is a different approach to the inventive act being located 
in the fusion of theory to ethnography, such as using Hegel’s theory of 
objectification to understand processes of consumption (Miller 2005). 
 
 Theory then, has played a slightly different role here, to the one it has 
habitually played in the wake of the philosophical turn. The majority of the 
theory deployed in this thesis, has some form of independent relationship to the 
ethnography. I will spell out what I mean by this. The German Idealists (and 
their reformulations of Lutheran Protestantism) have been some of my key 
reference points for theorizing how the Society operates. Yet they are also in a 
causal relationship to it, as we saw at the opening ceremony of the KWG when 
the Kaiser invokes Wilhelm von Humboldt. The writings of Max Weber have 
been another reference point in theorizing charisma. Yet it is possible that 
Weber’s incipient reflections on charismatic authority influenced the social 
structure of the KWG, being a peer of Adolf von Harnack, its founder. The 
Idealists were in a similarly causal relationship to the writings of Dumont, who 
purportedly was particularly inspired by Hegel and Herder (Appadurai 1988), 
when writing about hierarchy in India. The feedback loops continue. The 
Idealists were themselves enamoured with Indian philosophy: the idealist 
premises of the Bhagavad Gita and other Upanishads being a means for them to 
think through their own idealisms (Germana 2009, McGetchin 2009, Sedlar 
1982). The bulk of the theory I have used is thus already in an extraneous 
historical tension with the subject of study. Of course one could say the same of  
post-’68 French philosophy, and organisations in France, America and the U.K – 
as Boltanski has shown (2005) – which have been examined by social scientists. 
Except commonly such theories are employed without their causal influence on 
organisational logics being simultaneously historicized.1 
 
 In interpreting the Max Planck Society as an abstract whole which orders 
persons hierarchically, the emphasis has been not on the interactions between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Anthony	  Giddens	  called	  this	  causal	  influence	  that	  academic	  ideas	  may	  exert	  on	  society	  the	  ‘double	  hermeneutic’	  (1987).	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individuals (that jostling open air market of spontaneous exchange relationships) 
but between principles. The defining ‘structuring principle’ of the organisation is 
of course the Harnack principle – as its members are keen to tell us – and which I 
have presented analytically as the ‘hero principle’. Yet it is not simply the visible 
dominance of the hero principle that makes it the central key to unlock the social 
order. Here anthropological analysis really helps. In my view the most important 
ethnographic detail presented has been the use of tropes of fictive incest to 
describe the contravention of the hero principle, i.e. that the director should come 
from the outside and ex nihilo rather than from the inside as an inheritance. But 
what makes this so important is Levi-Strauss’ insight that representations of 
incest form the very basis of relatedness. It is ‘the intervention’ in the social 
order (1969: 32). Despite being rather different in their approaches, and of course 
one far more popularly accepted than the other, I cannot help but delight in 
bringing Levi-Strauss back together with his contemporary and compatriot 
Dumont. For the fact that incest tropes provide the very basis of relatedness is a 
perfect case for the collapse of the is and the ought. Incest, as the primary 
definition of what one ought not to do, becomes the defining opposition to what 
a society is. Inheritance is incest, thus the fact that the directorship is a non-
inheritable position is the central pillar of Max Planck ontology. 
 
 So the first interaction I am conjuring here, slightly elliptically, is that 
between the hero and precarity principles. I hold that it is the defining centrality 
of the hero principle which produces the secondary logic of precarity: that this 
Platonic Philosopher Ruler’s Guardian Auxiliaries should be dependent upon 
him for their professional wellbeing. Of course for the younger students this is 
less relevant. The very nature of studentship is a condition of dependence upon 
those from whom one is learning, so it is in keeping with what is commonplace 
elsewhere. However at the upper tiers this begins to look a little more 
idiosyncratic, and contains the potential for discrimination through an ‘informal 
hierarchy’ of senior scientists in or out of favour. I also wish to make the 
provocative suggestion that the interaction between the hero and precarity 
principles also plays out beyond the Max Planck Society’s borders. The 
‘academic pyramid’ of German universities has always, as Fritz Ringer says of 
the late nineteenth-century, ‘tapered sharply at the very top’ (1969: 54): with a 
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large cohort of younger lecturers employed precariously on temporary contracts, 
and a very small minority of professionally secure, heroic full professors 
positioned at an upper level, which is for most, out of reach. 
 
 Naturally if there are three principles that makes three sets of interactions, 
so we are left with precarity/longevity and hero/longevity. As should have been 
clear both ethnographically and theoretically, the relationship between precarity 
and longevity is one of complementarity as Dumont defines it. Both are, in a 
sense, antonyms although equally necessary to the social equilibrium. The 
technical staff are key and enduring repositories of specialist knowledge: 
whether how to prepare samples, how to use an instrument effectively, or of the 
protocols for how to treat and look after equipment and spaces so that the whole 
regime of scientific production runs smoothly. Scientists, having been rapidly 
apprenticed into this knowledge, then have the tools to produce data and to 
analyze it, transforming it ultimately into the stuff of scientific publications, 
before, in most cases, they leave the organisation for good. Their different 
functions within the organisation thus have a whole range of ontological effects, 
predominantly temporal. Meanwhile the relationship between the hero and 
longevity principles I have offered no real descriptions of, as technicians and 
directors do not appear to have as much contact with each other as scientists have 
with both. However, with more ethnographic research one might be able to take a 
Dumontian analysis yet further. There is a curious symmetry between the hero 
and longevity principles, the hero of course being a position of longevity too. 
Between them there is similarly inchoate evidence for what Dumont would call a 
‘reversal’ (1980: 281): the director being first a charismatic individual, and 
secondly the member of a community, and the technicians being first members of 
a community, and secondly charismatic individuals in their own right.    
 
 In their introduction to a journal special issue on ‘Value as Theory’, Otto 
and Willerslev describe two ways of conceiving of value (2013). The first is the 
classic exchange theory model, in which value arises from processes of 
interaction: the ‘production-oriented’ perspective which, as Robbins says (2013: 
100), has never gone out of fashion. The second however, is a conception of 
value as arising from within a cultural world which then informs the actions of 
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those who inhabit it. The latter is implicitly tied to Dumont’s intellectual legacy, 
and has undergone a ‘long period of neglect’ (ibid: 99) which may now in fact be 
coming to an end. It should be self-evident that my optic throughout has been on 
their second definition. Yet such an optic always begs the question of where 
value comes from if it is not produced through action. Here the role of history in 
the thesis has been important. In order to understand where the Max Planck 
Society’s gets its ‘ideas and values’ I have looked to Germany’s past – not of 
course, as an essential unique bounded entity, but one which has been formed in 
a relation of complementary genesis and schismogenesis with Europe and the 
world. Its history of ideas, of religion, of scholarly institutions, of foreign labour, 
even of monarchism have all been summoned to testify to a set of ideas and 
values which reverberate in the contemporary life of the Max Planck Society. It 
is through history that I have explored and explained its difference. 
 
 To conclude this first section, I shall attend to its title, and sketch the way 
in the thesis contributes not only to the study of organisations, but to the study of 
hierarchy in general. A perspective has been presented here which to my 
knowledge has not been theorized elsewhere: that hierarchy is not simply a 
question of staggered religious status, nor purely political ranking, but is 
increasingly, a system of differentiated temporalities. The fundamental 
difference is not between those who are given ‘agency’ and those who are not, 
but of those who get to stay and those compelled to leave: of those permitted 
future imaginaries, and those living in an interminable present. The rise of the 
latter has become a particularly pressing issue among the professional classes. 
Barley and Kunda explain, that in the 1990s U.S corporate downsizings were 
more likely to ‘target managers and professionals than they were blue and lower 
white collar workers': meaning that by 1997, an estimated 23% of all contingent 
workers in the U.S were from technical and professional occupations (2006: 10-
17). Academia specifically has also become a particular locus for this: with an 
increased use of temporary ‘teaching fellows’ in British universities, and ‘college 
adjuncts’ in the U.S, the latter now attracting its own scholarly attention (Chibnik 
2010, Nelson 2010, Professor X 2012). However, nowhere has this condition of 
impermanence been theorized as a secondary effect of new or enduring 
hierarchies, which is what I have done here. 
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 Finally, any contribution to the study of hierarchy must state its position 
vis-à-vis the subject’s main advocate, Dumont. While as I have said, Dumont has 
been my intellectual companion throughout, as a thinker I could always trust to 
offer surprising and radically original arguments – he had an enduring obsession 
I could never truck with: the opposition between individualism and holism. As 
with all big ideas, this obsession must have come from a very personal place. It 
has often been said that Dumont sublimated a longing for hierarchy into his 
work, but my instinct is that it is a more basic longing for holism, for a condition 
of belonging, for being a subjective after-effect of something bigger than 
himself. Perhaps a biography would reveal his own experiences of alienation, of 
a nausea for contemporary European culture generated by the feeling of being its 
outsider (as a perspective on ideology is only possible from a position of relative 
exteriority) a feeling which must only have intensified as the study of hierarchy 
became so totally subsumed within hyper-individualist alternatives. Interestingly, 
it is with respect to the German material that Dumont appears most tantalizingly 
close to abandoning his defining proposition. While beginning The German 
Ideology dismissing the imbrication of individualism and holism in German 
thought as ‘mixed up, confused’ (1994: 25) (i.e. confused only with respect to his 
own dogma), he ends by ceding that  ‘All in all, the opposition between 
individualism and holism is not immediately – say, in the first degree – 
applicable in Germany’ (ibid: 191). This is as close as we get to an admission of 
intellectual error, any further and he would have had to undermine the central 
premise of his most famous work. My argument by contrast – much like Rio and 
Smedal’s alternative dyad of totalization and detotalization (2009) – has partly 
been an effort to hammer another nail into the individualism/holism dichotomy. 
The Max Planck Society is a hierarchy/whole expressed through individualism. 
A single self encompasses a world, with which it is isomorphic, within it. A 
director is his department, the directors are the Institute: the individual is a 
whole, and the whole, an individual. 
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 ii) In comparison 
 
 A claim was made at the beginning, that I would use the ethnographic 
material to think comparatively, rather than ending with some statement of 
cultural particularism. Now is the time to make good of that claim. However I 
should point out – as I hope the reader has noticed – that each chapter regarding 
personhood was already either explicitly or implicitly comparative in content. 
This was most obvious with Chapter 4 and the directors. The dominant 
comparison was to the big-man systems of Melanesia, as another kind of leader 
who embodied their community and injected their personality into it. Yet there 
were also other comparisons, and – equally important – contrasts, to kingships, to 
great men, and in passing to the economic elite of Veblen’s leisure class. Such 
comparisons enabled me to paint a portrait of heroic headship: a form of 
leadership which is only unique in its peculiar concatenation of similarity and 
difference to other types. Chapter 5 and the technicians also hinged upon a 
comparison. The enduring question was how to explain one of those instances of 
feeled-work, in which the technical staff seemed to occupy a fundamentally 
different social location to those I had encountered in other ethnographies of 
science. The comparison here was between Germany and the rest of Western 
Europe and America. Chapter 6 meanwhile, contained the most global 
comparison, precarity being a condition experienced world-wide. Again I sought 
to identify the particular form that precarity takes inside the Max Planck Society, 
returning to its medieval etymology to theorize it as an after-effect of the hero 
principle. In this final section however, I will engage in two further comparisons: 
first between hierarchy as it has developed in Europe and America, particularly 
Germany, and hierarchy in those non-Western contexts where it has been studied 
by anthropologists, and ultimately, a broader comparison between Germany and 
the rest of Europe, particularly Britain. 
 
 In many non-Western societies, hierarchy remains the accepted discourse 
through which social relations are articulated, one derived from kin relations. 
This is true for parts of Africa (Warnier 2007, Brempong 2000) but particularly 
in Polynesia, which in general maintains what Ingjerd Hoëm calls, ‘a sense of 
place’ (2009: 247): where the status derived from one’s kin location is the 
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dominant organizing frame of social life. The islands of Tonga and Samoa are 
often cited as examples of hierarchical societies: Tonga still being governed by 
thirty or so noble families and indeed a king (James 1997) and Samoa by titled 
chiefs (Macpherson 1997). Firth’s early twentieth-century study of the Tikopia is 
also a classic example of a kin-based hierarchy. Firth’s Tikopia was bifurcated 
into chiefly families and commoners, the former’s preeminence arising from 
their superior religious status. Among these chiefly families were four ‘clans’, 
with four chiefs to represent them. The four chiefs (and thus their clans) were 
also ranked in order of their proximity to the gods: the highest chief/clan, the 
ariki, the closest to the gods and therefore of highest status.  
 
 In contrast to Western societies, divisions of labour in Polynesia have 
traditionally been of peripheral rather than central importance. As Firth says of 
the Tikopia, they have a ‘concept of labour as being without special dignity but 
as obligatory on every person’ (1957: xxi). Meanwhile Hocart notes something 
similar in Fiji, remarking that Fiji does not have ‘such strongly marked 
differences of vocation’. He draws a stark contrast with his native Britain to 
illustrate his point, ‘a Fijian carpenter is the companion of his chief. An English 
carpenter belongs to the proletariat’ (1970: 294). 
 
 As I see it there are thus two major points of divergence here – 
ideologically at least – with ideas about hierarchy as they have developed in 
Europe since the eighteenth-century. Firstly, a former hierarchy of kinship 
characteristic of the ancien régime, began in the early modern period to 
transmutate into a hierarchy of work oriented around Lutheran ideas of vocation. 
This of course, was particularly true in Germany. The dissemination of Luther’s 
precepts gave work a ‘quasi-sacred status in the Protestant Enlightenment’ (La 
Vopa 1988: 139), so much so that by the end of the eighteenth-century, people 
were identified not by family or birth but ‘by their function in a social division of 
labour’ (ibid: 138). The Nobility existed into the nineteenth and twentieth-
centuries, but became increasingly socially redundant and ideologically 
illegitimate, before effectively ‘vanishing’ along with the end of the monarchy in 
1918 (Himen 2008: 55). Secondly – a theme to which I have devoted hundreds of 
keystrokes already – hierarchy in late twentieth-century Europe starts to be 
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negated completely as a legitimate organizing principle. Anything which was not 
explicitly ‘flat’ was presented as inhumane and undemocratic. As Deleuze and 
Guattari once argued, the tree of hierarchy is ‘not a method for the people’ 
(1987: 8) and the only acceptable alternative formal heterarchy. 
 
 Of course in the last few paragraphs I have been referring to hierarchy as 
it gets discussed and spoken about, of its position within social ideologies rather 
than necessarily a set of practices. This is an important distinction to make, as 
ideologies while being productive of social life, is also belied by it. This is as 
true for the non-Western world as it is for Europe and America. A couple of 
examples will serve to demonstrate this. In Fiji, despite maintaining a kin-based 
hierarchy ideologically, Toren describes the ‘elective element’ (2000: 118) 
within the Fijian chiefship which militates against one chiefly dynasty wielding 
dictatorial authority. Meanwhile Brempong argues that ‘within the framework of 
hereditary matrilineal succession to stools’ among the peoples of central and 
south-western Ghana, there is an increasing trend towards the appointment of 
educated professionals or businessmen as stool occupants (2000: 75). Ideologies 
which maintain the formal precedence of hierarchy and kin relations, may in fact 
prove egalitarian and occupation-oriented in practice. 
   
 But my main interest is in how these ideologies get contravened in the 
West. One could make the point with a fair degree of confidence, that when in 
the latter quarter of the twentieth-century, hierarchy was increasingly repressed 
on the discursive plane, it in fact became proportionately virulent on the actual. 
New inequalities emerged surreptitiously through new flows of capital. A 
transnational elite was created, what Susan George has called the ‘Davos class’ 
(2010: 7): who paradoxically justify their own financial preeminence through the 
language of egalitarian ideology and its emphasis on individual merit, while 
ensuring their status endures for generations through trust funds for their 
offspring and the buying up of assets, in short, what in reality becomes another 
kinship hierarchy. The discursive suppression of hierarchy over the last forty of 
so years thus proves one of Antonio Gramsci’s most famous points, that the most 
powerful forces in society are those enshrouded in silence (2011). It is only 
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therefore by reinvigorating hierarchy as an analytic category, that we may 
paradoxically have the tools to undermine some of its uglier expressions. 
 
 However, it is important to point out that formal hierarchies do not have 
to necessarily be ugly. What those moralizing postmodernists, for whom 
hierarchy fails to accommodate ‘human needs’ (Iannello 1993: 21), always 
neglect to acknowledge, are the ways in which hierarchy can serve a prophylactic 
function, insulating social groups against the deadly silence of ‘control’ (Deleuze 
1992). It may seem counter-intuitive, but among the technical workers, it is 
precisely the explicit and clear-cut nature of their functions within the 
organisation that gives them their autonomy. That difference that is so 
challenging for me to transcend, protects them. On the other hand, the vagueness 
of the senior scientific role in a formal sense, as exhibited by their range of job 
titles, and more recently by that new and vulnerable tranche of scientists 
appearing in the statistics 'outside staff appointment scheme', leaves them more 
exposed to the inclinations and preferences of a particular departmental director. 
Diefenbach and Sillince's provocative claim, that 'whenever formal hierarchy 
decreases, informal hierarchy increases' (2011: 1517), should be uttered within 
earshot of those heterarchical utopians, who maintain that if the formal 
designation of roles and functions are abolished, then so too are all forms of 
social asymmetry. 
 
 Finally I would like to place Germany and the MPG in tension with the 
rest of Europe and America. The most obvious difference the MPG reproduces is 
Germany’s residual hierarchical ideology. Whenever I explained the nature of 
my project to non-specialists (‘a study of hierarchy in a German organisation’) 
my interlocutor would invariably respond with a quick nod and some pithy 
statement such as, ‘That’s a good place to study hierarchy’, or ‘Nobody does 
hierarchy better than the Germans’. It is widely acknowledged that hierarchy still 
has a place in Germany, despite having been long since banished elsewhere.  
 
 This thesis has been an endeavour to demonstrate and explain this 
anthropologically, to show that it is a consequence of the fact that Germany had a 
slightly different Enlightenment – a Counter-Enlightenment – which retained the 
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philosophical holism abandoned by its Western European equivalent. A retention 
of the idea of the whole, was a retention of the idea that persons were produced 
therein, rather than the other way round, creating the logical possibility for what 
can be defined analytically as hierarchy rather than stratification or inequality. In 
the Max Planck Society, this hierarchy is formally expressed as an encompassing 
monism, in which a community is encompassed by a leader; all the while being 
actually expressed as a tripartite structure, in which the ‘community’ is itself 
divided into two distinct complementary groups. Such a subtly different 
understanding of what persons and groups consist of that has enabled me to 
critique some of the tacit assumptions which have permeated the study of 
organisations in recent years, and illustrate the ways in which a German 
organisation makes a different kind of sense of itself than others in Western 
Europe and America. 
 
 Despite hierarchy being a commonplace expectation, I hope that within 
this, what I have presented is a surprising picture of how hierarchy is realized in 
Germany’s great ‘basic research’ organisation. Certainly, one would not 
anticipate ‘charisma’ to be a predominant ideology there, particularly from the 
perspective of the UK. German persons, until very recently, have been popularly 
represented in Britain as machine-like: hackneyed terms such as ‘clinical’ 
‘disciplined’ and ‘ordered’ rolled out to describe them. The metaphor of the 
machine is the ultimate other (Richardson 2013), and these representations were 
thus always tacitly a symbolic means of depriving German persons of their 
humanity. I have come to understand this, with the help of Paul Gilroy, as a 
consequence of the twin legacies of a World War Two victory and a post-
colonial ‘melancholia’ (2004): in which Britain dealt with the traumatic loss of 
Empire through a perverse focus on its defeat of the Third Reich. 
Representations of Germany have therefore been tools in the production of 
British national mythology. Of course, the Euro-crisis has realigned the balance 
of power. The winds of change blow through once more. Germany’s economic 
dominance of Europe (Beck 2013) has inaugurated a greater appreciation of its 
humanity: whether the ‘Protestant Leisure Ethic’ (Oltermann 2012), or its fair 
treatment of workers (Sandbrook 2013). By presenting the Max Planck Society 
as a charismatic organisation I hope that I too have shown the profoundly human 
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logic which has a place there, even if this comes with its own forms of 
instrumentality.     
 
 It seems fitting to end the story with some final remarks from one of its 
directors, who virtually enacts a Dumontian interpretation of Germany and the 
MPG, with all its rhetoric of values and the performance of contrastive 
definition. 
 
 ‘The Max Planck Society is very different. How 
should I say? It’s our social and cultural heritage. 
Germany is a socialistically-organised country, as is 
Japan. And I can clearly define it, it depends on the 
societal value system. The German system but also the 
Japanese, we are traditional fighter societies. And 
England was the same. Who is the hero? It’s Ivanhoe, a 
knight: clean, measured, no money of course, a white 
horse and a deep love for his queen. We love this 
metaphor.  
 
 Now England is essentially run by the banks. Your 
main values are economic. It is strange but indeed the 
fiscal balancing governs your cultural values. Which for 
me is crazy. It is crazy for many Englishmen of course. 
But think about London as such. It was an empire. It was 
a fighter culture. There was a time of wars when soldiers 
were heroes. Now I would say your heroes are the banks. 
Indeed English society became extremely successful 
because of the Empire, and of course all this trade from 
the colonies brought businessmen into a controlling 
position in your society. This defines societal values and 
these societal values reflect back into science. It’s very 
clear. 
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 In Germany it’s more like soccer. You pass the ball, 
forth and back, and the quicker you pass the ball to each 
other, the higher the probability that you win. And this is 
why I have to say Englishmen are very good at team 
sports. Soccer is a national sport. Which means that these 
so-to-speak ‘do-it-together’ values are still there. Below 
this shell of being rich is everything, you still have the 
much older traditions. Science is a two-player pass for us. 
To choose a team of ten people and then to accomplish a 
goal together. This is very very typical of the German 
society.  
 
 And directors are chosen persons. Very simple. Who 
are elected by their peers but also by the group, to run 
such an operation in the most effective manner. We are 
the heroes of the era where fighting with weapons is not 
allowed anymore. It is a Romantic idea. We sacrifice 
ourselves for the beauty of science. But already when I 
say those sentences it is clear that it’s the same driving 
force, going for the unknown, the beyond, like 
Christopher Columbus. These are guys we appreciate. To 
serve the society you go to unknown frontiers. All this 
pathos, it is the pathos of a fighting society. I understand 
myself as a servant of society. I am not a king, a 
monarch, I am first and foremost a servant. This is my 
understanding of my job.’ 
 
 Of course this director is offering a highly situated perspective. Germany 
is as dependent on global finance and trade, and the 147 transnational companies 
that control it (Vitali et al. 2013), as anywhere else. The truth value of this 
testimony lies in its articulation of the vantage-point from which he is speaking 
as one of the Max Planck elite. He is emphasising that there is an older, 
medieval, heroic tradition which has persisted there. Organisations hold pieces of 
cultural history inside them, reproducing them quietly, while society at large may 
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continue to change and to homogenise. The logic of the Max Planck Society 
continues to reject the commensurations driven by the proliferation of exchange-
value. And long may it continue to do so.  
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